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Abstract 
This dissertation sheds new light upon the complex interplay of factors (social, 
political and economic) that constrain the enabling environment for water sector 
reform and private sector participation (PSP) by analysing of the process of policy 
reform and the nature of stakeholder engagement in the provision of water and 
sanitation. Findings are based on an in depth case study of the La Paz/El Alto 
concession arrangement from 1997–2005, when the contract was abruptly 
terminated. The analysis is encompassed within the New Institutional Economics 
conceptual framework as it provides a holistic application of economic analysis on 
the role of incentives, institutions and behaviour, providing a common link in 
understanding between traditional economists and other social scientists, allowing for 
greater reflection as to the ways socio-political, cultural and historical contexts 
determine the behaviour of those involved in the water reform process.  
The delicate nature of the water sector provides evidence of how under certain 
institutional constraints, and where optimum accumulation of information is virtually 
impossible, human behaviour can become motivated by a volatile set of preferences, 
making it particularly difficult for policy-makers to manage the reform process and 
accurately predict reform outcomes. Research findings conclude that the difficulties 
policy-makers faced in reforming the water sector and introducing PSP in the case of 
La Paz/El Alto, stemmed from three fundamental factors: (i) The reform process did 
not consider how race-based socio-political and economic hierarchies, endemic in 
Bolivian history and culture, would influence intended outcomes; (ii) stakeholders 
underestimated the transaction costs involved in the process of reform and PPP 
implementation due to information and bargaining asymmetries; (iii) systemic 
barriers, beyond the control of stakeholders involved, constrained the space for 
partnership innovation and flexibility in the provision of water and sanitation, 
debilitating the possibilities for future collaboration between civil society, 
government and the private sector. 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction and Contextual Background: 
Polarisation and Misperception of Private Sector 
Participation in the Water Sector 
1.1 Context 
Use the words privatisation and water in the same sentence at a dinner party and you had 
better be prepared for a long night of heated, mostly uncompromising, debate. For some at 
the dinner table, “privatisation of water” echoes usurious prices and negative social 
outcomes, especially for the poor, who are either too vulnerable to handle price volatility 
of their water bills or simply cannot afford to pay for water at all. From this perspective, 
the suggestion that water should be treated as a commodity is criminal; the overwhelming 
health benefits of clean water and sanitation services coupled with the delicate 
environmental balance that must be assumed in sourcing and managing water resources 
responsibly, strengthens the belief that the entire sector must remain in the public domain, 
protected and overseen by the government. For others, the private sector is perceived to be 
better equipped than government to protect the water sector from misuse and inefficiency, 
inevitably providing more reliable and sustainable services to consumers, leading to the 
greater good of the public and positive social outcomes. By and large, these views fall into 
two opposite camps: (a) water as an economic good best provided through unfettered 
markets, and (b) water as a public good guaranteed as a human right. 
Much of the confusion in the debate is directly related to the use of language and 
terminology—namely the misuse of the word “privatisation.” Privatisation is the economic 
process of transferring property from public ownership to private ownership through the 
sale of government-owned equity (shares) in nationalised industries. However, less than 1 
per cent of all developing countries experimenting with privatisation ever went so far as to 
bring in private sector operators under a full-divestiture model (complete ownership 
transfer) for water and sanitation provision. More commonly, what we observe in the 
developing (as well as the developed) world, is a variety of hybrid structures, mixing 
public and private functions; these are known as public-private-partnerships, or PPPs, and 
usually involve only partial ownership—or even no ownership—for the private sector. 
Irrespective of the type of role and the responsibility taken on by the private sector 
however, time and again this debate is reduced to a simplified and polarising 
conceptualisation of water privatisation.  
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Emotionally charged misunderstandings and ideological arguments between those 
who support the principle of treating water as an economic good and those who cannot 
concede that the profit motive might be intrinsic to the efficient distribution of water, are 
usually at the heart of every debate related to involving the private sector in the provision 
of water and sanitation services. Those who believe that people should have to pay for 
water services may maintain that prices charged should be based on the concept of “ability 
to pay.” For drinking water and sewerage services, this ability is often measured by the 
ratio of the costs of such services relative to the overall household budget where the ratio 
should generally not exceed 5 per cent. Arguably, a below market price for water can give 
the impression that there is an inexhaustible availability of water and thereby sap the 
economic justification to curb consumption ultimately leading to the misallocation and 
misuse of the resource. At the same time, a price that is too high departs from the pareto 
optimum because it unduly limits consumption of an available resource, reduces user 
satisfaction and penalises the poorest segments of society. 
For many, on both sides of the debate, the idea that all households should bare the 
full cost of water provision is simply not a realistic policy approach for all countries (Hall 
2002), which is why many market proponents tend to support innovative subsidy 
arrangements and efficient tariff schemes that could potentially provide people with greater 
access. There are a range of subsidy arrangements that can be utilised to this effect and 
which also provide incentives for private firms to enter low-income areas. Unfortunately, 
however, these more complex discussions around subsidies often get lost in the more 
generalised economic vs. public good debate. In addition, the over-simplification of the 
provision of services is frequently coupled with fears and confusion (due to misleading 
crisis narratives) about global fresh water scarcity1 that has also led many people to draw 
                                                
 
1 Some hydrological science is needed to understand this point. Fresh water is commonly believed to be a huge but finite 
resource, as due to constant and increasing contamination the resource base must be declining. However, this basic 
supply-demand assumption is not entirely correct. In the grand scheme of the planetary hydrological cycle, not a drop of 
water is lost. The amount of water even increases by very small amounts magmatic water. The hydrological cycle is the 
closest thing to a self-containing continuum. It is powered by the solar energy, which causes water to evaporate from the 
oceans. When carried into the atmosphere, evaporated water vapour condenses and forms droplets: it rains. Water that 
falls on land moves through the cycle by a number of different paths. It contributes to replenishing subsurface aquifers, 
lakes and rivers. Some of it evaporates, while some returns to the oceans though surface runoff or groundwater flow. 
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erroneous conclusions about why people lack access to adequate services.2 As this 
dissertation will demonstrate, the real reasons why people lack access to clean water and 
sanitation have little to do with resource scarcity or the treatment of water as an economic 
good, but rather because of inadequate public policies, inaccurate assessments of the needs 
and preferences of consumers, a lack of trust in nascent regulatory institutions and 
arrangements, as well as, the excessive politicisation of the water sector.  
A clear indication of this policy problem is that urban water coverage is actually 
better in countries with fewer resources per capita (McGranahan 2002; UN-Habitat 2003).3 
It is true that the problems of increasing access, improving service provision and managing 
water resources sustainably can be improved with the help of innovative technology and 
greater financial investment. But, what the sector most requires is a human commitment—
a commitment not only from government but from all branches of civil society—to foster 
an environment where everyone plays an integral part in meeting the demand for this vital 
resource and where partnerships between the public and private sector are seen as “tools” 
rather than “artillery” in the pursuit of broader access to water. Sadly, however, 
discussions about the water sector are currently at a stalemate over the direction that 
should be taken to meet the UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) of halving the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
by 2015. In July of 2008, the World Health Organisation’s Coordinator For Water, 
Sanitation and Health, stated that these MDGs remain “badly off track” with regard to 
improvements in sanitation, pointing out that an estimated 1.6 billion people will still need 
access to improved sanitation by 2015” mostly in sub-Saharan Africa (Daily Times, 21 
July 2008). The outlook for drinking water is slightly more positive, but the two services 
have a co-dependent relationship at the policy level, as the sustainability of one service is 
invariably linked to the sustainability of the other's achievements. 
                                                                                                                                              
 
Water may become scarce in some regions at any time. Other parts of the world may experience unusually heavy 
precipitations. However, the overall planetary water budget remains balanced. 
2 In the developing world, as much as 50 per cent of water is lost through leakages bad pipes. More importantly, 
wherever in the world water is most scarce (which is mostly in developing countries), irrigation for agriculture consumes 
up at least 75 per cent and sometimes as much as 90 per cent of the available water.  
3 This is the case, even when controlling for a countries' per capita income.  
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Over-simplification of the privatisation debate extends far beyond the average 
dinner party conversation as government policy-makers, the development aid community, 
academics, civil society organisations and advocacy groups also find themselves reducing 
intellectual discourse to raw ideology-driven rhetoric. Sadly, it is the developing world that 
is losing out the most from fearful emotion around treating water as an economic good. 
Most arguments over privatisation are based almost exclusively on deconstructing 
multinational involvement in the water sector through aggressive appeals from civil society 
organisations to stop the major water corporations of the world from profiteering off the 
poor. The last decade has been marked by a series of organised resistance movements by 
civil society organisations (at the local, national and international level), often with the 
support of some academics and development practioners, who believe that governments 
across the developing world are unprepared and ill-equipped to handle a market-based 
approach to water service provision. Their case, which is rooted in moral argumentation 
against private monopoly control of natural resources and vital services, has grown even 
more fervent in recent years because it has been enveloped within the much broader 
movement against globalisation and privatisation. 
Meanwhile, institutional investors, lending banks and utility operators have grown 
increasingly wary of the risks involved in participating in infrastructure investments in 
developing countries. They have also come to realise that the water and sanitation sector is 
both more complex and less profitable than originally thought. A World Bank survey in 
2002 of private power investors in emerging markets (Lamech and Saeed 2003) 
highlighted some discouraging facts regarding the future of private investment in 
infrastructure in emerging markets.4 According to the survey, over 52 per cent of private 
investors were either "subdued" about infrastructure investment prospects or were 
retreating from emerging markets, with no new investors to replace them. The latest 
figures, specific to the water sector, are even more discouraging. According to the World 
Bank PPI database, water investment amounted to US$2.7 billion in 2009, well below the 
peak of 1997. Although it seems that the number of projects involving the private sector 
                                                
 
4 Survey 2002 - Preliminary Findings, Private Power Investors in Developing Countries, Ranjit Lamech & Kazim Saeed, 
The World Bank, Washington DC. 
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increased between 1995–2007, the much-needed large-scale investment commitments to 
the water sector are slowing down. The combination of these two forces—lack of local and 
international investor confidence coupled with the push against a market-based approach in 
the water sector by increasingly vocal and influential interest groups—is creating a very 
precarious environment for policy-makers to meet the needs of the poor.  
We are currently at a crossroads in the debate over privatisation. By 2007, the 
number of cancelled and distressed water projects had reached a total of 55 world-wide, 
representing 9 per cent of all water projects and over 32 per cent of committed investment 
between 1990–2007 (some of these projects are currently undergoing international 
arbitration).5 Even so, 84 per cent of the 220 contracts awarded for water utilities between 
1990–2005 were still operational by 2005 (Marin and Izaguirre 2006). In fact, the failure 
rate of projects involving private sector participation (PSP) compares well, if one considers 
the large share of underperforming public water utilities across the developing world. 
Recently released data from the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
Project Database, show that 62 new water projects with PSP accounted for more than US$ 
3.2 billion in investment commitments for 2007 across 14 developing countries. The 
majority of these investments, however, are concentrated in middle-income countries, with 
China and Georgia accounting for 63 per cent of that investment commitment and 76 per 
cent of the projects. Some of the other countries included in this list are Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Indonesia, India and Oman. Also, most of the newly reported projects are for 
water treatment plants and desalination initiatives, rather than much needed network utility 
upgrade and expansion.  
This dissertation sets out a case for why it is essential, now more than ever, to 
understand the deep complexities of the water sector—complexities that go far beyond the 
highly publicised issue of tariff increases that hurt the poor. This understanding is 
necessary in order to improve the enabling environment required to meet the needs of low-
income populations in lower-income countries. A case study is used to shed new light on 
some of these complexities, exploring the experiences of water sector reform in Bolivia 
and the failed PPP utility investment designed to expand and improve water and sanitation 
                                                
 
5 For further details see the PPI project database. 
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service provision in the adjoining cities of La Paz and El Alto. The intension is to provide 
evidence in support of why the water sector demands greater collaboration between civil 
society, government and the private sector, not less. 
1.2 Informal Approaches to Water Provision 
Across most of the developing world, certainly in rural areas, but also in low-income and 
more densely populated urban and peri-urban areas, residents (as opposed to commercial 
and government buildings) tend to be the last to receive adequate services from official 
municipal water and sanitation utilities. These residents without adequate access to such 
services must continue to find water for drinking, cooking, washing and bathing, and must 
search out for places to defecate and urinate on a daily basis. Even where piped water and 
sewerage networks do reach into poor neighbourhoods, home connections to utility 
networks are often unaffordable and/or unreliable, leaving residents dependent on 
alternative sources of clean water and alternative means of disposing waste. Municipally-
operated public standpipes, public toilet facilities, and public baths tend to be scantily 
maintained, if not out of service entirely.  
The World Health Organisation (WHO) reports that 1.6 million people continue to 
die every year from diseases resulting from a lack of access to safe drinking water and 
sanitation. In Africa, as many as 150 million urban residents representing up to 50 per cent 
of the urban population do not have adequate water supplies, while 180 million, or roughly 
60 per cent of people in urban areas, lack adequate sanitation. In urban Asia, 700 million 
people, constituting half the population, do not have adequate water, while 800 million 
people, or 60 per cent of the urban population is without adequate sanitation. For Latin 
America and the Caribbean, 120 million, representing 30 per cent of the urban population, 
lack adequate water; those without adequate sanitation number as many as 150 million, or 
40 per cent of the urban population.6 It is very important to understand that due to the high 
accompanying concentration of human and other waste, a disproportionately higher 
number of people affected by waterborne diseases live in urban and peri-urban areas. The 
MDG targets refer to safe drinking water but measuring water safety indicators at the 
                                                
 
6 WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Statistics (2010). 
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household level continue to be fraught by technical and logistical difficulties and high 
costs. Also, because of population growth, the number of people un-served has not 
changed substantially since 1990 (WHO/UNICEF Monitoring Program for Water Supply 
and Sanitation 2010). This is a situation that requires critical attention as it is estimated that 
the demand for water will rise by 40% globally and by 50% in developing countries by 
2030. 
For much of the last century, most governments believed that the best way to 
provide infrastructure services was through a state-owned monopoly utility network—a 
system mandated to provide “universal service” to residents often within a structure of 
uniform national tariffs. This approach was expected to take advantage of economies of 
scale and scope in what were thought to be “naturally” monopolistic activities, to ensure 
continuing access to funding for major investments, and to be able to meet the goal of 
universal access by way of cross-subsidising high and low-income users. Results have 
been disappointing. Having access to a water utility network has not necessarily 
guaranteed safe quality or reliability for consumers. With policy controls preventing 
utilities from charging the true cost of water provision, little money was available to make 
improvements to network pipes, while consumers had little incentive to conserve water, 
leading to a great deal of wastefulness. Without the financial resources required to expand 
and upgrade the network, progress in reaching rapidly growing urban populations has been 
very slow, particularly in the poorest countries. Oversight of water quality has tended to be 
inadequate, in part because of a lack of resources for monitoring utility performance, and 
in part because those running water utilities were often politically appointed bureaucrats 
rather than technically-savvy water sector professionals. Like many infrastructure services 
owned and operated through state monopoly, the water sector became synonymous with 
high levels of waste and inefficiency. According to one estimate, technical inefficiencies 
alone in power, roads, railways and water caused losses of over $55 billion a year in the 
early 1990s—equivalent to one percent of all developing countries’ GDP, a quarter of 
annual infrastructure investment, and twice the annual development finance for 
infrastructure (UNDP 2003).7 It is important to keep in mind that globally, around 95 per 
                                                
 
7 UNDP (2003),  “Unleashing Entrepreneurship: Making Business Work for the Poor.” (Chapter 2, p15). 
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cent of water supply and sanitation services continue to be provided by public authorities, 
by operators owned and controlled by the public sector (or in a few cases by cooperatives).  
Those urban/peri-urban residents either living without a water connection or those 
dissatisfied with the quality and/or reliability of service provided by the public utility, have 
tended to respond to their deprivation by relying on informal methods of collecting water, 
including a reliance on small-scale water providers (SSWPs). These providers, which 
continue to dominate much of the water service delivery market across the developing 
world, come in a variety of shapes and sizes: they range from larger more formalised 
providers, which might be independent, borehole-fed networks serving as many as 14,000 
residents, to water providers that are much smaller in scale, such as mobile water tankers. 
Mobile water tankers obtain water from a variety of sources—surface water, bore wells, 
occasionally even from the piped utility network itself and then transport the water to 
customers using trucks, carts, bicycles, even hand-carried buckets. Households that rely on 
these vendors are usually unable or unwilling to invest in their own wells or household 
connections to a network, which makes this a relatively good alternative. There are 
actually a variety of factors that make SSWPs particularly attractive to low-income 
households: (i) SSWPs do not usually require their customers have any legal title to 
property or land; (ii) they do not require customers to pay upfront costs or joining fees and, 
in many instances; (iii) they offer greater flexibility in terms of bill collection/payment—
i.e. households pay for water only when they most need it and when they can afford it. 
Low-income households may prefer to pay for water on a daily basis because it is often too 
difficult to budget for an estimated level of consumption on a monthly basis, or because 
they simply cannot handle fluctuations in billing amounts, especially when skills in savings 
are not sufficiently developed.  
There are three main problems with SSWPs, however. The first is that they tend to 
operate in a highly unregulated environment, which makes it difficult to monitor the 
quality of the water they sell. Although some countries are beginning to improve the 
institutional environment in order to support these vendors (and are actually integrating 
them into formal water sector strategies to target those hard-to-reach households), the cost 
of regulating numerous vendors, each with its own, unique approach to sourcing and 
distributing water, is generally prohibitive for governments in the developing countries. 
The issue over how to best regulate SSWPs (if at all) and how to integrate them more 
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formally into the wider development strategy for the sector remains unclear. The second 
issue is that the real (per unit) cost of water they deliver tends to be consistently higher 
relative to water provided through networks—as much as 10–20 times higher. A study 
undertaken in Nigeria found that SSWPs operating in un-served areas charge the poor at 
least 33 times as much for water as those connected to the mains (Mustafa 1993). In 
Morocco, families unconnected to the network and dependent on informal SSWPs pay 7 
per cent of their household budget on water, while those households connected to the 
utility pay only 0.7 per cent (Lahlou and Bahaj 2002).8 Some case studies have shown that 
when SSWPs are formalised and legally allowed to operate, they are able to compete with 
state-run and private utilities on price, despite the fact that they are not assisted with 
subsidies and are often required to pay corporate taxes, while state companies and 
concessionaires are allowed more favourable tax incentives (Crane 1994; Komives and 
Brook Cowen 1998; Solo 2003), but there is also substantial literature discrediting this 
proposition (Kariuki and Schwartz 2005).9 Lastly, although SSWPs are often able to reach 
communities that are sited in marginal areas of a city, such as on flood-prone land or steep 
hillsides or among informal and illegal squatter settlements, they simply cannot provide 
water on the scale that a well-functioning network should be able to.  
In any case, recent studies indicate that SSWPs continue to serve about 25 per cent 
of the urban population in Latin America and East Asia, and 50 per cent of the urban 
population in Africa. Estimates are as high as 80 per cent for sanitation in urban Africa, 
and demand for these types of services is growing in excess of 3 per cent per year on 
average (Solo 2003). There is a strong argument to be made that in order to achieve the 
targets set out in the MDGs, we may have to continue to rely on SSWPs in the short to 
medium term, especially in situations where utilities cannot afford to expand their systems. 
In fact, various studies suggest the need to maintain informal, private and community 
infrastructure solutions in parallel with formalised utility provision (Komives 2001; Albu 
                                                
 
8 It is often argued that the price of water for consumers should be based on the concept of “ability to pay.” For drinking 
water and sewerage services, this ability is often measured by the ratio of the costs of such services relative to the overall 
household budget, where the ratio is generally meant to stay below 5 per cent. More will be discussed with regard to 
“user ability to pay” in subsequent chapters. 
9 Kariuki and Schwartz (2005) review of over 400 documents on SSWP in water supply and electricity. 
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and Njiru 2002; Satterthwaite 2005). But examples of institutional frameworks that support 
partnership arrangements between SSWPs, utility operators and government are not yet 
commonplace and the changing roles of SSWPs will require some rethinking among 
policy-makers as well as donors. While in some situations SSWPs prove to be an inferior 
service, there may be other situations in which they provide a service that leads to a 
satisfied customer base. 
1.3 The Panacea of the 1990s: Replacing SOEs with Public-Private-Partnerships  
Many people are unaware of the fact that private sector initiatives were instrumental in 
establishing modern water supply systems across Europe and North America during the 
mid-nineteenth century. Much like the developing world today, most Europeans at that 
time relied on wells, private water vendors and rivers for their water supply, while 
governments were reluctant to invest in public works. This is why the private sector was 
called upon and a framework, based on the business profit incentive, was designed (Prasad 
2007). The private sector answered the demands of these industrialised countries by 
increasing water and sanitation network expansion and improving water quality, while the 
government focused on improving water sector legislation (Juuti and Katko 2005). 
However, by the late nineteenth century, as a result of unsatisfactory performance 
(inefficiency, high costs and, in some cases, corruption) and public health concerns in 
numerous European countries, many of these services were transferred to public or 
municipal ownership, where they remained until the early 1980s. There were three main 
justifications for the public provision of services: (i) the conviction that markets could not 
take into account the positive externalities enjoyed by society through the provision of 
these goods, but rather assigned value purely according to economic gains by companies; 
(ii) the belief that the opportunities to “free-ride,” presented by the non-excludable nature 
of many public services, were a disincentive for individual investment in their provision; 
and (iii) the observation that the market could not guarantee any minimal level of 
consumption necessary to maintain good health or the fair and egalitarian treatment of all 
citizens (Besley and Ghatak 2003).  
In general, because the water industry did not fit properly into the standard 
economic theory of competitive markets given its significant externalities attached to it 
(positive as well as negative social costs and benefits), and because it was largely regarded 
as a natural monopoly, international development assistance throughout the 1970s and 80s 
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focused almost exclusively on reforming and upgrading state-owned-enterprises (SOEs) in 
the urban water sector. Meanwhile, donor grants were channelled to support poorer peri-
urban neighbourhoods, where residents were involved in community-based service 
provision; buzz phrases of this era included: “user choice”, “felt need”, “bottom-up 
management” and “community-based management”. Although grants were provided for 
community-based service provision, the initiatives involving SSWPs were considered a 
temporary phenomenon and they tended to be ignored rather than supported at the policy-
level, as they ran counter to the SOE monopoly service provision model preferred by most 
Governments (Solo 2003). Most policy-makers and development practitioners, were 
adamant in their belief that only the public sector was capable of aligning the private and 
social incentives of water provision.  
It was not until 1987 that the OECD publicly recognised that scarce economic 
resources (human, capital, knowledge) had to be applied to natural water resources in order 
to make water available in the form, quality, location and time users need it—that the 
sustainable provision of water and the preservation of hydrological and ecological systems 
came at an effort and a cost.10 In other words, they introduced the notion that water should 
be conceived as an economic, as well as a public, good. The natural conclusion was that, as 
should be the case with any economic good, it is the user who should pay the cost of the 
provision of water. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, however, there was little confidence 
that the market mechanisms could be relied upon to generate the correct price for water. In 
theory, markets are appropriate provision mechanisms under certain conditions, one of 
which is that the goods in question are private goods: economic goods that are rival in 
consumption and with excludable benefits or costs. Goods are public in consumption when 
either one of these properties (or both) are not met; public decisions about their provision 
are then deemed appropriate due to possible problems in resource provision. Water was 
typically seen as an impure public good: a common pool resource that is non-excludable 
but rival in consumption. However, even the non-excludability factor can easily be 
contested (through privatisation of sources) or by-passed (through separable access like 
                                                
 
10 See: OECD (1987); The OECD used this opportunity also to mention the need for pricing systems that would be easily 
understood and acceptable to the consumers of water services. 
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taps in homes, or provision in bottled form), making water as a consumption good take on 
aspects of a private good (Mehta 2003).  
By the end of the 1980s, despite enormous investment, most public water utilities 
were underperforming catastrophically and the needs of consumers were not being 
satisfied. This was blamed on a combination of factors (common to most of the critical 
literature on SOEs): political interference and corruption, lack of managerial and technical 
know-how, overstaffing issues, distorted tariff structures, weak incentives and mechanisms 
to monitor performance. By and large, governments could not seem to help adopting 
paternalistic behaviour in seeking to protect underperforming utilities or in using them to 
increase employment (Shapiro and Willig 1990; Shleifer and Vishny 1996; Debande and 
Friebel 2003). The use of soft budget constraints by SOEs also provided an unsustainable 
environment whereby utility operators completely depended upon government for funding, 
which invariably provided them little incentive to maintain financial discipline and 
efficient management (Dewatripont and Maskin 1995; Kornai 2000; Kornai, Maskin and 
Roland 2002). All this made it difficult to conceive that public utilities would be capable of 
meeting expansion targets required to meet the needs of rapidly growing urban cities.  
In response to these inefficiencies and investment losses, policy-makers in the 
1990s began to move away from the strictly public model of service provision and began 
looking to the market for alternatives; a renewed hope emerged that a “governance-mix” 
among public and private functions, actors and resources could be developed for the sector. 
A new development-aid agenda was formulated (i) to tap into the culture and technical 
know-how of private sector business practices; (ii) to attract desperately needed capital to 
upgrade and expand utility networks; and (iii) as a means of introducing the principle of 
cost-recovery—a principle that until the 1990s had not been dealt with effectively at the 
policy level. As a result, institutional and regulatory reform, decentralisation, municipal 
capacity building and credit market development were rapidly pushed to the top of the 
development agenda as a means of encouraging PSP across all infrastructure sectors. This 
approach proved overwhelmingly successful in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) 
to the developing world—Latin America alone recorded US$361 billion in private 
infrastructure investment from 1990—2001. Worldwide, enthusiasm over new 
opportunities in the water sector generated private investor commitments of approximately 
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US$50 billion for more than 380 water infrastructure projects from 1990—2005 (World 
Bank PPI Database).11 
As noted above, the most common forms of PSP are so-called public-private-
partnership (PPP) arrangements. Definitions of PPPs vary widely in the literature but for 
the most part they are considered to be a special form of hybrid cooperation between 
public and private sectors. However, some authors include all forms of cooperative 
interaction between public and private institutions as PPPs. In the latter case, the term PPP 
loses much of its analytical value because all kinds of buying from external sources would 
be treated as a PPP relationship. Beginning with a narrower definition, the US-based 
National Council for PPPs (NCPPP 2004) defines a PPP as “a contractual agreement 
between a public agency (federal, state or local) and a for-profit corporation. Through this 
agreement, the skills and assets of both the public and private sector are shared in 
delivering a service or facility for the use of the general public. In addition to the sharing 
of resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the 
service and/or facility”. This definition describes the general purpose of a PPP and 
provides a working definition that will be used throughout this dissertation. Because soft-
budget constraints (associated with the paternalistic role of the state) were believed to be 
caused by the incompleteness of contracts between governments and SOEs, policy-makers 
and development practitioners were convinced that PPP contractual arrangements would 
allow for a hardening of firms’ budget constraints, restoring the appropriate investment 
incentives and improving productive efficiency.12 PPP arrangements in the water sector 
tend to include service contracts, management contracts, lease contracts and concessions—
                                                
 
11 As noted above, it is important to keep in mind that globally, around 95per cent of water supply and sanitation services 
are still provided by public authorities, by operators owned and controlled by the public sector (or in a few cases by 
cooperatives). 
12 To be clear, a hard budget constraint is not a synonym for profit maximisation. A profit maximising firm, even if it is 
in the red will try to cut its losses. A hard budget constraint means that even if the firm tries hard to cut its losses, the 
environment will not tolerate a protracted deficit. The emphasis is on punishment. What is really important is the 
psychological effect of the constraint; with a hard budget constraint, a deficit causes fear because it may lead to 
extremely serious consequences. Profit maximisation on the other hand, refers to the internal goal setting of the decision 
maker of the firm. It follows from this line of reasoning that the stringency of the budget constraint is not simply a 
financial matter but reflects in financial form a deeper socio-economic phenomenon—a social relationship between the 
state and the firm. 
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arrangements where the public sector, more often than not, retains equal or greater 
ownership rights over the water utility than the private sector participant (see Box 1.1: 
Types of PPP Contractual Arrangements). 
The constraints faced by SOEs are in some ways also applicable to utilities 
transitioned into PPP arrangements. Water and sewerage distribution networks continue to 
have natural monopoly characteristics due to economies of scale (because installing pipe 
networks in parallel is simply be too expensive) and scope (as co-ordination is cheaper 
within one organisation than two organisations), regardless of whether they are publicly or 
privately operated; this simply reduces the possibility for competition.13 Second, compared 
to other public services, water supply and sanitation systems are exceptionally capital-
intensive and contrary to the general public view on the sector, modern water treatment 
and wastewater purification constitute only a minor share of the total costs of the system—
the bulk of the costs are due to the maintenance and expansion of networks. As previously 
mentioned, poorer areas of the city are often sited in places that are physically more 
difficult to reach with a piped network, and the legal constraints to servicing households 
without legal title to their property/land are a factor in the service provision equation. The 
difference between the two approaches, however, is that PPPs are believed to be capable of 
making more economically rational service provision calculations. PPPs are meant to 
strike a balance using the profit-motive incentive to generate improved efficiency coupled 
with public oversight to ensure improved social gains. The private sector is meant to 
leverage sources of finance that are predominantly out of reach to the public sector, while 
the public sector is meant to attract support from the development community to provide 
additional risk and guarantee instruments to protect all parties involved in the transaction 
(consumers, government and private investors).  
Although many developing countries began opening up their water sector to a more 
market-based approach during the 1990s, it is important to clarify that most SOEs in the 
water sector were a long way from attracting private sector interest. People sometimes 
                                                
 
13 Noll (2002) discusses the possibility of introducing competition for the supply of bulk water in multi-reservoir systems 
or for sewerage treatment. Although in theory competition is possible within the sector, the expense and impracticality of 
transporting water and sewerage over long distances reduces the potential for competition. 
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mistakenly conjure up images of large multinational water companies, circling the globe 
like vultures waiting to prey upon poor, unsuspecting public utilities. The reality is that, 
even two decades after utilities began their transition to operating on a commercial basis, 
most public utilities in the developing world continue to be a long way from attracting 
international investor interest. Although policy-makers are striving to reform water sector 
laws and regulations, and are pushing public water utilities to operate as commercial, 
financially autonomous entities, most SOEs continue to lack the necessary capital 
investment required to expand fast enough to meet the enormous demands of rapidly 
growing urban populations. Although public utilities are making some strides in reforming 
tariffs to reflect the true cost of the water, such policies require long-term political will, 
while most politicians continue to fear losing favour with the populace. Even when 
politicians are able to design progressive tariff schemes, covering the operational costs of 
service provision is not enough. This creates opportunities for local private investors in the 
water market—for example, local institutional investors such as pension funds, rather than 
multinational water companies—to help support water utility upgrade and expansion. 
Unfortunately, however, these types of local institutional investors in many developing 
countries are not yet as available (or are only just beginning to emerge) as those of the US 
and Europe. 
Figure 1-1: Types of PPP Contractual Arrangements 
SERVICE 
CONTRACTS 
Usually short term (6month-2years), competitively bid and 
legally binding agreements between a government and a private sector 
partner to perform specific, non-core tasks of an enterprise in exchange for 
a fee, including information technology management, equipment 
maintenance, meter reading for example. General control and any capital 
investment remains with government. It is an attractive form of PPP where 
there is strong political or community opposition to private investment in 
the sector. 
MANAGEMENT 
CONTRACTS 
Transfer of responsibility for the day-to-day management, 
including operation and maintenance to the private sector, but ownership 
and legal responsibility remains with the government. These contracts are 
usually 3–5 years in duration and compensation either takes the form of 
fixed fee or it may be linked to performance indicators. The bulk of the 
commercial risk and all the capital investment risk, remains with the 
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14 Take-or-pay contracts is an arrangement whereby the BOT customer agrees to pay for a pre-determined amount of 
output (power, treated water etc.) whether they actually use it or not. 
public authority. These contracts are very attractive for governments that 
face resistance to PSP, but they are not recommended for governments that 
wish to access private finance for new investments given that they do not 
transfer the risk to the contractor, providing little incentive for the private 
operator to reduce costs and improve quality of service. 
LEASE 
CONTRACTS 
Sometimes considered a stepping-stone toward deeper forms of 
PPPs, such as concessions. Under a lease agreement, the government 
retains title to an enterprise’s assets and bears the responsibility for 
financing and planning capital investments/rehabilitation, but it leases out 
the public company to the private sector, which then assumes 
responsibility for operations, maintenance and a limited degree of capital 
investment for a period of 10–15 years. 
BOO/BOT 
CONTRACTS 
Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) contractual arrangements are usually 
implemented over a period of 15–30 years, during which period the 
private sector designs, constructs and operates facilities and after which, it 
relinquishes all rights or title back to the government. Build-own-operate 
(BOO) arrangements have only one difference, in that the assets remain 
indefinitely with the private firm. Many BOTs have failed to deliver 
optimal outcomes for governments and consumers because often the 
government agency responsible retains too much risk, especially where 
foreign exchange guarantees are provided or take-or-pay contracts are 
signed.14 These contracts are in many ways similar to concessions except 
that BOTs entail building of something new while concessions entail the 
assumption of responsibility for an existing facility. A take-or-pay contract 
is an arrangement whereby the BOT customer agreed to pay for a pre-
determined amount of output (power, treated water, etc.) whether they 
actually use it or not. 
CONCESSION 
CONTRACTS 
Contracts awarded through a competitive bidding process based 
on the lowest price proposed to meet government objectives. The private 
sector bears overall responsibility for the services, including operation, 
maintenance and management, as well as capital investments for 
rehabilitation, renewal, and the expansion of services for a period of 20 –
30 years depending on the level of investment and the period required for 
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1.4 The Problem of Transitioning to a Market-Based Approach to Water 
The Washington Consensus—whereby recommendations were made to governments to 
buoy neo-liberal development policies and engage in a more decentralised, participatory 
style of governance, and to ‘roll-back the state’ by embracing newer models of co-
provision with the private sector—is usually blamed for pushing governments to regard 
water as a commodity. However, this is a completely misconstrued interpretation of 
developments within the water sector. Although the principle of cost-recovery for network 
utility provision might have emerged within the formal institutional environment only in 
the 1990s, it is important to emphasise that water has been treated as a commodity by 
informal SSWPs for many decades prior. In Marxist political economy, commodification 
takes place when economic value is assigned to something not previously considered in 
economic terms, while according to classical economic theory this occurs as a goods and 
services market loses differentiation across its supply base; this often happens when the 
intellectual capital necessary for efficient acquisition or production is lacking.  
 Critics of private sector participation (PSP) argue that by treating water as a 
commodity we run the risk of pricing certain segments of the population out of access to 
clean water. But the treatment of water as a commodity, in and of itself, does not translate 
into an extortionate price regime—on the contrary, it has the potential to provide a more 
formalised and transparent framework for the exchange of a good and/or a service. Behind 
the policy of transitioning to a market-based approach to the provision of water was an 
intention to create more efficiencies in the distribution of water services via utility 
the concessionaire to recover its investments plus a reasonable rate of 
return. The return on this investment is usually paid back through tariffs 
collected from consumers. The concession is governed by the contract 
which details an array of conditions as well as penalties for non-
compliance. The main advantage of a concession is that it passes full 
responsibility for operations, maintenance, rehabilitation, renewal and 
system expansion onto the private sector and so creates incentives for 
efficiency in all the utility’s activities. Concessions become an attractive 
option when large investments are required to expand coverage and 
upgrade quality. Administratively, they are complex because they confer a 
long-term monopoly on the concessionaire and thus require rigorous 
monitoring and enforcement, making the role of the regulator crucial to the 
success of the project. 
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networks because the unregulated supply of drinking water through private water vendors, 
were deemed to expensive for the poor—not only in terms of financial cost but in terms of 
health cost as there were few guarantees that the water provided by SSWP was consistently 
fit for consumption. Still, despite the fact that water provided by SSWPs were recognised 
as a commodity, many low-income users have had more difficulty recognising that the 
water provisioned via utility networks was also a commodity. There are various reasons for 
this. Ideally, commodification should follow from the stage when a market changes from 
one of monopolistic competition to one of perfect competition but the natural monopoly 
characteristics of network provision to not allow for this. This rationalisation may be at the 
heart of much of the academic argument in favour of public provision of water services but 
there are other, more complex, reasons that will be addressed throughout this dissertation 
that explain why water on tap takes on a very different meaning for certain segments of a 
population.  
Countries that succeeded in attracting international private sector investment in the 
provision of water and sanitation services continued to face myriad challenges during the 
period of transition to market-based utility service provision. For those early PPPs of the 
mid to late 1990s, the literature suggests that governments did not take the time to 
thoughtfully develop a social policy strategy to ease the transition for low-income users, 
unaccustomed to being serviced by a utility operator. A strategy to mitigate the social 
impact of reform requires a great deal of understanding of the needs and preferences of 
both current and future low-income customers (both current customers and future 
customers), but this is not as straightforward as it may seem. There is often little available 
information clarifying the specific demands and/or preferences of these low-income 
consumer groups. Gathering census data on household consumption patterns and 
monitoring urban migration trends is a costly undertaking that many local governments 
simply cannot afford in the developing country context. Potentially interested private 
sector investors/operators, across sectors far more lucrative than water and sanitation, also 
find the cost of gathering accurate data on the demands and preferences of low-income 
groups too high to make the transaction viable. This is exacerbated by the fact that in many 
of these cities, GIS maps (and even printed road maps), detailing the physical and legal 
attributes of properties, are usually unavailable or out dated. Underdeveloped property 
rights systems—comprised of laws, institutions and information systems—and the lack of 
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legal records for informal/extra-legal land entitlements make urban planning for service 
delivery an overwhelming challenge for water utilities.  
Another challenge of reform is related to public outreach. Some PPP arrangements 
were designed and negotiated behind closed doors and without public consultation and 
although many PPPs were meant to have undergone a competitive bidding process, this did 
not always take place. Some PPPs were won by offering governments the best possible 
price and some by promising the greatest number of new connections, but most PPPs were 
won for reasons unbeknownst to the majority of the population being served. Often, 
residents were left simply to put their trust in policy-makers, but with little information 
clarifying exactly how reform measures would affect their lives on day-to-day basis. 
Reaching out to communities with information programmes is of course another costly 
endeavour, but not doing enough to communicate with low-income groups may leave the 
door open to other interest groups and political opposition parties to exploit reform efforts 
and play on the vulnerabilities of low-income users for political gain.  
As this research will explain, many of the social policy schemes designed to help 
low-income residents afford new connection charges and/or appliances (e.g. sinks, toilets, 
etc.) were well intentioned but did not give sufficient attention ex-ante to the 
implementation of water reform involving PSP. In the case of La Paz/El Alto, this aroused 
suspicion among a population who felt the government was bent on subsidising the private 
sector through social policies such as out-put based aid schemes, (discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter 6). Little attention and/or funding was directed towards providing 
information transfer to low-income households related to billing practices, nor was there 
sufficient support for skill-building around the practice of saving—many new (and old) 
customers were forced to acquire skills in saving almost over-night. These consumers, 
unfamiliar with billing statements generally, were in some cases illiterate and simply did 
not know what billing statements actually required them to do, let alone understand the 
meaning of penalty statements or what fines for non-payment would ultimately mean in 
practice. The other side of this, more often than not, was that consumers had little idea 
what their new consumer rights meant; this was evident in the case of La Paz/El Alto even 
five years after reform measures had been put in place. Another issue, relating to the 
disconnect between consumers, policy makers and service providers, was that consumers 
were in many cases forced to begin paying increased tariff charges before their service had 
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actually been improved. Also, as seen in the case of Bolivia, the private sector was 
sometimes used as a scapegoat to initiate other public sector reform policies, such as land 
and housing reform. For example, by making in-house water connections a legal 
requirement in the La Paz/El Alto case, policy-makers simultaneously forced residents to 
seek out titles to their properties. 
It has been the case that many governments lacked experience in negotiating and 
drafting contracts with private operators. In many instances, regulatory institutions 
(theoretically meant to monitor the performance of PPPs) were either non-existent or 
extremely nascent at the time contracts were negotiated. Due to a lack of qualified 
professionals experienced in water and sanitation service provision, regulatory agencies 
were often staffed with former employees of the public utility—experienced perhaps in 
technical operations, but not necessarily experienced in regulation and/or supervision. 
Laws and regulations relating to tariffs, water quality, environmental resource management 
and the like, were often unformulated when contracts with private operators were agreed. 
This, in some cases, led to awkward situations where regulations were being drafted, 
negotiated, and redrafted dozens of times over, together with new private sector operators. 
Other institutional weaknesses were due to the multiplicity of agencies, which sometimes 
had overlapping jurisdictions and competing political interests. Inter-governmental turf 
wars between more politically-driven government ministries and autonomous regulatory 
authorities were not uncommon either; these fragmented bureaucracies often made 
decisions according to individual agency mandates rather than through a consensual 
approach to the sector. These institutional impediments all invariably contributed to a 
distorted public sector message about the mandate of many PPP arrangements, 
destabilising the day-today management of the utility and causing a great deal of confusion 
for susceptible consumers.  
1.5 Bolivia’s Water Wars 
One of the major events that marked the beginning of the social movement against PSP in 
the water sector was the so-called Water War, which took place in Cochabamba—
Bolivia’s third-largest city—during the spring and early summer of 2000. Thousands of 
people took to the streets to protest against tariff increases that had been imposed in 
conjunction with the signing of a PPP concession arrangement with a company called 
Aguas del Tunari. Protesters fought pitched battles with police in the streets; the national 
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government reacted with force, declaring a state of siege and, during the disturbances, 
several people were killed and dozens wounded. Nonetheless, by the end of the summer, 
the protestors had won: tariff increases were rescinded, the concession agreement 
cancelled, and water provision was put back in the hands of the public utility. Bolivia 
instantly became a poster child for the anti-privatisation movement. 
Meanwhile, in the capital city of La Paz, a different type of PPP story was 
unfolding. A concession led by Suez-Lyonnaise des Eaux (now Ondeo Services), called 
Aguas del Illimani (AISA) had been fully operational since 1997, providing and expanding 
water and sanitation services to the adjoining cities of El Alto and La Paz. At the time, the 
contract was widely regarded as an example of "pro-poor" private sector participation in 
the water sector because the concession had been awarded to the investor that promised to 
deliver the greatest number of new connections to households in the poorest areas of the 
city. The PPP was also known for having implemented an innovative technological 
solution in partnership with development agencies and the local community, which 
enabled the new utility to build part of the piped network at a significantly lower cost—this 
was known as a “condominial system”. Given that this concession contract was widely 
regarded to be superior to others in the region and because it presented a sharp contrast to 
the failed PPP in the city of Cochabamba, it was selected as the basis of the research in this 
dissertation.  
The research began in early 2002, with the primary objective of gaining insight into 
how people were feeling about the “privatisation process” in La Paz/El Alto. The starting 
point was to carry out a basic consumer satisfaction survey in six (out of nine) districts of 
El Alto, which is La Paz’s poorer neighbour. El Alto’s population is made up of migrants 
from mining districts, where employment had fallen drastically with the collapse of the tin 
market,15 and from rural areas, where a prolonged drought had caused many to look 
beyond farming for their livelihoods. Many of these migrants continue to have close ties 
with the countryside and tend to think of themselves as rural. Life in the city, which is 
located at 4,100 meters above sea level, is quite tough. Residents primarily make their 
                                                
 
15 In October 1985, the price of tin fell by half and collapse of the international tin market sent shock waves across the 
world, causing many of Bolivia’s mines to close.  
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living in the informal sector selling merchandise or small services on the streets of La Paz. 
The average household income in El Alto is estimated at US$122 per month. La Paz is also 
poor, but its average monthly household income is more than double that of El Alto 
($256).16 Some of the households surveyed had only recently acquired a household 
connection to the utility network for the very first time, while other households had an 
existing household connection and were previously serviced by SAMAPA, the public 
utility.  
Over 300 households were asked two simple questions. The first: “Did they feel 
happier or unhappier today being serviced by AISA, than by their previous service 
provider (public network provision/self-provision/private water vendor).” The results of 
the initial survey were surprising. Virtually all the households that had been interviewed 
during the first stage of the research claimed that they had cleaner and more reliable 
service provision provided to them currently under AISA than they had before the utility 
was “privatised”. In this way, they claimed to be “happier” serviced by AISA. However, 
when asked the second question: “Did they believe that the provision of water and 
sanitation services should be in the hands of the private sector”, virtually all respondents 
asserted that their water resources should not be in the hands of the private sector and most 
respondents explained that it was important to them and that these services should be 
returned to public provision. The second stage of the research involved in-depth interviews 
with 60 additional households in El Alto, as well as focus group discussions with 
community members and neighbourhood association leaders, community based 
organisations (such as labour unions), journalists, non-profit advocacy organisations, 
development agencies as well as with government officials and management from AISA. 
This second stage was deemed important to further explore the seemingly conflictive 
sentiment toward the PPP arrangement. 
Again, for the most part, nearly all of the household respondents in El Alto 
interviewed during the second stage of this research also said that their services had 
improved under AISA. Although most concurred that water had become more expensive, 
this was not their primary complaint about AISA. The primary complaint from households, 
                                                
 
16 Ministerio de Vivienda y Servicio Básicos (October 2002). 
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as well as from community/neighbourhood associations, was an ideological estrangement 
towards the government’s policy of placing a public good in the hands of a private 
multinational company.  
Below are examples of some of the statements made by respondents during the 
interviews:  
“The government sold our water to the French and to the Americans and to 
the World Bank.” 
“The privatisation thing is bad”; “the globalisation thing is too”; “they’re 
stealing everything from us: our water, our gas, our mines, our land, our culture.” 
“How can these companies make us pay for something that is free? That is 
from God.” 
“I am ready to fight for what is right. And what is right is that our water and 
our gas are ours and we will fight for them. We always have to fight for everything 
here and against those neo-liberals.” 
From a purely classical decision-making perspective, it was difficult to rationalise 
that although respondents could speak with praise of the service provided by AISA, they 
were nonetheless prepared to go back to public provision given the choice and opportunity. 
Their ardent belief in the idea that water should not be in the hands of the private sector, 
took precedence over quality and reliability of service. Consumers were willing to risk a 
return to the inadequate and unreliable services provided in the past.  
In January 2004, less than two years after this research endeavour began, members 
of more than 600 neighbourhood organisations in El Alto mobilised a peaceful open-ended 
civic strike and pressed for a series of demands, including the cancellation of the contract 
with AISA. The platform for the protest, organised by Federation of Neighbourhood 
Boards (FEJUVE), was that AISA was charging rates that put water and sewer service out 
of reach for a majority of El Alto residents. The protesters also used this opportunity to 
demand that the government reverse a decree instituting price increases of 10 per cent for 
35 
 
 
gasoline and 23 per cent for diesel17 and they claimed that AISA had failed to expand 
water service to the outlying areas of the municipality, leaving 52 per cent of El Alto 
residents without basic water and sanitation services. These protests, which continued to 
take place over the course of the year, eventually succeeded in bringing down AISA and 
returning water provision to public hands. However, it became increasingly apparent over 
the course of this research that AISA was being used as a weapon in a much larger 
ideological conflict. This ideological conflict, which emanated in the water sector, 
culminated in the election of the first-ever indigenous president in Bolivia, and ultimately, 
in the re-nationalisation of companies in nearly every sector including electricity, gas, 
transport, even telecoms.   
The fate of the La Paz/El Alto concession is not dissimilar to what we are 
witnessing in various cases where water sector reform involving PSP is facing opposition. 
Despite some examples of outstanding achievement in terms of meeting expected targets, 
many governments have decided against renewing or extending seemingly successful PPP 
contracts with international water companies. According to the World Bank PPI database, 
between 1990–2011, 63 out of 743 water and sewerage PPP projects were cancelled or 
under distress. While this figure only represents 32 per cent of total investment in the 
sector, the figures do not include in their calculation the number of PPP arrangements 
whereby governments decided against renewing contractual relationship with private 
sector stakeholders. The fierce debate over PSP in the water sector is not isolated to 
developing countries alone; it is an international phenomenon. Even in countries such as 
the US, where water has long-since been accepted as an industry, we are witnessing flare-
ups against PSP in the sector. For example, residents living in a small town outside of San 
Francisco recently won a case against American Water Works Co. to bring service 
provision back to local control (Wall Street Journal, 17 June 2008). In many cases, such as 
this US example, the backlash against PSP has been primarily centred on price increases. 
What makes the findings from this case study on the La Paz/El Alto concession 
particularly interesting, however, is the revelation that price was actually not at the heart of 
the conflict. Even though the issue of price was used as a weapon by the anti-privatisation 
                                                
 
17 Decree 27959 of 30 December. 
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movement, the research findings offer a more complex interpretation of the conflict that 
emerged. The insights gained from this research will shed light on the multifarious nature 
of the water sector and the amalgam of liberal and collectivist principles that encompass its 
institutional framework.  
1.6 What the literature has to say about PSP 
The textbook definition of privatisation is understood to refer to the introduction of market 
forces into the economy and, in a narrower sense, the transfer of public enterprises, 
activities or assets to private hands, whether wholly or as a majority or minority interest 
therein. The objectives of privatisation may include the rationalisation of public 
enterprises, increased efficiency, a broader distribution of ownership, the reduction of 
public-sector expenses, the conversion of external debt into equity and the generation of a 
public demonstration effect—that is, social welfare gains—regarding a government's 
economic policy (Vuylsteke 1988; Gerchunoff and Cánovas 1996). Ironically, there is no 
evidence in the literature to suggest that this definition is understood by the vast majority 
of people affected by it, and there is only one recently published empirical study that 
attempts to unravel this phenomenon from the perspective of consumers (Carrera, Checchi 
and Florio 2005)18. As McKenzie and Mookherjee (2003) explain, the “existing studies do 
not identify the reasons of the popular disenchantment with privatization” and do not 
address the question of whether consumers may sometimes act irrational or make choices 
because they are uninformed (Carrera et al. 2005). Studies do not tend to consider 
ideological or religious objections to privatisation or question whether consumer sentiment 
is driven by past unfavourable experience with PSP in other aspects their household 
economy. Equally frustrating is the fact that cause and effect linkages to social gains which 
access to clean water may provide through PSP—not just in terms of improving well-being 
within the health sector (there is significant research dedicated to this relationship) but 
rather in terms of how such reform may help to provide the urban poor with assets—social 
                                                
 
18 Working Paper, presented at The American University of Paris, April 2005. Using the Latinobarometro (2002) survey 
of a representative sample of 18501 individuals in 17 countries as dependent variable of perception, and a privatisation 
dataset on the same countries, they find that disagreement with privatization is more likely to occur when a respondent 
was poor, privatisation was large and quick, involved a high proportion of public services as water and electricity, and the 
country suffered adverse macroeconomic shocks in a condition of high inequality of incomes. 
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capital—that increase their capability to “be” and to “act” 19 by building an improved sense 
of consumer identity are not sufficiently articulated in the literature. Social capital relates 
to a shared knowledge and understanding of norms and social relations embedded in the 
social structures of society that enable people to coordinate action to achieve desired goals. 
Trust—or lack of trust—for example, is perhaps one of the most important components of 
social capital and yet there is very little research attention devoted to understanding the 
degree of trust between consumers and service providers (be they public or private service 
providers).  
Meanwhile, most of the theoretical literature on PSP finds that privatisation 
improves the efficiency of firms, increases political accountability and reduces corruption, 
with empirical evidence supporting this result. Megginston and Netter (2001), for example, 
offer an extensive review of the literature on the subject, covering 61 empirical studies at 
the company level (both within and across countries), and they conclude that privately 
managed firms tend to be more productive and profitable than public firms in both 
developed and developing countries. In the developing country context, gains from PSP 
reportedly stem from better asset management and bill collection (Manibog et al. 2003) 
and because they lower levels of corruption by reducing the control of government over 
the rents offered by the operation of public services (Shapiro and Willig 1990). Various 
studies have also shown that PSP brings improvements in labour productivity, efficiency 
and product/service quality (Andres, Foster and Guash 2006).  
There are a number of problems with much of this literature however. The first and 
most important issue is that very few cross-country studies focus on a single sector for 
purposes of data collection and analysis: electricity, water and telecommunications are, 
more often than not, bundled together for examination. Also, most cross-country studies 
tend to focus on only one particular aspect of reform and most studies fail to distinguish 
between regulated and unregulated industries (Chong and Lopez-de-Salines 2003; 
Bortolotti and Siniscalco 2004). Furthermore, although the relevance of corruption as a 
driver of success or failure has been considered in theoretical modelling, it is rarely 
                                                
 
19 Amartya Sen (1999) argues that economic development should be seen in terms of the activities that people value, their 
capability to achieve these activities that then enable them to rise above the forces that control their lives. 
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addressed in empirical studies (Estache 2006). Others argue that it is too soon, from the 
current empirical evidence available, to support the assumption that the public sector is 
less efficient that the private sector (Hall 1999, 2002; Lobina and Hall 2000) and some 
note that in all monopoly sectors, including water, political decision-making actually 
increases efficiency (Willner 2001).  
Interestingly, much of the case-based and sector specific literature (although 
limited) does point to gains achieved through PSP. Blanc and Ghesquieres (2006), for 
example, provide evidence of a dramatic decrease in leakage and unaccounted-for-water 
losses that were made possible through a management contract between Suez and 
Johannesburg Water in 2001 to service the suburb of Soweto in South Africa. However, 
the problem with the study, as with other studies, is that it fails to address why, despite 
good results, government authorities chose not to renew their five-year contract with the 
firm. To state the problem simply, the literature either tends to treat the effects of 
privatisation too generally or it fails to address fully the relevance of myriad dimensions of 
performance. This gap in quantitative and qualitative cross-country evidence in the 
literature does not allow us to say for certain whether privatisation across the developing 
world has achieved what it was expected to have achieved. It is precisely because of this 
gap in the literature that this dissertation is focussed less on proving economic 
achievements and/or failures of PSP (although many of these are noted), but rather places 
its emphasis on the ways in which PSP is perceived by the various participants and the 
ultimate effect of these differing perceptions on PPP transaction costs and the 
sustainability of sector reform.  
1.7 Contribution to Knowledge 
Primary Research Question 
Q: Why is there a disconnect between the positive perception that consumers have towards 
improvements made to their water and sanitation services under PSP arrangements and the 
negative perceptions that they have towards private sector participation in the provision of 
these services?  
1.8 New Institutional Economic Applications: Unravelling the Challenges of 
Water Sector Reform and PPP Arrangements 
There are a myriad ways to address this question and given the interdisciplinary nature of 
the Social Policy department at the LSE, it was possible to explore literature across a broad 
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spectrum of disciplines, including psychology, history, anthropology, political science, 
institutional economics and behavioural economics. The objective being to bridge the 
current divide in the water sector literature over PSP and demonstrate that the recent 
breakdown of water sector reform efforts is due to a mix of complex socio-economic, 
political, historical, cultural and financial factors that impede upon the ability of water 
sector stakeholders to trust one another, share information, negotiate fairly and innovate. 
Deepening our understanding of the interface between civil society, the private sector and 
government by incorporating theoretical insights across disciplines helped to reveal many 
of the mechanisms required to improve the enabling environment, providing a new layer of 
consideration to the partnership paradigm.  
The analysis of the water sector in the case of Bolivia is structured within the New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) conceptual framework as this provides a more holistic and 
nuanced application of economic analysis on the role of incentives, institutions and 
behaviour, thus providing a common link between the understanding of traditional 
economists and other social scientists. Because NIE places importance on the processes 
that make up the formal and informal institutional environment—from international and 
national institutions to those operating within communities and at the household level—it 
allows for greater reflection on the ways in which social, cultural and historical contexts 
determine the behaviour of stakeholders involved in or affected by policy reform. The 
focus on process versus outcomes is also critical to adequately address the primary 
research question because focussing on the process of PSP reform allows us to consider 
pressures for, constraints on, and possible effects of institutional change on resource 
access, utilisation, productivity, as well as, individual household behaviour.  
According to the NIE literature, when institutional analysis is used to discuss 
government action, two facts need to be recognised: (i) the efficiency of government 
depends not only on its internal organisation but also on its interaction with society as a 
whole, and (ii) institutions are the endogenous result of several processes through time. 
Given this setting, the credibility of any policy reform process is crucial to meeting desired 
sector-specific outcomes. While the economic analysis of social behaviour enlarges the 
scope of economics, socio-political analysis deepens its foundations, typically also 
drawing from sociology, social psychology and political sciences. This interdisciplinary 
approach is critical to improving our understanding of the undercurrents surrounding 
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policy reform in the water sector. Specifically, this approach helps to reveal the interface 
between incentives and economic outcomes by: (i) incorporating a holistic perspective of 
the sector (ii) placing greater emphasis on the ways institutions evolve over time, with (iii) 
a focus on the cost of information and bargaining asymmetries, and on (iv) the importance 
on social relationships, trust and reciprocity (social capital).  
By taking into account how the behaviour of agents depends on the interactions 
between social beliefs, the rules of the game and formal organisational structures, this 
research presents new knowledge on how government authorities can adopt institutional 
strategies to suit the local context. The framework is also helpful for explaining the choice 
of possible contractual arrangements between different market participants, for analysing 
the type of institutional innovation needed to integrate additional players in the water 
market economy, and for understanding the role of government and the private sector in 
reducing the risk of exchange across the range of potential water market participants. 
Although much of the NIE literature tends to draw from empirical evidence found in more 
industrialised/developed countries, it still serves as an excellent conceptual framework for 
capturing the essence of policy reform processes and revealing the possibilities for 
building greater cooperation between institutions, the private sector/market and civil 
society. 
1.9 Summary of Findings 
The difficulties faced by development practioners and policy-makers in reforming the 
water sector and introducing PSP in the case of La Paz/El Alto, stemmed from three 
fundamental factors: (i) The reform process did not consider how race-based socio-
political and economic hierarchies, endemic in Bolivian history and culture, would 
influence intended outcomes; (ii) stakeholders underestimated the transaction costs 
involved in the process of reform and PPP implementation due to information and 
bargaining asymmetries; (iii) systemic barriers, beyond the control of stakeholders 
involved, constrained the space for partnership innovation and flexibility in the provision 
of water and sanitation, debilitating the possibilities for future collaboration between civil 
society, government and the private sector.   
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1.10 Research Contribution 
The contribution of this research to the current debate surrounding water sector reform and 
PSP in the provision of services is four-fold:  
Current debates place very little emphasis on the socio-political forces that impede 
upon the water reform process, although interest is growing. There is also insufficient 
discourse about the mechanisms required to incorporate historical context and cultural 
nuances into the policy-making process. Broad-based comparisons of the impact of policy-
reform and PSP across various countries and regions has led to a great deal of confusion in 
the sector and polarised much of the academic and policy-level debate. In recent years, 
greater attention has been placed on the interdependence of law, policy and organisations 
within the water services sector, and this interdependence has also become the central 
concern of many water resources management analyses (Bandaragoda and Firdausi 1992; 
Holmes 2000; Saleth and Dinar 2000). However, if institutional change is about how 
societies adapt to new demands, such analysis needs to go beyond what government 
bureaucracies, international agencies and legal and regulatory systems do, to incorporate 
the ways in which people, businesses, civil society institutions, religious organisations and 
social movements react to institutional change as well. We need to place more importance 
on the processes that make up the formal and informal institutional environment—from 
international and national institutions to those operating within communities and at the 
household level—and the exchanges that are exercised these myriad players, as it allows 
for greater reflection on the ways in which social, cultural and historical contexts 
determine the behaviour of stakeholders involved in or affected by policy reform.  
The economic discussion around PSP in the water sector emerges from the classical 
assumption that people make rational choices based on their own set of preferences and 
budget constraints, invariably limiting the scope of the literature debate to price-related 
issues such as service affordability, tariff and subsidy structures, universal service 
obligations, connection targets and technological modifications that reduce costs. 
However, as these research findings demonstrate, when it comes to the water sector, 
people’s choices and behaviours are conditioned not only by their own preferences and 
budget constraints, but also by social and cultural forces, moral influences, information 
asymmetry, media bias, manipulation by pressure groups and hierarchical perceptions of 
power. Invariably, these factors can severely impede the ways in which stakeholders react, 
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communicate, share information and negotiate during the reform process. This situation 
invariably leads to high transaction costs that will continue to constrain the future of water 
sector reform through PPP arrangements. In general, this research reveals new insights into 
the ways in which user groups, development practioners, civil society organisations, 
government and private sector players conceptualise privatisation. It reveals the diverse 
perceptions that stakeholders have of the policy-making process and their ability to 
influence the policy-making arena. More importantly, the research reveals how these 
conceptualisations affect voice, choice and market behaviour within the water sector.  
There is a spectrum of stakeholders involved in at least some aspect of water sector 
reform. These include: un-served households/communities, consumers (individual, 
industrial and government), civil society representatives, local municipal authorities, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), community based organisations (CBOs), the media, 
central government ministries, regulatory agencies, international development lending 
agencies, bilateral donors, outsourced legal/technical advisors, independent/small-scale 
private water providers, and commercial utility operators as well as their respective 
investors/shareholders. Each of these stakeholders has the capacity to influence or disrupt 
the fragile web that binds them potentially undermining the process of water sector reform 
and the institutional framework that supports it. By placing a great deal of emphasis on the 
origins and consequences of trust between partners active in the process of water reform 
and the ways in which formal rules (constitutions, laws, regulations, contracts etc.) 
intersect with informal rules (values, customs, traditions, etc.) within the sector, new 
mechanisms/tools can hopefully be developed to improve the enabling environment for 
water sector reform, to generate consensus and greater partnership.  
Some factors that constrain the water sector are more systemic in nature, beyond the 
control of the immediate partners involved in water sector reform. These systemic 
influences on the partnership paradigm might include: a country’s general economic and/or 
political climate, its existing fiscal framework for decentralisation and municipal finance, 
past experiences with PSP in other sectors, the degree to which a country has developed its 
financial sector and/or whether a country is bound by certain borrowing constraints. It also 
includes factors such as the roles and influences of international donor and development 
agencies, the influence of the media, well as international interest and pressure groups. 
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This research highlights the relevance of these systemic constraints on the partnership 
paradigm. 
1.11 Research Limitations 
Conducting research during a time of political tension has positive as well as negative 
implications. There is no question that there was often a great deal of apprehension during 
discussions with households, neighbourhood leaders, and with government and water 
company officials, who were perhaps concerned that their words would be used for 
unethical purposes, such as generating sensationalist newspaper reports or serving the 
interests of political opponents. However, once confidence was built, the air of political 
uncertainty lent itself to a great deal of emotive (and therefore revealing) pontificating 
among those being interviewed. In fact, there was often a recklessness in the way personal 
anecdotes were used to expose issues around reform—it was almost as if I, the researcher, 
were being used as a sounding board for frustrations that would otherwise remain out of 
the public domain. The richness that such fervour provides is good fuel for a researcher 
working alone in the field for an extended period of time. However, the logistics of 
conducting research during a time of political turmoil was extremely challenging with 
daily street protests (and some ensuing riots) and a general sense of festering anger toward 
light-skinned people, made going into El Alto to conduct household interviews not only 
difficult, but sometimes unnerving. I quickly observed that it would be impossible to 
conduct the type of interviews that I wanted on my own, largely due to the whiteness of 
my skin and my blond hair. Although I speak Spanish fluently, the initial impression from 
households in El Alto was that I was a representative of the water company, AISA. It was 
only when I hired a local male counterpart (who also happened to speak Quechua and 
Aymara) that strained relationships between myself and the (otherwise very timid) 
residents were resolved.  
Conducting research at such high altitudes of close to 4,000 meters above sea level 
also had its advantages and disadvantages. The complexity of servicing this area with 
water and sanitation services was fascinating, and being there for an extended period of 
time lent insights into factors that I might not have considered if I had not spent so much 
time in the field. During the daytime, temperatures in El Alto are very pleasant but in the 
evening, the cold is extreme and had I not been there so often at night, I would have never 
come to understand why water consumption was so low—after all, who wants to bathe 
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with freezing cold water at freezing cold temperatures? Gaining what would otherwise 
seem like common knowledge about the weather inspired the development of additional 
research questions relating to the bundling services (gas and water) and prompted a 
decision to look at the ways in which the development of other sectors (not only gas, but 
telecoms and financial sectors as well) affected the development of the water sector. 
The biggest impediment to conducting research at such high altitudes was its effect 
on my health. During the period of research, I developed a deep vein thrombosis (DVT) 
and later a pulmonary embolism (PE), which severely delayed the completion of my data 
collection phase. I had also planned to go back and spend more time in the field during the 
analytical and writing-up phase of research, which I was prevented from doing. This was 
not the only reason for the delay in completion of my dissertation, however. Two 
complicated pregnancies in 2005 and 2007, which were deemed high risk on account of 
this medical history, created additional delays. The cost of childcare, whilst writing up in 
London, contributed to further delays.  
However, although it is clear that the LSE has adopted a new policy to push PhD 
students to complete in less time, the extra time it has taken me to complete has had its 
benefits. Specifically, it has allowed enough detachment from the subject matter to observe 
the ways in which the theoretical framework used for this research applies to so many 
other areas of society. It is as though I can now see just about everything through an 
information and bargaining asymmetry perspective. I can also see the social problems and 
high transaction costs that arise from not fully understanding the demand-side of the 
economic equation across a huge range of sectors. Classical economic assumptions 
continue to govern the world around us and yet continue to fail at explaining the mismatch 
between supply and demand of certain products and services. The concept of a public-
private partnership--regardless of whether the partnership is designed for the water sector, 
sanitation sector, health sector, housing sector, renewable energy, education sector--
remains a contentious proposition for many societies because individuals (from North to 
South, East to West and from varied socio-economic backgrounds) continue to find it 
difficult to trust that public institutions have the capacity to properly regulate the "selfish" 
profit motive of private sector.  
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1.12 Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 2 provides a general understanding of the theoretical concepts pulled from NIE 
that were used throughout the research process. These concepts helped to frame the way in 
which the existing water sector literature on PSP, regulation, and consumer preferences 
and such, as well as the data collected from the field, would ultimately be considered and 
dissected.   
Chapter 3 is a description of the methodological approaches that were applied, and 
amended, in order to achieve research objectives. In summary, an initial household 
consumer satisfaction survey study was conducted in El Alto between November 2002 and 
January 2003. Over 300 households were interviewed and the results of this exploratory 
research phase provided significant insights and surprising results. The consumers first 
surveyed in November of 2002, predominantly indicated that they were generally “happier 
with their service under AISA in terms of water quality and reliability than they had been 
under SAMAPA”. Nonetheless, regardless of how satisfied they were with the improved 
services they were currently receiving from AISA (as compared to their experience under 
public and informal service provision) most of those interviewed said that they were 
willing to participate or had participated in demonstrations against AISA. Despite 
improvements in terms of access and reliability, these residents were willing to risk a 
return to the public provision model because of a seemingly shared value and attitude that 
their water resources should not be in the hands of private, foreign, profit-seeking entities. 
Time boundaries were set to evaluate the La Paz/El Alto case from early 1994, when the 
sector reform process began, through to January 2005, when the reform measures proved 
unsustainable and the PPP contractual arrangement was terminated.20 In August 2003 field 
work resumed and for the following three months, focus groups were conducted with 
community members and 60 households located in El Alto participated in in-depth 
interviews. Additionally, in-depth interviews with government, neighbourhood association 
leaders, AISA management, journalists, development aid agencies and NGOs were 
                                                
 
20 The original time period set for this research was meant to evaluate a 10-year period, from 1994–2004. This was 
extended because of the interesting turn of events that began to unfold in 2004. 
46 
 
 
conducted through to December 2004. Some of these interviews were carried out in 
person, others via telephone or email.  
 Chapter 4 provides a summary of the case study findings for the La Paz/El Alto 
PPP concession. Although the case is described in a sequential format, three distinct 
threads are woven together. The first strand is a socio-political interpretation of the 
sequence of events and conflicts in Bolivia, told as they unfolded, in a narrative style and 
include a necessary historical account of the pre-privatisation context. The second strand is 
more technical, as it relates to the story of the PPP contract, from bidding through to the 
termination of the contract; this thread highlights issues such as ill-conceived tariff 
structures, expansion mandates and other contract inefficiencies. The third strand focuses 
on the story of this research process and the way in which it was adapted in order to draw 
out new insights for understanding the PPP water sector paradigm.  
Chapter 5 explores Bolivia’s informal and formal institutional environment as it 
relates to the water sector and calls into question many of the assumptions currently 
circulating in the literature relating to the cause of Bolivia’s water conflicts.  
Chapter 6 focuses on a set of transaction costs that emerged primarily as a result of 
information and bargaining asymmetries and the implications that these costs had on the 
sustainability of the PPP contract.  
Chapter 7 centres on the systemic constraints to water sector reform as identified 
through case findings.  
In the final chapter, the significance of each of these areas on the future of the water 
sector is integrated and recommendations for policy-makers are further developed.  
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Chapter 2.  Unravelling the Constraints to Water Sector Reform In 
Developing Countries: 
A New Institutional Economics Approach 
If we look at society as a game, in which various players interact and exchange 
goods or services, “institutions” make up the rules of the game in society. They 
can be created or emerge over time and consist of written rules and/or 
unwritten codes of conduct. Consider for a moment the history of football. 
Football as we know it today traces its lineage to games of folk football played 
in England since medieval days. Folk football had few rules. What rules there 
were, developed spontaneously: They rested on custom and varied from village 
to village. Any number of people could play. Spectators could join in and play 
spontaneously. There was no referee, just a kind of social control by the 
players themselves. The aim of the game was to get the ball, a stuffed pig’s 
bladder, to the opponents’ end of the field, using any means. For hundreds of 
years, folk football developed incrementally. Then quite suddenly it was reborn 
into what we know today to be football and rugby. These changes did not 
come, as in the proceeding centuries, from the local level but from the top 
down. National governing bodies, including the Football Association (1863) 
and the Rugby Football Union (1871), were formed to codify the rules. The 
players’ skills, rather than brawn, received more emphasis and purposeful rule 
setting gave rise to more of a chess-like game between players. (McMillan 
2003) 
2.1 Introduction 
Almost all users of water and sanitation services across Europe and North America have 
come to expect in-house service provision and are fully aware that volumetric supply and 
economic pricing are used to calculate cost-recovery and resource allocation. In these areas 
of the world we observe established, or formalised, water economies where the water 
sector has emerged and is accepted as an industry. As highlighted in the introductory 
chapter, however, most of the developing world is made up of predominantly informal 
water economies with long histories of heavy dependence on self-provision, informal 
exchange institutions, and community managed water sources. Most users in the 
developing world continue to perceive water as a free good rather than a scarce economic 
good21 and/or perceive water as a sacred gift from God which should be available through 
                                                
 
21 In an influential 1932 essay, Lionel Robbins defined economics as “the science, which studies human behaviour as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses.” Goods (including services) that are scarce are 
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a system of natural rights and natural laws, rather than through the laws of the market. In 
many developing countries the “rules” that deal with how and by whom the water supply 
should be controlled, managed, treated, and distributed are often weak, and it is not 
uncommon to find water laws and regulations dating back to the nineteenth century. 
Reforming any institutional environment is an extraordinarily difficult task, but 
particularly so in the context of a developing country, where people have endured long 
histories of blatant political corruption and institutional instability. Such corruption is 
especially evident across infrastructure sectors, where there is immense opportunity, 
largely due to the weak rules that make up the legal and regulatory frameworks, for 
kickbacks and misappropriation of public funds. Analogous to the evolution of rules 
governing the game of football, policy-makers across the developing world have been 
striving, primarily taking a top-down approach, to quickly establish formalised water 
economies and to establish a new culture where citizens accept the water sector as an 
industry. The fact that so many governments have exhibited hasty responses to the 
imminent needs of the sector (responses both in terms of reforming water resource 
management and upgrading/expanding the provision of water and sanitation services), has 
invariably created a clash between two cultures. As Vandana Shiva (2002) explains, 
today’s paradigm war is a conflict over how water is perceived, valued, and treated, and 
“the culture of commodification is at war with diverse cultures of sharing, of receiving and 
giving water as a free gift.”22 
During the last two decades economists have made much progress in understanding 
incentives, contracts, and organisations operating within the complexity of the water 
sector, but economic theory still tends to constrain their attention to a very narrow and 
sometimes empirically questionable view of human motivation. At present it is clear that 
economic development depends upon variables that have not been considered fully by 
traditional economic analysis, such as the institutional environment of societies. To 
understand institutional environments, one needs to know what they are, how and why they 
                                                                                                                                              
 
called “economic goods”, while other goods are “free goods” if they are desired but in such abundance that they are not 
scarce, such as air or seawater. 
22 Dr Shiva is a physicist, ecologist, and activist whose recent book Water Wars (2002) is a synthesis of thirty years of 
engagement with communities defending their eco-systems and resources. 
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are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate in diverse settings. 
Broadly defined, the institutional environment is the prescriptions that humans use to 
organise all forms of repetitive and structured interactions, including those within families, 
neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and 
governments at all scales. This institutional environment can be interpreted through an 
understanding of the intersection between the formal “rules of the game” (constitutions, 
laws, regulations, contracts, etc.), and the informal “rules of the game” (values, customs, 
traditions, taboos, sanctions, common beliefs, and codes of behaviour) that encompass the 
perceptions, choices, and behaviour of a society. The opportunities and constraints 
individuals face in any particular situation, the information they obtain, the benefits they 
obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about their situation, are thus all affected 
by structuring rules or the absence of such rules.  
Individuals interacting within rule-structured situations face choices regarding the 
actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and for others. 
Further, the rules affecting one situation are themselves crafted by individuals interacting 
in deeper-level situations. If the individuals who craft and modify rules do not understand 
how particular combinations of rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular cultural 
environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and, at times, disastrous outcomes; 
this can be seen in the many recent failed water sector reform strategies in developing 
countries, and it demands that we come to terms with the extreme complexity of the 
intersection between the formal and informal institutional environment governing this 
sector.  
In order to address the primary research question, a thorough review of the New 
Institutional Economics literature was undertaken and consequently, a series of sub-
questions and mini-hypothesis were created to deepen research analysis.  
2.2 Sub-Questions and Sub-Hypotheses  
Q1: How has the clash between the informal and formal institutional environment – those 
“rules” governing Bolivian society – influenced intended outcomes and perceptions of 
water sector reform over time?  
H1: While today we may be witnessing a clash between the informal and formal 
institutions that support the provision of water, the real source of conflict that we must 
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confront in the water sector today is the politicisation of water provision rather than the 
commodification of water provision.  
[This is addressed in Chapters 4 and 5] 
Q2: How have those institutional arrangements—regulations, channels of communication, 
methods of negotiation and contractual specification—created tensions between 
stakeholders involved in the process of water sector reform and how does this affect the 
ability for policy-makers to accurately predict consumer preferences?  
H2: The delicate nature of the water sector provides evidence of how under certain 
institutional constraints, where optimum accumulation of information is virtually 
impossible, human behaviour can become motivated by a volatile set of preferences, 
making it particularly difficult for policy-makers to manage the reform process and 
accurately predict reform outcomes. Stakeholders underestimate the transaction/transition 
costs involved in the process of reform and PPP implementation due to information and 
bargaining asymmetries, which manifests in poor institutional arrangements. 
[This is addressed in Chapter 6] 
Q3: Are there additional factors, which have otherwise not been considered within the 
literature on water sector reform and PSP, which may contribute to these rising tensions?  
H3: Systemic barriers, beyond the control of stakeholders involved, constrained the space 
for partnership innovation and flexibility during the process of reform. These systemic 
barriers make it extremely challenging to align incentives between the various players 
involved in the process of reform. 
[This is addressed in Chapter 7] 
2.3 Introduction to the Conceptual Framework: New Institutional Economics 
(NIE) 
New Institutional Economics (NIE) provides the theoretical tools that are used in this 
dissertation to assist in the analysis of the process of water sector reform and PSP in the 
delivery of water and sanitation services. NIE is a somewhat generic term used by different 
authors for different analytical purposes, but although there is no commonly agreed-upon 
definition, NIE is based on one basic premise: that institutions matter for economic 
performance. NIE’s purpose is to help explain the determining factors in the development 
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and evolution of institutions, and to evaluate institutions’ impact on economic 
performance, efficiency, and resource distribution. In NIE, economic and institutional 
perspectives converge into an integrated analytical approach that draws attention to the 
ways that institutions affect livelihood components, invariably placing emphasis on the 
links between the policy process, social capital, and the degree to which 
households/individuals are vulnerable to policy outcomes. People, rather than the resources 
they use or the institutions they serve, are the primary focus of concern in NIE analysis and 
this allows researchers to take into account how development decisions affect distinct 
groups. The NIE framework also integrates into a common analytical theme the influential 
roles that a much wider range of stakeholders play: state, civil, private, local, national, 
regional, and international. 
Although NIE operates within the framework of neo-classical economics, it makes 
fewer assumptions. In particular, NIE does not assume the “institutional framework” to be 
a given, as is the case with classical economics, but incorporates institutions as an 
additional constraint and makes them the object of research. Also, researchers do not ask 
the neo-classical economic question “What would self-interested rational actors do?” but 
rather “How might rational actors be constrained (or constrain themselves) not to pursue 
their self interest?” The tendency to introduce greater institutional detail into economic 
models has come about gradually over time with the recognition that standard neo-classical 
analysis can be overly abstract and sometimes incapable of dealing effectively with 
problems of interest to policy-makers. Of particular importance for understanding the 
relationships between individuals and the formalisation of the water sector, the NIE-
approach recognises that agents sometimes (i) pursue goals that go beyond the needs of 
individual welfare; (ii) suffer from limited cognitive capacity; (iii) have to choose on the 
basis of imperfect knowledge/information; and (iv) have their choices shaped by 
institutional (both formal and informal) arrangements. NIE encompasses within it a range 
of features that make it attractive for the purposes of water sector research (see Diagram 
2.1) and in particular for the La Paz/El Alto case study.  
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Figure 2-1: Conceptual development 
 
NIE makes an important distinction between the institutional environment and 
institutional arrangements within a given country context. The institutional environment 
encompasses those human-made constraints that structure the political, economic, and 
social context and the interactions that take place within that context, delineating the rules 
of the game within which the institutional arrangements/governance structures actually 
operate and prescribing the rules of conduct (both formal and informal) within which 
human actions take place. Institutional arrangements or governance structures, on the other 
hand, comprise the entire spectrum of co-ordination mechanisms, ranging from the 
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“market” at one end through to “centralised organisations” at the other. Within this 
spectrum we observe all sorts of hybrid arrangements of networks, associations, social 
policies, norms, regulations, partnerships, and contracts. 
NIE also places a great deal of attention on the importance of path dependence. 
This term is often applied in different ways by economists and other social scientists to 
explain institutional choice, timing, and sequencing in the analysis of a specific sector. In 
neo-classical economic theory path dependency sometimes refers to problems of 
asymmetries in the reaction of some economic variables to changes in certain other 
economic variables; this is usually in relation to changes in price, with an increase or 
decrease having different effects on variables. The term is also used in the context of an 
investment in “lumpy” infrastructure. The high initial sunk costs create path dependency 
for subsequent decisions because of a high-fixed cost component.23 For New Institutional 
Economists, however, path dependency refers to the historical dimension of institutional 
change, to irreversible self-enforcing tendencies resulting from network-externalities24 and 
learning-by-using,25 to cultural factors, and to time lags both in the adaptation of informal 
institutions to formal ones and in the adjustment of perceptions of stakeholders (Brandes 
and Kriwoken 2006; Eggertsson 1997; North 1992; Witt 1993). In cases where these 
adaptations and adjustments do not occur in the way it has been assumed they would, 
incentives and opportunities brought about by changes in formal institutions will not 
positively influence the behaviour of stakeholders but rather lead to adverse effects on 
efficiency, on the distribution of assets and income, and on economic growth. This in turn 
affects the social and political situations of the countries or sectors involved. 
                                                
 
23 A lumpy decision entails trade-offs or compromises because realising a benefit from a choice necessitates accepting 
undesirable peripheral costs. Lumpy decisions almost always depend on indivisibilities; as when a good or policy cannot 
be broken down into tiny increments. 
24 A network effect is a characteristic that causes a good or service to have a value to a potential customer, which depends 
on the number of other customers who own the good or use the service. One consequence of a network effect is that the 
purchase of a good by one individual indirectly benefits others who own the good. This side effect in a transaction is 
known as an externality and externalities arising from network effects are known as network externalities. 
25 The concept of learning-by-doing has been used by Kenneth Arrow (1962) in his development of endogenous growth 
theory to explain effects of innovation and technical change. Robert Lucas (1988) adopted the concept to explain 
increasing returns to embodied human capital. Yang and Borland (1991) have shown learning-by-doing plays a role in 
the evolution of countries towards greater specialisation in production. 
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The behavioural strand of NIE (see Williamson 2000) exemplifies how bounded 
rationality26 can operate as a constraint in minimising transaction costs, how it can prevent 
individuals from appreciating the benefits of consuming certain goods (Besley and Ghatak 
2003), and how it can influence measures to resist reform (Fernandez and Rodrik 1991). 
Although this strand has not in the literature been applied to the water sector, this part of 
NIE can certainly help to identify and perhaps correct various types of demand-side 
anomalies originating from the behaviour of certain agents (in this study, the bounded 
rationality of consumers of water and sanitation services is addressed) which can 
potentially lead to sub-optimal outcomes in the water supply sector. These anomalies, 
which arise from a combination of status quo bias, perception bias, information 
asymmetry, cognitive capacity, sunk cost, and path dependency, are all very relevant to our 
understanding of water sector reform. By assessing the existence of these behavioural 
anomalies, NIE helps to identify how individuals are influenced by existing institutions 
(informal/formal) so that alternative approaches to water sector reform can ultimately be 
considered. 
This then leads us to the hallmark of NIE: a concern with transaction costs. These 
are the costs of seeking information, conducting negotiations, writing up contracts, 
monitoring and enforcing contract compliance and administration (Barzel 1985), 
formulating new institutional rules within a given sector (Paavola 2002), and coordinating 
and pursuing cooperation to achieve mutually desired goals. Transaction costs have 
important implications for water sector governance. In the first instance, this is because 
governance institutions (e.g. water sector or environmental ministries and or regulatory and 
supervisory agencies) cannot be perfectly designed ex ante.27 In other words, future 
contingencies may not all be foreseen at the time the government proposes a regulatory 
contract. The concept of interdependence is relevant here: interdependence prevails in an 
environment where the choices of one agent influence those of another. As an example, we 
                                                
 
26 Bounded rationality should not be confused with “irrationality.” The concept of bounded rationality attempts to take 
into account the cognitive capacity of a decision-maker (Simon 1962) and refers to the rational principals of non-
optimising adaptive behaviour of real people. 
27 In economic models where there is uncertainty that is resolved during the course of events, the ex antes values (of 
expected gain) are those that are calculated in advance of the resolution of uncertainty. 
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can consider a PPP arrangement where there are multiple “agents” involved: the 
government, a private investor, and consumers. These agents cannot be expected 
simultaneously to realise which of their interests are incompatible (or even compatible), 
and the conflict between them must therefore be resolved by defining (or redefining) initial 
endowments (Coase 1960; Paavola and Adger 2006). This is done in the first instance by 
assigning private property rights28 to one of the involved parties (Coase 1960); in this 
study that means determining the ownership and operational structure of the water 
resource. Once rights are assigned, regulations and regulatory agencies are established to 
oversee that this promotes the general good and encourages economic development and 
optimal utilisation of the property. Interdependencies between agents reveal themselves by 
way of the conflicts that emerge; in the context of water, this means conflicts over how 
water resources should be managed, water services provided, and the distributive 
consequences of reform measures. 29 These conflicts inevitably have to be addressed ex 
post, through the renegotiation of contracts in courts or in other social arenas. 
The complexity of water sector governance, especially in situations where such 
governance institutions are being established for the very first time, means that they can be 
extremely costly endeavours. While the nature of interdependence sets up their basic 
requirements, transaction costs influence the choice of institutional responses, due to the 
issue of information asymmetry. Costs between a regulator and a firm will occur after the 
first period of the contractual relationship, as the regulator gains more private information 
about the firm and becomes eager to renegotiate the regulatory contract to improve second 
period efficiency. This search for increases in ex post efficiency may introduce some 
perverse incentives from an ex ante point of view: anticipating an increase in the power of 
incentives later on, efficient agents may behave sub-optimally in the earlier periods of a 
                                                
 
28 In common use, property is simply “one’s own thing” and refers to the relationship between individuals and the objects 
which they see as being their own to dispense with as they see fit. Scholars in the social sciences frequently conceive of 
property as a “bundle of rights and obligations”. They stress that property is not a relationship between people and things, 
but a relationship between people with regard to things. Modern property rights can be said to begin with the transition 
from regarding the primary form of property right as ownership by entities, to the perspective that property rights are to 
promote the general good, and specifically encourage economic development and utilisation of property. 
29 See Bromley (1991) and Paavola and Adger (2006) for discussions on the implications of environmental regulation and 
interdependence, specifically the way in which regulation can entail lower transaction costs. 
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relationship (Estache 2001). Although it is easier to understand this type of transaction cost 
in light of the relationship between the regulator and the firm, this dissertation (in chapter 
6) will examine similar instances where information asymmetry ex ante increases 
transaction costs for consumers as well as the firm, inevitably constraining choice and 
optimal provision of services ex post. 
Formalised institutional relationships and structures which enable water sector 
norms to develop, such as government, the political regime, the rule of law, the court 
system, and civil/political liberties, cannot be separated from the norms and social relations 
embedded in the social structure of a society. Social capital, the third entry point for 
understanding transaction costs, recognises those features of social organisations that 
facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit, including horizontal 
associations such as networks, norms, and social trust (Putnam 1995). Theoretically, social 
capital is meant to lower transaction costs, improve the diffusion of information and 
innovation, strengthen informal insurance mechanisms, increase the probability of trust-
sensitive exchanges made by agents, and improve the authority of certain agents by 
drawing them into social networks. Using social capital theory helps us to capture the 
informal and formal institutional context so that we can more accurately predict how 
policies in the water sector are likely to have an impact on households and, in 
consequence, on the overall institutional arrangements that will either sustain or defy water 
sector reform efforts. 
Oliver Williamson (2000) proposed a framework that identifies four interrelated 
levels of institutional analysis, which were adapted within the conceptual framework for 
the study of the La Paz-El Alto case.  
Level 1:  Embeddedness or Social/Cultural Foundations. The highest level of 
institutional hierarchy, this level includes those informal institutions, customs, traditions, 
social norms, religion, language and ethics. The institutional foundations at this level 
evolve very slowly over time.  
Level 2: Basic Institutional Environment. This is the second level of institutional 
hierarchy, is what Williamson (2000) refers to as the "formal rules of the game." It is the 
basic institutional environment defined by the constitutions, laws, property rights and their 
allocations, basic political, legal and economic mechanisms that are meant to represent (or 
reflect) the attributes of a society's social and cultural foundations.  Changes in the basic 
57 
 
 
institutional environment occur more quickly than in the social or cultural foundations but 
change is constrained by the adaption of the underlying informal institutions (Level 1).  
Level 3: Institutions of Governance. At this level in the hierarchy, the "play of the 
game" is expressed.  It is here that the institutional arrangements through which economic 
relationships with society are governed.  The features of these arrangements determine the 
structure and boundaries of market exchanges. The choice of governance arrangements are 
meant to be influenced by the basic institutional environment and the macro-economic 
context. 
Level 4: Short-term Resource Allocation. This is what Williamson (2000) refers to 
as the day-to-day operation of the economy given the institutional dynamic of Levels 1,2 
and 3.  This level of institutional analysis involves consideration of prices, wages, 
consequences of monopoly, information asymmetry, market imperfections and agency 
dilemmas.    
From a classical economic approach, studying the effects of water sector reform 
might be reduced to a cost-benefit analysis of the dynamics of institutional change, but by 
using an NIE approach we can use the four levels of institutional analysis to explore why 
and how institutions in Bolivia changed at the micro, meso, and macro planes. At the micro 
plane this entails looking at the forces of individual interest that generated pressures for 
institutional innovation; at the meso level it means looking at the structures and dynamics 
of the actual process of institutional change and at the factors that facilitated or posed 
obstacles to innovation; and at the macro level it involves looking at the mix of indirect 
and direct pressures from other institutions and economic agents on the periphery of the 
water sector (see Table 2.1). The speed by which the basic institutional environment is 
expected to change or transition to a new institutional environment is a critical component 
to this conceptual framework. 
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Table 2-1: Informal and Formal Institutional Pressures 
Planes Informal Pressures Formal Pressures 
Micro Social values 
Cultural norms/practices 
Trends in participation  
Lack of information 
Information asymmetry 
Bargaining asymmetry 
Lack of access to clean water 
Lack of finance 
Equity considerations 
Household consumption patters 
Land entitlement issues 
 
Meso Information asymmetry 
Transaction costs 
Bargaining asymmetry 
 
Lack of inter-ministerial coordination 
Urban migration patterns 
Nascent regulatory agencies 
 
Macro Information asymmetry 
Political instability 
Inchoate Party Systems and 
Populism 
Bargaining asymmetry 
 
Macro economic instability 
Borrowing constraints 
Multilateral/Bilateral agreements 
Media 
 
2.4 Transitioning to New Institutional Arrangements 
The starting point for this research was an exploration of the historical interface between 
formal and informal institutions in Bolivia, providing the contextual backdrop for further 
investigation of the pressures for institutional change and the process by which 
institutional tools were adapted to reduce the political and regulatory risks faced by 
economic agents active in the provision of water and sanitation services (WSS). 
Understanding the pressures that historical antecedents, critical junctures, institutional 
evolution, and reactive sequences all have on the water sector can provide a more accurate 
picture of the sector and provide a broader conceptualisation of why reform measures 
involving PSP often fail. A number of studies provide insight into the historical context in 
which water sector formalisation occurred in Bolivia (Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Crabtree 
2005; Klein 2003; Olivera 2004; Van Cott 2000), encompassing a great deal of 
information relating to the history of social movements, the dramatic struggle for 
democracy, participation, equal rights, and cultural recognition both across Latin America 
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in general and in the Bolivian context in particular. Although the treatment of water is not 
dealt with explicitly in this literature, the authors of these studies help us to consider how 
the increasing influence of urbanisation on social movements might have had an impact on 
the process of water sector reform. They also provide us with insights into the indigenous 
values and cultural norms and practices which ultimately form the basis of the informal 
rules governing this segment of the population, and which are critical to our interpretation 
of consumer behaviour in the La Paz/El Alto case. This literature also greatly enhances our 
conceptualisation of WSS provision in the urban context beyond the strict analysis of PPP 
contracts, and presents the essential background needed to understand not only the 
plurality of identities crusading for improved access to basic services, but also the type of 
conflict that originates in people’s efforts to bring about a new institutional order. Even 
case-based literature on PSP in the water sector rarely takes into consideration the 
historical backdrop or looks to other socio-economic pressures and variables that affect the 
sector at the micro, meso, and macro levels. 
Recently, there has been an increase of literature focusing on the changing role of 
government institutions with the introduction of PSP in infrastructure development.30 PSP 
is not meant to mean “less government”, but rather to establish a different governmental 
role and to facilitate a shift in institutional governance and regulatory structures. According 
to this literature, however, the virtual absence of regulatory systems to monitor the 
performance of private scale operators (Savedoff 1999) and ignorance about and/or 
indifference towards the local cultural, social, and political conditions (Laurie and Marvin 
1999) are major impediments to PSP across various infrastructure sectors. Most authors 
stipulate the need for more experienced regulators to oversee PSP in infrastructure.  
In general, it is assumed that regulation is necessary because either (i) the 
government is interested in overcoming information asymmetries with the operator, and in 
aligning the operator’s interests with the government’s interest; (ii) customers desire 
protection from market power when competition is non-existent or ineffective; (iii) 
operators desire protection from rivals; or (iv) operators desire protection from government 
                                                
 
30 See Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) for a recent survey on the world experience and Hirshausen (2002) for an 
insightful discussion of the interactions between institutional development and infrastructure reform in Eastern Europe. 
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opportunism. Normative theories of regulation generally conclude that regulators should 
encourage competition where feasible, minimise the cost of information asymmetries by 
obtaining information and providing operators with incentives to improve their 
performance, provide for price structures that improve economic efficiency, and establish 
regulatory processes that follow the law and that are characterised by independence, 
transparency, predictability, legitimacy, and credibility. Many authors recommend that 
autonomous regulatory agencies need to be created to supervise and ensure service quality, 
fair pricing, and protection from government arbitrage, and to provide overall monitoring 
that conditions and provisions in contracts are met. However, the responsibilities, powers, 
and degree of discretion that newly established regulatory agencies should assume to help 
mitigate PPP transaction-costs across infrastructure sectors are still heavily debated in the 
literature. In the developed-country context, rigid regulatory systems are often viewed as 
ill-equipped in the face of unforeseen circumstances (Smith 1997) and flexible prices and 
quality standards are believed to allow for more creative methods of expanding service to 
different consumer groups, especially for lower-income areas. In the developing-country 
context, by contrast, we find very tight controls on quality and inflexible quality standards. 
Although the question remains open of how to guarantee that the private sector will 
yield the desired performance improvements, reference is usually made to contractual 
compliance (Rees 1998), and contracts negotiated by regulatory authorities could include 
specific provisions which oblige the private partner to take responsibility for implementing 
wider social policies, such as ensuring a benefit for the poor. Johnstone and Wood (1999), 
however, believe that this creates too much of a burden for regulatory authorities, who 
should not have this overarching responsibility for promoting the general good and for 
instituting social policies. However, if regulators are merely responsible for narrow 
contractual issues such as leakage targets or ensuring that a quota of new connections has 
been made, this leaves open the question of who should be responsible for dealing with 
unforeseen complex social and/or environmental consequences of a PPP; consequences 
that tend to have the greatest impact on the standard and level of provision to the poor. In 
practice, given the large number of low-income customers who are specifically meant to 
benefit from water reform involving the private sector, the responsibility of the regulator 
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inevitably extends far beyond monitoring contract compliance. To date there are still very 
few contracts involving the private sector that include explicit specifications for the benefit 
of low-income areas.31 For example, specifications could be included to provide alternative 
distribution methods and more flexible payment arrangements, or to give explicit roles and 
responsibilities to community members in the construction, operation, and management of 
water service provision. However, determining the correct incentive structure within a 
contract to include low-income populations is often too difficult, and contracts are 
designed ex ante without sufficient foresight or understanding of the demands and 
preferences of low-income consumers. Also, inexperience of private sector regulation 
tends to inhibit flexibility and creativity. 
2.5 Relevance for the Bolivian Case 
The regulatory overhaul that took place in Bolivia in the early 1990s in many ways created 
parallel governing institutional frameworks to protect the interest of the public. This new 
system created what had hitherto never existed prior to the 1990s: a formal system of 
checks and balances and a mechanism for depoliticising government oversight of certain 
sectors. However, it also required a massive inter-governmental relationship adjustment for 
civil servants. Bolivia is not unique in its rapid approach to regulatory reform; across Latin 
America and Africa, regulatory reform has been perceived as a stepping-stone for PSP. 
Surprisingly, though, there is very little discussion in the literature about (i) the impact that 
these new institutions have on inter-governmental dynamics; (ii) the transaction costs that 
arise due to inter-governmental information asymmetries, power asymmetries, and/or 
bargaining asymmetries between newly created regulatory agencies and line ministries; or 
(iii) the particular issues that arise when newly created regulatory agencies are staffed by 
former water utility staff members. 
The belief that an increased demand for good governance will spontaneously create 
its own supply of negotiating and supervisory capacities is dangerously misleading. Viable 
institutional solutions and the capacities to make them work have to be consciously 
designed and systematically developed (Keohane 2001); this takes time, and it does not 
                                                
 
31 The following PPPs included such specifications in their contracts: Buenos Aires, La Paz, Cartagena, and Nelspruit. 
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seem wise to fashion regulatory agencies impulsively simply for the sake of implementing 
a PPP. However, while it may seem obvious to many academics that government 
institutions should aim to evolve organically, patiently taking the time to build the internal 
capacity required to support long-term development objectives, in practice, patience and 
time are luxuries most politicians would argue they simply cannot afford. This is certainly 
the case in countries marked by long histories of political instability. Bolivia, for example, 
has endured 200 revolutions, coups, and counter coups since it gained independence; that 
is more than one government a year for the last 180 years. In such circumstances, 
politicians understandably assume they have only short windows of opportunity to carry 
reform processes through and are, therefore, willing to take on the extra risks of rushing 
reform. 
Much of the literature on PSP in infrastructure is very accusatory of government 
institutions. In particular, there is discussion of the indifference of regulators towards local 
cultural, social, and political conditions (Laurie and Marvin 1999), and a significant 
amount of the literature suggests that corruption and the unreliability of government 
authorities prevent regulators from negotiating and supervising private sector stakeholders 
appropriately (Bortolotti and Siniscalco 2004).32 While corruption has certainly proven to 
be at the heart of some PPP transactions, this seems to be an overly simplistic explanation 
for PPP failings. Given the tremendous institutional overhaul governments must go 
through in what is usually a very limited period of time in order to prepare for PSP, it is no 
small miracle when these institutions succeed in establishing themselves as legitimate 
governing bodies, respected (or even known to exist) by the public. To achieve the level of 
institutional capacity required to ensure transparency, strong negotiation techniques, and to 
supervise PSP, is an extraordinary feat. Certainly, even developed countries, with much 
longer histories of institutional stability and decades of experience dealing with PSP across 
various infrastructure sectors, may struggle to meet these challenges. 
                                                
 
32 They provide a recent survey on the world experience; see also von Hirshausen (2002) for an insightful discussion of 
the interactions between institutional development and infrastructure reform in Eastern Europe. 
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2.6 Negotiating and Sustaining PPPs 
Foster (1999) believes that strong government lies at the heart of sustaining PPP 
arrangements. Bately (1997), however, highlights the difficulty of the public sector in 
adjusting to new and different roles under PPP arrangements, and the likelihood that the 
public sector almost always has a lower level of bargaining power, depending on the 
circumstances underlying its decision to involve the private sector. The question of how to 
ensure that government officials retain their bargaining power when negotiating with the 
private sector is not addressed sufficiently in the literature; there seems to be a general 
consensus, especially in recent discussions, that the public sector is always at a regulatory 
disadvantage in relation to the private sector. As this dissertation demonstrates, this 
assumption is extremely misleading. Also, there is only brief mention in the literature of 
the role that outsourced advisors play in public sector negotiation techniques and 
bargaining positions, even though this can be pivotal to the design, sustainability, and 
productive outcomes of a contractual partnership. 
Two other relevant areas that have received only minimal treatment are changes in 
bargaining positions between the public and private sector over the life of a PPP contract 
(although recent research on contract renegotiation by Estache (2004) delves deeper into 
this issue), and the multitude of ways by which the public sector could make use of 
significant information held by local CBOs/NGOs (which often have better access to user 
preferences and needs) when negotiating with the private sector and/or when designing 
plans for network expansion. While many believe that the public sector is always at an 
informational disadvantage and lacking both in capacity and shrewdness when negotiating 
with the private sector, this assumption is unsubstantiated. Ironically, most renegotiations 
of PPP contracts have been initiated by the private sector rather than the government, 
which could mean that the private sector is in fact at a disadvantage during the first stage 
of contract negotiation, both in terms of the information it has at its disposal and in 
estimating the leverage it will have during future phases of the PPP process. 
In a similar vein, there is little discussion in the literature relating to the ways in 
which cultural differences between international private sector stakeholders and 
government stakeholders affect PPP sustainability. There is some research that details 
cultural differences in contract negotiation between the private and public sector more 
generally (Lewicki, Lewin and Weisee 1992); although there is nothing that focuses on this 
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issue specifically in relation to the water sector, the growing literature base documenting 
international negotiation styles can be used in our analysis. Laurent (1983), for example, 
documents a wide range of cultural differences in work-related values, attitudes, and 
behaviour, and determines that employees usually maintain their culturally specific ways 
of working even when employed by multinational companies. Hofstede (1981) and 
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1999), building upon Laurant’s conclusions, also 
highlight important cultural dimensions influencing organisations in their ability to 
negotiate. They categorise cultures as either particularist, where the nature of the 
relationship between given stakeholders determines how someone will act in a particular 
situation, or as universalistic, in which decisions are made based upon what is legally 
appropriate. Examples of the former are South Korea, Brazil, and Venezuela, while the 
latter describes countries in Western Europe and North America (Laurent 1983). 
This is extremely interesting when it comes to PPP contract negotiation in the water 
sector, because universalistic cultures tend to rely primarily upon extensive and specific 
contracts to document the “rules” of doing business together, whereas particularist cultures 
use written agreements much more loosely and rely on the strength of personal 
relationships to maintain a commitment. Particularists view detailed contracts and penalty 
clauses (which embody most PPP agreements in the water sector) as signs that they are not 
to be trusted; therefore, no relationship exists and they consequently feel little obligation to 
adhere to a contract (Adler and Kwon 2002). As many Asian, Latin American and Middle 
Eastern cultures have shown, personal relationships can, at times, be more durable than 
contracts, as well as more flexible. In a case study of a particularist culture in negotiation, a 
team of Brazilian negotiators explained that they only tell the truth once they have got to 
know the other party; that is, once they have developed a personal relationship with the 
other stakeholder (Adler and Kwon 2002). They described American negotiators as naïve 
for not understanding how negotiating really works. The Americans, on the other hand, for 
whom truth is an absolute “universal” that is unrelated to particular negotiations or the 
particular people involved, accused the Brazilians of acting deceitfully. 
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According to negotiation experts,33 negotiating is not always the best approach to 
building a business partnership. Sometimes the best strategy is “take-it-or-leave-it”, at 
other times it is bargaining, and on some occasions the most effective and appropriate 
route is negotiations focusing on problem solving (Katz 2005). Negotiating, compared with 
the other approaches, demands more time, which is why it is often assumed to be too 
costly in formulating PPP contracts, although it is generally the preferred strategy for 
creating win-win solutions (from a management perspective) in global business. However, 
the three areas in which the success of a negotiation depends—individual characteristics, 
situational contingencies, and strategic and tactful processes—vary considerably across 
cultures (Fisher 1980; George 1998). Another factor crucial to understanding how 
negotiating styles differ across cultures is the hierarchical relationship between buyers and 
sellers (which one could say PPPs emulate). In Japan, for example, the group that is higher 
in the hierarchy of a negotiation takes care of the group immediately below it: management 
takes care of workers, government takes care of industry, and buyers take care of sellers 
(Graham 1983). In the USA, by contrast, the buyer–seller relationship is viewed as being 
more equal, and there is consequently a different set of expectations and pattern of 
negotiating behaviour. 
It is very important to unravel some of the individual characteristics of those 
involved in the PSP process and/or the negotiation of PPP contractual arrangements, 
including their capacity to manage the negotiation process skilfully and their own personal 
stake in the sustainability of a PPP initiative. There is a general consensus among most 
negotiation theorists that the best way to approach bargaining problems is to search for 
synergistic solutions, in which both sides win. They argue that the art of negotiation lies in 
developing creative options and alternatives, not in using persuasive tactics that more often 
result in giving offence than in gaining agreement. What we observe in many PPP 
arrangements in the water sector, though, is a lack of synergy and major constraints on 
stakeholders (both public and private) to come up with creative solutions, especially when 
attempting to find solutions to meet the demands of lower-income consumer groups. It is 
                                                
 
33 Various negotiation resources have been considered; the review of the literature is not limited to PPP negotiation 
specifically. 
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not novel to suggest that history, path dependence, the cultural make-up of the formal and 
informal institutional environment, or the capacity of stakeholders to negotiate skilfully, 
might affect the process of PSP in the water sector, but for unexplained reasons these 
issues are currently not at the forefront of relevant debates. This is why it this dissertation 
treats as critical the need to focus analytically on the intersection of these dynamic forces. 
Bolivia is here the case study, but there is also a need for more in-depth research into these 
issues across other countries and regions. 
2.7 Consequences of Trust, Norms, and Networks in the Process of Water Reform 
What seems clear is that the sustainability of PPP arrangements depends 
largely on the degree of commitment on the part of the partners and the 
willingness of all stakeholders to play mutually agreed roles in the allocated 
activities. (Bennett 1998) 
There have been some attempts to analyse water sector reform from a consumer 
perspective (Komives 2001; Nickson and Vargas 2002), but the focus of analysis is almost 
always on measurable welfare outcomes or affordability, rather than on consumer choice 
and the degree to which consumers are satisfied with the process of reform, and/or satisfied 
with their quality of service. Nor does the literature extend its analysis to uncover how 
negative perceptions of reform influence consumer behaviour, regardless of how 
affordable/unaffordable connection charges and tariffs turn out to be. Also, long-standing 
explanations for why different individuals from low-income backgrounds face different 
costs of exchange tend to highlight transportation costs and/or the opportunity cost of time. 
However, there are other factors that clearly affect the cost of exchange, especially for 
low-income individuals; these include: (i) specialisation and frequency in conducting a 
certain type of exchange (familiarity and know-how); (ii) negotiating skill; (iii) local 
knowledge/belief system; (iv) personal networks; (v) trust; (vi) social capital; (vii) political 
connections; and (viii) ethnicity/race. 
An individual makes a choice based on budget constraints in relation to a particular 
set of prices. The full opportunity costs associated with that choice includes the price of the 
goods themselves, plus the transaction costs of obtaining the goods. Even if the money 
price of a particular good varies little across individuals, the opportunity cost of engaging 
in the transaction to obtain the good often varies substantially. The cost will be affected by 
the individual’s personal knowledge, personal network, transaction skills, time costs, 
location, organisation, institutional setting, and so on. Only in very exceptional situations 
67 
 
 
will all active participants in a transaction face identical opportunity costs. As mentioned 
previously, most of the economic discussion around PSP in the water sector emerges from 
the classical assumption that people make choices based on their own set of preferences 
and budget constraints, which is why the debate is centred primarily on price-related issues 
such as service affordability, tariff and subsidy structures, competition, and risk. 
Some attention has been given to the ways in which local cultural practices 
influence consumer behaviour in the water sector, but the issue is usually raised only 
briefly in studies with a broader focus. A few studies, for example, suggest that Andean 
cultural practices of water conservation in La Paz/El Alto impacted household 
consumption levels. This is argued by Foster (2001), Komives (2001), as well as, Barry 
and Sohail (2003), although the later studies rely on Foster’s 2001 data. None of the 
authors determine whether the practice actually stemmed from cultural habit, from a lack 
of information about the availability of water, and/or from the amount of water available 
for consumption, nor do they consider whether consumers’ behaviour is simply due to the 
fact that most households in El Alto suffer from bitterly cold temperatures with no access 
to gas/electricity; consumption of water will surely be low in such circumstances and this 
has very little do due with conservation values. It is also unclear from where data on 
cultural practices in El Alto was derived; specifically, whether findings were based on 
primary research including household interviews, or whether conclusions were drawn from 
secondary research and data collected from government authorities. 
These considerations are important because individual consumption behaviour, 
such as the conservation practices described above, might also indicate that the amount of 
water that users choose to consume is not necessarily dictated by price. Yet almost all of 
the economic literature attempts to correlate consumer behaviour with price; willingness-
to-pay surveys, often complemented by cost comparisons of what low-income users 
traditionally pay to informal water vendors, are abundant. These studies tend to 
demonstrate that it is usually more affordable for these targeted user groups to be served by 
a formal network utility. However, there is only a handful of studies that highlight the 
difficulties that low-income users face when adapting to new water sector reform payment 
arrangements; these studies focus specifically on how consumers shift from the daily 
payment arrangements of informal water provision to monthly payment arrangements, 
which require the acquisition of skills in saving (Komives 2001; Nickson 2002; Nickson 
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and Franceys 2003). Nor is there sufficient discussion of the challenges low-income 
consumer groups face in acquiring additional sources of finance (in the form of loans or 
grants) to pay not only for the cost of new network connections, but also to finance the cost 
of appliances such as taps, shower heads, sinks, toilets, etc. 
The research that forms the backbone of this dissertation draws particular attention 
not only to local cultural influences on consumer behaviour but also to the issue of 
choice—or rather the lack of choice—at the household level and the way in which this can 
affect user perceptions of the reform process. This thesis argues that from consumers’ 
perspective, belief in the long-term gains of improved access may be outweighed by fears 
over potential short term risks and/or losses accrued through the reform process. The 
findings make clear that this is not simply a question of price, but rather a question of trust. 
There is no reason to expect that societies in the developing-country context, many of 
which have never felt comfortable placing their trust in government policy-makers and 
have long histories of inadequate public service provision, will simply have faith in and 
support reform, regardless of how progressive a policy measure appears to be. Even when 
users agree to connect to the network they will have to feel confident that the water is 
indeed potable in order to feel their investment has been worthwhile. Again, research 
findings on the La Paz/El Alto case suggest that this degree of trust cannot be expected to 
emerge easily or spontaneously 
The minimal treatment of social and cultural constraints to PSP in the literature, 
including the minimal treatment of the ways in which unexpected preferences and values 
influence the economic paradigm of WSS provision, are not sufficient for an accurate 
reading of the sector. It is, therefore, imperative that we move beyond rational choice 
theory to dissect how (i) habits and routines can bypass cognitive deliberation (procedural 
rationality); (ii) moral influences can over-ride self interest and the cost-benefit calculus; 
(iii) social factors can shape and influence individual preferences; and (iv) emotional 
responses (expressive rationality) can confound cognitive deliberation. Williamson (1996, 
2000) combines the concepts of bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour to explain 
challenges in contractual relationships and in the ownership structure of firms, while 
Putnam’s (2000) focus on the role of social capital (trust, norms, and networks) in the 
realm of policy-making underpins the structure of much of the analysis of this dissertation. 
Substantial analytical attention is given to the institutional environment and to the ways in 
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which social capital can facilitate (or impede) co-operation, as well as to the ways in which 
social capital can be used to reduce transaction costs. Arguments are presented that suggest 
trust in people (behavioural trust), trust in the institutional environment (confidence), and 
trust in organisations (and government) are paramount to the success of water sector 
reform, especially where the private sector is an active participant.  
2.8 Information Asymmetry and the Application of Principal–Agent Theory 
The literature relating to information asymmetries in water sector reform seems to begin 
and end with the issue of contract negotiation and compliance; while contract negotiation 
has more to do with balancing incentives, compliance relates directly to regulation. The 
treatment of information asymmetries in the literature is concentrated almost exclusively 
on regulation in relation to PPP contracts, and is not concerned with the water reform 
“process” more generally. Overall, the literature raises the question of how we should deal 
with the imbalance of information that is likely to exist between regulators and the utility 
operators they are meant to supervise; the assumption is that operators are likely to have 
more information about the technical and commercial performance of the services system 
than the regulator, inevitably making it challenging for the regulator to oversee contract 
compliance. 
The literature on regulation has weaknesses for two main reasons: (i) it treats 
information asymmetry as if it were a fixed phenomenon, when in fact a policy 
environment may be far from static; and (ii) it fails to consider insider information that 
former technical and managerial staff from the utility bring with them if/when they become 
responsible for regulation. In many developing countries where PPP arrangements have 
been introduced, former utility managers and technical staff are offered positions within 
newly established regulatory bodies; while they may lack regulatory experience (Baker and 
Tremolt 2000), it seems highly probable that these professionals may actually have a 
deeper understanding of their complex consumer base (not to mention the internal 
organisational/human resource constraints of the utility) than an incoming international 
management team of a new utility company. There seems to be no research addressing 
specifically this issue. 
The provision of water and sanitation services should be understood in terms of 
interactive processes with a variety of contributors. Multiple actors have to invest money, 
time, physical and mental effort, and lend political support to a process that eventually 
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generates a mutually desirable result. If we look at water and sanitation services as an 
interactive process of provision and exchange, it becomes easier to understand why some 
processes do well while others struggle. A useful starting point for understanding this 
interactive process is to explore deficiencies relating to contracts and agreements between 
exchange partners, making use of a Principal–Agent (P–A) framework. According to P–A 
framework theory, a “principal” enters into a contractual relationship with an “agent”, who 
is expected to carry out the actions needed to produce the outcome desired by the principal. 
However, there are two fundamental problems with contracting: (i) adverse selection, 
meaning picking the wrong contractor (that is, one who is unable to produce the desired 
outcomes); and (ii) moral hazard; since an agent’s behaviour cannot be observed at all 
times it is possible that even a capable organisation will shirk its responsibilities and divert 
resources to other tasks in order to profit. As discussed below, these two factors are 
identified with hidden information and hidden actions (Arrow 1984). 
P–A models have been employed in many different academic fields in order to 
explain relationships, especially those in which an agent does not take actions that are in 
the best interest of a principal. This problem is thought to be particularly severe if the 
principal’s preferred action cannot be contractually enforced, and such agency problems 
have been a major subject of economic theorising (Grossman and Hart 1983; Hart and 
Holstrom 1987; Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979). The classical examples of principal–
agent relationships include the patient–doctor, the client–lawyer, the insurer–insured, and 
the landlord–tenant, and typical P–A interactions mentioned in the literature include those 
in the commercial–economic–managerial realm (Arrow 1985; Bowie and Freeman 1992; 
Moe 1984; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1985; Sen 1999; Stiglitz 1987; Westphal and Zajac 1998) 
and scholars have typically applied agency theory to problems such as compensation, 
acquisition and diversification, financial structures, employer–employee relations, buyer–
seller relations, vertical integration, regulation, and innovation (Donahue 1991; Eisenhardt 
1989; Laffont and Martimort 2001; Sappington 1991). P–A models usually aim to 
investigate the contractual relationship between parties, and the issue of incentives is 
crucial, especially in situations where the activities of one or more of the parties affects the 
welfare of the group, and where these activities are either unobservable (and hence cannot 
be bound by the contract), or the motivation of the activities is affected by private 
information (and is thus unverifiable). P–A theory then studies the allocations (for 
example, compensation schemes) that optimal contracts prescribe given the degree of 
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asymmetric information that exists between the principal and agent. Principal–agent 
interaction is especially interesting and difficult to analyse when the interaction focuses on 
the production of a qualified good or service where the skill and knowledge of the agent 
plays a crucial role in the outcome. 
In the context of the water sector, the most common P–A problem observed relates 
to the relationship between the regulator and the utility operator. Given that government 
action takes place in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information, it is not surprising 
that regulatory imperfections may arise when the actions of agents are not observed by a 
principal. As mentioned above, the literature consistently assumes that a regulator has 
access to less information than a private utility operator. Such a situation weakens the 
system of incentives that regulates the P–A relationship, increasing discrepancies between 
social and private objectives. As this thesis emphasises, however, there is a variety of 
deeper-level P–A relationships that encompass the water sector beyond the relationship 
between the regulator and the firm, in which asymmetric information, coupled with a lack 
of well-established governance mechanisms, inhibits the process and sustainability of 
reform. 
In the case of Bolivia, we observe a relationship between the government as 
principal and the regulator as agent. There is also a relationship between the government as 
principal and out-sourced technical advisors as agents during the information gathering 
phase, the bidding process, and/or the negotiation of the contract,34 as well as between 
utility shareholders as principals and utility operators/management as agents. Further, of 
course, there is the P–A relationship between customers as principals and three different 
agents: the government, the regulator, and the utility operator—through this relationship, 
customers are meant to regulate these three agents through political processes, regulatory 
processes, and/or consumer activism. P–A modelling has not been used to analyse these 
relationships in the water sector, perhaps in part because P–A modelling was designed to 
specifically analyse contracting interactions and outcomes. 
                                                
 
34 There is insufficient literature relating to time and other process-related constraints faced by potential investors, and 
there is inadequate insight into the role of outsourced technical advisors (Reese 1998). 
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As indicated above, adverse selection and moral hazard can be associated with 
hidden actions and hidden information (Arrow 1984). Hidden actions refer to unobservable 
acts when information is unavailable as to the quality of a service, or as to efforts being 
undertaken to improve a service by a utility operator. The principal cannot observe the 
“actions” of the agent he or she has commissioned, only the “results” of these actions. It is 
important to note that the results of an agent’s activities in themselves often do not give 
much indication of the effort or the means by which an agent has achieved an outcome. In 
other words, the performance improvements of a utility may be due to the involvement of 
supplementary assistance such as the efforts that users or other stakeholders have made in 
helping the utility to meet its targets. Hidden information, meanwhile, refers to when a 
utility operator (or any other agent) claims that there are influences beyond their control 
that have impacted on performance levels, and that they should not, therefore, be held 
accountable for any shortcomings in output. In such an exchange relationship, as Box 2.1 
illustrates, the transactions concerned involve an exchange of goods/services that are 
“determinable” in the sense that it is possible ex ante to specify clearly which services and 
returns will be provided by each stakeholder. 
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Figure 2-2: Exchange relationships 
 
Ideally, a governance oversight mechanism acts as a third party instrument to 
ensure mutual accountability and transparency. When all of the contractual provisions can 
be specified in advance, monitored, verified, and enforced, this situation is known as a 
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“complete contract”. However, given the high level of complexity and uncertainty 
surrounding PPPs, it is often impossible to establish every specification necessary in 
advance, so as to be able to include it within a contract. In New Institutional Economics, 
one speaks of “incomplete contracting”: situations in which unpredictable factors mean 
that a complete detailing of future exchange dynamics is not possible within a contract. For 
example, in some of the P–A relationships described above, a contract could take the form 
of new sector-specific regulations, and be meant to be interpreted in a broad sense. 
Incomplete contracting is quite commonplace across both the developed and developing 
world whenever expected benefits are anticipated to outweigh the expected costs of an 
exchange. When drafting such contracts, provisions are usually made to allow for 
adjustments to the contract at a future date (ex post) if required by changing circumstances. 
However, in order to anticipate possible changes and estimate their likelihood, a 
substantial degree of information must be shared between parties. Obviously, this practice 
of information sharing is not easily undertaken. The Governance Oversight Mechanism 
(GOM) is meant to deal with the issue of information asymmetry between a principal and 
its agents and to prevent agents from engaging in opportunistic behaviour, thus solving the 
P–A dilemma. This dissertation provides a critical assessment of the ways in which the 
GOM is used by the range of Principal–Agent relationships across the water sector.  
As discussed above, information asymmetry is also a factor when it comes to 
interpreting—or rather misinterpreting—consumer behaviour in the water sector. 
However, it is only marginally addressed in the literature on cost recovery and subsidy 
design policies, even though many of the problems inherent to the introduction of new 
tariff schemes often relate to the fact that policy-makers and utility operators lack 
sufficient household data about the consumers they serve (or intend to serve). Without this 
data, innovative structures for targeting the poor are obviously much more difficult to 
develop and implement, and certainly to sustain. As illustrated in much of the case-based 
literature, the process by which consumers are classified into tariff/subsidy brackets is 
often ambiguous, highly politicised, and lacking in transparency (Nickson 2001). Again, 
greater importance must be given to the collection of household consumption patterns, 
cultural norms, and overall livelihood frameworks that support this consumer group. This 
would ultimately help government and utility operators to have a better sense of future 
demand, and reduce some of the risk to the private sector inherent in upgrading and 
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expanding networks to lower-income areas. The analysis in this dissertation gives a great 
deal of attention to the impact of misinterpreting consumer behaviour. 
2.9 Limitations to P–A Theory 
Although an extremely useful starting point, the P–A approach only captures some of the 
interactions, behaviours, and overall relationship dynamics of actors involved in the 
process of water reform. Findings from the research suggest that that the typical model of a 
bilateral relationship between principals and agents can be overly simplistic, and that there 
is a multiplicity of actors involved in sustaining the partnership relationship. Also, 
although P–A theory is an interesting entry point to understanding the relationships 
between stakeholders, it falls short of helping us to understand fully the changing 
dynamics of the relationships that exist between the stakeholders ex post pre-bidding, 
bidding, and contract negotiation. Given the sunk nature of assets in the water and 
sewerage sector, the bargaining power between the private sector and the government 
radically changes after the initial investments are made. This feature, which Williamson 
(1996) calls the “fundamental transformation”, introduces the possibility of opportunistic 
renegotiations (for example, creeping expropriation, in which a government squeezes a 
project by taxes, regulation, access, or changes in law), which, as mentioned previously, 
can ultimately affect incentives to invest further. In the context of service provision, the 
relationships between the different agents and principals has the possibility to transform at 
various intervals throughout the 25–40 year span of a concession contract, due to the fact 
that informational and/or bargaining asymmetries may sway in either direction. Also, the 
P–A approach does not address the systemic barriers that affect stakeholders’ ability to 
cooperate and/or reciprocate. Systemic constraints to a PPP are external factors beyond the 
control of partners who actually share mutually desirable goals. 
There have been a variety of empirical observations made in the last decade in 
experimental research dealing with people’s social motivations in bargaining contexts and 
cooperation games. Such research has shown that reciprocity can be a powerful contract 
enforcement device (Fehr, Gachter and Kirchsteiger 1997), and the observation of 
reciprocity is important for understanding how to improve the sustainability of PPPs in the 
water sector. This is because (i) it shows that under certain conditions the problem of 
shirking can be less severe than predicted; and (ii) there may be important interaction 
effects of reciprocity and incentive-compatibility (Fehr and Gachter 2000). Reciprocal 
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behaviour is not restricted to laboratory experiments and, as the findings of this 
dissertation explain, contracts between private water companies and governments can be 
reciprocity-compatible when principals and agents both recognise the agency problem and 
react accordingly, and/or when systemic impediments affecting the partnerships are 
identified and mitigated. 
Overall, the literature relating to information asymmetries in water sector reform 
seems to begin and end with the issue of contract negotiation and compliance, and this 
raises the question of how we should deal with the imbalance of information that is likely 
to exist between regulators and the utility operators they are meant to supervise. Borrowing 
analytical techniques from Williamson (1975 and 1984) and Moe (1984) and from Miller 
and Whitford (2002), who contributed to the inclusion of P–A theorising within the NIE 
framework, this dissertation will go further and interpret the ways in which formal and 
informal institutions can constrain choices between principals and agents, thus making the 
link between transaction costs and information asymmetry across the range of P–A 
relationships that exist within the sector. The intention of this research is also to introduce 
the idea that systemic constraints or external rules can undermine the success of PPP 
arrangements, and thereby to contribute to the theoretical discussion around what 
constitutes “institutional rules” within the NIE framework. 
2.10 Systemic Constraints to PPP Sustainability 
The current study introduces several additional dynamic forces that play a critical role in 
unravelling the constraints on sector reform, and so provides a fuller conceptualisation of 
the rules governing the institutional environment and particular institutional arrangements 
that support the water sector. The dissertation refers to these as external rules, and they are 
the systemic constraints to water sector institutional reform. The current partnership 
literature places a great deal of emphasis on the need to create more compliant, transparent, 
responsive, and flexible partners (Caplan, Evans, and McMahon 2005), but systemic 
barriers may exist at the local, national, or global level that weaken the capacity of partners 
to meet these objectives in the water sector. Referring once again to Table 2.1 above, the 
analytical framework categorises its areas of focus into the micro, meso, and macro levels. 
The micro and meso categories are primarily characterised by behavioural constraints to 
partnership building; these include: a willingness between partners to communicate and the 
capacity to share information; divergent perceptions of power and willingness to trust; 
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and/or a limited capacity to engage in conflict resolution with partners. Macro factors, on 
the other hand, are more systemic in nature; these constraints are often beyond the control 
of the immediate partners involved in water sector reform. 
Macro or systemic influences on the partnership paradigm might include a 
country’s general economic and/or political climate, its existing fiscal framework for 
decentralisation and municipal finance, its past experiences with PSP in other sectors, the 
degree to which it has developed its financial sector, and/or whether it is bound by certain 
borrowing constraints. It also includes factors such as the roles and influences of 
international donor and development agencies, the influence of the media, the existence 
and capacity of local NGOs and CBOs, and the roles and influences of international 
interest and pressure groups. Another way to think about systemic constraints using the 
language of NIE is to think of these constraints as the “external rules” governing the 
sector. Both behavioural and systemic characteristics have the ability to present additional 
challenges to the successful implementation of a partnership initiative in the water sector, 
but by differentiating systemic constraints from behavioural constraints we are then better 
equipped to create the tools necessary for tackling these challenges. Although there is a 
great deal of reflection in the PPP literature on the potential efficiency gains of forging an 
alliance between civil society, government, and the private sector, including the plethora of 
social and political benefits to the partnership process, the literature fails to incorporate 
fully the impact that systemic constraints have on PPP arrangements.  
2.11 The Shift Toward Multi-Sector Partnerships 
In order to deal with some of the setbacks to water sector reform involving PSP, some 
policy-makers and development practitioners have begun to move beyond typical PPP 
arrangements between the public and private sectors towards partnerships that explicitly 
involve civil society. In other words, there has recently been a shift in focus away from bi-
sector partnerships to multi-sector partnerships (MSPs): that is, a public–private–civil 
society. Policy-makers, development practitioners, and academics are re-evaluating the 
integral role that civil society (users, communities, community-based organisations, non-
governmental organisations, labour unions) have played and the enormous contribution 
they have made in the provision of water, especially in rural and peri-urban areas, through 
community-based initiatives and/or in partnership with local government authorities. 
Although civil society has rarely been referred to as a strategic partner in the 
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implementation of PPP projects, increasingly we find PPP initiatives that have created off-
shoot partnership arrangements (often informal) with civil society to serve the poorest 
segment of the population being targeted by reform efforts.35 For the most part, analysis 
relating to the outcomes of such partnerships tends to emphasise the social value-add of 
civil society participation in water sector initiatives involving the private sector. 
Unfortunately, however, the interface between civil society, the private sector, and 
government is not presented as a formal alliance between these stakeholders but rather as a 
mechanism to compensate for inadequacies in original PPP designs. Most MSPs are set up 
only through the support of external agents, such as international NGOs, donors, and 
development agencies, rather than by government and private sector stakeholders 
directly.36 
While many academics and development practitioners have long since recognised 
the importance of creating the right enabling environment to nurture multi-sector 
partnerships as a development tool, government and private sector stakeholders have rarely 
relied on civil society as a partner to help raise awareness and disseminate information 
about PPP initiatives, let alone provided civil society with an opportunity to participate 
actively in the construction, operation, and maintenance of projects. In fact, more often 
than not, civil society continues to be perceived simply as a hurdle to PSP; a hurdle often 
navigated through public relations campaigns or simply by ignoring stakeholder demands 
altogether. However, the commercial case for involving civil society organisations has 
grown strong, centring primarily on the reduction of risk and cost to the private sector. 
Given the limited understanding of local culture and business practices, and limited access 
to important local household data (including accurate information on demand, preferences, 
and willingness to pay), it is clear that operating risks in developing countries tend to be 
very high. Working with communities not only provides greater access to information and 
promotes collaboration, but it can also facilitate the integration of innovative, lower-cost 
service delivery solutions. Civil society partnership responsibilities can include a range of 
activities, from contributing to the actual design of contracts, to raising awareness and 
                                                
 
35 See Alaba (2002), reflecting on the Philippine experience; Foster (2002), reflecting on the Bolivian experience; and 
Hardoy (2005) reflecting on the Argentine experience. 
36 For more on the role that mediators play on partnerships, see Brinkerhoff (2002); Fiszbein and Lowden (1999). 
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disseminating information about the benefits of the partnership, providing labour for 
network installation and revenue collection, and providing temporary and alternative water 
supply to certain user groups.37 
As this thesis shows, within a partnership framework, NGOs and CBOs can have a 
very important role to play, not only as advocates for poor user groups, but also by helping 
to organise civil society and to establish more structured alliances with both the private and 
government sectors to meet mutually favourable goals. There is ample evidence pointing to 
the fact that a greater understanding of socio-economic conditions will lead to higher rates 
of return on development projects,38 and that this type of information is often more readily 
facilitated through local NGOs/CBOs. Again and again, academics, development 
practitioners, and policy-makers have made linkages between partnerships and poverty 
reduction (Beal, Crankshaw, and Parnell 2000; Fiszbein and Lowden 1998; Mitlin 1999; 
Rakodi 1993; Satterthwaite 1997). In fact, many also argue that when the NGO community 
is involved in projects on the ground, partnerships tend to be more flexible—whether 
dealing with local or central government authorities, global institutions, private businesses, 
or communities—creating an advantage when undertaking activities that promote 
coordination and collaboration among various partners (Mitlin 2001). 
  
                                                
 
37 For further details regarding partnership typologies, see: Adegoke, Boss, Figueres, and Grass (2007). For further 
reading on the range of ways in which partnerships can be structured in practice, see: Evans, Kaplan Devas and 
McMahon (2004). 
38 IDB studies show that programs designed to be compatible with local socioeconomic conditions average a rate of 
return of 18.3 per cent, compared to only 8 per cent for other projects (Sustainable Development Department 2000). 
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Chapter 3.  Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Methodological design can be thought of as the logic or master plan of a research 
endeavour—that which pulls together and structures how the various parts of inquiry and 
analysis address the given research questions. A case study is one of several social research 
methods that aim to understand human beings in their social context by interpreting the 
actions of a single group or single event. It is particularly useful in situations where the 
researcher has no control over the events as they unfold. In line with Yin (1984 and 1994) 
and Lewis Richie (2003), the case study of La Paz-El Alto is focused on a particular 
phenomenon within a real-life context. Data was collected from multiple sources and 
carried out within a defined time frame: 2002-2005. Stake (1995) identifies three different 
types of case studies: (i) intrinsic, (ii) instrumental and (iii) collective. Intrinsic case studies 
are carried out in situations where a case is extremely unique; the objective of studying 
these types of cases is not the pursuit of building a theory but simply the intrinsic, deep-
seated, value of the case itself. Instrumental case studies on the other hand, are selected 
because they provide insights into an existing theory (or help to develop a new theory). 
Lastly, the collective case study is carried out much like the instrumental case study, but 
extends to multiple cases.  
Like Stake, Yin (1993) also makes a distinction among three different types of 
case-based research but focuses instead on their theoretical objectives: exploratory, causal 
and descriptive. In order to understand the experiences and challenges of PSP in the 
provision of water services in La Paz-El Alto, exploratory as well as descriptive 
methodological approaches were used. In exploratory case studies the collection of data 
occurs before theories or specific research questions are formulated. The causal case study 
on the other hand, aims to find cause-and-effect relationships and explanatory theories of 
phenomena. Lastly, to carry out the descriptive case study, a theory must be formulated in 
advance and it needs to be the subject of review and debate. According to Yin, case studies 
can be single or multiple, embedded (where sub-units of study are more than one) or 
holistic (in circumstances where the case contemplates a global programme) and the design 
of the case should link evidence with research questions. The design should have clearly 
stated objectives linked to research questions, sub-questions and units of analysis. It should 
also identify critical evidence, interviews and documents that support the data.  
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Galliers (1991) and Yin (1994) point to various limitations of the case study 
approach, which were carefully considered for this research endeavour. Their primary 
issue of concern is the potential bias of the researcher, particularly in circumstances where 
case studies have not been carried out with sufficient rigour—that is, without triangulation 
and a disregard for the chain of evidence. The other main criticism of case studies is that it 
is often difficult to extract generalisations from findings and apply them to wider 
populations. In response to the generalisation criticism, however, Walsham (1995) 
maintains that the validity of the case does not depend on statistical generalisation but 
rather on the plausibility and cogency of the logical reasoning used to describe the results 
and to draw conclusions from these results. Also, as Yin (1994) points out, case studies can 
be generalisable to theories even when not generalisable to populations.  
Qualitative research tends to be carried out from a relativist perspective, which 
acknowledges the existence of multiple views of equal validity (Popay, Williams and 
Rogers 1998). In terms of methodological interpretation of data, triangulation is often 
presented as a means of addressing qualitative evidence; in its early application, 
triangulation was believed to combine rationalistic and naturalistic paradigms (Mitchell 
1986, Duffy 1987). However, the attempt to justify qualitative research through the use of 
a ‘trinity of truth’ has been part of an on-going struggle for acceptance of qualitative 
research from the scientific field. From a methodological standpoint, triangulation can be 
helpful when trying to circumvent researchers’ personal biases, thus increasing the validity 
of findings (Kimchi and Breitmayer 1991).  It is also possible to mix methods to strengthen 
the validation process (Tobin and Begley 2002). However, while triangulation addresses 
the issue of internal validity by using more than one method of data collection to answer a 
research question, it can be difficult to perform properly: data collected using different 
methods come in different forms (surveys, interviews, focus groups, transcripts). Mixing 
methods, therefore, seems appropriate given that our world consists of far more than three 
sides. Richardson (2000) and later Ellingson (2009) describe the importance of 
“crystallization”—a multidimensional approach to qualitative research. Crystallization is 
an alternative term to triangulation (Richardson 1991), which aims to harness the analytical 
potential of exceptions in qualitative findings, allowing a research question to be examined 
from various angles. As Mays and Pope (2000) conclude, comprehensiveness may be a 
more realistic goal than internal validity for qualitative research.  
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Research paradigms can also be classified into three philosophically distinct 
categories. Gephart (1999) describes these categories as positivism, interpretivism and 
critical postmodernism. The key features that these three philosophical perspectives share 
surrounds the nature of knowledge pursued. Positivists seek to understand human and 
social behaviour using a mixture of observation and experimentation—these researchers 
make the assumption that reality is objectively given and is measurable using scientific 
methods, and they pursue and present evidence by empirical means (Henning, Van 
Rensburg and Smit 2004). This approach works when the reality being observed is stable 
and unchanging, when the researcher can adopt an ‘objectivist’ perspective—a detached 
epistemological stance based on the belief that people’s perceptions and statements are 
either right or wrong, true or false. Interpretivists, on the other hand, assume that there is 
no objective knowledge that is independent of human reasoning (Gephart 1999). These 
researchers (i) build knowledge by drawing inferences or by judging the match between 
information and some abstract pattern, (ii) attempt to understand phenomena through the 
meanings that people assign to them (Deetz 1996), (iii) use meaning (versus measurement) 
methodologies, such as open ended interviews, and (iv) make a point not to predefine 
dependent or independent variables ahead of research endeavour, but rather focus on 
making sense of a situation as it emerges in all its complexity (Kaplan and Maxwell 1994). 
In addition to these points, Gadamer (1976) suggests that human beings must be 
understood in their social context, which involves a continuous exploration of the whole to 
the part and back to the whole again. They key to this methodology is participation, 
collaboration and engagement of a researcher who does not stand above or outside the 
phenomena being explored. Meanwhile, for Critical Postmodernists, social reality is 
historically constituted and is produced and reproduced by people (Myers 2009) whose 
actions are constrained by social, cultural and political contexts (Reeves and Hedberg 
2003).  The task for these researchers is to deconstruct discourse to reveal hidden 
dichotomies (e.g. public vs. private; social vs. economic good) and then offer and 
alternative social arrangement (Boje 2001). This study incorporates elements of 
interpretivism as well as critical postmodernism within its philosophical methodological 
paradigm.  
Given the interpretive position adopted for this research and the nature of the 
research question, a single case study was chosen because it provides a systematic way to 
collect data, analyse information, present results and explore the complexity of the La Paz-
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El Alto case with great depth. Careful attention was placed on assuring (i) ethically 
sourced responses from those surveyed and interviewed—the vulnerability of participants 
was consistently recognised and their contributions duly acknowledged (see section 3.8 for 
more on ethical considerations); (ii) accurate data collection using multiple methods 
(Merriam 1998); (iii) categorisation and mapping of evidence to primary and secondary 
research questions; and (iv) analytical triangulation and “crystallization” of findings 
whenever possible. It is important to note that case studies do not claim to be 
representative, but focus instead on what can be learned from a single case.
Figure 3-1: Conceptual map of the research strategy 
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3.2 Methodological Approach 
The approach used in this research breaks down the case study into five phases. Phase I 
was primarily exploratory in nature, involving an identification of one of the growing 
problems facing the water sector, an initial review of the PSP literature and a preliminary 
survey study of 300 households in six districts in El Alto.39 This exploratory phase was 
carried out before a theoretical framework was selected for structuring the research 
analysis. Table 3.1 summarises this initial identification of the problem, the gaps in the 
literature, and the case study rationale. Figure 3.1 provides a conceptual map of the 
research strategy. 
Phase II involved the creation of a primary research question, an evaluation of 
various theoretical frameworks, and the development of a series of research sub-questions, 
each with a corresponding hypothesis. Phase III was dedicated to the analysis of the La 
Paz/El Alto PPP concession contract, of Bolivian laws and regulations (including draft 
regulations that had not yet been passed), and of data on coverage provided by the utility 
operator and regulatory agency and on service quality and reliability collected in the field. 
Phase IV involved 60 in-depth household interviews in El Alto, two focus group 
discussion sessions, and a series of interviews with central and local government officials 
(those working in line-ministries and those working in regulatory agencies), Aguas de 
Illimani (AISA) staff members, non-government organisations active in water sector 
initiatives, community-based advocacy groups, and neighbourhood association leaders 
(NALs). This phase also included a trip to Washington, DC, where interviews were carried 
out with members of the IBRD, the IFC, and the IDB who had actively participated in 
various aspects of water sector reform in Bolivia. Phase V was analytical and involved 
evaluating data and writing up the dissertation; this took place in London. However, as the 
conflict in La Paz/El Alto was continuing to unfold, Bolivia’s two mainstream newspapers 
                                                
 
39 When research began, El Alto was divided into nine municipal districts, eight of which were officially designated as 
urban and one as rural. A new municipal promulgation published on 11 October 2005 recognised three additional 
districts, and there are now ten districts designated as urban and two as rural. These urban/rural distinctions are 
recognised in the AISA contractual agreement, and they are relevant to conflict over the concession.  
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and various other media sources continued to be monitored.40 Contact via email and 
telephone with many of those interviewed was maintained through to 2005. The last phase 
involved processing data, interpreting findings within the theoretical framework, and 
connecting these findings back to the literature to determine relevance and value added. 
Table 3-1: Summary of initial identification of the problem, the gaps in the literature, and the 
case study rationale 
Research Problem Literature Gap Case Study Rational 
Efforts across the 
developing world aimed at 
reforming water and 
sanitation service provision 
through market-oriented 
policies are currently facing 
a backlash from local and 
global civil society groups. 
This backlash has led to the 
termination or non-renewal 
of various PPP contracts 
and created uncertainty for 
the future of PSP in utility 
upgrades and expansion. 
The literature on water sector 
reform and PSP has become 
largely polarised in recent 
years, encumbered by 
ideological conflict over 
whether water should be 
treated as a public or 
economic good. The 
literature also tends to focus 
primarily on the outcomes 
and impacts of PSP rather 
than the process of reform 
and the perspective that 
consumers have toward the 
process of reform. 
Bolivia’s “Water War” of 2001, 
in the city of Cochabamba, 
exemplified the power of civil 
society to reverse market-
oriented reforms in the water 
sector. An understanding of how 
the La Paz/El Alto PPP 
concession is faring (from the 
perspective of consumers, 
government, and private sector 
stakeholders) would help to 
determine whether other cities 
experimenting with PSP are 
experiencing a similar shift in 
attitude against PSP. 
3.3 Case Study Rationale 
During the first few months of the PhD process, various methodological approaches were 
considered to study the complexities of private sector participation in water sector reform. 
I explored quantitative as well as qualitative methods and at one point attempted to 
combine both approaches. At first, I was eager to compare household perspectives toward 
PSP across two or three different cities where PPP concession arrangements were in place. 
I was also keen to evaluate the social impact of PSP in the water sector, compare user 
sentiment toward PSP (i.e. the degree to which they were "happy" with their new services), 
and correlate this with the differences among the three city cases in terms of their unique 
process of reform (i.e. pre-existing regulatory institutions, regulations and laws, degree of 
                                                
 
40 Media sources included: La Razon, La Prensa, and Indymedia. 
86 
 
 
openness and transparency of reform process, bidding and contractual arrangements and 
consumer outreach). In order to carry out such an elaborate research scheme, however, I 
would have (a) needed a great deal more funding resources to carry out field research, (b) 
required much more data from the government or utility about improvements made at the 
household level, and (c) required more resources to gain greater knowledge and 
understanding of the national contexts of each of these cases, their languages and cultural 
traditions, than was at my disposal (i.e. without a team of researchers). It is also important 
to note that at the time when this research process began, data relating to the social impact 
of PSP in these cities was scarce. I would have had to carry out a large-scale social impact 
survey across three cities as a stepping stone before delving into my primary research 
interest, which had more to do with understanding the root causes of ambivalence felt by 
users across the developing world toward PSP in the water sector. I began listening to the 
experiences of my fellow PhD researchers engaged in cross-national comparative work; 
these perspectives coupled with the advice of my supervisor led me to conclude that such 
comparative work would force greater compromises in methods than a single-country 
focus.  
I decided on a singe case study approach, involving multiple sources and 
techniques in the data gathering process and continued to pursue a combination of 
quantitative, as well as qualitative, data collection that would mix surveys, interviews, 
documentation review and observation. However, I was unsure as to whether to approach 
the research using an inductive methodology (starting from a loosely defined hypotheses 
and moving towards verification) or a deductive methodology (applying a general theory 
to a specific case in order to interpret certain aspects). Deductive research would require 
that I establish a hypothesis by using theory, collect data and information to confirm or 
reject my hypothesis and then present a critical analysis of how to resolve the issue (Gill 
and Johnson 2010). My concern with this approach for the La Paz/El Alto case was that I 
thought it might compromise the ability to pay attention fully to the respondent's 
perspectives.  
Did I want to test a theory or develop a theory? 
I knew that opinions were strongly divided about the legitimacy of the inductive 
approach, which involves almost a reverse approach to the deductive method, as it is based 
on observation first, then pattern evaluation, tentative hypothesis and theory development. 
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But my primary research question had potential for rich and complex answers [Why is 
there a disconnect between the positive perception that consumers have towards 
improvements made to their water and sanitation services under PSP arrangements and 
the negative perceptions that they have towards private sector participation in the 
provision of these services?] and I wanted to have as much methodological flexibility to 
extract honest reflections and opinions from the various respondents I would interview. I 
was attracted to the idea of beginning a research process that was open to all possible 
observations (and deviations from my pre-conceived ideas about the case). I wanted to 
explore the possibility that I could begin with detailed observations of the world and 
gradually move towards more abstract generalisations and ideas (Neuman 1997). In order 
to break down this broad research question three sub-questions were created using 
concepts from the NIE theoretical framework. These would invariably help to sort, process 
and categorise findings:  SQ1: How has the clash between the informal and formal 
institutional environment—the “rules” governing Bolivian society—influenced intended 
outcomes of water sector reform over time? SQ2: How have those institutional 
arrangements—regulations, channels of communication, methods of negotiation and 
contractual specification—created tensions between stakeholders involved in water sector 
reform and how does this affect the ability for policy-makers to accurately predict 
consumer preferences? SQ3: Are there additional factors, which have otherwise not been 
considered within the PSP literature and literature on water sector reform, which may 
contribute to these rising tensions? 
It became apparent along the way that it is often impossible not to introduce some 
degree of deductivism into the data gathering process, but I do not think that this 
necessarily inhibits the capacity to describe and explore. Eisenhardt (1989) notes that 
researchers can benefit from an element of a priori specification of constructs that can help 
to shape the initial design of theory building approaches. The various phases of my 
methodological approach built upon each other and – although the first phase was most 
certainly inductive in nature – as I developed secondary research questions and mini-
hypothesis, it became possible to incorporate many of the positive attributes of a deductive 
approach as well.  Diagram 2-7 provides a conceptual map of the process of this research 
endeavour. 
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3.4 Phase I: Grounded Exploratory Research in La Paz/El Alto 
The research process began in late 2002, shortly after Bolivia’s first “Water War”, at a 
time when much of the debate surrounding Bolivia’s experience with PSP in the water 
sector was focussed on the Cochabamba case. Research detailing the experiences of La 
Paz/El Alto, by contrast, suggested that the La Paz/El Alto PPP served as an exemplary 
model for “pro-poor” concessions. This pro-poor conceptualisation of the concession 
arrangement was largely because a great deal of literature had been published on the low-
cost condominial water and sewerage programme, which was carried out in El Alto 
through a partnership arrangement between a group of low-income communities, the 
government, AISA, the World Bank, and the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA). However, analysis on water sector reform and PSP in service provision has 
focussed primarily on measuring outcomes such as efficiency gains/losses, affordability, 
increased and/or improved user access, and welfare gains, and because of this there is very 
little information providing insight into the perspectives that users have towards sector 
reform. Therefore, before designing a research strategy based exclusively on this initial 
literature review, it was judged important to spend a couple of months in the field talking 
to those directly involved and affected by the reform process. 
A very simple consumer satisfaction survey was designed and later carried out in 
six districts of El Alto, in order to collect an initial data set that would illuminate the 
degree to which consumers were satisfied/unsatisfied with the current service being offered 
to them by AISA. The survey was designed on the principles of grounded theory, which 
meant that it avoided being static or confining through the use of generative questions 
(Strauss and Corbin 1998). This approach also countered preconceptions formed from 
prior engagement with the literature or from prior commitment to a theoretical model, and 
provided the necessary freedom for theoretical concepts to emerge directly from the 
grounded research findings (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Lincoln and Guba 1985; Van 
Maanen 1988). Most household surveys targeting low-income users tend to be geared 
towards understanding whether users can afford access to network water services, rather 
than toward exploring their preferences and/or levels of satisfaction. This is odd, 
considering that there is ample recognition across developed economies that consumer 
satisfaction is a critical construct in understanding consumer behaviour. In the developing 
country context, where PSP in service delivery is a relatively new phenomenon, it would 
seem that consumer satisfaction, consumer loyalty, and word-of-mouth recommendations 
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are extremely critical determinants in gaining public support for any market-oriented sector 
reform strategy. 
The initial household consumer satisfaction survey study (see Box 3.1) conducted 
in El Alto took place between November 2002 and January 2003. Over 300 households 
were interviewed. As with many social science procedures, this exploratory research 
sought to find out how people experienced the setting under consideration; it was 
important to explore what meanings people give to their actions, and what issues concern 
them (Chambliss, D.F. and Schutt 2009). The goal was ultimately to investigate a “social 
phenomenon” without explicit expectations, and to attempt to unearth a theory from the 
data itself rather than from a pre-disposed hypothesis. 
Preliminary findings from the household surveys yielded surprising results, with 
over 90 per cent of the consumers first surveyed in November 2002 indicating that they 
were generally “happier with their service under AISA in terms of water quality and 
reliability than they had been under SAMAPA.” Interestingly, the majority of these 
consumers indicated that increased tariffs were manageable. Nonetheless, regardless of 
how satisfied they were, most of those interviewed said that despite the improved services 
they were currently receiving from AISA (as compared to their experience under public 
and informal service provision), they were willing to participate or had participated in 
demonstrations against AISA. Despite improvements in terms of access and reliability, 
these residents were willing to risk a return to the public provision model because of a 
seemingly shared value and attitude that their water resources should not be in the hands of 
private, foreign, profit-seeking entities. 
These initial findings demonstrated that many of the current problems facing El 
Alto and Bolivia’s impetus for water sector reform had as much—if not more—to do with 
the negative perceptions that consumers had of AISA and the nature of the reform process, 
than with simply the structure and/or outputs of the PPP contractual arrangement. These 
initial survey findings, therefore, demanded a more complex reading of water sector 
reform, and they helped to determine the way in which the remainder of the research 
endeavour would be designed, including which theories would best frame future research 
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uestions, which data collection methodology would be used, and, ultimately, the analysis 
of findings.41 
Figure 3-2: Simple Survey Questions 
Are you satisfied/happy with service provision under AISA? 
In terms of access (condominial/conventional)? 
In terms of reliability? 
In terms of quality/safety? 
In terms of affordability? 
In terms of responsiveness? 
District Neighbourhoods Number of households 
District I 
Tejada Alpacoma 
12 de Octubre 
Santa Rosa 
Villa Santiago 
15 
11 
12 
9 
District II 
6 de Junio 
Las Deticias 
18 de Mayo 
Villa SantiagoII 
10 
10 
10 
13 
District III 
Juliana 
Eliodoro 
Camacho 
San Luis Tasa 
Cosmos 79 
20 
17 
19 
22 
21 
District IV 
31 de Junio 
Puerta del Sol 
16 de Febrero 
Gran Poder 
8 
9 
10 
13 
                                                
 
41 Exploratory research often relies on secondary research (including a review of existing case literature and data), as well 
as qualitative interviews (in research relating to businesses, this includes in-depth interviews and focus group discussions 
with consumers, employees, management, and competitors). 
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Are you satisfied/happy with service provision under AISA? 
In terms of access (condominial/conventional)? 
In terms of reliability? 
In terms of quality/safety? 
In terms of affordability? 
In terms of responsiveness? 
District Neighbourhoods Number of households 
District V 
Huayna Potosi 
Nueva Asuncion 
Rio Seco 
11 
12 
11 
District VI 
Alto Lima 
Ballivian 
Los Andes 
16 de Julio 
12 
15 
12 
13 
Total 23 320 
There was an overwhelming consensus among those surveyed in Phase I that 
customers were “more satisfied” with service provision under AISA than they were under 
the provision of the publicly owned/operated SAMAPA. Specifically, access to services 
had greatly improved, quality of service had greatly improved, and, in terms of 
responsiveness to their consumer-base (“respect for client’s wishes”), the water utility had 
demonstrated “significant improvement”. Although on the surface these results may seem 
to provide a powerful message about the benefits of PSP in the provision of services in La 
Paz/El Alto, the findings should be considered with a degree of scepticism and caution.  
It became increasingly clear while carrying out the large household survey that this 
quantitative methodological approach on its own would not provide a sufficient account of 
user sentiment. Many of the households in El Alto did not fully grasp the line of 
questioning—perhaps in part because they had never before participated in a consumer 
survey and perhaps because of a nascent sense of consumer identity. In much of the 
developed world we take our sense of consumer identity for granted; we tend to understand 
our rights as consumers, and for the most part we know how to enforce these rights. 
However, in most developing nations, where service provision has historically failed to 
meet the needs of the majority of citizens, the culture of consumer identity remains largely 
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illusory. For example, although the majority of respondents surveyed ascertained that 
service provision was indeed ‘better “today” under AISA than it was “before” under 
SAMAPA’, these same respondents used the interview opportunity to seek out clarification 
on their billing statements and AISA’s fining practices. In the same breath with which they 
voiced their gratitude for having improved services, they simultaneously provided 
anecdotes about water shortages, broken meters, and pressure problems. Respondents 
would even ask for my own opinion as to whether the water flowing from their taps was 
safe enough to drink. So while these households might have been quick to respond 
positively to a general question about their overall level of satisfaction, this response alone 
could not be interpreted as an absolute indication of excellent services. What it does 
indicate is simply that from the perspective of the consumers surveyed, AISA was 
provisioning a much better service than that which they had received previously relative to 
what households suffered in the past in terms of inadequate service delivery. 
Although, as noted above, the majority of those interviewed asserted their 
preference for AISA over SAMAPA, many respondents were extremely confused about 
their billing statements and quite a few had accumulated extraordinary fines without 
realising it. Others were temporarily disconnected from the network at the time in which 
the survey was conducted, and some of these respondents felt it was easier to move house 
than to pay to be reconnected to the network. Some claimed to have meters that were 
broken, explaining that their meters were rarely checked, and some were perplexed as to 
why billing statements varied from month to month. Others mentioned that they continued 
to treat their water before consumption, for fear of getting ill. 
The other interesting result that began to emerge during the interview process—
although the survey questions had not been designed to elicit this type of information—
was that it became apparent that many of those interviewed were willing to participate in 
public demonstrations against the utility operator. Also, although the survey did not 
question consumers about the Cochabamba case, many of those interviewed used the 
opportunity to indicate their pride in the way the people of Cochabamba had managed to 
contest the government’s attempts to “privatise” the city’s utility. These findings suggested 
that indicators such as a consumer’s perspective on “affordability” and/or “improved 
access” do not give a complete interpretation of how sector reforms were being 
internalised by individual consumers. In fact, the most interesting finding from the first 
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phase of field-research was the contradiction between the positive remarks respondents 
made about improvements under AISA and their almost visceral negativism against PSP in 
general. Interviews, which were designed to last no longer than 15 minutes per household, 
increasingly began to run on for far longer and to deviate substantially from the specific 
survey questionnaire. Nonetheless, the survey was completed.  
Given the initial set of findings, a methodological decision was made at this point 
to return to the field with an improved set of interview questions and with more time 
allocated to each open-ended interview session. More in-depth discussions were required 
to gather information regarding the perceptions, motivations, attitudes and values of this 
consumer base, as well as in relation to their cultural practices and behaviour. Findings 
from the first phase of this research were, therefore, not used for the quantitative purposes 
initially conceived, although they were used to help structure the overall research design 
strategy and with the development of research questions and hypotheses.  
3.5 Phase II: Research Strategy 
Development of Research Questions, Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework 
Upon returning from the first phase of field research, a primary research question was 
developed: Why is there a disconnect between the positive perception that consumers have 
towards improvements made to their water and sanitation services under PSP arrangements 
and the negative perceptions that consumers have towards private sector participation in 
the provision of these services? 
In order to address this primary research question, four theoretical frameworks 
were initially considered. The first of these was to evaluate the process of water sector 
reform within the context of global social policy, which would focus the research strategy 
on exploring the ways in which the politics of globalisation influenced national social 
policy agenda-setting in Bolivia. There is no question that global actors played a strong 
role in shaping the process of water sector reform in Bolivia; these actors, which not only 
included international development organisations such as the World Bank Group, but also 
powerful International NGO interventions, had the capacity to enrich the national social 
policy debate and to empower in turn many local actors. Understanding the influence of 
these agencies, which often compete to shape national social policy discourse around PSP 
in the water sector, seemed extremely relevant to understanding the case of La Paz/El Alto. 
However, the initial set of findings suggested that global influences on social policy 
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formulation were only one piece of the puzzle in the study of the water sector paradigm. 
This approach on its own would not provide a complete picture of how or why consumer 
perceptions, motivations, and behaviour are influenced by other factors, such as local 
socio-historical or cultural norms, values, ambitions, and behaviour. Also, this theoretical 
approach would not help to further our understanding of the influence that information 
asymmetries between consumers, service providers, and government stakeholders were 
having on the sustainability of reforms; and information asymmetry issues were extremely 
evident during the first phase of research. Eventually it was decided that the global social 
policy framework would only narrow our conceptualisation of the ways in which national-
policies are shaped in the developing context. 
The second set of theoretical frameworks considered to explore the primary 
research question were rights-based moral theories, which focus on the identification of 
the moral rights relevant to a particular course of action, such as the right to life, the right 
to self-determination, the right to privacy—or in this case, the right to water. The 
recognition of different dimensions of water rights includes: usages (domestic, industrial, 
agricultural), boundaries (local, regional, and international), values (cultural, social, 
environmental, and economic), and users (human beings and all other life). Water is 
perceived in this context as essential for securing social justice, dignity, equality, and 
peace, entitling all users to sufficient and non-discriminatory access to water, as well as to 
a line of legal recourse. Since the right to water is explicitly enshrined in two UN human 
rights treaties,42 this type of approach to the study of water sector reform is relatively 
commonplace. However, although it would have been interesting to use a rights-based 
approach to explore the nature of consumer behaviour in the La Paz/El Alto case, this 
approach is quite confining. A rights-based approach does not allow much room for an 
analysis of other stakeholders impacted by the process of reform. More importantly, it does 
not recognise or support the notion that policy-makers often need to adopt utilitarian 
approaches to improving access to clean water regardless of the primacy of individual 
rights; utilitarian moral theories focus on the “greatest good for the greatest number” and 
                                                
 
42 These are the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child. The right is also included in a regional treaty: the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of 
the Child. Also, the Geneva Conventions guarantee the protection of this right during armed conflict. 
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do not recognise individual rights as the primary ethical concern. Structuring the La Paz/ 
El Alto case in terms of a moral theoretical approach would have presented the constant 
challenge of having to resolve the central conflict between utilitarian and rights-based 
theories. Also, using a rights-based conceptual framework would have biased the research 
strategy from its inception, as the framework presupposes that services are a “right” rather 
than a “privilege.” Starting with this a priori moral assumption would certainly have made 
it challenging to incorporate the perspectives, motivations, and behaviour of the each of the 
various stakeholders involved and/or impacted by the process of water sector reform in 
Bolivia. 
The third set of theoretical tools that were considered to explore the case study 
consisted of stakeholder and agency theories. Stakeholder theory examines individual 
preferences with the understanding that these individuals, and the groups they form, have 
particular relationships with an organisation and with each other. In a company, such 
stakeholders should include diverse constituencies, including customers and employees, 
suppliers, shareholders, stockholders, members of the financial community, branches of 
government, consumer advocate groups and other activist groups, trade associations, 
political groups, unions, and competitors (Freeman 1984; Brenner and Cochran 1991; Hill 
and Jones 1992).43 Stakeholder analysis is a central theme in methodologies that seek to 
accommodate multiple interests. For example, Ramírez (2001) provides a typology with 
eight contextual dimensions that come into play in accommodating multiple interests: the 
nature of the problem, the stakeholders, the convenor, the networks, stakeholders' 
capacities, and stakeholders' choices over procedures to deal with conflicts, negotiations, 
and dispute resolution. These eight dimensions function as lenses though which to analyse 
a multiple stakeholder situation. Although this is a useful methodological tool for 
identifying and mapping interactions between stakeholders, the theory seems to lack 
sufficient specificity and offers a somewhat unrealistic view of how organisations (be they 
utility operators, government agencies, or community-based organisations) operate. Also, 
relationships between stakeholders can only really be understood in terms of their place 
                                                
 
43 Clarkson (1995) makes a differentiation between primary and secondary stakeholders by categorising the firm and its 
employees, shareholders, customers, and suppliers as primary stakeholders, and the media and various special interest 
groups as secondary stakeholders. 
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within different strata or layers of social reality, and this requires consideration of 
historical and cultural contexts. Stakeholder analysis on its own does not provide a 
sufficient framework for integrating these layers of social reality into the analysis of the 
case study. 
Agency theory generally refers to the variety of ways in which agents linked by 
contractual arrangements with an organisation influence its behaviour. Agency theory was 
thought to be a key element to gaining insight into the attitudes that private utility 
operators have towards the risks involved in servicing low-income households. The 
underlying mechanism by which the relationship between a utility operator and 
government is articulated is based on a contract. The essence of agency theory in the 
context of PSP in water provision rests on the assumption that: (i) the desires or goals of a 
utility operator are in conflict with the desires and goals of the government; and (ii) that it 
is difficult or expensive for the government to verify what a utility operator is doing. The 
main problem that this theory identifies concerns risk sharing; the government and a utility 
operator have different attitudes towards risk and different preferences as to the types of 
risk they are willing to take on. While agency theory can be applied to explain the 
relationships between various stakeholders involved in the process of water sector reform, 
the results are mostly conceptual interpretations. Strictly speaking, the basic unit of 
analysis in agency theory is the contract that governs the relationship between a principal 
and an agent. For example, because there is no legal contract drawn up between a utility 
operator and the community, agency theory on its own would not help us to understand the 
relationship dynamic that exists between these two critical stakeholders. Also, even if one 
were to find a way of evaluating an implicit social contract between the community and a 
company (see Donaldson 1982; Donaldson and Dunfee 1999), it would be unclear with 
whom this social contract would have been drawn up, seeing as individual members of a 
community may not necessarily share similar interests. Exploring issues relating to the 
contract is certainly crucial to our understanding of the La Paz/El Alto case, but it is only 
one unit of analysis worthy of consideration. The objective of this research was to delve 
beyond the “fine print”—beyond a narrow analysis of the contractual arrangement. 
Elements of each of the aforementioned theoretical frameworks are useful for the 
analysis of the La Paz/El Alto case. On their own, however, they do not sufficiently answer 
all the questions driving this research. New Institutional Economics (NIE) was therefore 
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chosen as the most appropriate conceptual starting point, because the framework places 
significant importance on agency theory but locates it within a larger institutional, social, 
and political economy context. Choosing NIE as a conceptual framework offered a series 
of theoretical propositions to (i) guide the development of secondary research questions 
and hypotheses, (ii) structure data collection and analysis, and invariably (iii) provided a 
strong structure for carrying out the research strategy. The flexibility and reach that the 
framework offered into other disciplines (sociology, psychology, anthropology, political 
science, history, economics, and social policy) proved to be a vital element of this 
comprehensive approach, as this deepened the scope for analytical interpretation of the 
data.  
Research sub-questions were developed that incorporated certain key elements of 
NIE, namely: (i) the influences of informal institutions on economic behaviour, (ii) the 
interactions between institutional environments and governance structures; (iii) the 
influences of institutions on rationality, with consideration for emotional, cognitive 
responses of consumers; and (iv) the influence of informal/formal institutions on 
transaction costs. Table 3.2 provides the secondary research questions sub-hypotheses. 
A more extensive review of the literature related to Bolivia was conducted upon 
returning from the first phase of the field research within the framework of NIE. This time, 
additional emphasis was placed on exploring the history of market-oriented reforms and 
the process of institutional formalisation in Bolivia more generally. Sociology, 
anthropology, and even archaeology-oriented literature regarding the communities of El 
Alto was also reviewed, in order to develop further an understanding of the cultural norms 
and value-systems that made up AISA’s predominantly indigenous consumer base. Time 
boundaries were set for case-study, ranging from early 1994, when the sector reform 
process began, through to January 2005, when the reform measures proved unsustainable 
and the PPP contractual arrangement was abruptly terminated.44 Fortunately, the radical 
and well-documented experiences of the La Paz/El Alto concession offered an opportunity 
to conduct a methodologically rigorous study, and data collection was attained via multiple 
                                                
 
44 The original time period was meant to evaluate a 10-year period, from 1994–2004. This was extended because of the 
interesting turn of events that began to unfold between late 2003 and 2004. 
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sources in and out of the field, including empirical studies, government archives, legal and 
regulatory documents, newspaper articles, company documents including the concession 
contract, and interview-based discussions with representative stakeholders involved in 
Bolivia’s reform process. 
Table 3-2: Research Sub-Questions  
Sub-Questions Hypotheses 
How has the clash between the informal 
and formal institutional environment—the 
“rules” governing Bolivian society—
influenced intended outcomes of water 
sector reform over time? 
While today we may be witnessing a clash 
between the informal and formal institutions that 
support the provision of water, the real source of 
conflict that we must confront in the water 
sector today is perhaps the politicisation of 
water provision rather than the commodification 
of water provision. 
How have those institutional 
arrangements—regulations, channels of 
communication, methods of negotiation 
and contractual specification—created 
tensions between stakeholders involved in 
water sector reform and how does this 
affect the ability for policy-makers to 
accurately predict consumer preferences? 
The delicate nature of the water sector provides 
evidence of how under certain institutional 
constraints, where optimum accumulation of 
information is virtually impossible, human 
behaviour cannot always be expected to be 
rational, and it can become motivated by a 
volatile set of preferences, making it particularly 
difficult for policy-makers to manage the reform 
process and accurately predict reform outcomes. 
Stakeholders underestimate the 
transaction/transition costs involved in the 
process of reform and PPP implementation due 
to information and bargaining asymmetries, 
which manifests in poor institutional 
arrangements. 
Are there additional factors, which have 
otherwise not been considered within the 
PSP literature and literature on water 
sector reform, which may contribute to 
these rising tensions? 
Systemic barriers, beyond the control of 
stakeholders, constrained the space for 
partnership innovation and flexibility during the 
process of reform. 
As discussed above, the original intention of this research project was to combine 
quantitative and qualitative research methods. However, given the complex results from 
the initial survey and the realisation that the evidence from this survey would not provide 
an accurate picture of the challenge of water sector reform in the Bolivian context, it was 
deemed inappropriate to draw conclusions from the statistics. As mentioned, it became 
clear during the first phase of research that most of the respondents interviewed had never 
participated in a consumer satisfaction survey. It also became clear that the questions asked 
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in the survey were not framed so that respondents could fully answer questions in a way 
that left them personally fulfilled. The shift to a qualitative approach was deemed 
necessary to illustrate the range of views (and complex basis for these views) beyond what 
the survey results provided.  These open-ended, semi-structured discussions (interviews 
and focus groups) with households during the second stage of fieldwork would ultimately 
provide a freedom for respondents to communicate their thoughts on the topic of water and 
introduce issues that I had otherwise not considered. It was through this less guarded 
dialogue, that the extraordinary scale of influence of Bolivia's informal institutional 
environment was revealed.  
3.6 Phase III: Extended Literature Review 
The initial review of the literature primarily focussed on issues relating specifically to the 
water sector, privatisation, natural resource management, development and regulation 
across infrastructure sectors. However, in order to answer the primary and secondary 
questions an extended literature review was required to deepen my understanding of 
Bolivian context. To gain insight into the historical perspective in which water sector 
formalisation occurred in Bolivia, various books were reviewed (Klein 2003; Crabtree 
2005; Van Cott 2000; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Olivera and Lewis 2004), which 
contained considerable information relating to the history of social movements, the 
dramatic struggle for democracy, participation, equal rights, and cultural recognition, both 
across South America in general and in the Bolivian context in particular. Although the 
treatment of water is not dealt with explicitly in this literature, these authors help us to 
consider how the increasing influence of urbanisation on social movements might have had 
impacts on the process of water sector reform. They also provide us with insights into 
indigenous values and cultural practices (i.e. the informal rules that tend to govern this 
segment of the population) which are critical to our interpretation of consumer behaviour 
in the La Paz/El Alto case. 
This literature also greatly enhances our conceptualisation of water and sanitation 
provision in the urban context beyond the strict analysis of PPP contracts, and presents the 
essential background required to understand not only the plurality of identities crusading 
for improved access to basic services (needed in order to survive), but also the type of 
conflict that originates in people’s efforts to bring about a new institutional order. These 
books, and the myriad additional papers reviewed, suggest that the social movements of La 
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Paz/El Alto over PSP in the water sector were multifaceted in character, and they support 
the arguments made as part of this research, that the sustainability of the PPP concession 
was entangled within a much broader social, political, economic, and cultural struggle. 
3.7 Phase IV: Second-Stage Fieldwork in La Paz/El Alto and Washington, DC 
Stakeholders Identified for Interviews 
Local government officials 
Staff of central government line ministries 
Staff of the regulatory agencies 
Consumers/households 
Consumer associations 
Previous employees of SEMAPA 
Employees of AISA  
Micro-credit agencies 
Neighbourhood leaders (elected/self-appointed local civil society representatives) 
International NGOs 
World Bank, IDB, UNDP, USAID, and SIDA staff members 
Outsourced legal/financial PPP advisors 
Journalists 
Semi-structured focus interviews with government (line-ministries, regulatory agencies, 
municipal authorities), civil society (neighbourhood association leaders, NGOs and 
CBOs), and the private sector (AISA). Three different questionnaires were designed 
around a set of thematic issues. Given that many of the questions were historical, it was 
understandable that some stakeholders interviewed would present retrospective self-
justifications for their role and for what happened. Instead of making attempts to avoid this 
natural reaction, respondents were encouraged to explain their version of the “story” in 
order to enrich the data being collected. Indeed, questions were specifically designed to 
elicit stakeholder hidden interests in order to determine whether they were aligned, or in 
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conflict with, the stories of others and/or the government’s original policy objectives. 
Some words and phrases were specifically chosen to trigger emotional responses. It was 
assumed that respondents would be able to give at least 30 minutes for an interview 
(Merton, Fiske, and Kendall 1990). The goal was to interview at least ten decision-making 
stakeholders within each stakeholder grouping (civil society, government, and private 
sector) and to conduct an additional series of interviews/focus groups targeted specifically 
at users/consumers.  
Household interviews. Before a municipal reorganisation in 2005, El Alto had nine 
districts, eight urban and one rural, and the city can be divided into three zones: the city’s 
Northern Zone is populated by migrants from the Altiplano, or high plateau, who are 
engaged predominantly in artisan manufacturing and commercial activities; La Ceja 
dominates the Central Zone, where the principal public services, including water and 
electrical power, are located. The Southern Zone has some factories and is home to 
migrants from the southern region of the La Paz department. Households from districts 1–6 
were selected for this study, and were chosen at random. Unfortunately, in many of the 
neighbourhoods, tensions and crime rates were very high while this research was carried 
out. Therefore, all semi-structured household interviews were conducted during the day to 
lessen the risk to personal safety. This meant that the majority of interviews were 
conducted with female respondents. Qualitative, semi-structured interviews were used so 
that participants were encouraged to talk about what was important to them, including 
issues not raised by the questionnaire. The interviews, which took an average of 45 
minutes, were conducted in person. The majority of those interviewed did not feel 
comfortable being recorded and it took much longer than expected to convince each 
household of the purpose of the visit. This was also the case during Phase I, when the 
initial larger survey was carried out. In order to deal with this issue, a local resident of El 
Alto, who also spoke Quechua, was hired as an assistant. Most of the interviews were 
conducted directly outside the premises of the households and/or on nearby street curbs.  
Interviews with AISA and government stakeholders. Most appointments were easy 
to schedule, and ministerial/regulatory authorities, as well as private sector stakeholders, 
were willing to meet on multiple occasions. Many interviews took place early morning, 
before the workday began, or in the evening. The fact that these meetings often took place 
outside the work environment (in coffee shops and in restaurants) allowed a certain degree 
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of informality that proved extremely effective, facilitating a sense of ease in respondents 
and encouraging them to speak more freely than they might otherwise have done sitting 
behind a desk and in earshot of colleagues. Throughout the interviews, a conscious effort 
was made to communicate a sense of deep empathy with respondents views and to ask 
“how” rather than “why” questions whenever possible, to help prevent respondents from 
becoming defensive (Becker 1998). Fortunately, in most cases, a certain level of trust was 
established quite quickly and most respondents were extremely helpful, passing on internal 
and/or draft documents and sometimes acting as informants rather than respondents. 
Focus groups. Two focus groups were carried out. This was an attempt to cross-
check some of the data gathered through the semi-structured interviews in a short period of 
time, and to elicit from users any additional concerns relevant to the research that might 
otherwise have been overlooked. These groups varied in size, from 8–12 participants, and 
each participant was specifically selected for their availability for the full 1.5 hour session 
(Tang and Davis 1995; Krueger 1988).  
3.8  Ethical Considerations 
One of the most important aspects of carrying out any type of qualitative research, 
especially that which involves surveying and interviewing households and public officials, 
is attention to research ethics. Ethical issues need to be considered in any kind of research 
and the protection of participants, particularly their right to privacy, is imperative. 
Batchelor and Briggs (1994) claim that the failure of researchers to address ethical issues 
tends to result in those researchers being poorly equipped to deal with the unpredictable 
nature of qualitative research. The nature of ethical problems in qualitative research can 
often be complex as qualitative researchers focus their research on exploring, examining 
and describing people in their natural environments. Also, the relationship between 
researchers and participants can often evoke power imbalances that need to be thoughtfully 
planned for.  Ramos (1989) outline three different types of problems that may affect 
qualitative studies: the researcher/participant relationship, the researcher’s subjective 
interpretations of data, and the design itself. Miles and Huberman (1984) raise a number of 
ethical questions that researchers need to be aware of before, during and after research has 
been conducted: (i) Do participants have full knowledge of what is involved in research 
endeavour? (ii) Can the study hurt participants? (iii) Is the researcher being truthful in 
presenting data? (iv) Will the study intrude on privacy, confidentiality and/or anonymity? 
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(v) What should a researcher do if participants display unethical, harmful or illegal 
behaviour? 
When preparing research protocol for this case study, careful consideration was 
given to making full disclosure of my research intentions, acquiring informed consent and 
maintaining confidentiality wherever appropriate. A balanced relationship between myself 
(as researcher) and participants provided rich material related to the case, encouraged 
disclosure, trust and awareness of potential ethical issues. Interviews are a moral 
endeavour, as Kvale (1996) explains, because participants’ responses are affected by the 
interview and any knowledge gained through the interview affects our understanding of the 
human experience. For this reason, and the fact that qualitative research methods do not 
easily lend themselves to predict how data will be collected through interviews and 
observations (Streubert and Carpenter, 1999), researchers have an obligation to anticipate 
possible outcomes and carefully weigh the benefits and harm that may result from the 
relationship between researcher and participant.    
3.9 Evaluating research data and analysis 
Data analysis is a process of breaking up, separating, or disassembling of research 
materials into pieces, parts, elements or units, in order to reconstruct data in a meaningful 
and comprehensible fashion (Jorgensen 1998). In some cases, codes can help to 
summarise, synthesize and sort the myriad observations made, particularly in grounded 
methodological research where data may at first seem like a mass of confusing and 
unrelated material (Charmaz 2006). However, as Agar (1991) cautions, intensive data 
coding, disassembly, sorting and sifting is not necessarily the most appropriate strategy.  
There are numerous perspectives on what a researcher can and should notice in 
their data and how they should go about the process of making observations, writing field 
notes, recording interviews, gathering documents and producing a record of these findings. 
But the essence of qualitative research is to use the human researcher as the research 
instrument. While there are limitations in relying solely upon the researcher’s mind for 
data analysis, given the constraint of our fallible memory, the human brain remains the 
most powerful instrument for data processing and the role of thinking and intuition should 
not be underestimated (Marshall & Rossman 2006). Fetterman (1989) argues that entry to 
the research field—the identification of informants and key events, the design and re-
design of the research, and so on—all relies heavily on on-the-spot thinking and decisions 
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so while a researcher may employ other techniques to process data, these techniques 
require the ability to synthesise and evaluate information—critical thinking and a large 
dose of common sense.  
Because the qualitative researcher's mind never stops analysing data during the 
process of research, there is no point in pretending that the researcher must wait for the 
flow charts, matrices or computer printouts for inspiration (Goetz and LeCompte 1984). In 
fact, the researcher would be going against qualitative convention by processing the data 
only at the last stage of research. Flow charts, matrices and computers help the researcher 
systematise thinking, consolidate the data and facilitate communicating results to a wider 
readership but there is no substitute for intuitions and insights. Also, observations carried 
out during the research process often say as much about the observer as they do about the 
observed—field notes are ultimately selective, purposed and angled because they are 
authored (Emerson et al 1995). For the purposes of this research, guidance from Goetz and 
LeCompte (1984) was helpful for evaluating research findings. These authors use the term 
theorising to describe the process of thinking or intuition during a qualitative research. The 
first stage in theorising is perception, where the researcher accepts data but also gradually 
focuses on some analytic units for further research. The second stage comprises 
comparing, contrasting, aggregating and ordering. In this stage the researcher's mind 
organises and classifies the data so that some categories emerge. In the third stage, 
speculation, the researcher tries to conceptualise what is perceived and arrive at some 
initial hypotheses. The process repeats, so that hypotheses generated are further refined, 
modified, rejected or confirmed.  
Assessing the accuracy of qualitative research findings is not obvious but there are 
strategies that enhance the trustworthiness of the evidence. The traditional criteria for 
ensuring the credibility of research data—objectivity, reliability and validity—can be 
assessed in a relatively straightforward way because of standardised instruments for 
scientific and experimental research. The literature (Guba and Lincoln 1985, Krefting 1991 
and Creswell 1998) point to four strategies: credibility, transferability, dependability and 
conformability. Declaring credibility may involve getting member feedback on the data, 
interpretations and conclusions from participants involved in the study. This has been done 
wherever possible—sections of findings were sent to a number of people who had been 
interviewed as part of this research. Transferability can be achieved by providing a rich, 
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detailed description of the situation –sufficient information for a reader to be able to judge 
the applicability of the findings to another setting, case or theory (Seal 1999). The 
following techniques, based on Meriam (1998), were used to enhance the dependability, or 
reliability, of the case research findings: (i) explanations of assumptions and theory behind 
the study, (ii) use of multiple methods of data collection and analysis (triangulation and 
crystallization), (iii) explanation of how data was collected to allow for an audit trail if 
necessary. Lastly, confirmability—the degree to which findings can be corroborated by 
others and the extent to which I, the researcher, can account for my own individual 
subjectivity or bias—was paramount to this research endeavour. All data collected was 
organised into a retrievable form, archived in a way that would make it relatively easy for 
other researchers to access information and/or for others to challenge findings. 
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Chapter 4.  Case Background: The La Paz/El Alto Concession 
4.1 Friends of Bolivia: The Emergence of a Franco-Bolivian Alliance 
With the arrival of former president Jacques Chirac in Bolivia on 11 March 1997, an 
editorial in the French newspaper Le Figaro the next day asserted that “Latin America 
would no longer be the dominion of the United States” and that Chirac’s eagerness to 
invest in Bolivia “would equip the country to better resist pressures from Washington, 
DC.”45 Many other articles appeared in the French and Bolivian press over the three-week 
period in which Chirac toured the Mercosur Region (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, 
and Uruguay), each enthusiastically welcoming the prospect of major European investment 
opportunities in the country and a general shift away from investment reliance on North 
America. Approximately 5,000 police officers were mobilised in La Paz to watch over 
Chirac and his entourage, which consisted of 220 people—a mix of government and 
private entrepreneurs. Unsurprisingly, this caused quite a commotion in such a small 
country, which had a population of just over 9 million at this time,46 and during the few 
days that he spent in the city, Chirac kept quite busy with a variety of ceremonies and 
honorary award presentations. The most significant honours included the inauguration of 
an Avenida Francia (Spanish for French Avenue) and, even more impressive, he received 
Bolivia’s most distinguished award, “El Cóndor de los Andes”. Perhaps in exchange for 
these honours, or perhaps to defy the US government and to make a mark on the future of 
Bolivia’s infrastructure development, Chirac made a pledge to provide SAMAPA, then the 
publicly owned and operated water and sanitation utility servicing the cities of La Paz and 
El Alto, with USD 6 million in grants for rehabilitation purposes, along with a promise of 
future credit to start construction on a new water treatment facility.47 
At the time, demographic growth and migration from rural areas were considerably 
increasing Bolivia's urban population, which between 1950 and 1992 had risen from 26 per 
cent to 58 per cent of the total population. This increase was especially noticeable in larger 
cities such as La Paz/El Alto, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. As a result, such urban centres 
                                                
 
45 Author’s translation. 
46 In 1997 the population of Bolivia 2007, the population was 9.3 million (UN 2007). 
47 Centro de Documentación e Información Bolivia – Cedib. 
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generated great pressure on public services, the demand for which was simply not being 
met effectively. Comparatively, Bolivia had one of the lowest rates of water supply and 
sanitary sewerage coverage in all of Latin America (2001 census, reported in the La Paz 
newspaper La Razon, 12 June 2002); in 1997 it was estimated that public water supply 
systems covered less than 75 per cent of the population in urban areas, meaning close to 1 
million urban inhabitants did not have access to this service. Sewage disposal system 
coverage was even lower, estimated at 36 per cent.48 The health of the Bolivian population 
was generally poor, with a life expectancy of 59.7 years and the highest infant mortality 
rate in all of Latin America: 83 per 1,000 live births (IDB 1997; UNICEF 1999). Enteric, 
water-borne diseases were the second-most common illness recorded and the most 
common cause of infant morbidity and mortality. 
Chirac’s announcement of support for the Bolivian water sector immediately 
followed a personalised tour of SAMAPA, which was given by the then-president of 
Bolivia, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, who was also known as “Goni.” Goni was best-
known for his neo-liberal economic approach to development and for the shock therapy 
policies he had initiated as leader of the previous administration’s economic task force, 
which ultimately had put a stop to hyperinflation49 through the adoption of a very tight 
monetary policy. He was also raised and educated in the United States, from primary 
school through to his graduation from the University of Chicago, where he trained in 
Economics. This period of absence from Bolivia, combined with his seemingly strong 
friendships with Washington’s governmental agencies and with academics such as Jeffrey 
Sachs (not to mention the American accent with which he spoke in Spanish), would earn 
Goni the reputation of being Bolivia’s “gringo president.” After being elected in 1994, 
Goni initiated a unique type of partial privatisation under a new law called the Ley de 
Capitalizacion. This law allowed the Government to create new mixed capital corporations 
with the assets of state companies, opening key, formerly State controlled, growth sectors 
to domestic and foreign private investment. Under this scheme, the government transferred 
50 per cent of the shares of five out of Bolivia’s six largest enterprises (across the 
                                                
 
48 In rural areas, these percentages were lower still, with an organized water supply service available to only 24 per cent 
of the population, and only 15 per cent with access to latrines or other appropriate individual disposal systems. 
49 In 1985 inflation was an astounding 13,000 per cent. 
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telecommunications, electricity, hydrocarbons, transport, and infrastructure sectors50) to 
strategic investors in return for their commitment to investment and high performance. 
Between 1994 and 1997, modern regulatory systems were also created for most 
infrastructure sectors and for the financial sector. Uniquely, the capitalisation scheme 
transferred the rest of the shares to Bolivian citizens, primarily through pension funds. At 
the time of Chirac’s visit, Goni had approximately five months remaining of his term in 
office and, therefore, he had only a short window of opportunity left to pursue international 
investment interest in the water sector as part the capitalisation initiative.  
The April following Chirac’s visit was quite challenging for SAMAPA, as, 
unknown to most employees, plans were being made for its partial privatisation and the 
utility was undergoing internal staff reorganisation and operational changes.51 In May, a 
technical assistance grant from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) for USD 
980,00052 was provided to the Ministry of Capitalisation to assist the government with (i) 
the preparation of the regulatory framework for the sector; (ii) the development of quality 
standards for water and sanitation services; and (iii) the start-up and strengthening of the 
new water and sanitation regulatory agency. Throughout the months that followed, 
regulations outlining the specific powers and responsibilities of the new Superintendency 
of Basic Services (SISAB) were negotiated and sent to the Bolivian congress for approval. 
These regulations would ultimately define the new market structure for the Bolivian water 
and sanitation sector. Toward the end of May, seven weeks after Chirac left Bolivia and 
just three weeks after the government initiated its regulatory reform programme, the 
Government released invitations to bidders for the La Paz/EL Alto concession. Advisory 
services were quickly solicited to assist in the bidding process; contrary to what much of 
the literature suggests, these advisors were not from the IDB or the World Bank but were 
                                                
 
50 Specifically, YPFB (oil and gas), ENDE (electricity), ENTEL (telecommunications), LAB (airlines), ENFE 
(railroads) and EMV (tin/antimony). 
51 Interview with Johnny Cuellar, Superintendent at SISAB, and with Roberto Bianchi, Managing Director of AISA, 11 
December 2002. 
52 The total amount invested in this project endeavour was USD 1,333,000; USD 980,000 came from the IDB and USD 
353,000 from the Bolivian government (IDB Project Document TC-96-05-16-6, 1997). 
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rather a private consortium of British consultants from Halcrow, Melveny, and Myers, and 
from the French Paribas Bank. 
It is important to note that the formative part of the PPP process—the design of the 
offer letter, the bidding, the contract negotiations, and the transfer of SAMAPA to the new 
PPP structure—was strictly carried out by the Ministry of Capitalisation, rather than by the 
Vice-Ministry of Basic Services and/or the newly created SISAB. At the time, it was 
assumed that the Ministry of Capitalisation, having dealt with the previous sales of other 
state-owned enterprises, was more experienced in negotiating with private investors. 
Further, the National Basic Sanitation Directorate, which was the specific department 
within the Vice-Ministry of Basic Services responsible for country-wide water and 
sanitation policy and planning, was also left out of this aspect of the PPP process.53 Given 
that the water sector was not given much prioritisation prior to the 1990s, at this time the 
directorate was largely understaffed and under-resourced. The directorate was, however, 
allowed to assist the Vice-Ministry of Basic Services in drafting the new sector regulations 
and in strengthening the institutional structure of the SISAB. Critics of the government’s 
top-down approach to negotiating the terms of the AISA contract highlight that top sector 
specialists working within the National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR)—the 
government agency normally responsible for managing loans from the World Bank and 
IDB and for executing almost all of the country’s water and sanitation projects—were also 
excluded from the design of the La Paz/El Alto concession proposal. It is unclear why 
FNDR was not involved in the process, but internal government documents and project 
evaluation reports from 1996 and 1997 repeatedly state that FNDR demonstrated 
insufficient institutional capacity; many of the water supply projects in their portfolio were 
financed without taking into account the need for waste-water disposal, and tariff 
requirements were often disregarded.54 Nonetheless, given the enormous responsibility that 
FNDR had over the water sector, its lack of involvement was somewhat surprising; at the 
time they were managing three large-scale urban water supply programmes financed by the 
                                                
 
53 Interview with Jose Barragan, Vice Minister of Basic Services, 12 December 2002. 
54 Information from IDB and World Bank project evaluation documents, see the bibliography for a full list. 
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IDB for more than USD 240million.55 Municipal authorities in La Paz and El Alto were 
also excluded from the privatisation process.56 
According to government officials from outside the Ministry of Capitalisation, the 
government either did not have, or (according to some) chose not to devote, the time 
needed to construct a careful plan involving the government authorities normally 
responsible for the sector.57 Details of an IDB technical assistance grant of USD 1 million 
(approved in December 1996) to help the government with the preparation of the new 
regulatory framework and to develop quality standards for services and the start-up of the 
newly established SISAB, clearly state that the “development of the project takes into 
account the government’s urgent need to establish an adequate regulatory framework 
consistent with concession contracts that may be granted beforehand to private companies 
to provide service in La Paz and Cochabamba”.58 It is apparent that the urgency with 
which the concession was expedited invariably led to the exclusion of valuable and 
interested stakeholders outside the Ministry of Capitalisation. 
4.2 Enter Lyonnaise des Eaux (now Suez Environment) 
Only one round of bids took place during June and only one company presented an offer. 
On 17 July 1997, Aguas Illimani S.A. (AISA) signed a concession contract with the 
Superintendency of Basic Services; AISA was a consortium led by Lyonnaise des Eaux 
(with a 35 per cent share), together with, from Argentina, Sociedad Comercial del Plata 
S.A. (18 per cent), Meller S.A. (12 per cent), and Inversora en Servicios S.A. (10 per cent); 
and from Bolivia, Bicsa S.A. (20 per cent) and Connal S.R.L. (5 Per cent). AISA agreed to 
connect at least 71,752 households in El Alto and surrounding areas by December 2001, 
                                                
 
14 The combined programme cost for the IDB-financed Prodursa I (BO-00146) in 1990 and for Prodursa II (BO-0039) in 
1993 amounted to just under USD 170 million. The cost of the Basic Urban Sanitation Programme (BO-0125) in 1996 
amounted to just under USD 88 million. 
56 Interview with José Luis Paredes Muñoz, Mayor of El Alto, 13 December 2002. Even five years after the contract had 
been put into effect, the central government had never formally provided municipal authorities in El Alto with a copy of 
the AISA contract. However, according to interviews with SISAB, the Ministry of Basic Services and AISA, the 
municipality could have easily requested a copy at any time.  
57 Interview with Jose Barragan, Vice Minister of Basic Services, 12 December 2002. 
58 IDB Project Document (TC-96-05-16-6) 1997. 
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and to invest USD 350 million over a 30-year period towards the provision of services in 
the adjoining cities of La Paz and El Alto. Operations were to commence as early as 1 
August 1997. To date, it remains unclear why the government acted so swiftly in accepting 
this offer without organising a second round of bids, although other parties, such as 
International Water Ltd,59 had shown an interest but had pulled out at the last minute.60 It 
can only be assumed that the urgency was because this was during the last few months of 
Goni’s administration, and his term ended five days after AISA began its operations. 
Uniquely, the government’s selection criteria was based solely upon which bidder 
offered the greatest number of new connections to low-income households, rather than 
which investor would provide a greater tariff reduction. Specifically, the Request for 
Proposals fixed the length of the concession, the tariffs and connection fees, the required 
sewer expansion schedule, and the minimum acceptable water expansion schedule 
(Komives 2001). The requirement of 41 per cent coverage in the first five years was 
translated in the contract into a target of 27,200 new connections in El Alto. There were 
also expansion targets for La Paz: 100 per cent water coverage in the areas served, and 82 
per cent sewerage coverage for 2001, estimated to require 10,800 new connections. These 
were significant targets, but the bulk of expansion was to be in El Alto.  
The studies undertaken by Halcrow, Melveny, and Myers and by Paribas Bank are 
unavailable to the public, so it is difficult to assess accurately why it was deemed 
important to structure the bidding process in this way. However, according to interviews 
with government officials, the plan was broadly based on the country-wide strategy for the 
water and sanitation sector, first articulated in the 1992 Regulation, which aimed to 
improve coverage and quality of water, and to create a more efficient tariff structure. The 
1992 Regulations plainly stipulate universal service objectives, including the expansion of 
in-house water service throughout the metropolitan area. More importantly, these 
regulations also provide output specifications restricting the type of service that urban 
utilities can provide, including a specification to make metered household water 
                                                
 
59 This company is jointly owned by Bechtel and the Italian energy company Edison. 
60 This consortium would later win the bid to service the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia. 
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connections the only acceptable permanent water supply solution in urban areas;61 public 
stand-posts were only allowed as a short-term solution while a utility was in the process of 
extending the mains network (Komives 2001), and would otherwise be illegal.62 According 
to the government, SAMAPA had been unable to follow the 1992 Regulations, and this 
was why it was deemed necessary to reiterate these requirements, and to include an explicit 
expansion mandate for the company with the AISA contract. Many critics of the 
concession contract mistakenly assume that the in-house meter requirements were put in 
place due to pressure from AISA rather than from the government. In Chapter Five, there 
is further discussion of this issue, and evidence showing why it was actually not in the 
interest of AISA to comply with this regulatory requirement. 
Most concession contracts say something about how water and sanitation services 
must be delivered. They may specify outputs (type of service, number of connections, 
minimum service quality), or inputs (technical and materials standards, required 
construction techniques, procedural requirements). In general, mandating outputs—as is 
generally the case in the La Paz/El Alto contract—rather than inputs is preferable because 
it allows the concessionaire to choose the most efficient way to provide the desired outputs 
(Komives 2001). However, output requirements are not without their problems. The La 
Paz/El Alto contract restricted the flexibility of the concessionaire’s service offerings by 
requiring in-house connections and mandating service quality standards. Output 
requirements can also be harmful if, by restricting a concessionaire’s service offerings, 
they make service expansion too costly for the concessionaire or out of line with household 
preferences (Komives 2001, Foster 2001). However, because the government recognised 
that mandated connections could become prohibitively costly and could jeopardise 
expansion efforts, soon after the signing of the contract the SISAB sanctioned a lower-cost 
pilot project in El Alto (See Section 4 below).  
Meanwhile, the 1997 Regulations, some of which were approved in tandem with 
the signing of the AISA concession contract, required that all service providers in every 
city across the country—be they public or private, be they a utility network provider or a 
                                                
 
61 Article 64, 1992 Regulations. 
62 Article 100, 1992 Regulations. 
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tanker truck water distributor—create a concession contract with the SISAB in order to 
continue operating. Each unique concession contract with utility operators (EPSAS) would 
specify the service levels and quality obligations of the service provider. This strategy was 
taken largely because in order to be awarded a concession contract a service provider had 
to provide information regarding its legal operating status, the service area covered, and 
the environmental impact; previously, this type of information had either been unavailable 
to central government authorities and/or chaotically distributed between different 
government agencies. 
A reduction of personnel was also carried out at the time of the handover of 
operations to AISA. In August 1997, SAMAPA’s labour force numbered 639 employees, a 
figure considered well in excess of operating requirements. AISA offered early retirement 
incentives to eligible employees, which were accepted by about 133 individuals. These 
incentives, in accordance with Bolivian law,63 offered compensation of one month’s salary 
per year of service, plus one additional month’s salary for each 5-year period previously 
worked at SAMAPA. A pro-rata portion of the year-end bonus (equivalent to one month’s 
salary) was also paid depending on length of service. According to the SISAB and AISA, 
the voluntary early retirement process was well managed, and the company did not face 
opposition from either existing employees or the general public on this ground.64 
4.3 New Tariff Structure 
As with many developing countries, pre-privatisation tariffs in La Paz and El Alto were not 
only below cost recovery levels; the structure of the tariff system was extremely 
complicated and difficult to manage. Prior to the reforms in the spring of 1997, customers 
paid a fixed charge for the first 10 cubic meters they used, and there were over 150 tariff 
categories into which users were grouped. The tariff reforms, which were actually put into 
place just before offer letters to potential bidders went out, simplified the tariff structure 
into five categories based on an increasing block tariff scheme. There are usually two 
alternatives used for charging consumers a given volume of water: a Constant Volumetric 
                                                
 
63 Ley General del Trabajo, 1942; Reglamento de la Ley del Trabajo, Decreto Supremo No.224 de 23 Agosto de 1943. 
64 Interview with Jhonny Cuellar Superintendent, SISAB 11 December 2002; Interview with Roberto Bianchi, General 
Manager, AISA 13 December 2002. 
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Charge, whereby all users pay the same amount per unit of water used; and what is known 
as an Increasing Block Tariff (IBT), whereby the rate per unit of water increases in 
increments as the volume of consumption increases. Uniform charges are often unpopular, 
as a flat rate for water can lead to prohibitively high costs for low-income households and 
can end up being a disincentive for private firms to service poor areas, due to the risk of 
non-payment. The IBT treats the level of consumption as a function of household income; 
the price (usually set below production cost) is set for a basic amount known as a “block”, 
and the price increases with each additional block of consumption. 
The arguments that support this method of pricing, which can only work so long as 
every household has a metered household connection, are four-fold: (i) the low price in the 
initial block means that the poor can obtain a sufficient quantity of water for the “essential” 
needs at a low monthly cost; (ii) high income households pay a higher average price 
because they tend to consume more water than poor households; (iii) high rates charged to 
industrial and commercial customers relative to most residential customers promotes 
“equity” by allowing the water utility to cross-subsidize poor residential customers; and 
(iv) the price in the highest block can at the same time be used as a tool to discourage 
“wasteful” and “extravagant” water use (Boland and Whittington 2003). The problem with 
this system is in situations where a large number of family members live under one roof 
(Lahlou and Bahaj 2002). With a single connection to the utility network, invoiced on the 
basis of a single meter, these households, which are usually made up of low-income 
residents whom the rising block tariff was meant to protect, can end up falling into the 
higher block rate because of their consumption patterns and being billed accordingly. In 
these cases, the “social consumption block fails to benefit the target population. 
Conscious of such risks involved with implementing an IBT structure, the 
government of Bolivia set out to design an IBT structure meant to ensure low-income 
households would not be short-changed by this approach.65 The new regulations provided 
residential users with very large price differentials between blocks—the most expensive 
block being over five times the price of the least expensive block. There were four blocks 
for residential connections, two blocks for commercial connections and one for industrial 
                                                
 
65 Interview with Jhonny Cuellar, Superintendent, SISAB, 14 January 2003. 
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connections; the prices charged to industrial and commercial users were obviously much 
higher than those typically applied to residential use. The IBT scheme in La Paz/El Alto 
specifically allowed households to take 30m3 per month—or 1m3 per day—before the 
highest price in the block structure took effect. For example, if a household contained five 
members, this would translate into an allowable consumption of 0.2m3 (or 200 litres) per 
person per day. It is extremely important to note here that this amount is greater than the 
average daily consumption for water-users in the UK, even though UK users run luxury 
items that use a significant amount of water and which are unavailable to most low-income 
users in El Alto, such as dishwashers and washing machines. This policy would later prove 
quite problematic, as consumers in fact consumed much less than was expected, creating 
losses for AISA. This issue is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
When the contract with AISA was negotiated, specifications were also made that 
set the tariff for the first five years in US dollars, with no adjustment for inflation or 
changes in productivity. The exchange rate was calculated on a monthly basis for billing 
customers, who paid in Bolivianos. Although AISA inherited the aforementioned reformed 
tariff structure, new rates were still introduced just prior to the concession, which prompted 
some consumers to believe that this increase had been made by AISA. The tariffs just prior 
to the concession, in December 1996, were increased by 38.5 per cent, but when AISA 
began operations rates were adjusted again by an additional 20 per cent (Foster and Irusta 
2001). Despite the fact that tariffs were still considerably low (compared with the tariffs of 
all other major Bolivian water utilities), the fact that these increases happened in such 
quick succession was linked in the public’s mind with the concession, prompting a number 
of protests as AISA operations began. However, the combination of relatively low tariffs 
for most consumers, coupled with the dramatic increase in service quality and the 
immediate focus on network expansion, won a great deal of acquiescence for the company. 
It cost AISA, on average, USD 0.53 per cubic meter to provide water. 66 Further, the fixed 
cost of meter-reading and billing was estimated to be about USD 1.00 per month. For 
customers in El Alto, the average bill was less than USD 1.50 per month. To put the price 
                                                
 
66 This information came from AISA. It was not possible to get marginal cost figures for the company, as these were kept 
confidential. Figures were also unavailable for the average or marginal cost of sewerage service. 
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of water into some context, 97 per cent of AISA’s clients in El Alto paid an average of five 
Bolivian cents per day for water—less than a seventh of the cost of a loaf of bread. The 
contract with AISA specified that after five years, the SISAB would be able to review the 
tariff and establish a new rate for the next five-year period, based on operating costs, 
investment requirements, and a 13 per cent rate of return to capital. 
The structure of tariffs for the initial five years maintained the categories described 
above, distinguishing between residential, commercial, and industrial consumers, and with 
higher rates for higher-users, especially industrial users.67 The tariff had no fixed part, as it 
was based wholly on water usage, resulting in higher rates for many users but lower rates 
for low-consumption customers. Further, there was no tariff at all for sewerage: customers 
who had water and sewerage paid the same as those with only water. The reason for this 
was that there was inadequate information about sewerage connections to be able to know 
what to charge, so the company was required to develop the information base for sewerage 
connections, in order to provide a basis for setting a sewerage tariff during the next round. 
Connection fees were also set in the concession contract: the fee for a water connection 
was USD 155, of which USD 36 was the charge for a meter, and the sewerage connection 
charge was set at USD 180. The connection targets and tariffs were based on assumptions 
about population growth and levels of water usage. Although there was some degree of 
protest over the quick succession of tariff increases, the combination of relatively low 
tariffs for most consumers with the promise of expanded service and improved quality 
seemed to win acquiescence—at least at the beginning. 
  
                                                
 
67 According to some of the literature, IBTs promote water conservation and stop “extravagant” and/or “wasteful” water 
use because the price associated with the highest block can be punitively high. 
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Table 4-1: Water Tariff, 1997–2001 
Domestic 
(m3) 
Commercial 
(m3) 
Industrial 
(m3) 
Tariff 
(USD /m3) 
1–30     .22 
31–150     .44 
151–300  1–20   .66 
>301 >21 >1 1.18 
Foster (2001) 
Table 4-2: Number of Customers by Type, 1998 
Type of customer La Paz El Alto 
Domestic 
Commercial 
Industrial 
 68,078 
  9,823 
277 
 70,265 
  3,139 
138 
Arauco, (1998), pp. 193–194. 
Table 4-3: Billing Percentages, by Tariff Block, 1998 
Tariff block  Contribution as percentage of billing 
Low (.22) 
Medium (.44) 
Medium-High (.66) 
High (1.18) 
 17%  
25% 
6% 
52% 
(Arauco 1998: 193–194) 
Tariff structures can have a positive effect if they facilitate serving the poor by 
ensuring that revenues cover the cost of making connections. However, in this case, the 
contract did not always provide the right balance between the new tariffs structure and 
service incentives for the company. First, households were charged a unit tariff that fell 
well below cost for the first 30 cubic meters of water they used each month. The sale of 
water to low-consumption households thus became a loss-making proposition for AISA. 
Second, most of El Alto (the focus of the contract’s expansion efforts) turned out to consist 
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of low-consumption areas, with the average household consuming about 10 cubic meters a 
month. Third, under the unified tariff a household with a water connection but no sewerage 
connection would have the same monthly bill as a household with a sewerage connection 
and the same level of water consumption. This setup did not provide adequate incentive for 
AISA to provide sewerage connections. Fourth, the concession contract set maximum 
connection fees for water and sewerage that did not make allowances for the true cost of 
connection. The same connection fee applied for in-fill connections on existing lines as for 
connections in areas with no existing network. The concessionaire would therefore prefer 
to make in-fill connections, where profit margins had a chance of being greater. 
Consequently, the contract stipulated that in-fill connections could account for no more 
than half of all new connections. 
4.4 “Pro-Poor” Components and Inefficiencies of the Concession 
As soon as the contract with AISA was signed, various development agencies began 
designing projects to mitigate the potentially negative social impact of the concession. The 
best-known project was the El Alto Condominial Pilot Project, which targeted nine 
neighbourhoods in El Alto; it was conceived as a tripartite agreement between the GoB, 
AISA, and the World Bank Water and Sanitation Program, with technical assistance 
financing from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). This condominial 
approach was adopted by the World Bank from experiences in various Brazilian cities, and 
it aimed to connect approximately 2,000 households with condominial water connections 
and approximately 4,000 households with condominial sewerage connections. It is 
estimated that in Brazil some 5 million people in over 200 towns and cities are served with 
simplified, or condominial, sewerage (Melo 2005). This corresponds to about 3 per cent of 
the population of Brazil, and about 6 per cent of the population connected to sewers. This 
arrangement serves both rich and poor. 
Community participation, which was the main focus of the condominial approach, 
helped to lower the connection costs for residents living in El Alto because local residents 
were trained to construct and maintain their own condominial branches. These branches 
are engineered using innovative cost-cutting methods whereby the length, diameter, and 
depth of the network are substantially reduced. Typically, in the planning process for a 
simplified sewerage system, meetings are carried out at the housing block (condominio), 
where information dissemination, discussions, and clarifications are meant to enhance 
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unity in decision-making processes surrounding construction and maintenance 
responsibilities. Because users may finance in-house sanitary installations and household 
connections, they need to reach an agreement as to the type of condominial branch 
suitable. They must then comply with agreements established for construction and 
operation of the condominial branch, as well as for payment of tariffs. In return, the service 
provider agrees to fulfil its responsibilities as established in the “Terms of Connection” 
between the parties. Community participation in the process is also used to support 
complimentary actions such as raising hygiene awareness, which plays a role in achieving 
other public health objectives at a relatively limited cost. 
For the project to go ahead, the government of Bolivia (GoB) actually agreed to 
relax some of its technical standards, which at that time legally precluded the use of such a 
system or any alternative type of service provision. As noted above, the condominial 
system would allow for the use of smaller-diameter pipes, laid at relatively shallow depths 
in areas where they would not be subject to heavy loads from above. Typically, most pipes 
are laid underneath the patio or next to the home. In contrast to conventional sewer layouts, 
several households are connected to the same sewer so that the overall length and depth of 
the pipe network are reduced. While a conventional water connection would have cost 
consumers USD 196, and sewerage a further USD 249, a condominial connection would 
cost USD 112 and USD 142, respectively. The project was split into two phases: Phase I 
included the design of the networks, the integration of hygiene education through 
community participation in the works, training for local social workers and AISA 
engineers, as well as overall supervision; in Phase II, however, AISA would assume 
overall responsibility for implementing the condominial methodology and the World 
Bank’s Water and Sanitation Program would assume an advisory role.68 
Another pro-poor feature of the PPP process was an attempt by the GoB and the 
development community to support micro-credit initiatives for individual households in El 
Alto. For customers putting in sewerage connections (whether condominial or 
conventional), larger up-front costs were involved. Without a bathroom—or bathroom 
                                                
 
68 The WSP is an international partnership managed by the World Bank to help the poor gain sustained access to 
improved water supply and sanitation services. 
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appliances—a connection to the utility network had little significance. A bathroom cost an 
average of USD 440 (USD 400 in materials and USD 40 in labour); representing more than 
three months of average household income, this was a large investment for most El Alto 
residents. 69 Since households participating in the condominial programme were expected 
to construct bathrooms (Foster 2000), FUNDAPRO, a second-tier Bolivian bank created in 
1992 with funding from USAID and the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), provided 
USD 500,000 of capital for a micro-credit scheme, and the retailing of these loans was 
contracted to Caja Los Andres (CLA), a micro-credit institution well known among El 
Alto residents. The average value of the credits was USD 406, typically ranging from 24–
32-month terms, and households could use mortgage on property as collateral and/or a 
pledge of household appliances or moveable assets (for example, televisions or furniture). 
At an interest rate of 1.92 per cent per month, this represented a monthly repayment of 
USD 14.21, or about 6.2 per cent of the income of participating households. Soon after, 
another micro-credit institution, Mutual La Primavera, also began offering credit for 
households at a slightly better rate of 1.1 per cent per month. However, most households in 
El Alto still did not pursue micro-credit for this purpose. CLA suggests that more 
households could have benefited from the scheme had they applied, but there are cultural 
constraints to borrowing and within the Aymara community: there are more traditional 
forms of savings and a strong tendency to rely on relatives or friends for loans. Ultimately, 
the micro-credit line programme was dropped less than two years after it first began, due to 
its ineffectiveness in reaching lower-income households. 
Households participating in the condominial programme did end up benefiting 
somewhat from the reduced charge of the water connection (from USD 119 to USD 100) 
and slightly more from the sewer connection charge (from USD 180 to USD 100), but 
when the opportunity cost of the household’s time is fully accounted for, the saving 
disappears for the water service, and for the sewerage service it is reduced to USD 58 (or 
about 50 per cent of monthly household income) (Foster, 2001). The apparent 
misalignment between the structure of costs and tariffs led to a situation where neither the 
                                                
 
69 These are the estimates of WSP team members, based on non-random sampling of households. Labour estimates were 
based on 16 man-days valued at USD 2.50 per day.  
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utility nor the customers were fully able to perceive the cost advantages of the condominial 
system. From the utility’s perspective all new connections were lossmaking, because 
connection charges were not high enough to cover network expansion costs. Although the 
hygiene education component of the condominial programme implemented during the first 
phase resulted in significant increases in water consumption, these increases were simply 
not significant enough to move consumers out of the lowest tariff band and hence could 
not generate any profits for AISA (Foster 2000). AISA, therefore, could not warrant the 
cost of further hygiene education in the second phase of the programme. However, it did 
follow the advice of the development community and government, and offered flexible 
terms of payment for low-income households so as to increase the likelihood of a larger 
uptake of condominial connections. They established a quota payment system for 
participating households of two years—later expanded to five years—at a 1.08 per cent per 
month interest rate, which was lower than the interest charged by the micro-credit lending 
agencies. 
Another impediment to the success of the condominial programme was the lack of 
coordination between internal government agencies, AISA, and development agencies 
working on the condominial initiative. For example, while the condominial project for El 
Alto was underway, technical assistance through the WSP was directed toward educational 
activities in support of bathroom construction and hygiene awareness, while at the same 
time the FNDR decided to introduce its own completely separate program to provide free 
bathrooms to households in El Alto using some of the resources allotted to them through 
the aforementioned IDB grant. This inevitably caused complications, confusion, and 
resentment among those participating in the pilot initiative, especially between those 
households that had to pay for the cost of appliances and who contributed their labour. 
Although the WSP provided an overall positive evaluation of the condominial 
programme six months after the program ended in March 2001,70 a follow-up survey 
conducted ten months later by Nina Laurie and Carlos Crespo revealed a number of 
                                                
 
70 80.2 per cent of users claimed the condominial system functioned well, 14.9 per cent said the service was regular, 
(meaning neither good nor bad), 2.9 per cent stated that it was very good, and 2.1 per cent complained that it was bad. 
( 58–59). 
122 
 
 
technical problems with the condominial system, all of which were exacerbated by the fact 
that community members were ill-equipped to deal with maintenance problems (Laurie 
and Crespo 2007). The shallow pipes were of a narrow diameter and were laid at a flat 
gradient, which meant that they blocked easily, flooding properties upstream with sewage. 
Breakages in water pipes also meant that those downstream would be cut off until a 
problem could be repaired. However, although Laurie and Crespo accused the government 
of Bolivia and the SISAB of “changing the legislative environment to favour the activities 
of the private company [AISA]”, it is important to note that the technical specifications of 
the water networks were designed specifically to provide a more flexible option for low-
income residents; they were not for the benefit of the private providers, who suffered major 
financial losses by adopting the system. Although there were certainly failures in the 
application of the condominial system, the government heeded the advice of the WSP 
because of its successes in using this lower-cost option in other developing country 
contexts. Failures in the programme should not be taken as indicating collusion between 
the government and the private sector. 
The current research found that the majority of the criticisms of the condominial 
system did not come from residents who participated in the programme. Instead, 
complaints came from other quarters; neighbourhood association leaders were the most 
vocal in claiming that a “second-rate system was being imposed upon the poor”71 of El 
Alto, in contrast to La Paz, which had conventional water and sewerage. This kind of claim 
was effective in building political support, and it was exploited for political reasons by 
these leaders and by the political opposition movement. Bolivian engineers, trained in 
conventional water and sewerage systems, were called upon by neighbourhood association 
leaders and interviewed on radio shows to confirm that the condominial system was indeed 
second-rate and that the narrow pipes would not be able to sustain expanding households 
that might add additional storeys to existing properties (a common practice in El Alto). 
According to AISA and the SISAB, complications related to the functioning of the 
sewerage system were primarily due to the low water usage in El Alto, whether 
conventional or condominial: the water flow was simply insufficient to wash solid waste 
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through the pipes. AISA and engineers experienced in using the condominial technique 
argued that given the low volume of waste flowing through them, the narrower pipes 
actually functioned better than conventional, larger-diameter pipes.72 
Many of the findings that emerged through this research complement those of Jose 
Carlos Melo, who conducted a study in 2005 on Brazil’s experience with condominial 
service provision. Melo also found that (i) there was a significant lack of information on 
the fundamentals and techniques of the condominial approach, and a lack of experience in 
its application; (ii) resistance to technical and institutional changes hindered the application 
of the condominial approach; and (iii) normative and legal restrictions on maintaining 
condominial and conventional services in tandem constrain the dissemination of both 
systems (Melo 2005). The condominial approach was, of course, introduced in El Alto 
almost a decade prior to the publication of these and other similar findings.  
4.5 The Consumer Profile of El Alto Residents 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, El Alto sits at 4,000 meters above sea level. It is 
filled with street vendors and shopkeepers, merchants in their stores and sellers at their 
stalls, as well as brokers and commission agents. The sidewalks and streets are filled with 
women and men dressed in traditional Aymara attire, chaotically attempting to bypass 
oncoming traffic and creating waves of colourful movement; horns and music from car 
radios, local shops, and passing brass bands compete harmoniously with thousands of 
voices haggling over deals. It is also a precarious city of twisted streets lined with a 
hodgepodge of adobe and brick dwellings. Temperatures can range on average from -10°C 
at night to 20°C at noon. Seventy per cent of the working population are in family 
businesses or quasi-businesses, accounting for 95 per cent of jobs in shops and restaurants, 
80 per cent of jobs in the construction industry, and 75 per cent of jobs in manufacturing. 
Sixty per cent of the population is under 25 years old, and young people predominate in 
these sectors: more than half of the employees in manufacturing are between 20 and 35 
years old. El Alto dominates the hillsides and access to La Paz, which is situated in an 
immense land depression below. In 1952, scarcely 11,000 people lived in El Alto, which 
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was then basically a rural town. By 1985, the year in which it attained municipal 
autonomy, emigration from the mining centres and from rural Aymara and Quechua areas 
had driven the population up to 307,000, and by 1992 it had grown to 405,000. According 
to the most recent census, from 2001, the population had reached 650,000 and is currently 
estimated to be about 800,000. It is important to note that 81 per cent of this population 
consider themselves indigenous Aymara.73 
Approximately, 75 percent of El Alto workers are informally employed with small 
businesses that offer employees no social security, retirement, job security, or other 
benefits. Most families do not have access to professional medical care and there continues 
to be a high rate of infant mortality.74 Illiteracy rose in the early 1990s to 40 per cent, and 
only 25 per cent of young people were completing secondary school. The explosive 
population growth—averaging 10 per cent per year— meant that the vast majority of 
residents had extremely limited access to basic services. In 1997, UNICEF estimated that 
only 34 per cent of the city’s residents had access to all services, including paved streets, 
garbage collection, and public telephones. During the 1980s, neighbourhood associations 
began to appear across the city to deal with the poor quality of basic services, and today 
there are some 500 associations, which work through the Federation of Neighbourhood 
Councils (FEJUVE) specifically to initiate collective projects that improve the living 
conditions of city residents. They are also often responsible for disseminating information 
and promoting participation, and they are relied on by residents to put pressure on 
municipal and central government authorities. Self-dependence, exhibited in the way in 
which the city has developed and the sheer volume of self-made independent 
entrepreneurs, has generated a unique sense of self-esteem derived from a mix of 
indigenous entitlements and property rights. The relevance of this cultural make-up to the 
water sector will be explained in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
4.6 The City of Cochabamba: Enter Another PPP Concession 
During autumn 1999, while debates over the condominial system in El Alto were only just 
beginning to emerge and neighbourhood association leaders were becoming increasingly 
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74 The Center for Labor and Agricultural Development (CEDLA) and INE Joint Report 2010 
125 
 
 
vocal, a slightly different—and more tumultuous—story was unfolding in Bolivia’s third 
largest city, Cochabamba. In September, the national government, under the new political 
administration of President Banzer, 75 granted a 40-year contract to Aguas de Tunari to run 
SEMAPA, Cochabamba’s water system. This concession was an American-Spanish-
Bolivian joint venture with a majority share for the Bechtel Corporation, based in San 
Francisco, and International Water, which is based in London. Aguas de Tunari took over 
in October 1999 and was in full operation by the following January. 
Significantly, in the months leading up to the negotiation of the concession, Banzer 
had also initiated an army-executed coca eradication plan to destroy 106,000 acres of coca 
in Chapare, a rural province in the northern region of the Cochabamba department, once 
known as the world’s second-largest coca producing region. This plan, known as the 
“Dignity Plan” was strongly backed by the US government, but strongly opposed by the 
Federation of Chapare Coca growers,76 which was led by a dynamic farmer-turned-activist 
named Evo Morales. The Federation had strong links with the Movement Toward 
Socialism (MAS) political party, which would later succeed in winning Evo Morales the 
presidency of Bolivia in 2005. Due to the eradication policies, existing tensions across the 
department of Cochabamba were already quite strong when the government embarked on 
the privatisation of water and sanitation services in the city. Cochabamba, with a 
population of approximately 600,000 people, lies in a fertile valley at 2,558 meters above 
sea level; in contrast to La Paz, the demand for water is tremendously high and it is quite a 
scarce resource. As with the case of La Paz/El Alto, the new regulations ended the 
communal control of water, such as wells that had been built and managed by residents. 
This had a much greater impact in Cochabamba than it did in La Paz, because of the large 
population of small farmers; irrigation water was no longer free, and these farmers 
inevitably became one of the main protesting groups. 
                                                
 
75 Banzer had previously ruled Bolivia as a dictator between 1971 and 1978 (before being elected in 1997). Human rights 
groups blame him for more than 200 “disappearances”, some 3,000 political arrests, and for forcing several thousand 
political and trade union activists into exile. 
76 Federaciones Cocaleras de El Chapare. 
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4.7 The Cochabamba Misicuni Project 
While the concession arrangement with AISA required a tariff structure which would 
simply cover the cost of expansion, the Aguas de Tunari contract included in its tariff 
structure the cost of the Misicuni Project. This was regarded as being one of the most 
complex engineering projects in all South America: the USD 300 million deal involved the 
construction of a USD 130 million dam at 4,000 meters above sea level, a hydroelectric 
power station, and a USD 70 million tunnel to transport water 20 km from the Misicuni 
River through a mountain to the valley of Cochabamba. The project was estimated as 
costing up to six times more than alternative schemes (World Bank 2000); the new water 
concession was obviously designed so that consumers would help to cover the cost, but the 
government had wrongly assumed that people would be willing to start paying for this 
expensive project through increased tariffs before experiencing any improvements to their 
water and sanitation services. It is unclear why the Misicuni Project was supported and 
propagated by the municipality of Cochabamba, but it has consistently been used as a 
political platform throughout the city’s history, making and breaking various political 
careers for over 40 years. 
There is a great deal of contradictory information about the project and its impact 
on users. Some argue that the tendering process was not competitive; Aguas del Tunari 
was the only bidder and its tender was accepted despite many accusations of irregularities. 
Others claim that there was indeed another contender, named Aguas de Conari, which was 
turned down by the municipal authorities. According to certain central government 
officials,77 this second bid had won the support of the central government and it was also 
favoured by World Bank staffers who were at that time advising the SISAB. However, the 
proposed concession arrangement with Aguas de Conari would have used an alternative 
water source, and so the Misicuni tunnel project would have been dropped. They claim that 
the failure to adopt the proposal was the fault of political interests at the municipal level 
that pushed for the Aguas de Tunari contract. It was certainly the case that the local 
engineering partner of Aguas de Tunari was ICE Ingenieros, a company owned by one of 
the most affluent and influential families in Bolivia (Lobina 2000); this company also 
                                                
 
77 Interview with Superintendent Claude Besse, 25 March 2003. 
127 
 
 
happened to be a partner in the Misicuni tunnel consortium and had already been awarded 
financing from the Italian Government for a feasibility study for the Misicuni Project.78 
4.8 Cochabamba’s Water War  
The first major protest over the Cochabamba PPP concession took place two months after 
Aguas de Tunari began operations. February 2000 was marked by dozens of strikes, 
roadblocks, and other forms of civil disobedience; protesters succeeded in effectively 
shutting the city down for four consecutive days. The primary complaint of the protestors 
was directly related to the sharp increase in tariffs; post-privatisation tariffs rose at varying 
rates, from approximately 100 per cent for many but as much as 300 per cent for some. 
Tariffs were raised to help complete the dam and tunnel project, to guarantee a profit 
margin of 15–17 per cent, and to pay off past debts. Another issue of contention was that 
the water the Misicuni aqueduct was to carry to the city of Cochabamba was already 
claimed as a customary right by the irrigators of the Cochabamba valley. Under the new 
contract, these users would have to obtain licences for their wells, diversion channels, and 
other water infrastructure. This, combined with the secrecy with which the deal was 
conducted, instilled suspicion in an already wary civil society and very quickly made the 
issue an incendiary one. 
In response to the street protests, Banzer dispatched his police force and allowed 
them to use tear gas to prevent protestors from disorderly behaviour. According to most 
newspaper reports, thousands of protestors marching peacefully when police began using 
teargas that left 200 marchers severly injured and two people permanently blinded by the 
gas. In April, municipal authorities agreed to sit down with community representatives in 
an attempt to appease protestors; specifically, they agreed to speak with Oscar Olivera, a 
long-time labour leader and spokesman for the “Coordinating Committee for Defence of 
Water and Life”.79This was a coalition of opponents of privatisation, and it included 
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neighbourhood associations, water cooperatives, labour unions, and students. According to 
Olivera, however, while they “were talking with the mayor, the governor and the other 
civic leaders…the police came in and arrested us” (quoted in Public Citizen 2001). Upon 
hearing of these arrests, a huge public outcry ensued and crowds converged at City Hall 
the next day. More protests ensued; a federation of peasant organisations (FEDECOR) 
joined the urban protest when they saw communal rights threatened by the privatisation of 
rural water systems. Fifty people were detained, dozens injured, and six people were killed. 
According to Public Citizen, police broke into the homes of protest leaders and more than 
a dozen protestors were arrested and sent to a remote prison in the Bolivian jungle.80 To 
many protestors and spectators, Banzer’s actions were reminiscent of his days as a dictator 
in the 1970s, which led to a significant backlash against the government by large segments 
of the population across the country. As protests began to spread beyond Cochabamba, 
Banzer responded by placing the country under martial law and declaring a state of 
emergency. This state of emergency suspended almost all civil rights, allowing the arrest 
and confinement of protesters without warrant, and placing restrictions on travel and 
political activity as a curfew was enforced and gatherings of more than four people were 
banned. 
Bolivia’s “Water War” hit international headlines on 11 April 2000. Footage of an 
army official firing into the crowd, killing a young protester, provoked wide-spread 
international outrage and drew responses from international NGOs in Australia, Canada, 
France, and the United States. Even the Roman Catholic Church became involved, publicly 
asking the government to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. The case for Misicuni 
was lost, and the government quickly declared the privatisation process void. Managers of 
Aguas del Tunari left the city before the end of April, and Banzer cancelled the concession 
contract. By that time just over USD 20 million had been invested by Aguas de Tunari, and 
in November 2001 the company applied for arbitration with ICSID,81 seeking USD 
                                                
 
80 This was later confirmed both by former minister Walter Guiteras and former Information Minister Ronald MacLean 
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25million in damages. Following arduous negotiations between the government and the 
Coordinating Committee for the Defence of Water and Life, control of the city's water 
system was returned to the city. SEMAPA was reinstated as the water supplier, but 
supplemented with representatives from the Coordinating Committee. Olivera was quoted 
across dozens of international newspapers, exclaiming that the water war “had become a 
fight between David and Goliath, between poor people and a multinational corporation. 
They have a lot of money, and they want to take away our water.”82 Olivera vehemently 
argued that water was a human right, and as such should be treated as a social good, not as 
a commodity to be bought and sold. Famously, he declared that privatising water was like 
“leasing the rain”. 
Soon after “winning” this so-called Water War, Olivera was able to take such 
arguments against privatisation beyond Bolivia’s borders, with the support of various civil 
society organisations, academic institutions, and even the sponsorship of various 
international NGOs. He soon became something of an archetype for various anti-
privatisation organisations and global social movements. In October 2000, the Institute for 
Policy Studies awarded him its Letelier-Moffit International Award for human rights 
activity,83 and the following year the Goldman Institute awarded him a USD 125,000 prize 
for environmental action. By late 2001, the Coordinating Committee was an extremely 
powerful force across the country. Olivera and his colleagues became the defining voices 
of the protest movement against the privatisation of any natural resource, and he also 
formed a new Coordinating Committee for the Defence of Gas. 
Perhaps one positive outcome of the civil unrest in Cochabamba was that it took the 
spotlight away from the anger of farmers in the Chapare region, where, as noted above, 
massive coca eradication programmes had taken place. In June 2001, emboldened by the 
results in Chapare, the government decided to strike another coca growing region, this time 
in the department of La Paz, where many of the displaced coca growers from Chapare had 
moved. Here, the coca growers of El Yungas were closely aligned politically with Felipe 
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Quispe (aka Mallku); like Olivera, Quispe was also a well-known labour leader, albeit 
more controversial,84 and he was the overseer for the Confederación Sindical Unica de 
Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia. During the Cochabamba uprising in April 2000, 
Quispe had lent his support to the movement by besieging La Paz, commanding a civil 
insurrection of close to 500,000 people from the surrounding El Alto and El Yungas areas. 
Like most blockades staged in El Alto and La Paz, the insurrection brought the capital to a 
standstill. During the June military coca eradication offensive, which aimed to destroy 
1700 hectares of “excess” coca plantations, troops were met by thousands of peasants who 
demanded a dialogue with the government. Fearing another civil uprising like that of 
Cochabamba, the government quickly backed down and coca leaders were asked to 
participate in the discussions around eradication policies. 
Later that month, Quispe organised a hunger strike with the help of other 
neighbourhood association leaders from El Alto, in which more than 3,000 retired and 
disabled workers from across Bolivia demanded the increase in pensions that had been 
promised under the capitalisation program. The new pension system, based on individual 
capitalisation accounts, had established a universal old age benefit program financed by the 
shares of capitalised enterprises. Major problems ensued over the first few years of the 
program, mainly due to inadequate legislation and regulation of the securities market, 
which constrained the trading of capitalised shares.85 Also, fraud in the collection of 
pension benefits was apparently widespread, in part due to counterfeit identity cards and 
multiple birth certificates (Barbery 1999). The spring of 2001 was marked by numerous 
protests causing major upheaval for the capital city. Meanwhile, Banzer’s health was 
declining (he was suffering from cancer), and this led him to turn over his presidency to his 
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Vice President, Jorge Quiroga, in August 2001. Quiroga served as president through to the 
next elections, held in 2002.86 
4.9 The First Five Years of the La Paz/El Alto Concession 
Concurrent with these events, the first five years of implementation of the AISA contract 
in La Paz/El Alto were proving successful. The superintendent of the SISAB, Jhonny 
Cuellar, recorded that between 1997 and the end of 2001 AISA had made 52,000 water 
connections in El Alto. The company asserted, and he agreed, that these connections meant 
that it had reached its target of 100 per cent coverage in El Alto: its initial projection of 
71,000 required connections turned out to have been too high, largely due to an unexpected 
slowdown of El Alto’s population growth in the last couple of years of the period. AISA 
also performed considerably above what was contractually required in relation to sewerage 
connections. By August 2001, it had made 35,945 sewerage connections in El Alto, 
surpassing the 41 per cent coverage target to reach 54 per cent; this meant that it was about 
ten years ahead of schedule. 
Improvements in efficiency were also recognised: the time it took for residents to 
apply for a connection was reduced from three weeks to 48 hours. Also, prior to the 
reform, residents had been required to go to City Hall to pick up an application form for a 
household connection. They had also had to obtain an architectural drawing of the property 
and the connections they planned to make, present proof of ownership, and pay application 
fee (Komives 2001). Repeat trips to City Hall had also usually been necessary, since 
paperwork was often lost, and this made transaction costs particularly high. One of the first 
things ASIA did when it began operations was replace the three offices where applicants 
previously had to go to get their approvals with one room; applicants could then follow 
their paperwork and know what was happening. Rows of chairs for customers were also 
provided by AISA in a waiting room; unaccustomed to such an amenity, customers 
reported quite favourably about the way they were treated by the utility (Komives 2001). 
To increase the demand for household connections, AISA would even take the application 
process directly into neighbourhoods, working with customers to fill out the forms and 
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then taking the paperwork to the municipality to be processed in batches. Further, AISA 
chose to interpret rules requiring architectural drawings quite liberally, usually going ahead 
with connections ahead of the drawings being provided. 
Interestingly, despite the increases in charges, there was a strong culture of 
payment in El Alto and the company did not seem to have a problem with residents paying 
their bills. Of all the branches of Suez Environment around the world, AISA had the 
highest payment rate.87 The only situations in which non-payment was a problem during 
these first years involved institutional government customers, specifically the 
municipalities of La Paz and El Alto. As mentioned previously, AISA had responded to the 
concerns voiced by community leaders in El Alto over the affordability of connections by 
allowing customers to spread the cost of the connection over a two-year period. The 
SISAB was pleased that AISA charged these customers only 1.08 per cent per month in 
interest—a standard rate based on an average of rates charged by the top five banks, which 
again was considerably less than that generally charged by micro-lending institutions 
operating in El Alto. Also, AISA agreed to allow neighbourhood groups to make their own 
arrangements for network installation if they so desired. The leaders of some communities, 
for example, would try to save costs and time by collecting money from residents and 
outsourcing the construction of the network to a local contractor/specific member of the 
community.88 
Unlike the mandate for the public water utility, which never had a precisely-defined 
service area, the AISA concession contract did outline a specific service area, which was 
based on city boundaries outlined in the 1994 Popular Participation Law. The contract also 
made reference to an area servida (serviced area), which was defined as the area formally 
served by SAMAPA when the contract was signed as well as all areas included in the 
expansion goals of the concession contract. This area servida was the area that AISA was 
contractually mandated to serve and where percentage-coverage targets would be enforced 
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by the regulator. However, AISA had no obligation to serve those areas outside the 
concession contract, known as the area no servida. In 2001, Superintendent Cuellar made 
a formal request to AISA to extend their services into the area no servida, but from 
AISA’s perspective, this would obviously entail a tariff revision to reflect the additional 
costs of the expansion. 
4.10 Rising Tensions towards AISA 
The first tariff adjustment was due in late 2001. Expansion agreements were agreed fairly 
early: during the second five years, AISA would make 15,000 water connections in a 
specific area outside the originally defined service area. In addition, in line with the 
contract, the company would have to keep up with population growth, estimated to amount 
to an additional 21,000 households. In terms of sewerage, because the company was ahead 
of schedule, there was nothing contractually that Superintendent Cuellar could do to oblige 
AISA to provide a substantial expansion of service. Nevertheless, the company expected 
public pressure and that demand for sewerage connections would force AISA to continue 
with installing new connections. AISA envisioned increasing coverage from 54 per cent to 
56 per cent by 2006, amounting to an estimated 13,800 new sewerage connections.89 
Cuellar and the company agreed on an increase in revenues of 12.5 per cent, but beyond 
that negotiations were tough. AISA demanded tariff increases and argued that without 
them, the company would be unable to fund the investment necessary for further service 
expansion. At the same time, industrial companies—which considered AISA’s rates 
unfairly high and burdensome—were pressing for a reduction. 
People became aware that the data provided by the SISAB and AISA on 
percentage-coverage only pertained to the smaller area within the concession area. Due to 
this definition, AISA could rightfully make claims that they had achieved nearly full 
coverage for potable water in La Paz and El Alto (98 per cent and 97 per cent in 2001, 
respectively) and significant coverage in sanitation (91 per cent in La Paz and 60 per cent 
in El Alto in 2003). However, for those living in El Alto, particularly in the area no 
servida, it was obvious that the percentages would be much lower. Also, between 1997 and 
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2001 widely-dispersed human settlements had grown outside the limits of the area servida, 
as well as within the general concession area. There was little financial incentive for the 
company to serve these customers; given how far they were from the mains the cost would 
have been far too high for the households and cost recovery for AISA virtually impossible. 
Unfortunately, no firm data existed at the time to show exactly what percentage of the 
entire La Paz/El Alto population truly had access to potable water. Toward the end of 
2001, Cuellar hired external consultants to analyse the concession’s status, and they 
confirmed that AISA would need to have a 12.5 per cent increase in revenue to enable it to 
invest in those areas requested by the SISAB. However, Cuellar had not forgotten the mess 
of Cochabamba—not least because it had cost the previous water superintendent his job. 
People were also feeling the effects of the recession, which had a significant impact 
on economic growth in the country between 1997 and 2001. The Asian financial crisis in 
1997, coupled with low commodity prices, had made the first major dent in Bolivia's 
growth. Then, in early 1999, Brazil devalued its currency, which slowed Bolivia's 
economy even further. Growth rates peaked at 5.5 per cent of GDP in 1998, but fell to 0.4 
per cent in 1999, and then to zero by 2001 (by 2002 they rose to 2.4 per cent).90 Cuellar 
released two regulatory resolutions after the first round of negotiations with AISA in 2001. 
These resolutions went unnoticed by the majority of public and social organisations. The 
first resolution approved an increase of USD 0.10 to USD 0.220/m³ for a potable water 
connection in El Alto, and to USD 0.3444/m³ for domestic connections in La Paz,91 which 
represented an increase of 120 per cent in El Alto and of 244.4 per cent in La Paz. The 
second resolution approved increases in installation costs (for ordinary installations), from 
USD 155 to USD 196 for potable water and from USD 180 to USD 249 for sewerage, 
which represented increases of 24.4 per cent and 38.3 per cent, respectively. 
Another issue also arose in 2001. Neighbourhood association leaders of El Alto, 
together with municipal authorities, began demanding that AISA build an adequate storm-
sewer system to protect residents against flooding during the rainy season. However, the 
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concession contract did not commit AISA to maintain the existing storm sewer 
infrastructure or to expand it. In a city where the majority of poor residents are at risk of 
flooding during the rainy season, this matter was serious. According to the municipality of 
El Alto, the city estimated an investment of approximately USD 30 million was needed to 
build the necessary infrastructure. For AISA, building an adequate storm-sewer system to 
protect residents against flooding was not deemed profitable and therefore was not given a 
high priority. 
4.11 Presidential Elections of 2002 and Bolivia’s Second War over War (and Gas) 
In Bolivia, votes for the president are tabulated at the national level. If no candidate 
achieves a majority, the newly elected legislature chooses between the candidates: today, 
they choose between the top two, but until recently the top three would be considered. 
There is no guarantee that the candidate who receives the plurality of the popular vote will 
be chosen as president by Congress and it has been as common for candidates in second or 
even third place to be chosen as for the candidate in first place.92 Until 2002, three parties 
had dominated elections in Bolivia: Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) 
[Movement of the Revolutionary Left], Acción Democrática Nacionalista (ADN) 
[Nationalist Democratic Action], and Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR) 
[Nationalist Revolutionary Movement]. However, in 2002 two other parties emerged as 
major contenders: Nueva Fuerza Republicana (NFR) [New Republican Force] and the 
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) [Movement Towards Socialism] parties. Despite the 
high profiles of the traditional party candidates, much of the election revolved around the 
two candidates from these non-traditional parties. The NFR nominated its founder, Reyes 
Villa, who had served as Mayor of Cochabamba from 1993 to 2001, and who had gained a 
great deal of popularity during the Cochabamba water conflict. The other controversial 
candidate representing the indigenous and peasant sectors was Evo Morales; as noted 
above, he had come to national prominence as leader of the national coca growers union 
during the period of the coca eradication program in the Chapare area of Cochabamba. The 
MNR’s candidate was Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, or Goni. Not surprisingly, the 2002 
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presidential campaign in Bolivia was marked by major tensions surrounding all of the 
reforms initiated in the mid-1990s, especially those which had involved the private sector. 
Besides advocating the end of the drug eradication programs emphasized by the 
ADN government, Evo Morales’ campaign launched harsh criticism of Goni’s 
capitalisation initiatives. Morales argued that major adjustments needed to be made to 
Bolivia’s recently imported neo-liberal model, and he advocated that Bolivia should resist 
initiatives proposed by the United States and IMF. Morales was very popular with voters in 
rural areas and in the cities hardest hit by the recession. But the biggest boost to Morales’ 
campaign came from the US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha. Four days before the 
election, Rocha urged Bolivians not to vote for Morales, warning that the election of a 
candidate aligned with “drug dealers and terrorists” could result in the loss of US foreign 
assistance aid (La Razon, 27 July 2002). While these comments were denounced by all 
parties, Rocha’s remarks served to legitimise Morales’ standing as a viable candidate and 
illustrated how he contrasted with the traditional parties. Predictably, no candidate won a 
majority in the election. Although Goni received the most popular votes, Evo Morales, to 
the surprise of many, was just one point behind, riding a nationalist wave that rose every 
time a US Embassy official lectured Bolivians on the “consequences” of voting for 
Morales’ party.93 Although Congress opted to choose Goni as the next president, Morales’ 
MAS party surprised even itself by earning eight senate and 27 congressional seats, up 
from four only a few years before. 
Goni’s inauguration day, in August 2002, was marred by protests by the national 
confederations of labourers, teachers, medical workers, and peasants. Six months later, in 
February 2003, La Paz and other urban centres erupted in bloody protests against a 
proposed income tax. These social divisions widened in the months that followed and 
exploded again in September 2003, following Goni’s announcement of plans to export 
natural gas through Chile (Singer and Morrison, 2004). The National Coordination for the 
Defence of Gas, under the leadership of Oscar Olivera (previously the spokesperson for the 
                                                
 
93 Goni received the most votes of any candidate, although this was only a share of 22.5 per cent, which was far short of 
the absolute majority needed to avoid a vote in Congress. The final vote count also showed that Morales was only 1.6 per 
cent behind Goni; see Corte Nacional Electoral (http://www.cne.org.bo). 
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Coordinating Committee during the Cochabamba standoff), mobilised 30,000 people in 
Cochabamba and 50,000 more in La Paz to demonstrate against the gas pipeline into Chile. 
In response, the government called upon the military. The leaders of El Alto’s Federation 
of Neighbourhood Boards (FEJUVE), along with the powerful forces of Felipe Quispe, 
leader of the Pachakuti Indigenous Movement and general secretary of the United Union 
Confederation of Working Peasants of Bolivia (CSUTCB), dominated El Alto’s Radio San 
Gabriel, where each took turns vocalising demands that the government fully nationalise 
hydrocarbon resources and increase indigenous participation in the political life of the 
country. On 12 October 2003 the government imposed martial law in El Alto after sixteen 
more people were shot by the police and several dozen wounded in violent clashes, and on 
the following day the administration suspended the gas project. However, more violence 
ensued, leaving 67 people dead and hundreds wounded. Vice President Carlos Mesa 
deplored what he referred to as the “excessive force” used by the government in El Alto 
and withdrew his support for President Goni. The Minister for Economic Development, 
Jorge Torrez of the MIR party, also resigned in protest at Goni’s leadership. The governing 
coalition disintegrated shortly thereafter, forcing Goni to resign and flee the country days 
later. Goni was then succeeded by Vice President Mesa.94 
4.12 The Downfall of AISA 
There was no calm after the October storm. Immediately following the “successful” 
overthrow of President Goni, community leaders promptly added the AISA concession to 
their list of complaints against the government, and called for the cancellation of the AISA 
PPP contract. The FEJUVE, under the leadership of Abel Mamani and Carlos Rojas, 
continued to organise numerous strikes in the city, this time claiming that AISA’s water 
prices were too high and out of reach to the majority of El Alto residents. Protesters also 
                                                
 
94 Ten Bolivian families have initiated lawsuits against former President Goni and Defence Minister Berzaín relating to 
the violence that took place in Warisata, Sorata, and Achacachi during October 2003. The plaintiffs claim the two men 
escaped accountability in Bolivia by relocating to the US (to Maryland and Key Biscayne, respectively), and they should 
be forced to pay damages for the deaths. Goni and Berzain say the case should be thrown out. They contend that they 
were doing their constitutional duty to quell a violent uprising and that the events and people involved are purely 
Bolivian. In June 2008, more than 7,000 Bolivian workers, farmers and others protested in front of the US Embassy in La 
Paz demanding that the two men be extradited to Bolivia to face charges. 
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demanded that the government reverse its recent increases of 10 per cent for gasoline and 
23 per cent for diesel, claiming that the cost of all basic goods had skyrocketed. In 
response, the government agreed to “review” the contract with AISA. This was not enough 
for the FEJUVE. According to Mamani, “Aguas del Illimani has not complied with their 
contract, so they have to go” (La Razon, October 25 2003). 
According to AISA and the SISAB, the utility had in fact provided new 87,000 
drinking water connections since 1997, including 57,000 in El Alto. In terms of sanitation, 
69,000 connections had been made, including 47,000 in El Alto. This represented more 
connections than had originally been agreed upon in the concession contract, and an 
average annual connection rate three times higher than under SAMAPA. Water rates had 
increased slightly in real terms since 1997, but this was only because the rates were 
calculated in US dollars and the Boliviano had depreciated against the dollar; the utility did 
not directly increase consumers’ charges. Up until this point, AISA had invested USD 
63million in infrastructure and 92 per cent of the income generated from the firm was paid 
back to the Bolivian community either through the state (65 per cent in taxes, investment, 
and rent), in staff remuneration (20 per cent), or directly to suppliers (7 per cent). No 
dividends had been paid to shareholders. Aside from two expatriates, company employees 
were all Bolivian nationals.  
These details were not fully understood by the majority of the opposition 
movement, and those who were aware either did not believe them to be true or felt that 
they were not relevant to their larger struggle against the commercialisation of natural 
resources more generally. All this time, throughout the latter part of 2003 and for most of 
2004, AISA had made a concerted decision to keep as low a profile as possible, choosing 
not to exploit the various media outlets to present their side of the story. The government, 
meanwhile, tried to shift the focus of the protests away from water. In March 2004, for 
example, President Mesa announced that his government would hold a series of rallies 
around the country and at its embassies abroad, demanding that Chile return to Bolivia a 
stretch of seacoast that the country lost in 1884 after the end of the War of the Pacific 
(Singer and Morrison 2004). Chile traditionally refused to negotiate on the issue, but Mesa 
nonetheless began to make this a central issue of his administration. He continually 
appeared on national television to beseech protestors to stop and to understand the reasons 
behind the increases in fuel prices, arguing that cheaper subsidised Bolivian fuel was being 
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smuggled into neighbouring countries, causing a national shortage. On numerous 
occasions he also threatened to resign should violence to break out, but the strikes and 
protests continued. Thousands of El Alto residents hit the streets for days on end; 
roadblocks cut off traffic in and out of La Paz, shutting down El Alto’s international 
airport, which serves as the only airport for the capital city. At the same time, in the cities 
of Cochabamba and Potosi, factory workers, students, farmers, retirees, homemakers, 
unemployed workers, and minors all joined in marches organised against the fuel price 
increases. 
Meanwhile, the organisational capacity of the FEJUVE was growing strong. On 27 
September 2004, after completing a “grassroots discussion on different issues regarding 
the needs of the all Bolivian people”, the group submitted a formal letter to the government 
(a Pliego Nacional) demanding the nationalisation of Bolivia’s hydrocarbons, the recovery 
of all state enterprises that had been privatised, the expropriation of various politicians’ 
properties, and the repeal of Supreme Decree 21060 (which in 1985 had essentially 
established much of the neo-liberal policy framework); the letter also demanded better 
healthcare, employment, and education (Narco News Bulletin, January 14, 2005). Over the 
next month the FEJUVE began distributing pamphlets across El Alto, detailing 14 specific 
reasons why the AISA contract needed to be terminated. Neither the government nor AISA 
countered the FEJUVE’s tactics by distributing their own information pamphlets, nor did 
they do any other type of community outreach. Mesa also failed to give attention to the 
increasing hostility towards AISA during his television appearances. On 15 November, in 
one of the largest demonstrations to date, the FEJUVE gave the government 48 hours to 
respond to the demands previously articulated in the September letter and added several 
new points, specifically a demand to “expel all transnational corporations from the 
country, starting with Aguas de Illimani” (La Razon, 16 November 2005). 
Over the following weeks, a series of negotiations between government ministers 
and the leaders of the FEJUVE took place. The FEJUVE’s then-president, Abel Mamani, 
made the people’s point of departure very clear: “We didn’t come here to discuss what to 
do to improve service or lower our bills. We’re going to start with the root of the problem: 
Aguas de Illimani simply must leave” (La Razon 5 January 2005. On 11 January 2005, 
residents of the outlying El Alto neighbourhoods of Ballivian and Alto Lima, which 
continued to lack water and sanitation connections, seized several AISA facilities, 
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including a water tank. The same day, Mesa responded by sending a letter to the FEJUVE, 
saying he was beginning “the necessary actions for the termination of the concession 
contract” with AISA. The various leaders of the neighbourhood associations met at the 
FEJUVE headquarters to discuss the letter, but after three hours they decided to continue 
their strike. They then gave Mesa's government 24 hours to promulgate a decree 
immediately cancelling the contract with the water; otherwise, they claimed, protesters 
would seize the company's facilities. 
The following day El Alto remained paralyzed. The government presented the 
FEJUVE with another decree but this too was rejected because according to the FEJUVE it 
failed to make clear “that AISA and foreign managers of the company needed to leave 
Bolivia immediately” (quoted in La Razon, 13 January 2005). By the end of the day, the 
government gave in to the protestors’ request and presented Supreme Decree 27293, 
stating that they would comply with the requests of the FEJUVE and take the “necessary 
actions” to terminate the contract “immediately” and to guarantee water and sanitation 
service for El Alto and La Paz (La Razon, 13 January 2005). In response, the FEJUVE 
finally called an end to the strikes but warned that its members would remain on alert to 
make sure the company did not remove any equipment from its facilities. It also made a 
formal statement pressing for additional demands for re-nationalisation: “Electropaz is 
next”, they warned, referring to the electricity company servicing El Alto and La Paz; this 
was operated by the Iberdrola S.A., which is a Spanish company and a leading global 
private electric utility. On 23 January 2005, 20,000 residents of El Alto, already organised 
for a scheduled protest march into La Paz, participated in what became a victory march, 
celebrating the cancellation of the contract with AISA. SAMAPA was to be revived to take 
over the water and sewer service in La Paz and El Alto for a three-month period while a 
new entity was being established. 
After passing the resolution to cancel the AISA contract, President Mesa attempted 
to resign from office, but Congress refused his request out of fear of creating even more 
instability in the country. However, as the months passed and the conflict over Bolivia’s 
gas reserves continued, Congress finally accepted Mesa’s resignation and replaced him 
with the chief justice of the Supreme Court, who was given the responsibility of organising 
new elections. These elections, which were held just nine months later, led to a massive 
victory for Evo Morales, who achieved 54 per cent of the vote. Morales became the 
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country’s first fully indigenous head of state since the Spanish conquest, and unlike the 
presidents before him, after he was formally sworn in by Congress and the judiciary, he 
held a second, more emotive, acceptance ceremony at the archaeological site of 
Tiahuanaco, where thousands of indigenous supporters gathered to celebrate the most 
dramatic cultural shift in the make-up of Bolivian politics in almost half a century. 
4.13 A Brief Summary of Current Service Delivery Issues in La Paz/ El Alto 
Shortly after taking office, Morales appointed Abel Mamani of the FEJUVE as the new 
Minister of Water. Immediately after taking office, Mamani initiated a legal process 
against two ex-superintendents, claiming that they had acted against the rights of residents. 
He referred to Bolivia’s victory against the commodification of water, and made a proposal 
at the Fourth World Water Forum that “water be declared a human right to be owned and 
managed strictly by public entities”.95 Publicity surrounding the cancellation of AISA 
spread quite quickly, and much of it was misleading. AISA and its majority shareholder, 
Suez Environment, were depicted by much of the media as having profiteered off its low-
income consumer base, and irrelevant statistics regarding Suez’s global annual profits 
(rather than AISA’s) were used to perpetuate misconceptions about the concession further. 
However, within a year of Mamani’s ministerial appointment, there were various 
calls for his resignation. Allegations began to spread rapidly across the country that he was 
too inexperienced and did not have the technical capacity or background to oversee the 
sector. Much of this negativity was actually propagated by his former colleagues at the 
FEJUVE, some of whom felt slighted by his appointment and sceptical about his political 
motivations. The combination of rapidly deteriorating services in the adjoining cities of La 
Paz/El Alto, coupled by the publication of compromising pictures of Mamani in the 
company of prostitutes while in Italy on government business, generated an outcry among 
community members and a new set of protests that once again drew the working capital to 
a standstill. Morales terminated Mamani’s position with the government shortly thereafter, 
which led to continued instability for the water sector across the country. 
                                                
 
95 The 4th World Water Forum was held 16–22 March 2006. 
142 
 
 
Meanwhile, AISA reverted to a public utility model, called Empresa Pública Social 
de Agua y Saneamiento (EPSAS).96 The utility was meant to be restructured as a “public-
social company”, although how exactly this would be done in practice remains unclear. 
According to the FEJUVE, the utility was meant to be governed by a popular assembly 
with elected delegates from all regions of the city, who would be given the task of 
formulating the policy of the water company (Pérez 2005). However, according to the 
SISAB website, the utility is a sociedad anónima (equivalent to a “limited” company), 
owned by the government with two private shareholders, and it continues to be regulated 
under commercial law. 
Since 2007, there has been a continuous flow of criticism of the EPSA on account 
of water shortages, accounting errors, tariff increases, and poor disaster preparedness. 
According to Carlos Rojas, who stayed on as an active member of the FEJUVE after 
Mamani became minister, service expansion has decreased while rates have increased by 
40–100 per cent since the departure of AISA, with few new works being carried out.97 The 
executive secretary for the mayor of La Paz has also made various statements to the press 
claiming that the utility “fails to comply with regulations for cleaning of sewerage pipes 
and major aqueducts [and that this] is having disastrous consequences for residents across 
the two cities” (Javier Zárate, quoted in La Razon, 11 February 2008). In response to many 
of these complaints, Víctor Hugo Rico, who is the current EPSA manager, argues that the 
company is barely able to cover the current costs of provision and that the company 
desperately needs to hire more personnel. Due to the fact that no agreement has yet been 
reached as to the type of institutional structure the utility should have, he says he is unable 
to leverage any additional funding for investment (La Razon, 11 February 2008). Local 
residents, as well as hospitals, schools, and commercial and industrial consumers are 
growing anxious. Meanwhile, representatives of El Alto’s FEJUVE are once again 
threatening to take over the utility and create their own service provider. 
                                                
 
96 EPSAs are not unique to La Paz/El Alto. This is the name given to any municipal utility in the country. They were 
designed as part of the regulatory reform of the late 1990s requiring all utilities (public and private) to draft a service 
provision contract with the SISAB. 
97 BNamericas Interview, 12 September 2008. 
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The Morales administration modified the regulatory structure in 2007 by placing 
many of the superintendents under the control of their relevant ministries, potentially 
decreasing the regulators’ freedom from political interference. This action reversed what 
many outside observers believed had been Bolivia’s strongest political and economic 
pillar, as regulators had acted independently and were supposedly beyond the reach of 
party politics.  
4.14 AISA Audit 
In Annex Two there is a summary of an audit of AISA, which was released in 2007. A 
relatively unknown local auditing firm conducted the audit and it acted under immense 
political pressure as the government needed to find ample reasons why it should not pay 
AISA compensation for terminating the concession contract. However, even under these 
circumstances, discrepancies between AISA’s stated compliance with the contract 
expansion targets and those found by the auditing firm do not vary significantly. The 
auditors do take issue with the estimated returns they calculated AISA would have 
generated: taking an average for the 30 years of the concession, the auditors estimated the 
financial return for the Concessionaire to be 22.9 per cent, which they then categorise as 
being “significantly high”. It is important to note, however, that these estimates were made 
without sufficient information regarding (i) infrastructure investments undertaken by 
AISA; or (ii) the goods/assets transferred from SAMAPA to AISA, which were never 
registered; further, there was (iii) no available documentation related to the payroll of any 
of the various investment projects. Most significantly, the auditing firm surprisingly 
confuses revenue streams with profit earnings, which are two completely different 
concepts.98 Profitability (and not revenue) is a much more accurate measure of the 
potential sustainability of a firm’s success. We do not know exactly what the profit 
earnings were for AISA during the concession period. 
                                                
 
98 Revenue is the money that comes into a business, but it does not take into account expenses and cash outflow. As a 
result, revenue is not a good measure of a firm’s success, and this is especially true when the necessary costs of doing 
business are high. Profit, on the other hand, is the money that a business retains after all expenses have been paid and 
accounts have been settled. 
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For its own part, Aguas del Illimani claims that the Bolivian government owes it 
USD 65 million for investments. An article by the progressive news agency Bolpress 
argues that this claim is grossly exaggerated. They point out that under the contract the 
government is obligated to compensate the company only for its fixed net assets, and as of 
31 December 2004 this amount did not surpass USD 22 million. Further, if the costs 
recuperated from connection charges alone are discounted against this amount, then the 
State would only owe Aguas del Illimani a maximum of USD 9 million (Bolpress, 17 June 
2005). However, the Government of Bolivia has also taken another avenue, claiming that 
the contract itself was illegitimate. Using the argument that the great “sell-off” of major 
public enterprises in the late 1990s was riddled with corruption, there was a move to 
revoke all contracts signed during the period of “capitalization” and to claim compensation 
from these companies. 
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Chapter 5.  Understanding the Clash between Formal and Informal 
Institutions in the Water Sector 
5.1 Section I: Bolivia’s Informal Institutional Environment 
5.1.1 The Relevance of Pre-Hispanic Values and Customs 
Toward the end of the last chapter, we were left with the image of Evo Morales honouring 
his presidency in a ceremony at the archaeological site of Tiahuanaco; a site which dates 
back to approximately 200 BCE, over 1,000 years before the rise of the Inca Empire and 
the Spanish conquests. It was here that Morales was crowned as Apu Mallku, which means 
“supreme leader” or “prince” in Aymara, thus accepting a symbolic mandate to oversee the 
Ayllus, the vast network of traditional groupings and social structures of the Aymara 
people. Tiahuanaco, built near the Lake Titicaca basin of Bolivia, consists of massive 
blocks weighing up to 100 tons each. Brought from several miles away and fitted together 
without mortar, these blocks were cut, squared, dressed, and notched with a precision 
equalled by no other aboriginal South American civilisation. It is believed that Tiahuanaco 
contained several large temples surrounded by moats; the central temple, called the 
Akapana, was constructed in a series of seven tiers, which were meant to resemble the 
nearby mountain peaks, and engineers plumbed it with drains so that when the annual rains 
arrived, water would thunder through the temple (Morell 2002). It was here that the people 
of Tiahuanaco celebrated fertility ceremonies and other rites of passage while water roared 
through the mountain temple, exemplifying a renewal of the earth and the “circulatory 
system of the Aymara universe” (Kolata 1993). 
A 32-year drought from 563–594 CE (Kolata 1993) apparently caused widespread 
devastation across the Tiahuanaco Empire, prompting the Aymara people to revolutionise 
their agricultural techniques and to use raised-bed irrigation systems.99 Many scholars 
                                                
 
99 The high altitude of the Titicaca Basin required the development of a distinctive farming technique known as 
“raised-field” agriculture, which is today seen only in experimental, government-funded projects. In antiquity, this 
method comprised a small but significant percentage of the agriculture in the region, along with irrigated fields, pasture, 
terraced fields, and cocha (small lake) farming. Artificially raised planting mounds are separated by canals filled with 
water, and these canals supply water for growing crops; however, they also absorb heat from the sun during the day, and 
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believe that these new techniques were the catalyst that allowed the empire to prosper for 
an additional 400 years, and the city to reach a population of an estimated 50,000 by 800 
CE (Kolata 1993). Sustaining a productive agriculture-based society in such a dry and 
severe region through the use of primitive irrigation and hydraulic technology was an 
extraordinary accomplishment, and is very difficult to imagine. In 1957, an American 
scholar named Karl Wittfogel famously put forward a theory of “hydraulic civilisations” to 
explain the rise of state-societies. He argued that in order to progress, such civilisations 
required despotic rulers uniquely prepared to wield supreme power over water resources 
(Wittfogel 1957). Wittfogel believed that irrigation had an organising effect: the 
scheduling of water use, the maintenance of canals, and the defence of canals from hostile 
neighbours were all factors at work within hydraulic societies, so that efficiency gains 
would be achieved only through central control and a political and social structure capable 
of organising the forced use of labour. According to Wittfogel, this powerful monopoly 
over water resource distribution within a society would lead to a single-centred despotic 
government. We cannot say for certain whether this was in fact the case in Tiahuanaco; 
there is some debate between the archaeological evidence, which is suggestive of a 
powerful centralist government, and anthropological research, which supports the notion 
that Tiahuanaco was based on a system of kin-based reciprocity and regulation, rather than 
hierarchy and control (Schaedel 1988; Graffman 1990). At its peak, between 800–1000 
CE, the Tiahuanaco Empire controlled nearly the entire Lake Titicaca basin, an estimated 
area of around 58,000 km²; this empire then vanished suddenly, around 1100 CE. To this 
day, its disappearance remains a mystery, and a focus of myth and controversy. 
Regardless of how little is actually known about the true history of the ancient 
Aymara civilisation, Evo Morales’ acceptance of his presidential honour in the open air, 
with his feet on the ancient rubble of his ancestral past at the site of Tiahuanaco, clearly 
exemplified his reverence for the informal institutions (values, customs, traditions, and 
culture) that he and his supporters believe to embody the Aymara heritage. In front of tens 
                                                                                                                                              
 
this heat is radiated during the bitterly cold nights, providing thermal insulation. Over time, the canals also were used to 
farm edible fish, and the resulting canal sludge was dredged for fertiliser. 
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of thousands of people, Aymara community leaders replaced Evo's western clothes with 
native attire. They then removed his shoes to enable him to stand in closer proximity to the 
Pachamama (mother earth), and they gave him a walking stick decorated in gold and 
silver, which was said to represent the transfer of authority back to the Aymara people for 
the first time in over five centuries. In many ways, this day marked the rise of another kind 
of power, more cultural than political: that of a post-modern Indian icon. The hope of most 
Bolivians was that this political ascendance would signify a much-needed blending of the 
informal and formal institutional frameworks that currently make up modern day Bolivia. 
The pre-Hispanic values, customs, and traditions of the Andean population are 
particularly relevant to understanding the water sector in Bolivia and help us to answer the 
first sub-question laid out as part of this research endeavour: How has the clash between 
the informal and formal institutional environment influenced intended outcomes and 
perceptions of water sector reform over time. During the 2003 uprisings these informal 
rules formed the backbone of the opposition’s campaign against PSP, a strategy that 
eventually led to the collapse of the La Paz/El Alto concession arrangement. Across the 
developing world, the rhetoric of indigenism100 is increasingly being adopted to support 
political protest movements (Brysk 2000), and this has played a major role in motivating 
international activism. In Bolivia, the recent shift from class-based social movements to 
ethnic-based movements (Canessa 2006), combined with prominent Indian leaders’ 
aggressive pursuit of reclaiming an indigenous nation-state identity, may have come at the 
expense of progressive water reform policies and created a precarious setting for the future 
of service provision for the urban and peri-urban poor. The objective of this chapter is to 
analyse the ways in which the informal and formal institutional rules governing Bolivian 
society have influenced the process of water sector reform. This is of wider significance 
because clashes between informal and formal institutional environments also occur in 
many other developing country contexts; this is especially the case in cities with long 
histories of heavy reliance on self-provision, where informal personalised exchange 
                                                
 
100 Based on the UN definition, the term “indigenous” refers to communities, peoples, and nations that have a 
historical continuity with the pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies of a particular territory, and which consider 
themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in that territory. 
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institutions and community-managed water sources still dominate, and where water, as a 
natural resource, is incorporated within religious or spiritual belief systems. 
Much of the literature against the commodifcation of water tends to place a great 
deal of value on informal personalised exchange institutions, emphasising the peaceful and 
cooperative practices of many low-income communities in support of community-managed 
water provision. This literature makes the point that the process of commodification, 
through the commercialisation of service provision and the introduction of PSP, has 
created an environment of conflict among communities that might otherwise work 
cooperatively through informal rules of exchange (Bustamante 2002; Getches 2002; 
Guevara Gil 2004; Peña et al. 2004; Sikkink 1997; Trawick 2003; Vera 2004). Meanwhile, 
the international language of indigenous rights—especially in the case of Bolivia (and 
other Andean countries)—has become a powerful mechanism for user groups to bundle 
issues related to service provision into a much larger agenda concerning discontent over 
issues such as ethnicity and social exclusion. Recent research by Boelens and Hoogendam 
(2005), for example, specifically considers local norms and cultural expressions on water 
rights in different Andean groups, as well as the cultural politics of resistance and rights-
building, as a way to explain the ways by which people build negotiating power to defend 
the water systems that form part of their identity. These researchers suggest that national 
and international elites (or enterprises) use both state intervention and privatisation policies 
to nullify indigenous water rights, ultimately denying, forbidding, and/or undermining 
local forms of water management (water control rights). 
The difficulty with much of this literature is that it draws conclusions about Andean 
values, customs, traditions, and practices primarily from rural indigenous demographics, 
where water users are more likely to base their livelihood on socially collective, 
community-oriented practices of reciprocity and redistribution; practices that perhaps 
emerge from attributes unique to Andean culture or, equally possible, that have evolved 
out of necessity for survival in the absence of adequate formal service provision. Also, 
although urban communities, such as indigenous populations living in La Paz/El Alto, may 
share some similar traits in terms of collective and community-based cultural and political 
organisation, there is a marked difference as to the applicability of community-managed 
water resources and service provision. This is not to say that we should shy away from 
integrating a ‘livelihood’ perspective into the planning of urban upgrades and the 
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expansion of water and sanitation services. On the contrary, this livelihood perspective is 
critical to developing the water sector in a more sustainable manner, because the livelihood 
perspective (and its application through the Livelihood Framework) identifies the 
vulnerability of consumers as the most important factor in determining the successful 
outcome of sector reform. Thus rural and urban institutional environments deserve 
analytical differentiation as well. One of the aims of this research is to demonstrate that 
there are opportunities for customary and indigenous principles to be integrated formally 
into urban planning for service provision, particularly where the private sector is involved.  
The remainder of this chapter will address the following research question: How 
has the clash between the informal and formal institutional environment – those 
“rules” governing Bolivian society – influenced intended outcomes and perceptions of 
water sector reform over time? Evidence will be presented to demonstrate that although 
we may be witnessing a clash between the informal and formal institutions that support the 
provision of water, the real source of conflict that we must confront in the water sector 
today is the politicisation of water provision rather than the commodification of water 
provision. Herein lies the greatest barrier to building a common institutional framework to 
improve access; not only for Bolivia’s urban poor but for urban areas across the 
developing world. 
5.1.2 The Polity of the Pachamama 
“We don’t believe in privatisation because we have respect for the 
Pachamama”101 
During interviews with households and neighbourhood leaders, discussion about the 
current water conflict often evolved into a conversation about the values and customs of 
the Quechua and Aymara people, most notably around the untranslatable word that 
simultaneously denotes a “moment in time” and a “locus in space”; this is “Pacha”, which 
encompasses earth, world, time, and place (Solomon 1991).102 These respondents referred 
specifically to the Pachamama, whom they believe to be the mother earth spirit 
responsible for providing her people with water. They argued that contemporary Andean 
                                                
 
101 Interview: El Alto Resident, 10 November 2003. 
102 Pacha is also referred to as “earth” personified as a female being in modern folk religions. 
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society continues to perceive water as a necessity and a “spirit of life that others should not 
be able to gain from.” One respondent explained that “If the Pachamama could talk, she 
would tell us, ‘stop polluting and stop selling water’ but she can’t talk, so we have to speak 
for her.”103 Another remarked that “those who understand our values can understand why 
Aguas de Illimani is an enemy of the Pachamama and why we must refuse that “she” be 
sold off to transnational companies.”104 However, was this perception of the Pachamama 
correct? Would the Pachamama really be against PSP in the provision of water? Did these 
respondents believe that the use of water resources for political and economic gain was a 
phenomenon created solely through the commodification of water in recent decades? 
From a mixture of archaeological and ethnographic research, historians have 
deduced two pervading generalities about the Pacha. Earth’s living mass was imagined 
rising up from the waters of the surrounding ocean as a single world mountain made up of 
all the Andean ranges and consisting of female-like valleys and male-like, snow-capped, 
heights. Throughout the history of the region, the indigenous Indians worshiped the great 
snow-capped peaks because that was from where their water was believed to come (Avila 
1918 [1645]: 83). Water, including rainstorms and mudslides, snow and glacial runoff, and 
tiny irrigation canals and mighty rivers, was believed to move over Pacha in a circular 
path, rising up from the ocean into the sky along a “Milky Way river” (Solanes 1991). 
When water takes the form of storm water and downward flowing water it is considered to 
be male, while the Pacific ocean water is considered to be female, and usually referred to 
as Mama Cocha (“Mother Lake”) in modern Andean myth (Solanes 1991; Solomon and 
Urioste 2000). Interestingly, the hydraulic embrace of moving water and enduring earth 
was imagined as sex; their grip was seen as yielding a biotic system in which life-forms 
emerge from the blending of earth and water (Dumézil and Duviols 1974–1976). Hydraulic 
sex was actually imagined as a rather turbulent affair. Myth-tellers, recounting with a good 
deal of humour the harrowing vicissitudes of a water-poor irrigation economy, likened its 
hazards to the comical chaos of undisciplined sexual desire. The union of wild water from 
the heights and from the soil of the valleys provided the greatest agrarian wealth of the 
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western Andes. Anthropological, ethno-historical, and archaeological narratives about the 
influences of indigenous social structures and belief systems on rights-to-water canals and 
land tenure offer a rather complex reading of Bolivia’s past; this has important 
implications for our interpretations both of the informal rules that have historically 
governed Andean communities, and of the modern-day relationship between indigenous 
communities and Pachamama. 
Interestingly, the exploitation of natural resources for political and economic gain 
appears to have been a part of Andean society long before the Spanish invasion. 
Mythological texts such as the Huarochirí Manuscript, which is one of the oldest sources 
for the beliefs and practices of pre-Hispanic Andean communities, describe a highly 
politicised use of natural resources and provision of fresh water for agriculture and human 
consumption.105 Marriage myths, of which there are many, are believed by many scholars 
to be myths of social dynamics (Solomon and Urioste 2000) that express not only an ideal 
of reproductive union, but also an image of the many tensions involved in creating such a 
union. The pre-Hispanic myths focus a great deal on the tensions between highlanders and 
lowlanders; highlanders sought land by downward invasion and by establishing vertical 
outliers in the mid-altitudes, while lowlanders in turn sought to capture more water sources 
by extending their canals upward and exerting political power over the lakes and streams 
of the heights (Torero 1974: 73–79). Irrigable crops grew best in places where canal water 
fertilised pockets of sun-warmed soil amid the rocky river canyons. Irrigated valley lands 
symbolised abundance, and access to warm land with water was seen as the limiting factor 
in winning wealth. These myths provide vivid renderings of the struggle between water-
poor and water-rich groups.106 
Arkush and Stanish (2005) argue that much of debate over whether water conflicts 
existed in ancient Andean societies is due to confusion over what constitutes evidence of 
                                                
 
105 The Huarachí Manuscript has been described as a kind of Andean Bible; a conscious attempt by the Andean people to 
organise their mythology and history in order to protect them against the encroaching imposition of European mysticism 
during the early 1600s. It was composed relatively independently from Spanish preconceptions about native religion. 
106 Ancient Andean myths that relate to water conflict can be found in the Huarachí Manuscript (6:82–90; 
12:170; 30; 31: 406 –432). 
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warfare or conflict; this confusion exists because there has been comparatively less 
archaeological research conducted into pre-historical state development in the Andes 
region than in other areas. Early Spanish chroniclers’ accounts of Andean civilisations 
portray military might as the cornerstone of the Inca Empire, and they claim to have 
encountered huge Inca armies supported by a superb logistical framework for roads, supply 
depots, secondary centres, and forts (D’Altroy 1992, 2002; Hemming 1970; Hyslop 1984; 
Rowe 1946). Inca oral histories also describe periods of frequent warfare among ancient 
Andean societies, in which local warlords battled each other for plunder, political 
dominance, territorial resources, and, in particular, for water resources (Cobo 1979 [1653]; 
Guzman Poma 1980 [1613]). Also, records of various sixteenth-century lawsuits between 
indigenous Andean communities provide additional insights into the conflicts that existed 
over the management and use of water. For example, a lawsuit in 1558 concerning the 
Yauyo of Chaclla and the Yunca of Collique (among others) shows how, in pre-Hispanic 
times, the downward penetration of “vertical archipelagos” led to conflicts so mutually 
costly that lowlanders and highlanders were usually forced to reach a modus vivendi of 
shared irrigation work and ritual reciprocity between leaders (Murra 1975a [1972]). 
Typically, these arrangements were delicate, very unstable, and liable to lapse into 
prolonged violence when politically stressed. Even after Inca pacification, there is much 
evidence to support the view that indigenous groups incessantly tried to cheat and coerce 
each other in their pursuit of control over water resources. 
In stark contrast to the archaeological literature, the anthropological literature 
emphasises the peaceful water management practices and rituals of ancient Andean 
societies; this literature tends to support the theory that the management of water resources 
in Andean societies is based on the principles of equity, proportionality, and reciprocity 
(Sikkink 2008; Trawick 2003). Scholars suggest that sources of conflict only emerged with 
the arrival of Spanish colonialists; colonialists bent on destroying traditional agricultural 
systems of water provision by introducing hierarchical forms of resource utilisation that 
eventually led to water scarcity and a breakdown of indigenous community value systems 
(Abercrombie 1991; Remy 1994). Most of this research, however, draws on case-based 
and/or cross-cultural comparative analysis of rural Andean and/or Bolivian community 
behaviour through “participant observation”, without taking into account any of the 
contrasting archaeological evidence. These anthropologists not only theorise that ancient 
water-exchange rituals are directly responsible for the communal order of shared natural 
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resources and the control of water dispute management; they also nearly all call for a 
return to the indigenous model of community control over water as a way of mitigating 
current, modern-day conflicts over resources and water distribution (Sikkink 2008). 
However, while the idea of conflict tends to evoke visions of violence, conflict over 
water can also be interpreted through an exploration of rituals. Aymara and Inca rituals to 
bring rain were described by sixteenth-century chroniclers (Calancha 1978; Murua 1946) 
and, surprisingly, these ancient rituals continue to be celebrated across the Andes region 
today. Tinku, for example, is a form of ritual conflict that is still practiced across many 
parts of the Bolivian highlands. Although the term specifically means “encounter” in 
Quechua, and it is usually a festive event involving music, dancing, food, and drink, these 
prearranged tinku encounters between different communities, moieties, or kin groups can 
indeed become quite violent affairs; people are injured or even die (Chacon and 
Guandinango 2003; Gorbak, Lischetti, and Munoz 1962). When community members 
fight, they tend to use arms considered traditional, or “Inca”, which include slingshots, 
boleadoras, clubs, and whips (Alencastre and Dumézil 1953; Orlove 1994). Personal group 
hostilities and grievances also often enter into the battle. Blood shed during battles is 
believed to encourage the fertility of the earth, and when a death occurs it is perceived to 
be a good omen for the winning community, encouraging rainfall, control over water 
resources, and a prosperous harvest (Chacon and Guandinango 2003; Gorbak, Lischetti, 
and Munoz 1962; Hartmann 1972). However, contemporary tinkus are often supervised by 
local police and/or religious authorities in order to prevent bloodshed (Chacon and 
Guandinango 2003; Orlove 1994; San Martin 2002) and in some localities, tinkus are even 
banned by the local government or church because of the frequency of violent incidents 
(Zorn 2002). Although still considered to be a playful practice, increasingly, people are 
participating in tinku as a statement of indigenous peasant autonomy and fierceness, and in 
contrast to the mestizo culture (Orlove 1994; Zorn 2002). 
There is no question that across the Andes region, reverence for the Pachamama 
remains a spiritual constant, and the culturally-bounded political relationship between the 
people and the land is stronger than ever. It is a relationship viewed by most of the 
indigenous community as one based on territorial entitlements to soil, water, air, and 
subsoil (namely, natural gas) resources that make up Bolivia’s vast mineral-rich landscape. 
For the purposes of this research, households were therefore asked to respond to an open-
154 
 
 
ended question about the Pachamama. Specifically, they were asked: “What would the 
Pachamama have to say about water reform in Bolivia?” Most respondents felt that the 
Pachamama would be against the selling and exploitation of any of Bolivia’s natural 
resources by private companies, particularly “foreign ones”. When it was explained to 
them that their water resources had in fact not been sold off—that AISA did not actually 
“own” any of Bolivia’s water resources or the infrastructure (pipes, networks, and/or 
treatment facilities) supporting its distribution—respondents were surprised and very 
sceptical. One of the focus group discussions regarding the Pachamama evolved into a 
discussion around the issue of “entitlements”. This group, made up largely of 
neighbourhood association members, argued that the Pachamama would demand that 
water be “free” for all. They argued that the concept of cost-recovery, and the treatment of 
water as an economic good, was incongruous with a belief in the Pachamama. 
Interestingly, much of what was highlighted by respondents sounded more similar (in 
spirit) to the rights-based doctrine outlined in the United Nations Declaration on Human 
Rights, than to any mythical doctrine concerning the revered Pachamama. The UN now 
says explicitly that access to safe water is a fundamental human right. 
5.1.3 Territorial-Based Ideologies 
“Partitioning the land to the real ancestral owners: this is the dignified 
purpose of our people. And all those politicians who only care about pleasing 
the Americans—the ones who think they are above Bolivian law—they should 
be taken to the execution wall.”107 
Ayllu 
In order to appreciate the complexity of the social relations and institutions of the Aymara 
people, one must first come to understand indigenous communities in relation to the 
concept of Ayllu (Abercrombie 1986; Albo 1972; Canqui 1993; Izko 1992; Platt 1982, 
1987; Van Cott 2000). Ayllu, in its most specific sense, refers to an intimate kin group, 
what Abercrombie terms (1986: 119) a “circulating connubium” of vital essences among 
people sharing corporate interests, shared resources, common ancestors, representative 
sacred places, and a common identity. Simultaneously, though, it is a slippery term that 
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can also refer to overlapping identities (Izko 1992; Platt 1987) and which can shift in 
meaning depending on day-to-day and/or regional context (Abercrombie 1986). Ayllu can 
invoke an intricate and malleable sense of place, community, and identity for an 
individual, but it can also define complex relations in a hierarchical socio-political 
landscape. Historically, Ayllu provided social and personal coherence for constituent 
groups and individuals, but it was also the foundation for a hegemonic political ideology 
(Mainwaring et al 2006; Van Cott 2000). Aymara systems were organised within a 
complex amalgam of corporate and class structures, and Ayllus were divided within this 
structure into two groups: an upper nobility (Hanansaya) who had access to private 
property and inheritable rights to land and free labour, and a lower class (urinsaya) to 
which everyone else belonged (Klein 2003). So, while much of the literature tends to place 
great emphasis on Aymara communal practices and common rights to land, it is important 
to keep in mind that, historically, the Andean system was also made up of complex 
institutions, communities, and properties, ranging from private estates to colony 
communities. 
Land boundaries in many parts of rural Bolivia today are not understood by people 
spatially, but rather conceptually; property is not something that is seen primarily as land 
divided on geometric principles, but rather as a set of continuing relationships in regards to 
access to agricultural products that happen to be grown in widely diverse ecological niches 
(Goodale and Sky 2000). A system of inheritance developed centuries ago in order to deal 
with the Altiplano’s often harsh micro-environments (marked by differences in 
temperature and rainfall patterns), and this ultimately resulted in the distribution of all land 
types within a community’s holdings among all households; the households of each 
community own several small parcels of land distributed among the different micro-
environments. Thus, a single family might farm as many as 30–70 non-contiguous plots of 
land. In any given year a family may lose part of its crop to flooding, but if the family also 
owns parcels in a micro-environment that normally experiences less rainfall or has better 
drainage, at least part of the production will be spared. This system, resembling a micro 
version of verticality, includes the use of many different cultivars in each micro-
environment to further reduce risk by maximising variability. 
Unclear ownership rights and blurry land boundaries in rural Bolivia have been a 
breeding ground for outbreaks of violence between Ayllus, and they are a cause of 
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contention between Ayllus and government authorities. The conception of rural Ayllu 
identity is important for our understanding of the La Paz/El Alto case because of the 
migratory history of the city and the largely unplanned urban expansion of El Alto 
(Sandoval and Sostres 1989); in the 1940s and 1950s much of the communitarian and 
territory-based ideologies of rural Aymara agriculturalist societies seeped into the urban 
ideological landscape. These largely rural origins of the population of El Alto suggest that 
many of the city’s inhabitants are reluctant to adapt to modern urban lifestyles. 
Since Bolivia gained its independence from Spain, socio-cultural change, massive 
job losses in the formerly crucially-important mining industry, and, most significantly, 
escalating land and water conflicts, have compounded the region’s problems to the point 
where bloodshed has been increasing for the past few years. Modern-day Bolivia can be 
divided into three distinct regions: the highlands, the valley, and the lowlands, with each 
region characterised by differing climates, vegetation, and types of inhabitants. Since pre-
Colombian times, Aymara people have dominated the highlands, while Inca Quechua-
speakers and their descendants have dominated the valley. Historically, the lowland 
regions were inhabited primarily by rainforest tribes, but today this region is made up of a 
large number of inhabitants of European descent. A survey undertaken in 1997 found that 
less than 4 per cent of the lowland and valley region population speak Aymara (Urquiola et 
al 2000), which proves just how little mobility there has been between highland and 
lowland populations. Each of these regions has its own unique urban centre; for the 
highlands, this centre is El Alto and La Paz, which almost exclusively attracts migrants 
from the rural highlands (Andersen 2002). Between 1950 and 2001 average rural-to-urban 
migration grew at a rate of just under 4 per cent.108 
Over the years, Aymara activist intellectuals have worked very hard to reconstitute 
the Ayllu among indigenous peoples (Albro 2005). A paper by Calderon, Piscitelli, and 
Reyna (1992) hypothesises that urbanisation has spurred indigenous populations’ efforts to 
find spaces in which they can express themselves, and that semi-frustrated attempts at 
modernisation, coupled with long periods of reverie, have led to these groups (through 
                                                
 
108 Data for 1950, 1976, 1992 comes from Urquiola et al. (2000), and data for 2001 from http://www.ine.gov.bo/Censo_2
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their social movements) affirming their desire for self-determination through claiming 
ethnicity-based rights. Sanjines (2002), for example, analyses the presentation of mestizaje 
in the socio-historical, political, and aesthetic traditions of twentieth-century Bolivia; he 
contends that it represents a fundamentally Western perspective, in which the process of 
cultural, ethnic, and racial mixing is not seen as a merging of equals, and that this 
invariably excludes indigenous ways of viewing the world. He shows how modernity in 
Bolivia has depended on a perception, forged during the colonial era, that local cultures 
need to be uplifted. Rather than a romantic notion of the Pachamama and a symbiotic 
relationship between the Aymara people and their natural resources, it is this turbulent and 
emotive history of Bolivian Indian integration that deserves greater attention in our 
conceptualisation of Bolivia’s current conflicts over water. 
5.1.4 The Emergence of Customary Law (Usos y Costumbres) 
“The privatisation thing is bad”; “the globalisation thing is too”; “they’re 
stealing everything from us—our water, our gas, our mines, our land, our 
culture”109 
In the first two decades of the twentieth century, Bolivia enjoyed an economic boom, 
which came primarily from the tin-mining industry. Related to the economic ascendancy of 
the tin producers was the rise to power of the Liberal Party, which seized control of the 
country from the Conservatives in a military revolt in 1899. Bolivia’s major mining centres 
were located closer to the city of La Paz than to the capital in Sucre, and so the Liberals 
decided to shift the economic and political centre of gravity to La Paz. The Liberal Party 
had actually come to power by mobilising Indian communities in the department of La Paz 
to fight for them against the Conservatives. Andean community leaders had hoped that in 
return for their support, the Liberals would back their efforts to hold onto lands that had 
been under threat since the 1860s, when a series of statutes had begun that outlawed native 
communities and proposed various means of privatising lands (Platt 1987). Once in office, 
however, the Liberals turned on their allies, mainly because the goal of native land 
ownership conflicted directly with the Liberals’ socio-economic class interests. This was 
especially true in the La Paz area, where the creole class of landowners (i.e. white Spanish 
                                                
 
109 Interview El Alto Resident, 18 November 2003. 
158 
 
 
descendants) favoured incorporating Indians into their haciendas, over the classic liberal 
approach to small landownership.110 Indigenous communities responded to this betrayal by 
organising themselves to reclaim their usurped lands and by demanding the rights that 
liberalism theoretically promised to all Bolivian citizens: political representation, 
education, and personal freedom (Perez 2005; Rivera 1986). Nevertheless, living 
conditions of the indigenous peoples, who constituted more than half of the population, 
remained deplorable. Forced to work under primitive conditions in the mines and in 
nearly-feudal status on large estates, the indigenous people were denied access to 
education, economic opportunity, political participation, and basic services throughout first 
third of the twentieth century in Bolivia. 
However, Bolivia’s defeat in the Chaco War against Paraguay (1932–1935) marked 
a turning point. Great loss of life and territory discredited the traditional ruling classes, 
while army service produced stirrings of political awareness among the indigenous people. 
In 1936, Standard Oil was nationalised and the state-owned firm Yacimientos Petroliferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) was created. From the end of the Chaco War until the 1952 
revolution, the emergence of contending ideologies and the demands of new groups 
convulsed Bolivian politics. One of the outcomes of the 1952 revolution was a 
determination by the new government (led by the MNR111) to create a new Bolivian 
society consisting of an ethnically-mixed middle class. In order to achieve this, the 
government promoted the concept of mestizaje, or a cultural blending between Bolivia’s 
various ethnic groups, with the objective of assimilating Indians into formal political and 
economic spheres. Although indigenous culture continued to be glorified, it was glorified 
more as folklore for the governing elite rather than considered part of contemporary 
culture. Not everyone was pleased with this notion of cultural blending. Some critics of the 
policies believed it was an attempt to create individuals who were consumers and 
                                                
 
110 Erick Langer (1988) has shown that in different regions of Bolivia, Liberals took varying approaches to the “land 
question”. In contrast to La Paz, the political elite in areas where mining was the backbone of the economy (Potosi) or 
where land was already divided into small parcels (Cochabamba) tended to divide communally held lands among the 
people themselves so that they might become small private farmers. Liberals, meanwhile, were actually ambivalent about 
eliminating caste and race distinctions. See also Platt (1984). 
111 This was the same party that would later bring Goni to power, in 1993. 
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producers of merchandise, speakers of Spanish with aspirations to a Western ideal of 
civilisation (Cusicanqui 2004). The challenge of representing the geographically isolated, 
linguistically and culturally diverse indigenous population through a homogeneous set of 
political institutions proved difficult, as many indigenous cultures simply rejected the 
concept of political representation, preferring direct forms of participation based on the 
traditional model of Ayllu.112 
By 1978, the Katarista indigenous movement had emerged in Bolivia. The 
Kataristas took their name from the late eighteenth-century rebellion of Julian Apaza, who 
came to be called Tupaj Katari after leading a rebellion in La Paz in 1781 against the 
Spanish authorities. Julian Apaza suffered a harrowing death at the hands of the Spanish, 
who sought to make an example of his lawlessness by ripping his body apart and 
distributing pieces of it to various Indian communities (Crabtree 2005). His heart is 
believed to have been buried under a Catholic monument in El Alto named Corazon de 
Jesus, and Andean priests continue to use this site as an altar for indigenous rituals. 
Katarismo was an attempt to recreate a sense of a nationalist Aymara identity and to 
promote ethnic distinctions within the country; throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, the 
Katarista movement succeeded in bringing a number of ethnic concerns closer to the 
centre of the political stage, but during the 1980s it splintered into a number of factions. 
Victor Hugo Cardenas, the leader of one faction, became Goni’s vice-president during his 
1993–1997 term in office; Cardenas was the first ever Indian Bolivian to occupy such an 
elevated position.113 The more radical faction of Katarismo, however, explicitly and 
fervently rejected this kind of established hybridity and the normative models of mestizaje 
that had been promoted across Latin America. The leader of this radical faction, Felipe 
Quispe, grew to become one of the most powerful community leaders in El Alto’s history. 
                                                
 
112 For more on this topic, see Lazarte (1993). 
113 The MNR-MRTKL (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Katari de Liberación) ticket won the first plurality in Bolivia, 
with 35.6 per cent of the valid vote, and Sánchez was confirmed as president by Congress. A coalition government that 
included the Free Bolivia Movement (MBL) and the Civic Solidarity Union (UCS) was formed. Together, the coalition 
parties won 54.7 per cent of the valid vote and held 79 (of 130) seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 18 (of 27) seats in 
the Senate. 
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As noted in the previous chapter, Felipe Quispe was a principal instigator and organiser of 
the protest movement against water privatisation and AISA. 
Findings from interviews with households and neighbourhood association leaders 
provided further evidence in support of Calderon et al (1992), who argued that when 
Kataristas proposed a pluri-ethnic state of Aymaras, Quechuas, and Tupi-Guaranis, they 
were not only fighting for the right to be different, but they were also undermining the 
notion of a homogeneous nation-state and rejecting the position of cultural mestizaje as the 
root of Bolivian state ideology. Although the Goni–Cardenas administration of the early 
1990s believed very strongly in the virtue of a mixed Bolivian society, it also wanted 
formally to introduce policies that would give greater legitimacy to the indigenous cultural 
heritage. It tried to keep the balance by introducing the Law on Popular Participation, in 
1994, and the Decentralisation Law, in 1995;114 these aimed to provide new resources and 
responsibilities to municipalities, and they included a framework for supporting local 
grassroots organisations in the planning and monitoring of municipal programmes. 
Prior to 1994, Bolivia was a limited federation; its nine provinces all had some 
policy-making responsibility, but the central government could override their initiatives 
and control their budgets, and provincial governors were appointed by the president 
(Barbery 1998; Singer 2005). Remarkably, 42 per cent of Bolivians did not actually live 
under any formal local government structure (Grindle 2000), meaning that almost half the 
population had not been properly represented. The Law on Popular Participation created 
311 municipalities (now 314), allowed for the direct election of mayors, and mandated that 
20 per cent of national tax revenues be transferred to municipalities automatically on the 
basis of population size.115 Even more significantly, the law created a series of “Territorial 
Organisations” (OBTs) representing geographic and ethnic interests, effectively granting 
full recognition to traditional local political organisations by formally institutionalising 
                                                
 
114 For more detailed analysis of decentralisation in Bolivia and its impact, see Grindle (2000: 94–146), Ameller Terrazas 
(2002), Faguet (2002). 
115 Following the completion of the HIPC process, the GoB enacted a second fiscal decentralisation by transferring the 
money devolved from donors to municipal governments on the basis of an automatic formula that emphasises the 
distribution of poverty within each municipality. This transfer was made through the National Dialogue Law (Ley de 
Dialogo Nacional). 
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their admittance within the formal policy-making process. These OBTs were established 
according to what is referred to as usos y costumbres, or “customary law”. 
5.1.5 The Power of Neighbourhood Associations  
“We want to build our own confederate state, our own government led by an 
indigenous president, our own army, our own economy as the descendants of 
Huyana Capac, the sovereign government of the Incas.”116 
Today, the OBTs of El Alto are organised as Juntas Vecinales, or neighbourhood 
associations. Throughout the last half-century, these associations, through their leaders, 
have helped to organise new urban settlers, often acting as the spokesperson for residential 
clusters in El Alto and/or as the mediator between municipal government authorities and 
residents. They also work closely with local political organisations, and there are various 
types of neighbourhood councils: youth organisations, cultural associations, migrant 
centres, workers’ associations, and labour associations. Also, during the 1970s, labour 
federations were created for merchants, vendors, and artisans; these groups, made up 
mostly of small business owners and self-employed workers, later formed some of the 
most powerful and militant unions in the country: the Bolivian Workers Union (COB), the 
Regional Workers Union (COR) of El Alto, and the Confederation of Campesino Workers 
of Bolivia (CSUTCB). Through these groups, other social organisations emerged, 
including the social base for the radical Pachakuti Indigenous Movement (MIP), and the 
Bolivian Landless Movement (MST-B). The COR represents many of the workers in the 
informal economy, some government employees, and workers in the private sector (such 
as workers in the manufacturing industries). Their main activities focus on mediating 
disputes within economic organisations and representing them vis-à-vis government and 
employers. 
Labour unions thus have very close links to neighbourhood associations, which 
grew powerful over the decades by making demands for improved basic services better 
known to central and local government authorities. Today, Neighbourhood Association 
Leaders (NALs) are responsible for submitting project proposals and plans to the 
municipal government, and they are provided with public funds under the Popular 
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Participation Law.117 Some associations deal with concrete neighbourhood issues, while 
others take a more prominent role in mediating disputes or advocating for specific groups 
(Mamani 2004). Prioritising and executing projects with municipal funds occur in a highly 
politicised environment, and according to Quisbert (2003) neighbourhood dynamics in El 
Alto often reflect tensions between residents and NALs over the correct appropriation of 
earmarked community funds. Still, for many residents of El Alto, NALs are perceived as 
the only means through which individual community voices are heard. 
The powerful Federación de Juntas Vecinales (FEJUVE), which was discussed in 
the previous chapter, represents the most important political entity in El Alto and serves as 
an umbrella organisation for the more than 550 neighbourhood committees across the city. 
It is recognised by central and municipal governments as a legitimate mediator for the 
residents of El Alto, and it is unsurprising that due to long histories of social exclusion 
from formalised government structures, many residents feel obligated to support the 
FEJUVE out of loyalty regardless of whether they agree (or fully understand) whatever 
cause the FEJUVE happens to be fighting for.118 Findings from this research suggest that 
the first set of mobilisations, in September 2003, were in reaction to a municipal resolution 
(MR 090/2003) to regulate and tax real estate transactions. NALs explained that this was a 
government strategy to levy taxes on the residents of EL Alto in order to “get more money 
from the poor” (Cori, quoted in Prensa Altena 2003). Newspaper columnists argued that 
the failure of municipal government authorities to inform the population of the scope and 
purpose of the new proposal had resulted in the mobilisations (Prensa Altena 2003; Pulso 
2003), while other journalists argued that the mobilisations allowed FEJUVE leaders to 
raise their profiles as a strategy against legal charges of corruption (El Diario 2003; La 
Razon 2003). 
5.1.6 Implications for Property Rights and Indigenous Heritage 
“The killings [in Warista] brought us together. We were angry but the rage 
was not only because of the dead. It was also because of our situation. We 
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have been forgotten. This is what it means to be poor and Indian, you 
know?”119 
Interviews with Neighbourhood Association Leaders (NALs) for the purposes of this 
research took place in 2002. During the interviews, NALs were asked about their views of 
the AISA concession. At that time, surprisingly, complaints regarding water affordability 
for low-income consumers in El Alto were not mentioned as being a high priority issue, 
although some of AISA’s fining practices for non-payment were occasionally brought up. 
Discussion over quality of service problems experienced by the residents of El Alto was 
also kept to a minimum, although many residents who had condominial connections felt 
slighted by the installation of an inferior service. NALs used the interview opportunity to 
expound in detail on their conceptualisation of water as a “precious natural resource that 
should not be in the hands of private individuals and profit-seeking multinationals.” 120 The 
primary grievances of the NALs were twofold, consisting of “the government’s abuse 
power and disrespect of their patrimonio propio [customary law]”, and their belief that 
AISA was failing to meet its contractual mandate to expand into the remaining districts of 
El Alto.  
The concept of patrimonio is derived from medieval Spanish legal parlance 
stipulating property inherited from one’s father, and in modern Bolivia it thus refers to 
inherited legal jurisdictional rights over land in accordance with the rules of family estate 
inheritance. Over the years, however, legal terms that were developed to delineate 
indigenous identity were appropriated to new ends by protesting coalitions, and the 
indigenous movement, through the usos and costumbres legal framework, sought to 
expand the state’s limited concept of “land” from simply a factor of agricultural 
production, into land as “territory” that was understood as the “location for the social 
reproduction of collective identity.”121 In the opinion of the interviewed NALs, the 
government had exploited their legal patrimonial rights over this “territory” when they 
allowed AISA to own and operate their water supplies. 
                                                
 
119 Interview with an El Alto resident, 30 January 2003. 
120 From a focus group discussion, 31 January 2003. 
121 Interview: Pablo Mamani, an Aymara and director of sociology studies at UPEA, 16 January 2003. 
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In common usage, property is simply “one’s own thing” and refers to the 
relationship between individuals and the objects which they see as being their own to 
dispense with as they see fit. Scholars in the social sciences frequently conceive of 
property as a bundle of rights and obligations. Modern property rights can be said to begin 
with the transition away from ownership by entities as the primary form of property right, 
and towards the theory that property rights should promote the general good, and 
specifically encourage economic development and the utilisation of property. The defence 
of “traditional use and distribution of water as a collective cultural right based on 
customary law” was first used during the Water War of 2000 in Cochabamba (Laurie et al. 
2003). In this case, the Coordinator of Water and Life made great advances in creating new 
alliances across class, gender, and ethnicity, and had the support of both mestizo and 
indigenous groups in challenging the new potable water legislation. These alliances 
ruptured the rural/urban dichotomy that had always existed historically, and effectively 
helped urban and middle class Bolivians to claim what were essentially rural indigenous 
cultural heritage rights (Laurie 2003). Laurie (2007) argues that the government of 
Bolivia’s (GoB) agenda of introducing the principle of water commodification, while 
simultaneously engaging in the process of recognising the rights of indigenous groups to 
self-determination and collective land ownership under a pluri-cultural constitution, was an 
incompatible development approach because it created a situation whereby two different 
forms of modernity were forced to compete. Findings carried out as part of this research 
support Laurie’s view. 
It is important to take a closer look at the neighbourhood associations of El Alto, in 
order properly to understand the way in which they try to reproduce the traditional rural 
Aymara and Quechua forms of community organisation and structure--and hence the 
informal institutional drivers to their pursuit of formal institutional reform; what Felix 
Patzi, an Aymara sociologist, calls “their logic, their territoriality, their entire system of 
organisation”. According to him, the three elements that show the validity of El Alto’s 
communitarian structure are ties to the market, to land, and to education, and in his opinion 
a community is characterised by the existence of collective property and private 
ownership. For example, El Alto’s ties to the market include merchant trolleys or booths, 
where individuals engage in selling a range of goods in the informal market. According to 
Patzi, “these selling booths are not private property, they’re managed by the union, the so-
called guild; or you could say, the owner is the community.” People obey the union 
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because “without the ability to sell, they simply cannot survive”.122 The issue of collective 
rights and ownership is relatively straightforward when it comes to ties to land in rural 
communities, but it is a more complicated matter in El Alto’s urban setting, where people 
tend to own their own piece of land and have titles to their homes. In the city, ties require 
some degree of interpretation, and NALs can construe them as ties to natural resources or 
to services that provide a collective good for the community. The fact that decisions over 
water, electricity, gas, and other services in El Alto were historically not individual ones, 
and the fact that marginalised residents were historically dependent upon neighbourhood 
associations to make up for the shortcomings of the state, greatly facilitated the ability of 
NALs to promote this understanding. 
5.1.7 Manipulation and Politicisation over Water Rights 
“Whites are here as renters on our land, and we need to put a giant fence 
around them, a reservation, a safe place for white people to be.”123 
At a time when “hybridised” cultural forms are supposed to be more common, both in 
Latin America and elsewhere around the world, movements like that of the Kataristas, 
which seeks to revitalise Aymara culture by explicitly contesting hybridity (Canessa 2000) 
and manipulating popular understanding of customary law, have presented a barrier to 
policy-makers seeking to modernise not only the water sector but also other infrastructure 
sectors. It was extremely effective for protest leaders to use customary law to bring various 
user groups together—not only lower-income users but also middle and higher-income 
user groups who were unhappy with having to shoulder the costs of cross-subsidy 
arrangements. Equally important, the tactics employed by local civil society organisations 
to play on the sentiments of international advocacy organisations—especially those 
opposed to privatisation and globalisation—provided opposition leaders with the resources 
to replicate in La Paz/El Alto their achievements in Cochabamba, and to further propagate 
their somewhat distorted interpretation of Aymara land and territorial sovereignty as this 
relates to customary law. 
                                                
 
122 Interview with Felix Patzi, 13 January 2003. 
123 The statement above was made by Felipe Quispe in an interview with Tom Hayden (Hayden 2001). Felipe Quispe 
leads the CSUTCB indigenous peasants’ movement. During the 1980s and early 1990s he led the Tupac Katari guerrilla 
army, until he was arrested and jailed for five years. 
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The interpretation of indigenous heritage, as propagated by these influential NALs, 
has led to a great deal of misunderstandings about the La Paz/El Alto PPP water 
concession, and it is important to draw attention to the powerful influence that NALs have 
developed over the years by tapping solely into Ayllu communitarian and territory-based 
ideologies. The top priority for NAL respondents, as revealed during interviews in a focus 
group session, was to create a new “Popular Assembly” composed of delegates from 
indigenous communities and urban neighbourhood associations, along with worker, trade, 
and agrarian unions, each elected according to their respective and pre-existent “customary 
procedures”. It was explained that once created, the first objective of the newly-formed 
assembly would be to redraft a national constitution to better represent the rights of the 
country’s indigenous majority, and the second would be to re-nationalise Bolivia’s natural 
gas reserves. 
It is important to note that members of NALs and merchants’ guilds are obligated 
to participate in organised demonstrations, assemblies, and actions, and a system has been 
devised to monitor each family’s attendance. The councils are territorial, and to be 
recognised by the FEJUVE, a neighbourhood association must have at least 200 members. 
Patzi describes them as part of a process of social self-organisation within urban zones to 
resolve the basic urban needs of residents; neighbourhood groups hold monthly or weekly 
meetings where they discuss community problems. Although participation in the 
neighbourhood council is supposedly voluntary, at least one member of each family or 
household is expected to attend, and non-attendees are socially stigmatised through 
rumours that they do not respect the neighbourhood or the council. Again, the obligation 
seems to be accepted by residents who feel that the urban community is a kind of natural 
extension of the rural community and a form of organisation that ensures survival in a 
hostile environment. To avoid censure, practically the entire neighbourhood participates in 
the monthly assemblies, and those who do not attend marches, actions, meetings, or 
assemblies are given fines that tend to be symbolic punishments. At times, the 
neighbourhood council intercedes in conflicts and fights between neighbours, and on 
serious occasions administers justice, with sanctions that are meant to work towards the 
benefit of the neighbourhood. This informal institutional governance framework bestows a 
character that penetrates deeply into the daily on-goings of residents in El Alto, and offers 
a much more complex reading of the driving force behind the city’s anti-privatisation 
movement. 
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The informal institutional environment, represented by the governance structure of 
El Alto’s neighbourhood associations, seems to encompass structures of territorial identity 
within which other kinds of loyalties exist; loyalties that have little to do with privatisation 
per se, and which are much broader in scope. These findings serve as evidence that the 
standoff in January 2005, which culminated in the collapse of AISA, did not actually 
symbolise a battle against a “big bad” multinational water company but, rather, symbolised 
a Katarista revolution against the established mestizo governing institutions. Most of the 
indigenous leaders interviewed believed that the reason why state-run industries had not 
succeeded in raising living standards for the vast majority of citizens in Bolivia’s past was 
simply because the industries had been managed by corrupt and racist white elites, with 
little incentive to provide good services to low-income, indigenous communities. From 
their perspective, a new governance structure, led by an indigenous political party, and 
influenced by the values, traditions, and customs of the Aymara people, would provide 
entirely different public-sector outcomes for the poor and for marginalised members of 
society. 
5.2 Section II: Formal Institutional Environment 
5.2.1 Path Dependence: Bolivia’s Shifting Institutional Dynamics 
“Up until recently, the focus in many countries has been on attracting foreign 
investment. Now attention is shifting to how you can design credibly 
autonomous regulatory entities.”124 
“Path dependence” refers to how institutions at a particular point in time are determined by 
their evolution from earlier institutions. North defines it as: 
a term used to account for the parallel characteristic of an institutional 
framework that has shaped downstream institutional choices and in 
consequence makes it difficult to alter the direction of an economy once it is on 
a particular institutional path. The reason is that the organisations of an 
economy and the interest groups they produce are a consequence of the 
opportunity set provided by the existing institutional framework. The resulting 
complementarities, economies of scope and network externalities reflect the 
symbiotic interdependence among the existing rules, the complementary 
informal constraints, and the interests of members of organizations created as 
                                                
 
124 Interview with William Savedoff, IDB economist working on water sector regulation, 3 September 2004. 
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a consequence of the institutional framework. In effect, an institutional matrix 
creates organisations and interest groups whose welfare depends on that 
institutional framework. (North 1989) 
In the mid-twentieth century, support for the idea that utility services should be controlled 
by the public sector was based on two fundamental arguments: (i) at this time, only the 
state had the resources to provide the massive investment needed to increase coverage and 
improve the quality of services, since financial markets were too underdeveloped to make 
sufficient funds available to the private sector; and (ii) given that most utilities tend to be 
monopolies, state equity was required to protect users from private sector exploitation. 
However, in the 1970s many shortcomings in the traditional model of public sector utility 
services began to surface, with problems rooted primarily in political interference: state 
companies had become ineffective entities, instruments of political favouritism with 
directors and managers who often had little sector-specific experience, and who were often 
obligated under political pressure to adopt policies concerning employment and allocation 
of investments that made little entrepreneurial sense. Prices and tariffs served political 
interests, and were often kept artificially low as part of anti-inflation strategies, and utilities 
were riddled with subsidy arrangements that failed to improve access for the poor. The 
reform movements that began to take shape in the 1980s, based in large part on examples 
initiated in the United Kingdom and Chile, propagated the idea that the traditional 
institutional model for service provision should be separated into three different roles: (i) 
Political: strategic and long-term sector planning; (ii) Provision of Services: a public or 
private role designed for the construction, operation, and administration of all means of 
service delivery; and (iii) Regulatory: a public role controlling service providers but 
independent of the political process. 
The establishment of a regulatory regime that not only ensures safe and effective 
service provision to users but also has the capacity to ensure that viable incentive 
structures sustain political sector-specific planning strategies is by no means an easy feat. 
A formal regulatory environment/framework is meant to embody the specific institutional 
context of a country, as reflected in its formal and informal rules of economic transacting 
and social behaviour. It is meant to be an apolitical entity and yet be flexible enough to 
coordinate with ministerial decision-makers who are constantly pressured by party politics. 
In an ideal situation, regulatory structures evolve over time, propelled by a combination of 
practical experience and ideological enthusiasm. Sometimes, major discontinuities in the 
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regulatory regime are created by important pieces of legislation or landmark cases that 
transform perceptions about how the system should (or should not) work. 
For the most part, water sector reform development and traditional utilities 
regulation across the developed world have consisted of a long series of incremental 
changes, which in turn have led to relatively strong regulatory foundations. In 
circumstances where PSP was introduced into the provision of services in the water sector, 
this incremental approach arguably helped not only to strengthen the capacity of regulatory 
agencies to monitor private sector agents, but also to strengthen the perception of 
consumers that their rights would be protected by the government. What we observe in 
most of the developing world, on the other hand, is a kind of sequencing problem: 
regulatory regimes are often set up just before, in parallel, or even after privatisations have 
taken place; this is also true of other sectors, including telecommunications, transport, and 
energy. The main trend that marked much of the privatisation fashion of the early 1990s 
across the developing world was what we could refer to as: “fast privatisation”. 
This “fast privatisation” approach was due to the belief that market institutions 
would be built once private ownership was established. However, it is now understood that 
introducing these new public sector agents is a delicate process, requiring “buy-in” at all 
levels of government; especially at the ministerial level, given that ministerial agents have 
historically acted as regulators as well as policy strategists in the developing country 
context. Equally, if not more importantly, consumers need to believe that these new 
regulatory agents have the capacity to ensure their protection. The Bolivia case is not 
particularly unusual; many PPPs have been designed in countries where the existing 
institutional environment has been unstable and where nascent regulatory regimes were 
used as mechanisms to lure private sector interest and provide a layer of comfort to 
investors that would otherwise resist building long-term partnerships with the public 
sector. It is difficult to imagine that consumers, many of whom will most likely be unaware 
of the rapidly unfolding institutional changes occurring during the process of water sector 
reform, will trust that these new government agents will be unbiased and have the capacity 
to oversee the behaviour of a service provider. Institutional arrangements can sometimes 
be used to prop up or make up for weaknesses in the institutional environment/structure 
through the implementation of social policies, regulations, and contracts, but without an 
established well-respected institutional framework such arrangements may fail to win 
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public support, because they are perceived to have been implemented haphazardly. More 
empirical research on the effects of sequencing on regulatory reform and PSP is needed.  
The remainder of this chapter will explore the way in which the formal institutional 
environment for water sector governance emerged in in Bolivia to deepen our 
understanding of the clash between informal and formal institutions and question the real 
source of conflict around reform. 
5.2.2 Sector Organisation, Responsibilities and Functioning 
 Prior to the reforms of the late 1990s, Bolivia was similar to other developing 
countries in its somewhat chaotic management of the water sector. Three different 
ministries shared equal responsibility for formulating sector policies: the Ministry of 
Planning and Coordination (MPC), the Ministry of Urban Affairs (MUA), and the Ministry 
of Health (MH). The MPC had sector-wide responsibilities as it coordinated all external 
and government financing to the sector; the MUA, meanwhile, was supposed to oversee 
the urban water sub-sector. A committee under the MUA, which included representatives 
of the Cadaster Unit and the MPC, was responsible for reviewing and approving tariffs for 
the urban water utilities. The Corporation of Water and Sanitation (CORPAGUAS), an 
agency within the MUA with a staff of about 70, was responsible for carrying out 
investments and overseeing operations of urban water systems other than those of the nine 
departmental capitals. 
Meanwhile, the MH formulated water and sanitation health policies for the entire 
sector and provided oversight of the rural water sub-sector. The National Office of Health 
and Sanitation (DSA), a Department of the MH with a staff of about 300, was responsible 
for overseeing health and water and sanitation services in the rural and fringe areas of the 
cities (those beyond the reach of the municipal utilities). The DSA usually collaborated 
with the regional development corporations (RDCs), another departmental public agency 
under the oversight of the MPC. Although not specialising in the water sector, RDCs 
played an important role by using part of their royalties to hire CORPAGUAS to invest in 
small towns and fringe areas of the cities in their regions. In general, RDCs did not recover 
costs from the beneficiaries. 
There were two additional sector entities playing an important coordinating role in 
the decade leading up to the water reforms of the 1990s. One was the National Association 
of Water Supply and Sanitation Institutions (ANESAPA), created in 1983; this was a 
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private association bringing together both public and private agencies, and it was 
responsible for sector-wide coordination between the various ministries and municipal 
utilities. It also carried out water sector training courses. The other public entity was a 
technical Advisory Committee on Water Supply and Sanitation (COTEAS), which was 
responsible for helping to formulate sector plans, building consensus among the various 
ministries, and coordinating sector institutions. COTEAS had representatives from 
ANSAPA and the MPC on its board and a representative from the MUA acted as its chair. 
Almost all the funding for the water sector (and for other regional/municipal 
infrastructure investments) has traditionally been carried out by Bolivia’s powerful 
National Fund for Regional Development (FNDR), which was established in 1988; it still 
exists today, and remains a highly political financial intermediary housed within the 
Ministry of the Presidency and run by a politically appointed management team. This 
intermediary is not self-financing; it was designed specifically to channel external 
donations and government grants for investments. Operationally autonomous municipal 
water companies were responsible for water and sewerage services in the nine 
departmental capitals of Bolivia. Private cooperatives were (and continue to be) 
operational in Santa Cruz and Tarija, but in all other departments water utilities were 
owned and operated by the municipalities before reform. Boards of directors composed 
mainly of municipal authorities governed these utilities and it was quite common for 
municipal councils to interfere with boards’ authority in submitting tariffs for government 
approval. 
5.2.3 Rationalisations for Sector Reform 
It would scarcely be an exaggeration to say that the greatest danger to liberty 
today comes from the men who are most needed and most powerful in modern 
government; namely, the efficient expert administrators exclusively 
concerned with what they regard as the public good.125 
Investments in Bolivia’s water supply and sanitation averaged about USD 10 million per 
year during 1970–1989 (World Bank 1990). These investments increased service coverage 
levels by about ten per cent over that period (mostly in rural areas), but in 1990 Bolivia’s 
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coverage levels were still well below those prevailing elsewhere in Latin America. In 
many urban areas the quality of services actually deteriorated, despite new investment; this 
was primarily because projects were either ill-conceived or poorly executed, as many 
operating agencies failed to generate sufficient cash for replacing or maintaining physical 
facilities.126 The operating agencies’ contribution to investments from internally derived 
sources was insignificant or nil, and the GoB contributed most of the local funds. Donors 
contributed about 80 per cent of the total investment funds. The main external donors in 
the water sector throughout this period were the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (KfW) of Germany, the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), and the World Bank’s IDA. In 1990, a “Major Cities 
Water and Sewerage Rehabilitation Project” was implemented in the three major urban 
centres of Bolivia. The objectives of this very ambitious project, which cost USD 67.3 
million and was financed by the World Bank, included: (i) improvements and expansion of 
water and sanitation services in La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba; (ii) improvements 
to the operating efficiency of the water utilities responsible for services in those cities; (iii) 
the development of improved sector policies and institutional arrangements to accelerate 
sector development throughout the country; (iv) increasing the capabilities of the central 
sector agencies responsible for sector oversight; and (v) improvements to the way in which 
Bolivian authorities and donors coordinate sector-wide projects. 
The low investment and service coverage levels in the sector at the time were 
attributable to several interrelated factors; one major element was certainly the country's 
weak economic condition and the consequent low-income levels of most Bolivians. 
However, according to archive project documents from governmental and various 
development agencies, there were several other major constraints, unrelated to 
macroeconomic conditions, which resulted in an inefficient and often ineffective use of the 
available, albeit limited, resources. These constraints were: (i) project design standards 
were usually overambitious. Bolivia had yet to adopt cost-effective standards and apply 
low-cost and appropriate technologies to reduce per-capita investment costs; (ii) cost 
recovery and financing policies were too vague and weak to guide fiscal performance or 
                                                
 
126 Interview with Jhonny Cuellar, SISSAB, 11 December 2002. 
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promote financial discipline in the sector operating agencies. The GoB, for example, 
lacked targets for the water utilities and beneficiaries, and there were no performance 
stipulations for lending funds to the utilities; (iii) a lack of a firm sector financial policy 
framework affected the ability of utilities to generate funds and plan in advance for 
facilities to upgrade and/or expansion; and (iv) the fragmented institutional responsibility 
over the sector was stifling. Since no single institution had the mandate or the capacity to 
plan, promote, or enforce sector policies, there was a general lack of direction and a 
prevailing institutional weakness among all water-governing institutions. The fact that the 
national-level DSA and the RDCs had loose and overlapping responsibilities for utilising 
investments and overseeing sector operations only made matters worse, by creating 
circumstances in which they competed for the same donor resources to carry out water and 
sanitation projects in both rural and peri-urban areas. The chaotic interrelationship between 
the various ministries resulted in a duplication of efforts, avoidance of the more difficult 
policy decisions, and prolonged delays in planning investments. 
5.2.4 The Promulgation of Bolivia’s Water and Sanitation Law 
 “It was as if from one day to the next the entire power structure over the 
governing of the water sector became an important discussion. But those of 
us who were experts and experienced in the sector weren’t present at that 
discussion.127 
In August 1988, the GoB presented another plan to the Water Decade Consultative Group 
Meeting, for the years 1988–1997. The plan proposed total investment of about USD 250 
million, which they hoped would dramatically increase countrywide service coverage 
levels. It also emphasised the adoption of low-cost technologies, new investments, and the 
rehabilitation of existing facilities, in addition to improving operations and management 
activities. Moreover, the plan established that most operating agencies would have to use 
their revenues to cover their operating and maintenance costs, as well as the costs of 
replacing facilities and servicing their debts. However, the plan was flawed in a number of 
areas: it failed to emphasise the need for utilities to generate revenues internally to finance 
these much-needed investments, it did not rectify the overly complex tariff structure, it did 
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not set any type of efficiency standards for the utilities, and it did not address the problem 
of inter-governmental coordination and accountability. 
During this period, various other institutional structures were also being 
strengthened through government initiatives. As noted above, the Organic Law on 
Municipalities (LOM) was introduced in 1986 as part of the government’s commitment to 
decentralise, and local and regional entities began gaining prominence in Bolivia's public 
apparatus. The LOM instituted democratic elections of mayors and municipal councilmen 
for the first time, and it spelt out municipalities’ responsibilities in the delivery of urban 
services. With the promulgation of the Tax Reform Law the same year, a mechanism was 
established for revenue-sharing between the central government and the municipalities, 
which were to receive 1.2 per cent of the national Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The 
strengthening of the regional and local government involved the introduction of two other 
important laws: the Concessions and Public Services Law, which consolidated municipal 
authority over a certain set of public services formerly distributed ambiguously among 
central and local government authorities; and the Decentralization Law, which proposed 
the creation of specific governmental departments to oversee sector functioning and 
distribution criteria for shared tax revenues. With regard to the management and provision 
of local public services, concession systems and privatisation began to be encouraged, with 
a view to increasing the efficiency and coverage of these services without overburdening 
the municipalities with new activities. 
In 1990, the government announced its commitment to reduce incidences of 
poverty and poor health through improved access to basic services. In 1990, the 
government’s Plan Bolivia de Agua y Saneamiento stated that national potable water 
coverage would increase from 57 per cent in 1990 to 84 per cent by 2015. Sanitation would 
be increased from 38 per cent to 64 per cent over the same period. In order to reach these 
goals, the government stated in its plan that it would seek out PSP for the country’s three 
largest cities: La Paz, Santa Cruz, and Cochabamba. In November 1991, a decree was 
issued creating the National Basic Sanitation Directorate (DINASBA), under the National 
Under-Secretariat for Urban Affairs in the Ministry of Human Development. The 
department was assigned the tasks of setting priorities for plans and projects, preparing 
investment programs, establishing standards and regulations, furthering health and hygiene 
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education, and acting in general as the sector’s planning and coordination body at the 
national level. 
Despite this wide-ranging set of functions, by the mid-1990s DINASBA had 
insufficient staff and was not yet able to take up all its responsibilities, which is perhaps 
why the Goni administration did not involve the directorate sufficiently in the design of the 
La Paz/EL Alto concession arrangement with AISA. Under the same 1991 Decree, 
sanitation administrative units were created in each of the country's nine departments. The 
task of these units was to create departmental plans and programs and to set priorities, 
provide technical and administrative advisory services to the local entities involved in the 
sector, carry out and supervise works, and provide water quality control for localities that 
lack the means to do so. Like DINASBA, these units were still at the embryonic stage 
when the government began to engage with the private sector. 
In 1992, the first Privatisation Law was introduced. This was followed in 1994 with 
the Capitalisation Law, along with the Sector Regulation System Act (SIRESE), the 
objective of which was to regulate, monitor, and supervise the activities of the country’s 
various sectors, including water supply and sewerage. The act established a General Board, 
attached to the Ministry of Finance, and sector boards in charge of each specific sector. 
The boards’ functions included approving and publishing prices and rates, granting and 
renewing concessions, promoting efficient service delivery, and, in general, complying 
with and enforcing legal requirements and sector regulations. The act, thereby, centralised 
the regulatory function into a single agency, known as the Water Board. Towards the end 
of 1995, the World Bank, IDB, UNDP, and the CAF each began to promote the idea of 
PSP in the water sector for Bolivia. This policy shift can be seen in World Bank project 
documents for the extended financing of the “Three Major Cities” project, which was 
extended for an additional two years, until 1997, to help prepare the cities for PSP.128 It can 
also be observed in the case of Bolivia’s second-largest city, Santa Cruz. Santa Cruz’s 
SAGUAPAC is the world’s largest water co-operative, with notably high efficiency 
outcomes (Nickson 1997), but it was unable to obtain a sub-sovereign guarantee from the 
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Bolivian government when the cooperative applied for a World Bank loan of US$25m to 
finance its investment program.129 
However, it was not until 1999 that the government put into place its Water and 
Sanitation Law 2029, with the help of the IDB. This was almost two years after the PPP 
concession was granted to AISA to service La Paz/El Alto. This new Water and Sanitation 
Law would not only lay out the regulatory framework for the provision of water and 
sanitation services, but would also establish the rules related to the type of access that the 
government would allow, granting exclusivity to concessionaires operating in any urban 
centre made up of more than 10,000 inhabitants (all municipal utilities, whether public or 
private, were referred to as concessionaires). The enactment of this law changed the face of 
Bolivia’s institutional framework governing the water sector, and pointedly dismissed the 
existing informal institutional water framework. 
                                                
 
129 It is important to frame the shift in water sector policy within a wider policy context. The fact that the government 
began to minimise its issuance of sub-sovereign guarantees to municipalities to finance infrastructure investments in the 
mid-1990s was also due to systemic/macro-economic and financial considerations, many of which had little to do with 
the water sector itself. These systemic issues are discussed further in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6.  Information, Relationships and Market Behaviour 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter will address Sub-question 2; the question of how institutional 
arrangements in the Bolivian case—regulations, channels of communication, methods of 
negotiation and contractual specification—created tensions between stakeholders involved 
in the process of water sector reform and how this affected the ability for policy-makers to 
accurately predict consumer preferences. Evidence will be presented to demonstrate that 
the delicate nature of the water sector, under certain institutional constraints, where 
optimum accumulation of information is virtually impossible, human behaviour can 
become motivated by a volatile set of preferences, making it particularly difficult for 
policy-makers to manage the reform process and accurately predict reform outcomes. 
Stakeholders, invariably, underestimate the transaction/transition costs involved in the 
process of reform and PPP implementation due to information and bargaining 
asymmetries, which manifests in poor institutional arrangements. 
 As explained in Chapter 2, New Institutional Economic Theory argues that the only 
societies that will endure are those that succeed in creating institutions that effectively 
reduce transaction costs (North 1990). Such costs include: the costs of searching for a 
partner (or group) with whom to exchange; screening potential partners to ascertain their 
trustworthiness; bargaining with potential partners to reach agreement; transferring 
products; monitoring the agreement to see that the conditions are fulfilled; and enforcing 
the exchange agreement (Holloway et al. 2000). These transaction costs are now 
acknowledged in mainstream economics, being widely applied with slightly different 
meanings to organisational structures (e.g. vertical integration), market failures (e.g. 
externalities and asymmetric information), institutional choices, and public choice (e.g. 
administrative costs). Transaction cost economics has contributed to our overall 
understanding of observed patterns of organisation (Rao 2003), and “transaction cost” is 
now a generic term referring to any costs that come from realising a transaction across a 
market. Accordingly, transaction costs can be interpreted as “the costs of any activity 
undertaken to use the price system” (Demsetz 1997), including market-based approaches 
to water policy. 
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Since different types of costs may be borne by different players at different points 
in the policy process, a proper classification of transaction cost categories is important to 
ensure that all relevant costs are accounted for. According to Dahlman (1979), transaction 
costs include: (i) search and information costs; (ii) bargaining and decision-making costs; 
and (iii) monitoring and enforcement costs. Institutions are motivated to reduce such costs, 
and, in principle, they are organised to achieve this by lessening the uncertainties around 
the transaction. However, this aim may not always be achieved: at any point in time, an 
institution may engage in conflict and there may be uncertainty over future institutional 
changes. These are likely to lead in turn to increasing transaction costs (Meyer 2001). In 
PPP transactions, there are costs incurred in the areas of communication and enforcement 
to reduce the risks of loss from transaction failure. These costs are related to property 
rights, and if they and/or the risk of loss from transaction failure are too high, they will 
cancel out the cost savings and other benefits that could arise from the transaction. The 
result is market failure and an incomplete transaction, despite the potential long-term 
benefits the trade may have offered to society as a whole. Critical to our understanding of 
economic development, therefore, is an understanding of transaction costs. 
Transaction costs economics has only recently become considered as a potential 
tool for development policy analysis. It has primarily been a discourse in business 
literature, while neoclassical economic development theory has regarded the determinants 
of transaction costs in general terms only, such as a country’s legal framework (legal 
systems already in place to support the transaction), the project size (capital cost), the 
economic/market system, the length of the procurement process (approximating the 
complexity of the project), and the number of bidders (approximating the intensity of 
competition at the bidding stage). If we take only these “macro” determinants into account, 
then the cost of the transaction for the La Paz/El Alto concession could be regarded as 
quite low, for several reasons: (i) a new legal system supported by independent regulatory 
agencies was in place to oversee the PPP; (ii) the size of the project was relatively small; 
(iii) the length of the procurement process was extraordinarily short (lasting approximately 
three weeks); and (iv) there was only one bidder for the government to contend with. 
However, focusing solely on these points would paint an inaccurate picture ignoring 
factors which contributed to the transaction costs actually being high. This macro 
perspective would also make it appear that costs were incurred solely by the “buyers” 
(AISA and its shareholders), and not the “sellers” (the government/communities). 
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Although perhaps more difficult to quantify, there is no question that sellers are also 
affected by low and high transaction costs. It should be noted that there is no attempt made 
in this research and analysis to measure the transaction costs incurred by consumers, 
neighbourhood associations, the government, AISA, or its shareholders, although this 
would of course be an interesting exercise. However, before one can begin measuring, one 
has to gain a better understanding of what elements to measure and where to look for costs. 
As an initial starting point, we know that transaction costs stem from a combination 
of the institutional environment and institutional arrangements (North 1971). In the 
previous chapter, much of the discussion focused on the institutional environment. To 
complement this, it is critical to understand fully the constraints stakeholders face in the 
development and implementation of these so-called institutional arrangements: the 
regulations, channels of communication, and methods of negotiation, as well as the 
contractual specifications that are meant to serve the interests of consumers, especially 
low-income consumers, whilst properly incentivising the private sector and ultimately 
meeting government policy targets. It is argued here that demand uncertainty can be 
exogenous to the innovation process in water service provision and upgrade, and that 
market demand for new “products and services” offered by a utility may be affected by 
factors other than the product and service itself. Macroeconomic effects, regulatory 
uncertainty, political manipulation, values, misperception, a lack of trust, and changes in 
preferences are all examples of what might be considered as aspects of uncertainty around 
the cost of demand (or to what is referred to in this chapter as the mismatch between 
supply and demand). It will also be argued that the costs of establishing strong and reliable 
institutional arrangements need to be considered at the earliest stages of social planning 
and regulatory design, particularly where PSP is meant to act as a catalyst for what is 
deemed by many as a public good. This chapter will use the La Paz/El Alto case to 
highlight the ways in which such transaction costs can influence intended outcomes, with 
the intention of exposing several risks that have not yet been addressed fully in the existing 
literature on PSP and on transaction costs. 
  
180 
 
 
6.2  Contracts, Contracts… If It Were Only Just About the Contract 
AISA has completed its contract perfectly—at least that is what the regulator 
says—but if you accomplish something that is insufficient, it continues to be 
insufficient…The concession contract focuses on a limited service area, not 
allowing the company to satisfy the needs of the population…The contract 
underestimated the areas of service in El Alto…There are many problems 
associated with the coverage and access to services in El Alto that depend on 
the original contract being modified to meet the needs of the entire urban 
population.130 
Regulation is undoubtedly a costly affair, whether in the developed or developing country 
context. Certainly, some of this cost is due to the inability of regulators to enforce 
contracts, but the complexities of regulation and the regulatory system that support it go far 
beyond the technical nuances of contract compliance. There are three ways in which the 
literature has considered the subject of contracting. From the perspective of theory of the 
firm, La Paz/El Alto should be considered as an “incomplete” contract, and analysis should 
focus on the inefficiencies that arose in the concession due to circumstances that were 
unforeseen in the original contract. Privatisation literature would suggest an analysis using 
a “complete” contracting perspective and focusing on problems that arose solely due to 
moral hazard and information asymmetry in the supervision and monitoring of the 
contract. Management literature would recommend a focus on relational issues around 
contracting—particularly, on the political sensitivity of the relationships between public 
and private organisations and the consequences of trust in sustaining such partnerships. 
Within management literature, trust is a robust measure of the strength of relationships 
(Gummesson 2002; Ford et al. 2003; Johnstone et al. 2001), as it tends to be cited by 
policy makers as a key element of project success (Egan 1998; Edkins and Smyth 2006). In 
order to explore the case of La Paz/El Alto as fully as possible, each of these three 
literature bases was used to strengthen the analysis. 
This chapter consists of two sections relating to two sets of transaction costs. 
Section I considers costs caused by informational problems between government 
stakeholders and water consumers, exploring how information—or rather the lack of 
information—regarding user preferences and potential demand affected the original design 
                                                
 
130 Interview with Jose Barragán, Vice-Minister for Basic Services, 17 October 2003. 
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of the contract and, invariably, the regulatory outcomes that ensued. Section II discusses 
the extent of information asymmetry problems between the government and the firm, as 
well as the ways in which hierarchical inter-governmental power relationships affected the 
tactics and timing of regulatory intervention. Both sections will ultimately address the 
ways in which inadequate communication channels and distrust between the firm, the 
government, and consumers eventually led to an environment in which consumers made 
choices about the future of their water provision services that flew in the face of rational, 
classical economic assumptions.  
6.3  Section I: Institutional Arrangements and Consumer Vulnerability 
6.3.1 The Cost of Gathering Consumer Information 
Transaction risk tends to increase when parties have less access to and 
information about each other.131  
The crux of why a regulator is needed in the water sector is to structure and monitor the 
quality and quantity of services provided by the utility, as well as to protect consumers 
from usurious pricing that might emerge due to the naturally monopolistic character of the 
sector. Most discussion of Principal-Agent (P-A) problems between the regulator and the 
water utility tend to begin at the point at which monitoring the contractual agreement 
between the two parties commences. However, we can observe P-A dilemmas arising long 
before this point. The dilemma begins with what we could term an implicit “social 
contract” between consumers (principals) and government (agents), represented by the 
regulatory authorities assigned to act on behalf of citizens and to protect their interests. The 
theory of an implicit social contract holds that by remaining in the territory controlled by 
government, people give consent to be governed. The social contract and the rights that it 
provides are neither natural nor permanently fixed; the contract between citizens and the 
regulator, therefore, acts as means towards an end—the benefit of all—and (according to 
philosophers such as Locke or Rousseau) is only legitimate to the extent that it meets the 
general interest. Of course, regulators are neither elected representatives nor selectively 
chosen by consumers; rather, they are appointed by central government authorities through 
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a selection process based on their technical qualifications. Their intended role is to protect 
the interests of consumers as directly as possible, which is why the general trend has been 
to create regulatory bodies that operate independently of the rest of government, in order to 
decrease the chances that their decisions might be influenced by the larger inter-
governmental political dynamic.  
From this social contract concept, it is reasonable to suggest that any regulatory 
agency ought to be fully informed about the consumer base before drafting an explicit 
contractual agreement with a utility company; at the very least, these agents need to know 
how many consumers there are, what consumers demand—not only what they might be 
able to afford, but what they are actually willing to pay—and the type of service 
consumers prefer to have. The majority of the literature confirms the logic of this and 
contends that in order for water reform to succeed and be sustainable, sector improvements 
must be service-oriented and demand-driven (Cotton, Sohail and Tayler 1998; Brikke and 
Rojas 2001; World Bank 2004; DFID 2004). However, correctly forecasting the type of 
service that will truly satisfy the wide range and variability of consumer preferences is not 
so straightforward. While the need to acquire this basic household information may seem 
obvious, in the developing world this task can pose some of the most serious stumbling 
blocks to reform. From a purely logistical point of view, researching in rapidly sprawling 
urban centres is an extremely difficult and costly task, due to underdeveloped cadastre 
systems where many residents do not have titles to their homes, and particularly in areas 
where residents are unconnected to a formal water and sanitation utility network. While in 
the developed world government can usually rely on the market to gather information 
regarding consumer preferences and demand, in the developing world, where the water 
market is immature and where much of it remains in the informal sector, the preferences of 
consumers—especially low-income consumers—are usually unknown to government 
policymakers and those regulating the provision of services. Also, due to the fact that the 
planning processes undertaken by public water utilities have tended to be internally driven 
and dominated by supply considerations—that is, because they do not tend to operate by 
the law of supply and demand—public utility information regarding consumer preferences 
is also scarce.  
Privatisation literature on the issue of decentralisation assures us that lower levels 
of government, closer to the beneficiary population, have an informational advantage in 
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identifying citizens’ preferences, as well as the flexibility to respond to local conditions. 
As local governments act on this information, it is assumed that consumers will be willing 
to pay more for services. In theory, decentralised water services should also improve 
governments’ ability to treat water as an economic good, create incentives for efficient 
water use, and finance improved service delivery improvements and expansion (Dethier 
2000). While these assumptions might hold true in theory, in practice central governments 
have to act on recommendations and use the information provided by local authorities to 
determine the appropriate policy and regulatory framework for the water sector. The reality 
is that this information can be very difficult to get. In the case of Bolivia, as in most places 
where countries are supporting market-driven sector reform measures, policies and 
regulations are rarely driven from the bottom-up, despite the existence of decentralised 
governance structures in the country. More often than not, policies that push for greater 
participation of the private sector are top down measures, usually derived from, or even 
modelled upon, the experiences of other countries. Also, a great deal of the intellectual 
capital that goes into the design of water sector policies, strategies, and regulations 
involving PSP tends to come from international outsourced advisors, who may be equipped 
with technical skills in PPP contractual design in general, but who are not likely to be 
familiar with the specific socio-political nuances of the local water sector context. 
The rest of this section highlights four major informational challenges that made it 
particularly difficult for regulators to understand the preferences of low-income water 
users. These are predominantly adverse selection problems whereby the regulator’s 
ignorance of consumers’ private information (state of nature) concerning the treatment and 
usage of water services led to the design of ineffective incentives (for the consumer and for 
the private sector). Lack of information, or misinformation, about these preferences limited 
the regulators’ ability to estimate consumer demand correctly and invariably increased the 
design’s stress on progressive tariff structures suitable for the needs of low-income user 
groups. The second important informational challenge that will be discussed relates to the 
regulator’s ignorance about the time-cost of adjustment that consumers (as well as 
suppliers) faced in adapting to reform. It is clear from the findings that in PSP 
arrangements, time is a crucial consideration for building public trust and support to 
sustain reform efforts. The third adverse selection problem is due to differential risk 
preferences among consumers. 
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Consumer preferences naturally evolve over time, especially as one’s consumer 
identity is strengthened, but government is not always able to observe when consumers 
switch from one set of preferences to another. Meanwhile, those networks, organisations, 
and private entities working more closely at the local level with consumers (be they 
neighbourhood associations, CBOs, or NGOs) can have an informational advantage when 
it comes to inferring consumer preferences. Opportunistic groups at the local level can, 
therefore, easily take advantage of the regulator’s inability to infer consumer preferences 
accurately, and further persuade—or even manipulate—consumers to change their set of 
preferences more radically. Further, there is the issue of goal incongruence, where the 
agent’s goal actually differs from that of the principal. This situation can be observed in 
incidences where regulators do not have incentives to disclose to consumers information 
about their own preferences or to provide rationalisations for their actions, because they 
feel that consumers will not have the cognitive capacity to make informed choices on their 
own (Arrow 1984; Williamson 1981). Discussion around goal incongruence is a fourth 
informational challenge to be analysed. 
6.3.2 Consumer Preferences and Consumption Habits: In-house Water Connections 
vs. Standposts 
You cannot think of El Alto as a city, because it is more rural in character 
than urban.132 
As explained in the introductory chapter, the unplanned nature of most low-income urban 
settlements makes it harder to supply water by conventional means: there is a lack of clear 
access routes for pipes to be buried in convenient straight runs, and houses have no 
identifier or address, which makes it difficult to record consumption and deliver bills in a 
normal way (Nickson and Franceys 2003). To service these populations, public providers 
have traditionally constructed standposts designed to serve between 200 and 500 people. 
The standposts are usually located at the end of the pipeline in peripheral areas of the city, 
which means that along the way other consumers (usually slightly wealthier ones) can 
install their own pumps to extract water from the mains into their own storage tanks. This 
greatly reduces the pressure of the standposts, which are usually provided to low-income 
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users free of charge. Unfortunately, the poor quality of the water, combined with the fact 
that the service is free, destroys any sense of personal responsibility and ownership of 
particular standposts, invariably creating a situation where posts are often vandalised and 
where taps are left on permanently, leading to a great deal of wastefulness.  
This was certainly the case with La Paz/El Alto. Interviews with households 
confirmed that local standposts were vandalised with great frequency, with taps often 
stolen and water run dry. Respondents also explained that two or three trips were usually 
required to find alternative, relatively functioning, standposts. From the government’s 
perspective, this situation was a clear indication that the practice of using standposts 
needed to be eliminated, although many users would have preferred to have had improved 
standposts rather than to see them done away with altogether: “We were never asked what 
we wanted,” explained one respondent. “No one ever bothers to ask us what we really 
need, especially with something like this where the government already knows what they 
want to do—and let’s face it, the water company can make more money if they don’t have 
standposts.”133 Part of this statement is certainly true. At no time did the government 
consider alternative options for the provision of water through standposts, and at no time 
were household studies or consultations with community representatives undertaken before 
a decision was made to eliminate standpost service provision. However, it is not true that 
the utility company would be able to make more money off household connections rather 
than standposts, and this mistaken belief is discussed further below. 
Interviews with government officials from three different ministries (the Vice-
Ministry of Basic Services, which includes the Ministry of Housing, Ministry of 
Capitalisation, and Ministry of the Presidency) confirmed that there were four basic 
reasons for their decision against continuing with standposts; reasons that are quite 
commonplace across the developing world: (i) the government wanted to contain El Alto’s 
urban sprawl by minimising the extent of illegal housing; (ii) the government wanted to 
have better control over the quality of the water to reduce the incidences of water-borne 
disease and infant mortality; (iii) the government was also attempting to deal with 
sanitation problems, using household connections in an attempt to couple water provision 
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with sanitation provision; and (iv) there was political pressure on the government to 
provide “equal” access to water for all. The last point, which is actually based on an 
internationally recognised promise that governments are expected—indeed, often 
pressured—to make, is known as the Universal Service Obligation (USO), where service 
providers are charged with the legal duty of delivering equitable access to all citizens. 
Special consideration for the unique rural-urban water sector paradigm of El Alto is 
also critical to our understanding of why low-cost alternative water and sanitation 
solutions, such as standposts and pit latrines, were not considered by the government to be 
viable options. A conspicuous feature of Aymara culture is a great variety of witches, 
omen-takers, dream interpreters, diviners, herbalists, and medicine-men who practice 
magical curing techniques but also black magic. Some of these religious and cultural 
idiosyncrasies present barriers or simply preclude these communities from benefiting from 
certain forms of modern hygiene. Particularly, there is a belief that evil spirits reside deep 
within the earth, and that these can escape through holes in the ground, and also a belief 
that possession of another person’s faeces can be used to harm them through witchcraft 
(Foster 2002). Residents who hold such beliefs prefer to dispose of their faeces 
anonymously in scattered locations, and without digging holes. In rural parts of Bolivia, 
such beliefs and practices have less of an impact, but in an urban setting they can 
obviously have detrimental consequences. These “primitive” customs were one of the 
justifications used by the government to impose regulations and contractual specifications 
for piped water and sewerage provision. The government argued that a conventional piped 
system would not create a conflict with traditional beliefs because the pipes would 
ultimately return faeces to surface water courses, filtering sewerage back to the mother 
earth. 
According to interviews with local government officials, neighbourhood 
association leaders, CBOs, NGOs, and former employees of SAMAPA, the government 
never solicited advice from organisations actively working in the basic services sector in El 
Alto regarding this cultural constraint. Had they done so, the government might have been 
better informed as to the preferences of low-income households and might have designed 
reform measures that provided consumers with a greater degree of choice, empowering 
them with the ability to choose the type of service most suitable to meet their immediate 
needs. These respondents did agree with the government regarding some of the habits of 
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rural Aymara communities; they highlighted the fact that young children were afraid of 
falling into pit latrines and that women were reluctant to expose their vaginas to a 
corresponding hole in the pachamama, lest it blow an “evil wind up them”. However, the 
respondents believed that these beliefs/cultural constraints could be overcome so long as a 
community: (i) was made fully aware of the project and convinced of its potential benefits; 
(ii) was allowed to participate in the project’s planning and construction; and (iii) could 
contribute in the form of direct payment, operation, and/or maintenance of the system. For 
example, one low-cost initiative, known as the Yakupaj Initiative (Yaku means water in 
the Quechua language) succeeded in bringing simple water services to 350,000 rural 
people and basic sanitation to over 100,000 people between 1996 and 2001. To overcome 
cultural fears related to the pachamama, technological adjustments were made to convert 
pits to septic tanks and existing water-sealed toilets were adapted so that they could be 
manually flushed with as little as two litres of water, instead of the standard five. 
Much debate remains as to whether alternative arrangements such as the Yakupaj 
Initiative would have been welcomed in El Alto’s urban context, or whether they would 
have been perceived as a second-class alternative. Both government officials and staff at 
AISA provided evidence to support the argument that when the government relaxed its 
regulatory constrains and allowed AISA to offer consumers in El Alto alternative lower-
cost condominial services, most consumers still opted for a conventional system because 
they considered the lower-cost option to be inferior (See Section 6.1). However, it should 
be noted that the price saving on the condominial service was not very significant, and so 
the potential savings might not have been considered sufficient to merit the risk of opting 
for it. Either way, it is clear that the government was somewhat ill informed about the 
preferences of a good majority of El Alto’s residents. Improved channels of 
communication might have provided the government with greater insight into consumer 
preferences while promoting greater awareness among low-income residents of the health 
and hygiene benefits of having a household connection. 
Had the government been more informed as to the preferences of this user group in 
the early to mid 1990s, the 1992 Regulations would perhaps have included special 
provisions for the use of standposts or other alternative arrangements (especially for 
sanitation, which would not require a connection to the network). Certainly, had the 
government steered away from branding standposts as “illegal” in the regulatory 
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framework, AISA might have been allowed to design a system to build metered standposts 
for selected communities. Metered standposts are being used in peri-urban settlements 
across the developing world (e.g. in Colombo, Sri Lanka, and in Lusaka, Zambia), and 
billing is shared by the community. Creating a culture of payment and community 
ownership around standpost water provision can resolve many of the problems relating to 
wastefulness and vandalism that tend to come with free standpost provision (Keener, 
Luengo, and Banerjee 2009). 
Given the strength and organisational capacity of El Alto’s existing neighbourhood 
associations, this type of shared collection and payment scheme might have been quite an 
easy system to implement in practice (although the transaction costs involved in setting up 
such schemes in a sprawling urban context deserve more research attention). However, it is 
very important to note that many residents of La Paz/El Alto—in fact, all of the residents 
interviewed in the course of this research—as well as many external observers and 
researchers have somehow been led to believe that AISA was in favour of the 
government’s policy of eliminating alternative service provision options when, in fact, 
AISA would have much preferred to be able to offer its consumers a variety of service 
choices. According to AISA, providing consumers with options to meet their preferences 
would have simply been more cost-efficient and would have potentially led to greater 
consumer satisfaction.134  
6.3.3  Low Demand and the Inefficiency of the Increasing Block Tariff  
First of all, it is too cold to take a shower. They [AISA] say that I should have 
water all the time, but I don’t need it all the time. I need it usually on Sunday 
but by then there seems to be no water left anyway—just a trickle with no 
pressure.135 
The most common complaint from AISA was that the government completely 
overestimated the demand for water that would emerge from El Alto’s consumer base. 
AISA claimed that the government misled the company into believing that if it would only 
extend and improve the network and connect directly to households, there would be a 
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surge in demand. Much of the literature on the La Paz/El Alto case laid the blame for the 
lack of demand on the fact that household connection charges were too high, and that, 
because the tariff was pegged to the US dollar, the cost of water became prohibitively high 
for low-income residents of El Alto when Bolivia’s currency devalued in the late 1990s. 
However, this is not what household respondents claimed during this research. Although 
most respondents did state that connection charges were high, many of them contributed 
their time and labour to reduce initial costs, and some benefited from a government grant 
to allow them to purchase appliances. According to respondents, having access to water via 
a household connection made life easier in terms of time saved and also because it was 
“cleaner and more reliable.” However, they also explained that if there was a lack of 
demand, this was simply because their habits and their preferences had remained the same; 
they continued to use water for predominantly the same purposes as before, and in the 
same way. 
Many of the interviewed residents who had relied on standpost provision prior to 
receiving a household connection through AISA claimed, for example, that having an in-
house connection was “good” but “not necessary”, and that it did not necessarily make 
them happier. For the most part, these residents tended to have a single tap connection, but 
not a functioning toilet. Although it was not possible to establish the figure exactly, it 
appeared that over half of the households interviewed had functioning toilets.136 
Interestingly, these same residents explained that they (and many other residents) 
continued to share water whenever necessary and to pay collectively for the use of water 
consumed from a tap in one household. Frequently, even in areas where residents had been 
connected to the network under SEMAPA, respondents would explain that their taps were 
not working but that it did not matter because a relative next door was supplying them with 
sufficient water. There is no attempt here to over-romanticise the process by which 
neighbours would come together to share water, as conflicts did arise. However, the case 
study demonstrates that, when necessary, consumers were capable of relying on each other 
                                                
 
136 It was beyond the scope of this research project to tackle the issue of sanitation in any depth, even though there are 
invariably many synergies with water provision. Sanitation is a much more sensitive topic to engage in discussion 
because respondents are more likely to become embarrassed about the state of their functioning toilet. I picked up on this 
whenever I asked to be taken to the place in their home where there was a connection to the network. 
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in much the same way as they had done historically under SEMAPA, and that they could 
organise payment collection on an informal basis. It cannot be assumed that a strong sense 
of consumer identity can be adopted overnight as a natural consequence of 
commercialising services. 
On the issue of tariffs, most respondents did not have any idea about how the tariff 
structure worked, and they were not always aware that by increasing the number of 
additional families using one household tap they were inadvertently shifting themselves 
into a higher tariff band. As mentioned in the case summary, the increasing block tariff 
scheme in the La Paz/El Alto case allowed households (estimated at an average of five 
persons) to take 30 m3 per month before the highest price in the block structure took effect. 
In other words, it established a “lifeline block” below the cost of supply to ensure that 
basic water needs for life and health would be affordable. Obviously, when three or four 
households rely on one tap, costs increase and billing statements become more volatile. 
There is some suggestion in the literature (Nickson and Franceys 2003) that such 
households should be registered in such a way that the lifeline allowance is increased to 
match the number of households, but even the authors of this literature acknowledge that in 
practice the system would be too difficult and complex to administer. The cost to AISA of 
servicing certain areas of El Alto already barely covered their administrative costs and it 
was difficult to find reliable employees capable of recording accurate meter readings; to 
introduce any additional complexity into the task of meter reading would have required 
prohibitively high increases in administrative costs to AISA.137 Once again, what we 
observe through this example is a clash between informal and formal institutional 
arrangements addressing the provision of water services. 
IBT schemes help to set marginal cost pricing 138 and to redistribute income among 
groups of customers. By setting a price below average revenue for the first block and 
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138 Economic efficiency is promoted when prices reflect the marginal cost of the services provided. In general terms, 
marginal cost at each level of production includes any additional costs required to produce the next unit. A number of 
factors can affect marginal cost and its applicability to real world problems. Some of these may be considered market 
failures, including information asymmetries, the presence of negative or positive externalities, transaction costs, price 
discrimination, and others. 
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prices above average revenue in the higher blocks, large water users (usually industrial and 
commercial entities) subsidise low-income water users. In theory, this creates an optimal 
means of “second best pricing”, pursuing economic efficiency subject to a cost recovery 
constraint (cost recovery constraints are thought to be endemic to the developing country 
context). In the absence of information about user preferences, though, the task of 
designing an IBT structure obviously becomes more difficult. Bolivia’s IBT scheme was 
by no means simple to understand for the majority of households interviewed in this 
research, and most users certainly had no idea what price they were actually paying for 
water on a monthly basis. In fact, respondents had severe difficulty interpreting most of 
what was outlined in their billing statements as well as their penalty charge notices).  
Although the new tariff scheme was far less complex than the proceeding scheme, 
which had included 150 different tariff categories, there were a few major problems with 
the IBT scheme based on its initial design. In order for low-income consumers in the first 
block to benefit from the full subsidy, it would have been necessary for these consumers to 
use water through the entire first block—the less water used by a household in this lowest 
block, the smaller the subsidy from the higher blocks. In general, household consumption 
in El Alto was low. Further, as mentioned above, the ways in which water was put to use 
by most households interviewed did not change overnight simply because these households 
gained access to a tap. 
It should further be noted that it is misleading to think that IBTs must be consistent 
with marginal cost pricing. IBTs result in different customers simultaneously paying 
different prices for the same service, in this case the provision of water services. Only one 
of these prices—the prices charged to consumers in the highest block—are equal to the 
marginal cost. Marginal costs are meant to rise with increased aggregate use, but the block 
tariff fails to capture the relationship between the consumption of water and price equal to 
the cost of increased use by that specific consumer (Boland and Whittington 2000). Also, 
for IBTs to work, households need to have a metered connection to a network. This 
supposedly acts as an incentive for consumers to make the choice to connect to the utility 
network, which eventually is meant to lead to positive health externalities for consumers. 
In the case of La Paz/El Alto, though, consumers were not given the choice as to whether 
or not to connect to the network, and so the IBT was not really needed as an incentive. 
Further, there is no existing empirical evidence that proves a correlation between IBTs and 
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improved health. If there are health benefits to be gained, they are more likely to come 
from simply being connected to the network, rather than from the allowable volumetric 
consumption in the lifeline block. 
Another problem with the tariff scheme was that the initial tariff design was not 
directly linked to productivity or investment needs. As mentioned previously, there was no 
tariff at all for sewerage: customers, who had both water and sewerage installed paid the 
same as those with only water (2001). The reason there was no sewerage tariff was again 
due to inadequate information about the sewerage connections and the estimated number 
of households in need of a connection. It was up to AISA to develop this body of 
information and then to use it to propose a sewerage tariff during the next round of tariff 
negotiation with the regulatory agency, the SISAB. Mechanisms for the revision of tariffs 
were meant to allow for potential rises in labour, chemical, and exchange costs, and were 
included in the original contract so that adjustments could be made without a complete 
renegotiation of the contract. Of course, when these adjustments were discussed with the 
government, they quickly became a heated political issue. Members of civil society 
organisations and other observers, unfamiliar with the design of the original contract, 
interpreted any discussion over tariffs as an attempt by AISA to renegotiate the entire 
contract and directly increase tariff rates.  
It is also important to keep in mind that the rates in force in La Paz/El Alto were 
lower than those of other major Bolivian cities, including the public cooperative of Santa 
Cruz and the public utility of Cochabamba. Average tariffs in La Paz-El Alto increased by 
an average of 20 per cent in 1997 but the fix charge, which had previously penalised small 
consumers was eliminated at the same time (Foster 2003). This meant that most poor 
families experienced a decline in their monthly water bills, while other wealthier 
consumers saw a sharp increasefo in their monthly billing statements. It is also important 
to note that although a 20 per cent average tariff increase is significant, when compared to 
the average tariffs in neighbouring cities, the average tariff in La Paz-El Alto Also was 31 
per cent lower than the average tariff in Santa Cruz and 21 per cent lower than the average 
tariff in Cochabamba (Martin 2009). Also, compared with other utilities, such as 
electricity, water remained the least expensive. The message that was received from the 
household interviews with low-income users of El Alto was that volumetric charges were 
not a significant concern. 
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Table 6-1: Initial Tariff Structure for Aguas de Illimani (AISA)139 
(varies by user category and monthly water consumption) 
Tariff 
US$/cubic meter140 
Domestic141 Commercial Industrial 
1.1826 301 m³ 21 m³ and above 1 m³ and above 
0.6642 151 to 300 m³ 1 to 20 m³  
0.4428 31 to 150 m³   
0.2214 1 to 30 m³   
(Komives 1998) 
  
                                                
 
139 This is the tariff structure designed for the first five years of the contractual arrangement. 
140 Indexed to the US Dollar. 
141 Ninety-nine per cent of all domestic consumers use less than 150 cubic meters of water per month, meaning that very 
few customers ever pay the same unit cost as commercial or industrial consumers. 
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Table 6-2: Effective Per Unit Price of Water for Households with In-House Water 
Connections in Sample Neighbourhood Areas of La Paz and El Alto  
 Avg. monthly water 
consumption 
Avg. monthly revenue Price per cubic meter 
of water 
El Alto – North 7 m³ $1.54 $0.22 
El Alto – South 11 m³ $2.44 $0.22 
La Paz – Tacagua 10 m³ $2.21 $0.22 
La Paz – Cota Cota 60 m³ $20.53 $0.34 
(Komives 1998) 
6.3.4  Time-Cost in Adjusting to Reform 
The most important characterization which we apply to the bargaining 
process is that it is fundamentally time dependent. It is widely appreciated 
that the passage of time has a cost in terms of both dollars and the sacrifice 
of utility, which stems from the postponement of consumption… If it did not 
matter when the parties agreed, it would not matter or not they agreed at 
all.142 
In a way, the SISAB (regulatory agency) seems to have been set up only to 
provide comfort to the private sector not to the public.143 
It is important to reiterate the way in which this research project defines “the transaction” 
as it relates to the case study. The transaction—the investment between both parties 
(buyer-AISA and seller-GoB) in terms of financial and time cost—was initiated the 
moment bidding documents were drawn up and negotiated to form a private consortium for 
the La Paz/EL Alto concession. The exchange, or trade, between the GoB and the AISA 
consortium continued through to the abrupt termination of the transaction seven years 
later—at least 18 years ahead of the expected date at which the transaction was meant 
either to draw to a close or be extended for another period of time (potentially another 25–
35 years, in line with typical PPP concession estimated time-frames). Consequently, the 
overall life span of the transaction being analysed is seven years.  
                                                
 
142 Cross (1969). 
143 Interview with an El Alto resident,17 January 2003. 
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One aspect of regulatory reform that is overlooked by the literature is the way in 
which consumers are meant to adapt to their new role within a completely new regulatory 
culture. The literature contends that within the traditional model of public service provision 
(where autonomous regulatory agents are not considered necessary), consumers have 
tended to feel powerless. In theory, PSP is meant to solve this problem by acting as a 
catalyst for the establishment of a stronger consumer identity, and providing consumers 
with voice, choice, and regulatory culture to empower citizens and facilitate direct 
consumer participation in the monitoring of service providers. The Bolivian regulatory 
framework, designed during the mid-1990s, was created with the expectation that 
consumers would finally be able to participate actively through three regulatory 
channels.144 The reforms facilitated consumers with: (i) the right to launch complaints, in 
the first instance directly to utility companies, and then to the SISAB; (ii) the ability to 
appeal their grievances if/when the SISAB provided an unsatisfactory response to these 
complaints; and (iii) the right to express their opinion at public hearings summoned by the 
SISAB as a consultative mechanism for its most important decisions. 
Obviously, for such a system to work in practice, these regulatory institutions (their 
mandate and purpose) need to be understood and supported by those members of the 
population that the agencies are foremost meant to protect. Although Bolivia’s new 
regulatory framework may have created the progressive structure to support a newly 
empowered consumer-base, it did not necessarily equip the population with the tools and 
capacity to act upon its new regulatory rights. Clear and simple procedures for consumers 
to engage with regulatory authorities should have been presented in enough time for the 
population to become familiar with the new tools and mechanisms at their disposal and so 
use them effectively. From the perspective of many of those interviewed for this research, 
“the SISAB was not really created by the people” to help govern the water sector and 
                                                
 
144 The regulatory reform that took shape during the mid-1990s created this system, which included five sector-specific 
superintendencies/regulatory agencies, one superintendency responsible for dealing with the appeals process, and a 
General Superintendency, SIRESE, responsible for overseeing/coordinating efforts of the various sector-specific 
agencies. 
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protect consumer interest; rather, it was created in order “to look ‘good’ so that the private 
companies would come.”145 
Central government authorities do not deny that Bolivia’s transition to a regulated 
water market system was rushed. However, they contend that such a major institutional 
overhaul would always attract significant opposition, and that taking too long to transition 
to such a system bears the risk of institutional reform simply not taking place. According 
to one government official, “everyone talks about participation as if it is the answer to 
every institutional impasse, but participation itself more often than that leads to a 
stalemate, especially in sectors such as water and energy.”146 Findings indicate that the 
government did not attempt to undertake any participatory programs during this period. 
Still, government officials argue that people were provided with a five-year window of 
opportunity between the time the first set of sector regulations were introduced (the 1992 
Regulations) and the time the government decided to introduce PSP. From their 
perspective, five years should have been enough time to adjust to the idea that household 
water and sanitation network connections would be the only legally acceptable type of 
service provision. It is certainly unclear just how much the government invested in making 
the case for this legal requirement known to the public. When probed, government officials 
explained that they often relied upon SAMAPA to act as the intermediary for legal and 
regulatory messages regarding the water sector. Given what we know about the case, 
though, SAMAPA never took the government’s 1992 regulations seriously, so consumers 
themselves had no incentive to transition to this requirement during the initial five-year 
period. 
Ironically, much of the analysis surrounding the relationship between regulatory 
authorities and private utility operators assumes that a P-A dilemma arises because the 
utility has an informational advantage over the regulator (on the day-to-day operations of 
the firm), which gives them more power or leverage over the regulator. However, when 
comparing this relationship to the relationship between the regulator and a public utility—a 
utility often run by a politically appointed manager—the power of the regulator to hold the 
                                                
 
145 Interview with El Alto resident, 10 November 2003. 
146 Interview with Vice-minister Jose Barragán. 
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utility accountable for non-compliance with regulatory standards is actually much more 
limited. Private enterprise, unregulated, will respond only to human need that is expressed 
as economic demand, which is why the needs of the poor might be neglected. According to 
AISA, “government is in a much better position to lay down the rules and regulations 
within which private enterprises have to operate and if it wants to, it can weigh those 
regulations in favour of the poor.”147 This statement may be true, and it was certainly 
validated by the Vice-Minister of Basic Services, but it is unclear whether consumers have 
the ability (or willingness) to uphold new rules and regulations governing the water sector. 
Even though it had been the government who ultimately created the conflict between the 
utility operator and consumers by creating a legal requirement to connect to the network, 
consumers were angrier with the utility company for taking the government reforms 
seriously than they were with the government. 
A number of questions also remain. How long should it take to transition 
consumers to a new style of governance and regulatory oversight with a formalised 
market-based service provision system? What type of participatory measures can be 
utilised to create greater consumer buy-in to reform efforts and increase the likelihood of 
meeting the demands and preferences of this particular group of consumers? Deepening 
our understanding of the clash between informal and formal perceptions of water can 
provide some answers, in particular identifying where the issue of water rights might 
overlap with other sources of social unease. Other answers can be found only by engaging 
directly with communities. Sustained success in water and sanitation programmes depends 
on catalysing real demand and real participation to liberate community determination and 
resources, and this is relevant to every other problem of poverty and community 
development. 
The question of how to transition water users to a new regulatory system and 
market-based approach to service provision should be at the forefront of the debate on PSP 
in the sector. The transaction costs that stem from large-scale community outreach and 
information sharing about the potential benefits of reform, the new rights that consumers 
will be awarded, the new set of responsibilities that consumers will have to bear, and the 
                                                
 
147 Interview with Bianchi, Managing Director, AISA, 2002. 
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new tools at their disposal to act upon their consumer rights, are all no doubt high. After 
all, these costs are in addition to the costs of creating and distributing education material 
related to good hygiene practices. However, the cost of mistakenly assuming that 
consumers will adapt naturally to reform measures, without specific social policies and 
programmes in place to ease their apprehension and vulnerability, is a much greater risk to 
the sustainability of water sector reform and PSP. These transaction costs were certainly 
not factored into the planning of the La Paz/El Alto concession. 
6.3.5  Building Confidence and Establishing Consumer Identity 
Sure, people complain much more now that water has been privatised. That’s 
because there is someone specifically to complain to and to complain about. 
When water was in public hands we simply resigned ourselves to the idea that 
we had poor government services, there was no one in particular that we 
could hold accountable. The same was for transport. Now we complain more 
and we demand more. Not only have our services been upgraded, we’ve been 
upgraded: we are now paying consumers with more sophisticated 
preferences.148 
The most revealing aspect of the time-cost of adjusting to reform was discovering just how 
long it took for people to establish a consumer culture or consumer identity in El Alto. 
Household interviews took place five years after some households had been upgraded to 
the new network, and yet most respondents seemed reluctant to take up complaints with 
AISA and enact their new consumer rights. For the most part, consumers would first seek 
support from a community leader or NAL. However, consumer rights should not be 
confused with entitlements. Most of those interviewed felt that they were “entitled” to 
water, as it was perceived as a natural resource and a public good—but they held their 
government ultimately accountable for their situation, not AISA, as clearly stated by many 
residents who adamantly believed that the government had sold their natural resources off 
to the French, to the Americans, and to the World Bank so that these entities could make 
money off Bolivia’s natural resources.149 It seemed odd at first that the same politically 
charged individuals who would stage mass demonstrations against the government would 
                                                
 
148 Interview with London resident. 
149 Various interviews in El Alto. 
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be so apathetic when it came to direct (administrative) action against AISA. It needs to be 
considered how long it takes for a person to develop a sense of consumer identity. 
Some insights come from new approaches, which analyse consumption and its 
behavioural choices and practices as social and cultural rather than psychological or 
economic phenomena. Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) refers to a family of theoretical 
perspectives that address the dynamic relationship, and possible tensions, that exist 
between individual consumer behaviour and social, cultural, and ideological structures that 
are mediated by markets. It is “the consumption of market-made commodities and desire-
inducing marketing symbols [that] is central to consumer culture, and yet the perpetuation 
and reproduction of this system is largely dependent upon the exercise of free personal 
choice in the private sphere” (Arnould and Thompson 2005). One focal issue in CCT is 
thus the question of consumer freedom. Are consumers truly free to pursue and develop 
their own motives, preferences, experiences, and behaviours? Or does culture determine 
these factors to such a degree that consumer freedom is limited or illusory? We have 
gained some insight into the ways in which El Alto’s social structure (social norms and 
cultural values) may have influenced consumer freedom and sense of identity, but 
additional research is needed. Particularly, there is a need for more research in other 
sectors relating to socio-historic patterning of consumption in cases where PSP has been 
introduced to improve the relationship between service provider and recipient client. 
It would also be interesting to find out whether consumers develop a consumer 
identity more quickly in other sectors where transitions were made from public to private 
service provision, such as telecoms. Unlike water and sanitation, telecoms is a competitive 
sector, and therefore might lend itself to a more rapid manifestation of consumer culture 
and identity because it offers consumers choices. It could be argued that there was some 
degree of choice provided to many households in El Alto, in that they could opt in or out of 
the condominial network provision, but perhaps these households felt pressured into the 
decision they made. Although is not entirely clear, it would seem that all households who 
had the option of condominial services decided to opt for them (at least in the beginning, 
before complaints and suspicion grew about these services being inferior to the traditional 
network connection), and this would indicate some degree of social pressure to make the 
choice (this will be discussed further in the next section). It would be extremely interesting 
to return to La Paz/El Alto and continue to explore, at a deeper level, how institutional and 
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social structures systematically influence consumption and reciprocally, and the 
relationships between consumers’ experiences, belief systems, and practices. It would also 
be interesting to observe the way in which consumer identity in the water sector has 
evolved (or not evolved) since the utility was placed back in the hands of the government. 
6.3.6  Differential Risk Preferences: Moving From One Set of Preferences to Another 
Water services are an obligation, not a charitable act.150 
Over the years, El Alto’s condominial programme has received a great deal of attention 
from the international development community. It continues to be cited by many as a 
successful example of community participation and as a case study to prove that 
government, the private sector, NGOs, and the community are capable of working together 
toward a mutually beneficial goal. Others, though, disagree: in their interpretation, AISA 
found it difficult to establish an NGO partner, and it therefore ended up working directly 
with the community, setting up special pilot project offices to support areas where 
condominial projects were in operation.151 Although the condominial program had many 
supporters and has been the subject of various development reports, it is important to keep 
in mind that most of the people living in El Alto had never even heard of the programme 
and it barely scratched the surface of the sanitation problems faced by the city.152 Still, 
there are two interesting points that emerged from the condominial programme. The first is 
that in order for the project to go ahead, the government made a big step in agreeing to 
relax some of its technical standards, which had legally precluded the use of such a system 
and/or the use of any “alternative” service provision options.153 This regulatory 
compromise, which was carried out under informal agreements between AISA and various 
                                                
 
150 Taken from a document prepared for World Water Day, 200 by Dr Rosalind Stanwell, World Health Organisation. 
151 Interview with Ken Kaplan, Director, Building Partners for Development. Kaplan participated in a multisector 
partnership program which supported the condominial approach with AISA, SIDA, and the World Bank’s WSP. 
152 This finding came from the initial household survey and was later confirmed by government authorities and AISA 
management. 
153 The condominial system allowed for the use of smaller-diameter pipes laid at relatively shallow depths in areas where 
were they would not be subject to heavy loads from above. As mentioned in Chapter 3, AISA agreed to allow 
neighbourhood groups to make their own arrangements for network installation if they so desired. The leaders of some 
communities, for example, would try to save costs and time by collecting money from residents and outsourcing the 
construction of the network to a local contractor/specific member of the community. 
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neighbourhood groups, successfully connected approximately 2,000 out of 7,000 
households in 2002. The effect of this regulatory flexibility proves that government 
regulation can be malleable (when willing) and adjust as new information (including 
technological innovation) becomes available, possibly leading to positive welfare 
outcomes. 
A second point is that despite the lower-cost option that the condominial 
programme offered consumers, AISA soon discovered that even in some of the poorest 
communities, residents were opting out of the lower-cost scheme in favour of the more 
conventional, higher-cost water and sewerage system. The decision of consumers to 
demand higher-cost conventional connections was based on nothing more than the 
suspicion that ‘alternative’ solutions meant second-class solutions. In the case of Brazil, 
where condominial technologies were first developed, the government did not offer low-
income consumers an option between condominial and conventional services. Certain 
areas of the city of Brasilia (as well as other cities) were simply selected by the 
government and the alternative system was implemented. The government of Bolivia, in 
contrast, made a policy decision to allow consumers the freedom to choose between the 
two options.154 It remains somewhat unclear as to why the government made only this 
particular exception for an alternative system of provision. Perhaps there was pressure 
from the international development community or from AISA, but respondents never fully 
rationalised why this approach was allowed and/or why other low-cost innovations were 
not tried. Although AISA acknowledged its preference for allowing standposts for those 
consumers who preferred them and acknowledged their interest in working with private 
small-scale service providers to service those areas that were hardest to reach, the 
government felt it could not justify allowing some consumers to receive what it believed to 
be substandard provision.  
The progression of switching from one set of preferences to another as one’s 
consumer identity becomes more sophisticated is certainly greatly enhanced and nurtured 
by a market-based service provision culture. As mentioned previously, if governments fail 
to offer consumers choices to meet their various preferences, they may unwittingly stunt 
                                                
 
154 Interview with the SISAB. 
202 
 
 
the development of consumer identity and minimise a consumer’s sense of ownership and 
responsibility for services rendered. Still, the complexity of combining alternative service 
provision with conventional service provision is significant, especially in circumstances 
where price alone may not be the only determinant motivating the choices that consumers 
make in the water sector. It would be interesting to explore further the transaction costs 
involved when such alternative arrangements are offered to consumers. Another important 
point with regard to providing consumers with choices is that a choice between two types 
of service options may not be sufficient, and there needs to be a whole range available to 
consumers. It would have been interesting to observe what consumers might have 
preferred had they been offered a more substantial lower-cost alternative, such as the type 
of service offered through the Yakupaj Project as described in Section 4. Overall, the point 
here is that given how difficult it is for the government to determine ex-ante the way in 
which consumers’ demands and preferences may sway and/or progress, the government 
should have facilitated AISA with greater regulatory flexibility so that it was not 
constrained by policy and could rely directly upon demand trends as indicated by the 
market. 
6.3.7  Participation 
The root cause of the failure of so many water and sanitation projects has 
been the assumption that the problem is primarily technological and can 
therefore be resolved by engineers. Proceeding on this basis, the planners 
themselves define the problems that must be overcome and the priorities that 
must be met. There is no space for consultation with the community, and no 
consideration of how the technical solution arrived at will fit with the 
cultural, socio-economic and environmental realities of the recipient 
community. The result is a total collapse of understanding between provider 
and recipient, and, ultimately, the community’s refusal to use, pay for, and 
maintain the service.155 
As mentioned above, low-income residents interviewed in El Alto reiterated that they were 
more comfortable voicing their complaints with NALs than they were with AISA, the 
SISAB, or municipal authorities. When asked to rank the level of responsiveness of these 
four agencies, they ranked NALs as “most responsive”, AISA as “responsive”, and 
                                                
 
155 Mariela Garcia, sociologist at CINARA Institute in Cali, Colombia. 
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municipal authorities and the SISAB as “unresponsive.” High profile members of local 
CBOs such as the Cordinadora del Agua and of NALs such as the FEJUVE sought both to 
serve and stimulate public interest in social issues around water privatisation, and were 
popular public personas widely known across many neighbourhoods in El Alto. Residents 
would listen to these figures speak on the radio and find them convincing, while by 
contrast there were no specific members of the SISAB or AISA whose names were known 
to residents. 
Stakeholders most vulnerable to the potentially negative impacts of reform, such as 
those living in El Alto, were a perfect target for NALs and certain CBOs, as they could 
easily be persuaded into believing that their public actions (involvement in protests and 
strikes) were necessary to protect the greater good of their community. Despite the fact that 
the majority of interviewed consumers believed that their WSS had improved dramatically, 
these same groups also believed (or were led to believe) that they could afford risking a 
return to lower-grade service provision in order to bring about greater social change for 
their community. NALs and CBOs had greater access and reach at the local level than 
AISA or the government, and although in some instances these groups were acting with the 
best interest of consumers at heart, it cannot be denied that a separate political agenda also 
motivated their interests and actions. 
The objective of this section is not to paint a completely negative picture of NALs 
or of any other community association in El Alto. Bolivia is characterised by a large 
variety of local institutions, including an estimated 67 different types of associations active 
across the country, which make significant contributions to individual household welfare 
(Grootaert and Narayan 2004). Although these community organisations vary in terms of 
inclusiveness and quality, they are a strong and necessary force in connecting poor people 
to municipal governments and to markets. Government policies to support social capital 
formation through membership in such community associations should not necessarily 
diminish. However, government support needs to be more nuanced in order to take into 
account the local social relations and power structures that exist within some of these 
informal institutions. At the very least, in the case of La Paz/EL Alto, government-
sponsored community-outreach programmes should have been equipped with the tools to 
provide consumer groups with an alternative perspective regarding the benefits of water 
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sector reform and PSP, in order to combat the negative messages presented by NALs and 
CBOs. 
Similarly, AISA could have done more to reach out to communities; at the very 
least, it could have assembled a small team of people solely responsible for community 
consultations in order for residents to become more familiar with people within the 
company. This practice has been successful in other cities, such as Cartagena in Colombia, 
where a long history of political clientelism, corruption, and racism permeate into an “us” 
vs. “them”—or a “haves” vs. “haves not”—culture in a similar way as the situation in La 
Paz/El Alto. The difference with the PPP established in Cartagena, though, is that the 
utility, ACUACAR,156 created a team with one particular person designated as the 
intermediary between consumers and the utility. This representative is a familiar name 
among community groups, trusted and respected even in neighbourhoods that remain 
outside the agreed concession area of ACUACAR (Barbery 2003). Part of the reason why 
such a relationship with the community works in Cartagena can perhaps be attributed to 
the fact that regulators allowed ACUACAR the flexibility to respond to the unique needs 
of different peri-urban communities. The company was allowed to reach out on its own 
accord and partner with local NGOs/CBOs to design alternative service provision 
arrangements and to support alternative billing arrangements based on community-driven 
initiatives (Nickson 2002; Barbery 2003). Bolivia’s regulations prevented AISA from 
having the same degree of flexibility. 
Another reason why AISA struggled to gain the trust of community members was 
because of some naïve or insensitive corporate public relations decisions. For example, 
many AISA billboards, which were distributed across the adjoining cities, featured images 
of blond, blue eyed children happily swimming in a pool below the slogan “More Water, 
More Life”. The slogan demonstrated how disconnected AISA appeared to be from the 
realities faced by the majority of the population it served. After witnessing the success of 
community participation in El Alto’s condominial programme, where various community 
                                                
 
156 In December 1994, the city of Cartagena and Aguas de Barcelona (AgBar) established a mixed-ownership company 
called Aguas de Cartagena SAESP. (ACUACAR) to improve and extend water and sanitation services (WSS) to the 
city’s 900,000 inhabitants. 
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members were actively involved in the planning, building, and operating of their own 
water and sanitation systems, AISA did eventually decide to hire additional people with 
backgrounds in social and community work to help integrate more closely with 
communities and to build trust,157 but the decision was tardy and, given the power of those 
closest to the beneficiary community, AISA needed to invest much more in changing its 
public image. Private companies may lack specialist experience in the field of social work 
and community outreach, but this does not imply incompatibility. In fact, interviews 
conducted with private water utilities in other developing countries also reveals a strong 
willingness to work in partnership with non-profit making schemes and to learn lessons 
from social workers engaged at the local level. Although this willingness is almost 
certainly motivated by a belief that these lessons might ultimately turn out to improve 
profitability for the company in the long term, it still exemplifies compatibility in terms of 
potential welfare outcomes. 
How participation happens in practice should not be overly romanticised. It takes a 
great deal of work and involves a great deal of risk, not only for consumers but also for 
utility operators. As was explained in Chapter 4, the relationship between a private utility 
operator and consumers is often built upon tenuous foundations, simply due to opposing 
perceptions of how water should be treated (as an economic vs. a public good). Informal 
partnership arrangements with community groups that might enhance participation are 
more complicated and delicate under this type of environment. Also, participation usually 
requires some degree of local leadership, and local leaders are not immune to corruption. 
Take for example AISA’s attempt at increasing community participation (and support for 
reform) by continuing some pre-concession informal payment arrangements with 
neighbourhood groups for water and sewerage installations. NALs entered into an informal 
partnership with AISA and made arrangements directly with residents to collect money 
and to hire contractors to construct the local network. About two-thirds of these 
agreements had problems such as missing money, incompetent or unscrupulous 
contractors, or poor quality materials used in construction. Engaging in these types of 
informal arrangements carries risks and associated costs that should not be ignored. 
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Although in recent years civil society has become a powerful impetus in water 
policy formulation at the local, national, and global level, there continues to be a severe 
lack of synergy among civil society stakeholders in terms of their ability/willingness to 
trust government and private sector stakeholders when implementing projects jointly. Not 
only are utility operators apprehensive of the risks associated in informal partnerships with 
community members, but some CBOs and NGOs are also apprehensive that, by entering 
into partnerships with the private sector, they will be co-opted, or be perceived as being co-
opted, into propping up policies and practices that support PSP. Similarly, when deeply 
rooted animosity and mistrust exist between government and representative community 
groups, the government can also create obstacles for cooperation between utility operators 
and community groups and indirectly (or directly) prevent local-level participation. For 
example, the government of Bolivia certainly considered some members of the FEJUVE to 
be “violent anarchists whose ambitions are solely political and not to help the poor 
improve access to services.”158 This distrust often led the government to regard civil 
society in El Alto as a homogeneous and monolithic group, which ultimately perpetuated 
the “us vs. them” mentality. 
Regardless of the challenge of engaging with community representatives, many 
would still argue that the success—or rather the sustainability—of any water project 
depends on the participation of citizens. “Local communities must be actively involved in 
decisions about the trade-offs between standards, cost and affordability,” says a report on 
funding the Johannesburg targets written by Cambridge Economic Policy Associates. For 
Mr. Von Braun of IFPRI, “the answer to water pricing is efficient institutions of user 
associations that can negotiate with higher-level bodies. “What is driving demand for 
drinking water is not so much price, but the capacity to politically articulate,” he adds. “In 
some parts of the world the poor have become more articulate through decentralisation, 
devolution and more democracy, and what is on the top of their agenda is clean water.” 
While the chances of a programme succeeding perhaps increase through greater 
participation, the cost of participation programs cannot be ignored. Referring back to the 
experience of community participation in the condominial program, households 
                                                
 
158 Former President Goni in an interview with PBS, 2006. 
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contributed with their own labour and social workers were recruited to: (i) help organise 
the community into condominial units; (ii) train the community in construction techniques; 
and (iii) supervise construction. In the case of water service, the savings achieved through 
community participation were about the same as the costs of organising the community, so 
that there were no net cost savings associated with community involvement (see: Foster 
2001).159 
There is a further issue that cannot be ignored when we talk of participation: goal 
incongruence. There are individuals with years of experience in participation who believe 
that, more often than not, goal incongruence between central government objectives and 
community objectives comes to a head despite huge investment in community outreach 
and participation. The bargaining power over certain issues may switch between 
community and government, but “ultimately one party wins and the other loses—when 
these types of circumstances arise, no compromise is reached and no concessions are 
made—and let’s face it, the government usually wins because they are convinced that they 
know what’s best for the people.”160 Bounded rationality is a condition in which 
individuals are intendedly rational in their desire to maximise economic benefits, but are 
subject to limited cognitive competence as a result of imperfect information. Governments 
sometimes acknowledge this when designing policies that they believe to be in the best 
interest of citizens, but where citizens are supposedly constrained by their cognitive 
capacity; in other words, when governments believe that people “don’t know what’s good 
for them”. Until now, arguments have been put forth that greater access to information 
about consumer needs and preferences should facilitate governments with the tools to 
design more appropriate and innovative institutional arrangements that better meet social 
welfare objectives. 
This bottom-up, community knows best, approach is certainly quite popular in 
development circles today, but what of those situations in which consumers have 
preferences that are simply incongruous with government priorities? What about those 
                                                
 
159 It should be noted, however, that in the case of sanitation cost savings from community participation did rise by 5 per 
cent. 
160 Interview with Diego Zavaleta, Technical Secretary of National Dialogue, Bolivia. 
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situations—should they exist—in which water users might not know what’s good for 
them? How does the subject of bounded rationality fit into the participation equation in 
practice? We need to acknowledge that for many low-income residents, water and 
sanitation are a simply a long way down the list of priorities, while at the top are things 
that are felt to have a more direct impact on day-to-day living and family income. Job 
creation and improvements in transport and electricity are often seen as more pressing, 
and, particularly for low-income populations, words such as “hygiene” remain fairly 
abstract concepts and the link between health and productivity or income is even more 
abstract. 161 
6.3.8  Vulnerability  
Psychological and institutional structures of power have always cast them 
[urban poor] in the role of supplicants. The poor are not seen as agents of 
change: they are seen as passive recipients of favours bestowed or withheld 
by the people in power.162 
The water that comes out into the sink is much better now than before. Before 
you could even see bugs come out with the water and it smelled of excrement. 
Still now the water is not transparent, it is cloudy and it smells of chemicals. 
Either way we have to treat the water before we drink it.163 
Fist one bill comes and then another for something else. I didn’t pay my 
water bill and then all of sudden my electricity was turned off. Now I have to 
operate my shop with no light and no water.164 
Institutions are certainly a source of vulnerability, but they are also affected by the 
vulnerability of those they are meant to serve. Further, a weak institutional environment 
promotes vulnerability in the definition of property rights and in exchange. However, 
while this vulnerability might be further perpetuated by inadequate institutional 
arrangements, institutions can alternatively use the tools the at their disposal—policies, 
regulations, and contractual incentives—to support partnerships in the water sector that 
might reduce risks for consumers; in this way, consumers may be more likely to benefit 
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from reform. However, just as there is a wide range of variation in consumer preferences, 
there is also variation in the degree to which consumers are willing to take on risk. The 
more vulnerable a person/household is (in terms of exposure to a range of adverse events), 
then the more likely it is that he or she will choose low-risk institutional arrangements, 
sometimes at the cost of lower average productivity. Most of the analysis of risk in PPP 
arrangements tends to focus on the tools governments use to balance the risks shouldered 
by the private utility (construction cost risk, demand risk, operating risk, regulatory risk, 
obsolescence risk, foreign exchange risk, and political risk). The risks to the private sector 
operating in unfamiliar developing country settings are unquestionably high, and the 
balancing act between government and the private utility will be discussed in Section II. 
However, government must also be aware of risk from the perspective of consumers, so 
that it can implement measures to incentivise consumers to take on the risks that also arise 
in PPP arrangements. 
Many researchers fall into the trap of perceiving El Alto as one large, sprawling 
urban slum. This is mostly because the government does not have comprehensive 
household data showing the variability between households living in different 
zones/neighbourhoods of El Alto. Researchers are left to make assumptions using largely 
out-dated data based on predominantly aggregated measures of household income that fail 
to present an accurate picture of the huge wealth disparity between certain areas. This lack 
of disaggregated data constrains our ability to view El Alto as a multi-faceted and 
heterogeneous community. Although predominantly inhabited by residents of indigenous 
origins, the assets of El Alto residents vary considerably from one zone to another, and, 
consequently, the preferences and risks households are willing to take, and are able to 
afford, must also vary considerably. 
“No one that I know qualified for credit,”165 explained one resident in El Alto, 
when asked about the micro-credit scheme offered to households to help finance the US$ 
400-worth of materials required to construct a fully equipped bathroom. The frequently 
cited results of the El Alto Pilot Project, where three-quarters of the households that 
applied for credit were approved, paint a misleading picture of the micro-credit dynamic 
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and the risk appetite of most households. First, the pilot project helped to provide 1,977 
households with water connections and 4,050 with sewerage connections; however, only 
one-quarter of these households ever applied for credit despite the assistance of social 
workers on hand to help them through the application process. This quarter, a tiny subset 
of the population that was already fortunate enough to be a part of the pilot program, also 
had incomes that were substantially higher than average for El Alto. The credit program’s 
intention of providing households with a loan on a 32-month term, at an interest rate of 
1.92 per cent per month, was simply inappropriate, because it carried too much risk on an 
investment that would never yield a direct financial return for individual households. It is 
clear, through examples such as this, that time was never taken to consider the amount of 
risk that households could afford to take in realising the government’s dream of universal 
services for all. 
There were also households that might have been able to afford the monthly water 
usage payment at some times, but which for one reason or another were unable to do so for 
a long enough period to avoid a temporary disconnection. One resident confided that it was 
“cheaper to move house than to pay our fine and a reconnection charge.” One perhaps 
serious issue addressed by only two collaborating researchers relates to the fact that many 
residents of El Alto experienced hidden costs caused by not having a water meter: because 
many areas of El Alto had not yet been supplied with a meter, prices were fixed by AISA 
according to the value of their housing. Houses valued at less than US$ 25,000 were asked 
to pay US$ 2.38 monthly for their connection, compared with US$0.75-$0.88 per month 
for those with installed meters (Laurie and Crespo 2007). This significant difference was 
due to the increasing block tariff structure, which afforded residents in a lower 
consumption bracket with a cheaper price per cubic meter. This significant differential 
between what some residents were paying compared to others in the same income bracket 
should not have been allowed to occur. Some residents, in this predicament, felt they had 
no option but to remain disconnected. 
6.3.9  Universal Service Obligations and the Consequence of a Rights-Based Approach 
to Service Delivery 
From a business perspective, Talbot (2002) identifies tighter contracts and regulation as 
possible deterrents, in that the general country and financial risks are exacerbated by 
“unreasonable contractual constraints” and “unreasonable regulator power and 
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involvement.” Further difficulties for private water operators include “an emphasis on 
unrealistic service levels”, “attempts to apply European standards in developing countries”, 
and “the explicit demand for ‘connections for all’ in developing countries.” Talbot finally 
rejected the sustainability of introducing full cost recovery from users in developing 
countries, arguing that the notion that “water pays for water is no longer realistic in 
developing countries: even Europe and the US subsidise services” and that “service users 
can’t pay for the level of investments required, not for social projects” (Talbot 2002).166  
Why are governments in the developing world placing such pressures on water 
utilities? Ask any politician this and they will iterate the same response: there is extreme 
political pressure on governments to provide the same quality of water to all users. While 
there is no reason why governments should relinquish their responsibility to meet this 
USO, we have observed that the politicisation of water rights can have major implications 
for shifting user preferences—shifts that can invariably interfere with the potential normal 
functioning of the water market. Time and again across the developing world, we witness 
politicians who make the promise of equal access to services a hallmark of their 
campaigns, and we hear emotive speeches based upon “rights-based” arguments that state 
that water provision is not a charitable act, but the obligation of the state and the right of 
each individual. The rights-based approach provides claimants with a legal framework, 
based on human rights law, for action within their own political system. This approach has 
the potential to empower individuals to demand, as a minimum, that water quality and 
quantity must suffice to meet basic human needs in terms of drinking, bathing, cleaning, 
cooking, and sanitation, but it also has the potential to create expectations that are far 
beyond the capacity of utilities to provide. Such promises also emphasise the public good 
perspective of water rather than the economic benefit, which can lead to further challenges 
in meeting USO with the help of the private sector. The rights-based approach does not 
necessarily contradict the market-based approach to service provision, but rights-based 
literature tends to confuse matters with the claim that water systems that exclude certain 
groups who cannot afford to pay user fees are inconsistent with human rights. 
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6.3.10  Subsidising the Private Sector 
Ultimately, if Bolivians are going to get real access for water, it’s going to 
have to be subsidised—and most likely it’s going to have to be subsidised in 
some form of foreign assistance.167 
When I tried to introduce an OBA scheme in El Alto, in order to make up for 
the shortfalls in coverage stipulated under the AISA contract, I was met with 
a great deal of resistance from the Junats Vecinales and the Cordinadora de 
Agua. They believed that by implementing this grant scheme together with 
AISA—a grant scheme that would have basically subsidised the cost of 
expansion into areas not covered by the contract—the government was 
subsidising the ‘private sector’. The public simply did not understand that 
this was actually a subsidy targeted at them.168 
One of the biggest drawbacks to cross-subsidy schemes in the water sector is that no 
additional funding is injected into the system, the amount that can be raised through cross-
subsidy being limited to the existing customer base. This puts a limit on the financial 
resources that can be directed to social priorities to meet welfare objectives, and on the 
corresponding obligations that can be imposed on the private sector. One alternative to 
cross-subsidies could be to supplement some public funding into the design of water 
concessions in situations where certain targets with low financial returns are imposed on 
the private operator (be they requirements to serve low-income areas or meet certain 
environmental criteria). The problem is that this can be misconstrued to mean that the 
public sector is subsidising the private sector. 
In late 2003, the Ministry of Basic Services tried to provide AISA with a grant 
based on its good performance as a company. The company had already complied with its 
expansion mandate as outlined in the contract for the initial five years, and was on target 
for the second five years of operation. However, two remaining districts of El Alto 
remained outside the contractually agreed concession area, and to expand into these areas 
without making any adjustments to the existing tariff structure would have generated 
overall losses for AISA. The SISAB had decided against increasing tariffs in 2001, when 
they had the opportunity to do so, but opted instead to increase slightly the cost of 
household connections (see Section II; 7.4). Unsurprisingly, these remaining unconnected 
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areas of El Alto were made up of residents who would find it much more difficult to pay 
for the charge. For this reason, the Vice-Ministry of Basic Services decided that in order to 
meet the government’s social objectives of servicing this area, they needed to inject 
additional financial resources into the partnership arrangement. One way to do this was to 
award the utility with what is known as an output-based aid (OBA) grant.169 OBA is a 
strategy for supporting the delivery of basic services that depend at least in part on public 
funding. In essence, disbursement of public funding (including proceeds of bank loans or 
grants) is tied to the delivery of specified outputs or services by private firms or NGOs. 
OBA approaches to providing public funds to support the delivery of basic services have 
been successfully implemented in a range of sectors (Brook and Smith 2001), but 
experiences of OBA schemes in the water sector were relatively nascent at the time the 
minister wanted to utilise them. 
Beyond interview discussions regarding the OBA scheme, the VMSB did not 
provide specific financial information regarding the exact amount of financial resources 
they were prepared to contribute. At the time when the interviews were conducted, the 
government had only recently introduced the idea of implementing OBA schemes across 
the country, both in order to reward utilities performing well, and, indirectly, to meet 
welfare objectives. Given that utility operators across the country were finding it difficult 
to generate the economic returns necessary to service some low-income areas, the Vice-
Ministry had high hopes for the success of the scheme and had plans to replicate the 
scheme for various other EPSAS. Unfortunately, the Vice-Ministry faced too much 
resistance from the public. By 2003, the Water Coordinator and NALs had grown quite 
powerful and these civil society leaders accused the government of trying to subsidise the 
private sector. Using figures based on global profits earned by AISA’s largest shareholder, 
Suez, these groups misguided residents into believing that AISA would be profiting from 
the OBA grant, whereas, in reality, those benefiting the most from the scheme would have 
been those neighbourhoods that remained outside the concession area. Without the exact 
financial details, it is difficult to explain exactly how the scheme would have affected each 
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individual household and what the OBA scheme might have achieved. However, the point 
here is that whatever relief the grant might have provided for users to move to formal 
network utility service provision, the notion that the government was seen to be 
subsidising the private sector prevented the scheme from taking off. The government 
contends that this type of barrier to reform is commonplace; on the face of it, PSP may 
provide greater opportunities for innovation and creativity in meeting social objectives, 
because it more efficiently frees up resources, but a lack of consumer trust limits the level 
of creativity. 
6.4 Section II: Distribution of Regulatory Rights 
6.4.1  Switching Costs, Games, and Regulatory Capture 
The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of 
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the third world.170 
People play “silly” games because they are not quite so smart as we typically 
assume in our analysis. The rules of the game… are all akin to equilibrium 
expectations; the product of long-term experience by a society of boundedly 
rational and retrospective individuals… The inertia we see in institutions 
mirrors the inertia we see in equilibrium expectations, and the ways of 
groping for more efficient institutions—gradual evolution of institutions, the 
adaption of institutions to sudden drastic changes in the environment, more 
conscious and purposeful breaking-out of well-known equilibrium patters and 
(perhaps) plunging into a period of disequilibrium, and everything between 
these—mirror similar sorts of changes to equilibrium expectations.171 
As mentioned above, it is convenient to think of legal frameworks affecting water 
provision as consisting of two distinct though inter-related components. One component is 
comprised of substantive laws—the institutional environment described in Chapter 5—
which express the values, rights, and vision of the water sector, including the obligations or 
responsibilities of citizens toward water consumption and conservation. The other 
component consists of processes for resolving disputes: the institutional arrangements 
through which stakeholders respond to one another, cooperate, bargain, and adjudicate. 
There is no doubt that Bolivian legislation and regulation relating to water services is 
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complex. At the time in which the concession model for La Paz/El Alto was agreed upon, 
much of the legal framework was outdated and new regulations for the sector were in their 
infancy. A great deal of weight therefore was placed upon the AISA concession contract. 
Equally, because of the nascent regulatory oversight of the sector,172 there were also some 
“moral codes”, or expected informal rules of engagement between the consortium of 
investors and utility operators, and the government. The following section uses findings 
from the La Paz/El Alto case to dissect issues of sequencing good governance, risk, and 
incentives. It demonstrates that many of the regulatory difficulties that arose during the 
seven years in which AISA serviced the adjacent cities were only marginally due to 
inadequacies in the design of the initial contract. Although certain aspects of the contract 
were in need of revision or renegotiation, the shifting regulatory and institutional 
dynamics, as well as the highly politicised games that were played between stakeholders 
(utility operators, regulatory authorities, line ministries, NALs, and other advocacy 
groups), failed to provide an incentive structure for cooperation, collaboration, and 
compromise. In other words, seemingly unjust and unfair management of the legal system 
may have corrupted moral sentiments on both sides, ultimately demoting what had been 
expected to be a long-term (possibly permanent) relationship between players into a finite, 
highly emotive, and extremely politicised environment where there was sure to be only one 
winner and one loser. Ultimately, in these circumstances a new contract, or a revision of 
the existing contract, would still not have resolved the conflict or restored trust between the 
various players involved.  
Although the GoB began taking steps in 1994 to create an independent water 
regulator through the SISAB, the specific powers and responsibilities of the regulator were 
not established until three years later, in 1997. The 1997 Regulations provided the SISAB 
with greater control over the water sector, by specifying that all entities (public or private) 
with the responsibility of water or sanitation service provision to the public needed to be 
granted a concession contract from the SISAB in order to provide services. Because the 
1997 Regulations did not define service level or quality requirements for the 
concessionaires, nor did they set coverage standards or tariffs, these obligations were 
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meant to be included in each individual concession contract and defined by other existing 
and future regulations. As explained in Chapter 4, the La Paz/El Alto concession contract 
was handed over to the SISAB and the Ministry of Basic Services after it had already been 
designed, negotiated, and agreed upon under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Capitalisation.173 It is important to note at this point that in no other country in Latin 
America are regulatory agencies responsible for granting concessions or licenses; the 
power is usually with municipalities. Whether the contract could have been better 
articulated to meet the demands of the sector had experts been involved from the 
Municipality or the Ministry of Basic Services (specifically the Water Directorate), was a 
major source of contention during the period of this research. The previous section would 
suggest that provisions to meet the needs of the most vulnerable consumers might actually 
have been met had better-informed government representatives been active in the early 
stages of the PPP process, but that the government preferred to utilise the technical 
knowhow of the transaction oriented Ministry of Capitalisation. However, this would be 
too easy an explanation for what happened. Regardless of who within government might 
have been better suited to negotiate the terms of the contract, every single member of 
government interviewed for this research believed that writing a “complete” concession 
contract, provisioning for every eventuality that could occur over a 25–40 year period, is 
simply an impossible task. 
An incomplete contract—one that purposely leaves out, or highlights, a number of 
key aspects to be resolved over time as new information becomes more available and as 
consumer preferences develop—is a much more realistic option for PSP. Regulation is a 
continuing task of contract monitoring, enforcement, and renegotiation (Armstrong, 
Cowan, and Vickers 1994), and the success of PPPs is dependent on the way in which 
regulatory institutions govern and manage those risks (undertaken by consumers as well as 
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service providers) in order to provide the right balance of incentives (Savedoff and Spiller 
1999). While the previous section of this chapter focused on the transaction costs 
stemming from institutional arrangements between government and consumers, the current 
section focuses on the types of transaction costs that emerged due to information and 
bargaining asymmetries, and from a misalignment of incentives and general sense of 
distrust that emerged between the GoB and AISA. These costs, which went beyond 
disputes over contract “compliance”, prevented stakeholders from adapting to 
demographic, social, political, and economic changes that occurred in the country, and this 
is where trust becomes a fundamental component to the sustainability of any PPP 
arrangement. What the case of LA Paz/El Alto demonstrates is a situation where agents’ 
beliefs with regard to how the “game” (of water and sanitation provision through a 
concession model) should be played were altered by a change in political environment. 
In classical game theory, agents have a set of choices, which are fixed a priori, but 
the approaches to these choices have multiple equilibria. In other words, an institution (in 
this case, the regulatory body, the SISAB) can be viewed as an equilibrium phenomenon 
and its actions can be seen as a shift from one equilibrium to another. How does this shift 
happen? In Nash Equilibrium, no rational agent will find it beneficial to change his or her 
strategy unilaterally, but if all possible actions are objectively known and fixed, some 
rational agents can perceive the possibility of a better equilibrium, either through deductive 
reasoning or by learning from “best practice” elsewhere, and thus become engaged in 
activity that makes its choice a focal point. Often such a rational role is expected from the 
government. The government (itself an agent) has its own incentives, but also limitations 
in cognition, reasoning, and persuasion (Aoki 2001). Consequently, it is unclear whether 
the government is capable of leading the coordination necessary to move from one 
equilibrium to another, or even willing to do so. The process of institutional change, 
therefore, could be conceived as one in which agents are induced to re-assess and revise 
their game models. 
However, a problem arises in that it is difficult to generate a new, shared belief 
system between the agents—and only through a shared belief system can equilibrium be 
restored. If institutions are nothing more than a set of laws and regulations, then they 
would be more malleable and could be changed by legislation or government decree, but if 
we conceive of institutions as a shared system of beliefs about how the game is being 
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repeatedly played, then they must be viewed as stable and durable with an unwavering set 
of values. Arrow (1974) explains that institutions have their own codes of communication, 
and that when an institution reflects particular values, those working within the institution 
and those who support it (various stakeholders) will adapt their own values to accord with 
those of the institution. This is an important theoretical insight, because in the case of 
Bolivia the SISAB was an institution created for the sole purpose of regulating 
concessions. Every water utility across the country was asked to create a concession 
contract with the SISAB in an attempt to instil a “commercial” commitment to treating 
water as an economic good, with the assumption that utilities would behave more 
efficiently as a result. The SISAB was built on a market-based philosophical mandate and 
a belief that these values would lead to improved access across the country; the La Paz/El 
Alto Concession was meant to mark the beginning of the proliferation of this value. It was 
going to prove to all the sceptics that a market-based approach to water was the best way 
forward. The values of the institution—of the SISAB—were therefore aligned with those 
of AISA, as they shared the same market-based philosophical belief system and approach 
to service delivery. These shared values would, at least in theory, make up for any gaps in 
the design of the original contract, because, ultimately, the SISAB would have to uphold 
the free-market rules of the game. 
As the political climate began to change, tensions began to rise between the Vice-
Ministry of Basic Services (the policy agents) and the SISAB (regulatory agents). At the 
heart of this was a disagreement over who in the government was really responsible for 
protecting its citizens. Jose Barragán, the Vice-Minister for Basic Services, felt that the 
SISAB “had stopped fulfilling that mandate.”174 Public choice theory reminds us that one 
of the root causes of regulatory failure is the capture of regulators by the industry being 
regulated; this happens when regulatory agents begin to identify with the interests of the 
regulated rather than the public they are ultimately meant to protect. This is not to say that 
regulatory agencies eventually become corrupt; rather, they are ultimately “captured” by 
the institutional values to which they are meant to adhere. Policy agents, in contrast, cannot 
be captured by their policies, because ultimately their institutional values are the 
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democratic “will of the people”, and when the will of the people changes so to will the 
policies of those institutions. However, in the case of regulatory agents (not only those that 
were supported in Bolivia, but those created around the world to regulate the “market” 
across almost all sectors of the economy), their institutional values do not waver in the face 
of public opinion. Also, individuals within an institution compete among themselves to 
accumulate assets and competences in a direction that enhances further the power and 
values of the institution. It is important not to forget that many former employees of 
SAMAPA transferred to the SISAB when it was created, including the Superintendent of 
the SISAB, Johnny Cuellar, who had been SAMAPA’s lead operations manager for at least 
a decade before the AISA takeover. In 2000, Cuellar was designated the role of 
Superintendent, and in 2001 he also decided to take on the role of General Director of 
ADERASA (Association of Water Regulatory Entities of the Americas), which involves 
facilitating collaboration around common initiatives in the field of regulation. 
ADERASA—or rather the values of ADERASA—are also shared with the World Bank’s 
PPIAF (Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility), which has allocated funding and 
promoted best practice and distance training for member regulatory agencies since 2003. 
 It was quite striking at first to discover how many residents believed that the only 
reason they had a regulatory agency was because without it they would not be able to 
attract foreign investment. Investors’ perceived credibility that regulations will bring about 
intended and agreed-upon outcomes, and the perceived commitment of government to 
adhere to current regulatory rules, is critical to the partnership. Within the post-concession 
environment, the regulator must not be seen to be reducing the prices and profits of 
privately regulated businesses opportunistically. If we look at trust in “exchange” terms, 
and as the currency of a system’s power (Parsons 1963), a high level of trust gives 
authorities the power to “invest in” new commitments, which further enhances public trust, 
whereas a low level of trust sets the stage for aggressive political protest and, if sufficiently 
widespread, political instability (Parsons 1963; Coleman 1993). Where trust is high, 
transaction partners will spend less time and resources on monitoring whether the other 
party is shirking or fulfilling the “spirit of the agreement”, and if the exchange partner is 
confident that the other party will not be opportunistic, both parties can devote fewer 
resources to monitoring. Trust may also reduce transaction costs by reducing the amount of 
time and resources that transacting parties spend on ex post bargaining and haggling over 
problems that arise in the execution of transacting. A high level of trust means that each 
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party will assume that the other is acting in good faith and will interpret behaviours more 
positively (Uzzi 1997). With mutual confidence that inequities will be fairly addressed and 
remedied, there are lower ex post costs. On the other hand, a lack of trust may cause 
transacting parties to suppress potentially relevant information that would be useful for 
resolving conflicts. 
As discussed above, the relationship between the regulatory and the regulated, 
whether formal (contractual) or informal (Arrow’s value-based codes of conduct), is 
vulnerable to post-contract opportunism on the part of either the firm or the regulator. 
There is a great deal of literature suggesting that when there is trust, requirements for 
enforcement and monitoring are reduced (Paldam and Svendsen 2004; Butter and Mosch 
2003), while, inversely, distrust means more enforcement and monitoring, and a greater 
likelihood of disputes, and these invariably lead to higher transaction costs. However, the 
unique factors in the water and sanitation sector need to be remembered: water and 
sewerage distribution networks continue to have natural monopoly characteristics due to 
economies of scale (because installing pipe networks in parallel is simply be too 
expensive) and scope (as co-ordination is cheaper within one organisation than in two 
organisations). Regardless of whether networks are publicly or privately operated, this 
simply reduces the possibility for competition, and in this type of uncompetitive 
environment a regulatory agent might be perceived not simply as an agency captured by 
shared values within the firm, but as captured by the firm itself. This hopefully lends 
insight into why policy agents were able increasingly to represent the “people” in the battle 
against AISA, while regulatory agents of the SISAB continued to defend AISA’s position. 
Ultimately, policy agents had the space to act against AISA and rally around populist 
opinion over what should be done to service certain disputed areas of El Alto, while 
regulatory agents did not have this luxury. For regulatory agents to act in this way would 
have altered the rules of the game between the regulator and the regulated such that neither 
player (neither AISA nor the SISAB) would have been able to play cooperatively in the 
future; breaking trust between the pro-market regulatory institution and the firm could 
have spiralled into institutional instability for all other pro-market regulatory agencies 
across other sectors, as the system of predicted and normative beliefs that had guided both 
agents until then would have ended. 
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6.4.2  Disputes Over Coverage Area 
Without water there is no life, so really it is life that the company is depriving 
the people of in El Alto… Aguas de Illimani committed to cover all of the city 
of El Alto and they haven't done it.175 
You can't assign the company with obligations that are outside the 
contract.176 
The AISA concession contract explicitly defined the geographic area that the utility 
operator was obligated to serve and the expansion agreements for the first ten years were 
agreed upon amicably and early on in the PPP process. During the first five years, AISA 
made 52,000 water connections in El Alto and asserted that by doing so it had reached its 
target of 100 per cent coverage. As explained in Chapter 3, AISA’s original projections 
were set at connections to 72,000 households. According to the SISAB, however, there 
was an unexpected slowdown of El Alto’s population growth between 1999 and 2001, and 
so the government, together with AISA, modified this particular target.177 Modifying the 
target did not require any formal renegotiation of the contract. 
During the first five years of AISA’s operation—which was before the 
Cochabamaba water conflicts began—the relationship between AISA and the government 
“was more professional and less political”178 and therefore allowed for greater reciprocity 
based on trust and cooperation. In terms of sewerage connections, AISA had performed 
above what had been contractually required: it was ten years ahead of schedule, having 
reached 35,945 sewerage connections by August 2001. This translated into 54 per cent 
coverage, when the target had been 41 per cent coverage. 
Attaining 100 per cent water coverage should not be interpreted literally. Due to a 
number of technicalities, including some disagreement as to the geographic concession 
coverage boundaries, how the area is defined, and what is meant by a “connection,” slight 
                                                
 
175 Interview with Julian Perez, an advisor to the Federation of El Alto Neighbourhoods, 3 October 2003. 
176 Interview with Alberto Chávez Vargas, AISA Director of Operations, 14 October 2003. 
177 An audit of AISA conducted by Pozo and Associates in May 2006 (see audit summary, Appendix D) found no 
evidence to support this demographic slowdown. By their calculations, AISA should have been fined USD 949,400 
(USD 189.88 x USD 500).  
178 Interview with Alberto Chávez Vargas, AISA Director of Operations, 14 October 2003. 
222 
 
 
tensions began to emerge among neighbourhood associations as to AISA’s claims and the 
perception that the SISAB was lending full support to the company. The first tariff 
adjustment, meanwhile, was due in late 2001. AISA agreed to make an additional 15,000 
new water connections in a specific area just outside the originally-defined service area as 
detailed in the contract, to make up for not having had to make as many connections as 
expected during the first five years. In line with the contract, the company would have to 
continue making connections to households based on population growth, which was 
estimated to amount to another 21,000 households. In terms of sewerage, the company was 
ahead of schedule, and, therefore, there was nothing contractually that the SISAB could do 
to require additional expansion. However, perhaps because AISA feared public pressure, it 
agreed to make 13,800 new sewerage connections, increasing its coverage from 54 per cent 
to 56 per cent by 2006.179 
AISA and the SISAB agreed that a 12.5 per cent increase in revenues was needed 
to meet these targets, but they did not agree as to how the company would go about 
increasing revenues. AISA claimed that tariffs needed to be increased in order to meet 
further expansion targets, but there was already increasing pressure on government from 
industrial consumers who felt that their tariffs were unfairly high. By the end of 2001, the 
SISAB had to make a decision on tariffs to be maintained for the following five years. 
Rather than increase the tariff for water (there was still no tariff for sewerage), the 
government decided to increase water connection fees from USD 189 and USD 240 for 
water and sewerage, respectively. The SISAB also made some changes in calculating 
depreciation, allowing some of the utility’s assets to be depreciated over 40 years rather 
than 30 years. Overall, this represented 7.5 per cent of the 12.5 per cent increase in 
revenues that AISA required to make the expansion possible. A year later, in July 2002, 
through negotiations with the World Bank and the government an agreement was made to 
exchange some of AISA’s debt with World Bank and additional international funding. This 
resolved the pending 5 per cent in revenues. 
When interviews were first carried out with staff at the Vice-Ministry for Basic 
Services, the government generally showed its support for AISA. Toward the end of 2003, 
                                                
 
179 AISA figures, 2002. 
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however, as tensions mounted over the concession, Jose Barragán, the Vice-Minister of 
Basic Services, began to change his stance toward AISA. After a number of meetings with 
community groups, Barragán made a public announcement in which he stated that “The 
[AISA] contract is unacceptable. It leaves 200,000 people without water. If the company is 
willing to expand service to 200,000 people then we can talk about it. If Aguas de Ilimani 
is not prepared to solve the problem, I'll join with the people in El Alto and demand that 
the company leave.” 
6.4.3  Conclusions: Enabling and Disabling Institutional Arrangements 
There are four main conclusions from this chapter. The first is that we must call into 
question the implicit assumption that government always acts in the interest of low-income 
consumers, as informational problems may: (i) cause regulators unwittingly to implement 
regulations that are not in the best interest of low-income households; (ii) prevent 
government from including certain pro-poor measures in the initial design of a PPP 
contract; and/or (iii) limit the freedom to take appropriate regulatory actions when 
necessary. In the Principal-Agent (P-A) literature, regulation tends to be viewed as a game 
between various players with different degrees of recourse. In the normative context, the 
government is generally viewed as a single entity with a set of policy tools and a perfect 
ability to use these tools for the sake of maximising social welfare (Laffont and Martimort 
2001). While this simplified model of one agent and one principal may work in theoretical 
discussion, in practice we find that the internal organisation of a government consists of a 
multitude of players with many different interests (some hidden, some explicit), as well as 
highly politicised, hierarchical power relationships that are often non-linear. In practice, 
there is rarely such a thing as a single welfare-optimising government entity, because that 
would presuppose that there is a single welfare-optimising vision of a government made up 
of several layers of micro-social welfare optimising agents: some elected and some 
politically appointed, and some responsible for setting policy, others for regulating it, and 
still others to implement the governing equation (usually, the face of government with 
respect to the people). 
The second conclusion relates to the cost of setting up institutional arrangements 
that better reflect or support both the formal and the informal institutional environment. 
Government and international investors must face up to the realisation that information 
transfer is critical for building support around new sector-specific institutional 
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arrangements at the local level; particularly when these arrangements embrace a new type 
of ideology. In other words, each sector (whether it be water, telecoms, mining, gas, or 
transport) carries with it a unique long history, and attached to this history is a value 
system created by its members. The costs caused by conflicting values over water as a 
commodity might have been reduced if more attention had been given at the onset of 
reform to the powerful energy generated in ideological conflict. A conflict over price can 
more easily be resolved than a conflict over ideology. The less importance a government or 
a firm gives to resolving the root causes of an ideological conflict, the wider the gap 
becomes between value systems. The wider the gap, the less information transfer occurs, 
and the less information transfer occurs, the greater chance that either side in the conflict 
might be manipulated by exogenous forces. 
In the current case study, many low-income residents were ideologically opposed to 
the notion of water being turned into profits for a French multinational and were 
disillusioned by a government seemingly ill-equipped to rally its citizens around market-
driven policies. They were therefore prepared to risk going back to poor quality water 
provision for the sake of ideology. It is certainly beyond the scope of this study to ascertain 
whether local political opposition groups manipulated all the interviewed respondents, but 
the ease with which political opposition groups were able to exploit this ideological 
conflict in the pursuit of power is certain. Governments around the world should learn 
from the mistakes of the Government of Bolivia. The pursuit of welfare maximisation, by 
definition, always begins with the best of intentions, but there needs to be greater public 
buy-in around policy-shifts; people cannot be patronised into believing that something is in 
their best interest when they do not understand why it is in their best interest. Herein lies 
the time-cost factor: it takes time to build consensus, time to adjust, and time to build trust, 
and time costs must be factored into the process of reform, particularly where private 
sector, profit-driven welfare maximisation principals are at the heart of reform efforts. 
The third conclusion relates to the cost of understanding consumer preferences, 
cultural nuances, and constraints to the usage of the product being sold. In Chapter 8, some 
of the lessons observed in this case with regard to the mismatch between supply and 
demand will be applied to other sectors. Whatever the sector, it is critical that this 
mismatch is resolved through more investment in demand research and more research on 
alternative arrangements or innovations. This should occur not only in relation to the 
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product or technology on offer, but also in terms of billing and collection channels, and 
whether consumers have the financial capacity to deal with the shocks that come with any 
type of reform. As policy-makers reach out to better understand the needs and preferences 
of low-income populations, they inadvertently help to establish trust with the community 
and are inadvertently more prepared to engage with foreign investors eager to engage in 
their country. This also creates greater faith in the democratic process and system. 
Decentralisation is critical for making this possible, but it has to be real devolution of 
power. It is worth recalling a statement made by the head of infrastructure planning for the 
city of El Alto, housed within the Mayor’s office. He asked if a copy of the AISA contract 
could be given to him “because none of the city officials in the Mayor’s office of El Alto 
had ever been privy to it.” This false pretence of decentralisation is ineffective for 
incentivising democratic participation. 
In theory, PSP in the water sector is meant to allow consumers greater control over 
the quality of service they receive from their providers. It is meant to create a greater sense 
of customer self-determination in a sector historically immune to a culture of 
accountability. Perhaps, had civil society really understood and/or appreciated the benefits 
that potentially come from the commodification of water service provision, these different 
forms of modernity could have complemented one another. If we follow the line of thought 
of a modern property rights perspective, the rights that consumers acquired in the case of 
the La Paz/El Alto concession provided consumers—especially low-income consumers—
with the capability to utilise property rights (in this case in the form of consumer rights) for 
the first time. The surveys and interviews conducted in this research project further show 
that the formalisation of water service provision through PSP also provided an enabling 
environment in which a new sense of consumer identity could emerge among a population 
(the vast majority of households living in La Paz/El Alto) long deprived of consumer 
rights. However, the consumers were not really given freedom of choice. Can consumers 
be free ‘inside’ market structures, especially ones that are not even really competitive? 
What role do market processes play in constraining or enabling consumer freedom? And 
what type of protection from shock does this freedom afford? 
This brings us to a final thought. There is no question that developing a private 
infrastructure project is a complex task. It not only requires firms and governments to 
conduct due diligence, prepare proposals, undertake marketing, conduct bidding processes, 
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negotiate deals, and find sources of funding; it also requires firms, governments, and 
consumers to agree to function within a regulatory system that is constantly evolving and 
in which new tools (regulatory incentives/disincentives, social programmes, and financial 
incentives) might be introduced (at any time) in order to assist with the functioning and 
sustainability of the relationship between consumers, government, and the private sector. 
This is not to say that firms and consumers have to commit to working within a 
dysfunctional regulatory system. What it does mean, though, is that in the real world, a 
regulatory system must contain the flexibility to adjust to the changing demands of the 
sector and its consumers, especially in cases where the needs and preferences of consumers 
are not well known at the onset of reform. If given this flexibility, regulatory agents can act 
on new information that becomes available to them over time and take actions—that is, 
make use of new tools or incentives—when necessary. However, the question of 
regulatory capture is a significant one. While the actions taken by the regulator may be 
justified from the perspective of an outsider (as far as simple gaming logic would suggest), 
the question of public choice is a serious one and needs to be addressed across all sectors, 
particularly where there is a lack of competition. 
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Chapter 7.  [External] Institutional Environment: Understanding the 
Systemic Constraints to PSP in the Water Sector 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the third and final research question outlined in the dissertation--
whether there were any additional factors, not considered within the specific literature on 
water sector from involving PSP that may have contributed to the tensions and challenges 
of reform. Arguments will be presented to support the idea that systemic barriers, beyond 
the control of stakeholders involved, constrained the space for partnership innovation and 
flexibility during the process of reform. These systemic barriers made it extremely 
challenging to align incentives between the various players involved in the process of 
reform. There is a great deal to be learned for policy makers, private investors, 
development practitioners, civil society organisations and consumers by incorporating a 
wider analysis of systemic constraints to Public-Private-Partnerships. 
7.2 Limitations on Financial Flows 
7.2.1  Macro-economic Considerations and Capital Market Constraints 
It is a basic tenet of accounting that investors, not customers, fund capital 
projects. The risk-takers then recover their outlay, with profit, when the 
project produces a product for sale. This is the heart, soul and justification of 
the system called 'capitalism'. That's the theory. But when a monopoly 
operator gets its fist around a city's water spigots, it can pump the funds for 
capital projects from captive customers rather than shareholders.180 
Two things went very wrong for Bolivia in the 1980s. At the time, the reigning economic 
model across Latin America was import substitution, which meant a very insular type of 
economy with high tariff walls and a lot of protection. The government was keen to 
industrialise in this environment, and while this was not a mistaken policy per se, it was 
combined with a great deal of growth generated by petrodollars, the boom created by all 
the money circulating around the world due to the big increase in petroleum prices. During 
the late 1970s banks had begun lending a great deal of money to Bolivia for its 
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industrialisation initiatives; this had been under the assumption that “countries do not go 
broke”, and this paradigm ultimately led bankers to make a series of unwise lending 
decisions. Eventually, Bolivia could not meet its large debt repayments, and the money 
invested in Bolivia by foreign banks stopped being rolled over. Although the government 
of Bolivia (GoB) did not allow the country to go bankrupt, it simply stopped paying its 
loans back. The GoB, like many other Latin American countries, had simply borrowed too 
much, and given its inflexible economy at the time (e.g. exchange rates were fixed), once 
inflation began it became very attractive to import and very difficult to export. As the debt 
crisis continued, the government was unwilling to cut back its fiscal policies, and so 
invariably the country ended up with no credit rating, no capacity to borrow, and unable to 
control escalating inflation. Then, in the early 1980s, Bolivia was hit by another shock 
caused by the severe drop in the price of raw materials and commodities. 
A poor macroeconomic climate, unclear positions on regional investment rules, the 
lack of a new national investment code, and an unfavourable history of relations with the 
foreign private sector all resulted in overseas investment in Bolivia averaging a mere USD 
11 million from 1983–1987. The only significant inflows into the economy during the 
1980s were from international sources such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the IDB, 
whose balance of payments support propped up the economy. Latin America’s so-called 
“lost decade” of the 1980s translated into inflation of over 25,000 per cent for Bolivia in 
1985 (Sachs 2002), and this inflationary period had major implications across every sector 
of society. Due to the continuous depreciation of its tax base, government spending was 
especially affected: the government was able to collect only 7 per cent of its needs through 
taxes, and there was no capacity to borrow. On a day-to-day basis, this translated into a 
culture of survival through speculation and corruption. In order to make money, people 
would buy products at the official price and sell at the black-market rate; people would 
stand in line to buy just about anything, because whatever could be bought could then be 
sold on for more money a few days later. This resulted in a widespread scarcity of goods. 
Further, because the foreign exchange rates were fixed, the government would sell dollars 
to the importers at a subsidised price, and the importers would then resell the dollars to 
suppliers (who were often not supplying what they were actually receiving payment for) on 
the black market. This led to an immense amount of corruption, social unrest, political 
instability, and ultimately the institutional breakdown of the Bolivian government. 
Meanwhile, anyone with a fixed salary—such as public servants and teachers, etc.—grew 
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increasingly impoverished with each passing day. The poor became poorer, losing most of 
their savings, and the middle class was squeezed, while the rich (equipped with the skills 
and means to hedge their bets by buying dollars) became richer, ultimately widening 
inequality across the country. 
This is relevant to the water sector as a Public-Private-Partnership (PPP). The 
literature on Public-Private-Partnerships (PPP) identifies the preconditions for successful 
infrastructure projects and areas of risk, particularly institutional and political risks that 
lead to currency devaluation. It is difficult to determine how ideal conditions and ideal 
contractors can be guaranteed unless there is a clear understanding of each stakeholder’s 
vulnerability and of their short, medium, and long-term interests. It is no secret that in 
order to attract international investment finance PPPs have to meet the requirements of 
investors, who are reluctant to accept currency risk, and it is therefore critical to consider 
thoroughly the macro-economic history and volatility of a country when structuring PPPs 
in the water sector. Given Bolivia’s hyperinflationary period, it should come as no surprise 
that Aguas de Illimani’s (AISA) international investors wanted to limit their exposure to 
currency risk by indexing tariffs to the value of US dollar; this would preserve the real 
value of profits generated by local operations and of payments in hard currency to 
subcontracted subsidiaries. There has been much criticism that the La Paz/El Alto 
concession contract specified this provision without sufficiently explaining why. Critics 
complained that indexing tariffs to the dollar shifted too much of the currency risk onto 
(already vulnerable) consumers (Hall 2002; Laurie 2005), placing the blame on “risk 
averse, greedy corporations” rather than on the government. However, they did not offer 
any alternative solution as to how to remedy what is effectively a macro-economic 
systemic constraint on PSP in the sector. 
The reality is that even stronger economies supporting concession arrangements are 
at risk of currency devaluation. For example, the original concession agreement for the city 
of Manila partially relieved consumers from currency risk by providing concessionaires to 
recover additional costs incurred in the previous operating year as a result of currency 
devaluation, with interest and in instalments (Esguerra 2002). Following the Asian crisis in 
July 1997, the Philippine Peso (PHP) devaluated from PHP 26.00 = USD 1.00 in 
December 1996 to PHP 50.00 = USD 1.00 by the end of 2000. The concession agreement 
was renegotiated in October 2001 and the Foreign Currency Differential Adjustment 
230 
 
 
(FCDA) was introduced as a mechanism to allow operators to pass on all the costs of 
currency devaluation to consumers automatically and on a quarterly basis (Esguerra 2002). 
Of course, international private water companies also have a commitment to their 
shareholders to protect the commercial returns of their project, but the reality is that even 
the most detailed contracts cannot necessarily be designed to protect companies 
sufficiently from the burden of currency risk. When, for example, the Argentine economy 
collapsed in 2001, the water utility operating in Buenos Aires, which was also structured as 
a PPP concession, took a major hit because it had not negotiated enough protection for 
itself. Ultimately, the utility was forced to default on an interest payment to the Inter-
American Development Bank (for a USD 140m water sector loan) and this action resulted 
in the US rating agency, Standard & Poors, downgrading Aguas Argentinas’ credit rating 
from “CC” to “D” (S&P 2002). Presumably, shareholders would have been very angry at 
this outcome, which resulted in resistance to future investment proposals planned for the 
city. A lower credit rating also translates into more expensive future credit for the 
company, even if loans become available to finance future network investments. 
Although the principle for distributing risks is widely accepted, the determination 
of what risks can or cannot be meaningfully controlled by the concessionaire can give rise 
to intensive negotiation followed by often unsuccessful and bitter renegotiations. The good 
faith approach (Miller 1992 and Miller and Whitford 2002) assumes that PSP will tend to 
result in a combination of lower costs and less risk for the public sector, but stresses that in 
a true joint venture all risks, costs, and payments must be shared proportionately. 
According to Klein and Roger (1998), risks that the concessionaire can control less 
effectively than its customers should not generally be shifted to the concessionaire. Still, it 
also seems unfair that consumers should have to bear the brunt of the risk in currency 
devaluation. Shifting risks to consumers that the concessionaire cannot control does not 
increase their net costs and this helps to reduce the likelihood of contract renegotiation 
(Hukka and Katko 2003). Still, the point remains that despite provisions made in 
concession contracts and/or other institutional arrangements designed to protect investors 
and consumers, complete protection against currency risk in PSP arrangements involving 
foreign investment remains unattainable. 
Although most of the consumers interviewed for this research did not say 
specifically that Bolivia’s local currency devaluation affected their ability to pay, the 
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steady depreciation of the boliviano against the dollar did mean that the amount in 
bolivianos people paid for water rose by about 33 per cent over the five-year period of the 
PPP concession. One must appreciate that from the perspective of consumers, especially 
low-income consumers who in some cases had only recently adapted to the practice of 
interpreting billing statements and functioning within the more formalised utility provision 
framework, it can be quite difficult to distinguish between an increase in price due to 
currency devaluation and an increase in price due to a tariff rise. For these users, who do 
not necessarily understand why prices have increased, such increases still translate into an 
unexpectedly higher expense for their water and sanitation services. In some cases it can 
also translate into users feeling that they have been tricked by their government and robbed 
by their service providers. It is of course important to keep in mind that the vast majority 
of consumers interviewed did not say that their services were too expensive to afford, but 
rather that they were more expensive than before and more expensive than they assumed 
they would be. Nonetheless, for local anti-privatisation interest groups, bent on 
propagating the idea that private utilities engage in exploitative practices, any confusion or 
frustration over price increases was used to manipulate consumers into thinking that water 
companies had reneged on promises of keeping tariffs constant. 
It is important to remember that the stability of a county’s macro-economic 
environment and the extent to which its domestic capital market and borrowing capacity 
are developed directly impact the way in which PPP arrangements in the water sector can 
be structured and risk be reduced. In most developing countries, there is virtually no ability 
to raise long-term debt and equity on the scale required to finance infrastructure projects, 
because domestic markets tend to be too immature. The average term available in most 
countries is less than seven years, and often not at competitive rates. Local capital markets 
usually lack mechanisms to enhance the conditions of finance, especially for small and 
medium size cities, and most institutional investors lack the regulatory flexibility and the 
long-term investment horizon required for the financing of local infrastructure projects. 
For Bolivia, developing its domestic capital market will take quite some time, even though 
securities have been trading since the Bolsa Boliviana de Valores S.A. was established in 
1989. The Securities Law (Law 1834, 1998) laid the groundwork for creating a truly 
modern securities exchange, but social unrest and economic disruptions have slowed its 
development (US State Dept. 2005). Nonetheless, over the last few years several Bolivian 
companies and some foreign firms have been able to leverage funding through local capital 
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markets. Bolivian accounting and reporting procedures do not fully conform to world 
standards and Bolivian firms commonly maintain several sets of books: one for tax 
authorities, one for bankers, and another for management.181  Even so, the Securities Law 
of 1998 provides a sound institutional basis for the development of a capital market. 
Capital markets broaden the spectrum of risks available to investors, and thereby make 
savings and investment more attractive (Marathe, Noel and Sirtaine 2004). This could have 
a potentially powerful impact on the financing of water sector investments in the future: 
capital markets can accommodate the wide array of risks encountered in the sector, 
including equity risk in sovereign and sub-sovereign private sector finance, public debt, 
and structured debt finance for sovereign and sub-sovereign infrastructure program 
finance. The roles of infrastructure private equity funds, bond underwriters, and credit 
rating agencies are critical factors here. Capital markets could potentially also provide risk 
mitigation products to facilitate PSP by providing cover for sovereign and sub-sovereign 
policy risks, including political risk, convertibility risk, transfer risk, and sub-sovereign 
breach of contract risk. 
Integrating capital market constraints into the wider discussion of water sector 
reform is of critical importance for analysing the possibilities for future growth in the 
water sector. Tailor-made approaches involving innovative financial instruments to fit the 
local contextual environment may trigger dramatic institutional change at the local level, 
which invariably may also help to spur municipal capacity for planning water sector 
initiatives. According to the literature, governments can complement capital market 
development with municipal capacity building and institutional strengthening by: (i) 
improving information systems, accounting and budgeting procedures, and/or legislation; 
(ii) introducing bankruptcy legislation; (iii) allowing municipalities greater control of their 
own sources of revenue/taxes; (iv) improving the predictability of intergovernmental 
transfers so that municipalities can plan strategically for investments whilst also giving 
assurances that transfers will match clearly specified objectives; and (v) making a clear 
separation of fiscal and financial systems (Barbery, Inel, and Noel 1998; Marathe, Noel et 
al 2004). These development programmes may help to pave the way for municipalities to 
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raise local resources and to access domestic financial markets, which will in turn 
strengthen the institutional framework for PSP in the water sector and enable more 
innovative institutional arrangements between local, regional, and global partners for 
development. 
In order to address some of the aforementioned capital market constraints to 
borrowing, in January 2000 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) decided to experiment for the first time with an investment in a water project that 
would shift currency risk away from local consumers/taxpayers. They did this by issuing 
their first local currency loan, equivalent to €21m, to a municipally-owned Polish water 
company, MWiK (Bydgoszcz) (Lobina 2000). By lending in local currency, the EBRD 
was able not only to avoid the foreign exchange risk, but also to improve the credit-
worthiness of a project that generated solely local currency income. This invariably 
improved the possibility of future borrowing for further investment and development. 
There are, of course, barriers to local currency lending,182 and only certain institutions, 
such as the EBRD, are ultimately willing to assume the risk. Also, many countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe, where EBRD is active, meet the criteria for local currency 
lending. Lower-income countries such as Bolivia, where local currency lending is most 
needed to finance the water sector, are still struggling to develop an adequate market 
infrastructure, especially in relation to a local institutional investor base and credit culture. 
It remains that for these countries, such systemic barriers need to be fully understood and 
addressed as a part of larger efforts to reform the water sector. 
7.2.2  Legal and Regulatory Borrowing Constraints for Municipalities and 
Municipally-Owned Water Companies 
In order to meet IFM guidelines (including the HIPC requirements) 183 and 
recommendations for achieving macroeconomic stability, the government of Bolivia put in 
place many restrictions on municipal borrowing. In 2006, neither debt service nor debt 
                                                
 
182 Barriers include: (i) factors in a country’s existing exchange rate policy, including the surrender of independent 
national monetary and exchange rate policies, the adoption of a currency board, or macroeconomic instability; (ii) poorly 
regulated and/or capitalised banking systems; (iii) a lack of credible market indices and liquidity money markets; (iv) 
high domestic interest rates; and (iv) an inadequate market infrastructure (EBRD 2008). 
183 HIPC, or the Highly Indebted Poor Countries program. 
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stock could exceed 20 per cent of current revenues. However, the legal framework for sub-
national/municipal borrowing did provide for diverse and innovative financial instruments, 
for which municipalities were free to solicit from any financial entity, either public or 
private. Municipalities were, and continue to be, allowed to create “sinking funds”, for 
example dedicated to the repayment of specific loans/bonds. There are also clear 
procedures for the collateralisation of a variety of assets and revenue streams, such as tax 
and non-tax income, physical assets, and capital investments. Local governments can also 
formally guarantee credit for municipal enterprises through the use of promissory notes, 
transfers from the central government, and physical assets. It is unclear, though, whether 
these guarantees are counted as part of the municipal debt, and this ultimately leads to 
difficulty in pricing municipal credit. 
The regulatory framework remains inconsistent when it comes to municipal 
borrowing restrictions. In particular, the Organic Municipal Law requiring prior 
authorisation for indebtedness, and Law 1654, which gives authorisation rights to Regional 
governors (the Norms of Decentralisation), do not concur either with the Norm on Public 
Credit, which details the certification process for municipal debt, or with norms outlined 
by the Ministry of Finance (in Law 1178) which regulate borrowing through the central 
government184 and which stipulate debt service ratios of 20 per cent and debt stock ratios 
of 200 per cent. Also, in addition to the existing limits on debt service and debt stock, the 
IMF implemented consolidated annual debt ceilings both for municipalities and regions—
regions are allowed to borrow only on a short-term basis and exclusively from the central 
government. Interviews with central and local government officials confirm the growing 
demand for municipal credit. Even though the law allows for municipalities and municipal 
companies such as water and sanitation utilities (or EPSAS, as they are referred to in 
Bolivia185) to borrow from commercial banks, contractors, and suppliers, the reality is that 
municipalities are almost entirely dependent on the financial intermediary, FNDR (the 
National Fund for Regional Development), controlled by the Ministry of the President. 
Since 1987, short-, medium-, and long-term financing for municipalities has been provided 
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almost exclusively by FNDR, which monopolises over 90 per cent of the total market share 
for sub-national entities. FNDR is also responsible for the allocation of external grants and 
transfers from the central government and for offers of technical assistance to 
municipalities in the preparation of project proposals. 
Bolivia’s banking system is still too underdeveloped to offer adequate long-term 
funds to municipalities, although financial regulations (Law 1178) allow for municipalities 
to apply for commercial bank financing and to pledge future transfers from the central 
government as guarantees. Unfortunately, however, despite the progressive 
decentralisation reforms, almost all central government transfers are already earmarked for 
specific purposes and therefore cannot be effectively used as collateral. Municipalities are 
legally allowed to pledge municipal physical assets as guarantees (for example, water 
treatment plants and/or other potential water utility property and machinery), but in 
practice these assets are typically not considered by the Superintendency of Banks to serve 
as a real guarantee. According to staff at the Superintendency of Banks, this is partly due 
to the fact that Bolivia’s judicial system is extremely weak and bureaucratic: in the case of 
default it is estimated to take at least six years for a commercial bank to collect its assets, 
and there is little confidence that the law protecting the lender will ever be enforced. 
Information pertaining to municipal revenues, expenditures, indebtedness, and the 
programming and execution of municipal investments is quite inconsistent among 
government agencies.186 Despite the Government of Bolivia (GoB) claiming to have made 
advances there is no standard for tracking the flow of information between the Vice-
Ministry of Popular Participation and Municipal Development and the Vice-Ministry of 
Basic Services. Neither the Central Bank, the Superintendency of Finance, nor the FNDR 
have an information system in place to share this crucial data between agencies, and this 
does nothing to strengthen the creditworthiness of municipalities. Meanwhile, all grants 
obtained from international financial institutions and multilateral/bilateral donors that are 
allocated to local governments, EPSAS, and other municipal companies are channelled 
                                                
 
186 The FNDR’s estimates are different from those provided by the municipality of La Paz and El Alto, and from those 
provided by the Superintendency of Finance. 
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through the FNDR or through three other centrally controlled funds.187 Criteria for the 
allocation of these grants vary greatly and there is no ranking of individual investment 
projects. As a result, local governments and EPSAS face considerable uncertainties in 
planning their investment programs and in designing financing plans to undertake them. 
Lastly, many consider the FNDR to be a highly politicised institution rather than a strictly 
commercial financial intermediary. This is mainly because the Fund is overseen directly by 
the Ministry of the President rather than the Ministry of Finance, where it would be 
perhaps more appropriately placed. 
We know that compared to other public services, water supply and sanitation 
systems are exceptionally capital-intensive, due to the high costs of maintenance and utility 
network expansion. While borrowing through central government and/or public financial 
intermediaries (like FNDR or any other centrally controlled regional/municipal 
development fund) might provide cities with much-needed long term finance at somewhat 
attractive rates, the case of Bolivia demonstrates that credit for certain locations may be 
politically driven and/or inefficiently allocated. The case is not dissimilar from that of 
many other developing country contexts: municipalities across the globe face considerable 
uncertainties in planning their investment programs for water and sanitation services and in 
designing financing plans with which to undertake them. The time it actually takes to 
receive grants and other central government transfers and the lack of transparency in the 
allocation of these funds severely hamper the development of a municipal credit market to 
support water infrastructure needs. Centrally controlled regional/municipal development 
funds such as the FNDR exist across the developing world, and although most were 
originally designed to act as transitional institutions geared toward strengthening municipal 
credit markets, these funds as yet have not evolved into market-oriented suppliers of credit. 
Instead, they continue to exist as monopolistic public institutions, crowding out potential 
private sector lenders and investors that might otherwise be interested in the sub-national 
infrastructure market. The consequence of this is a systemic constraint on water sector 
reform and the commercialisation of water utilities. 
                                                
 
187 Fondo de desarollo Campesino, Financiera de Desarollo Santa Cruz and Naciona Financiera Boliviana. 
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Under the public finance model, local governments borrow on their own account 
through loans or bond issues, but their borrowings are counted against general government 
debt, inevitably constraining central government borrowing capacity. Given that the 
benefit from infrastructure investment can span several decades there is a strong argument 
to be made that future generations should participate in its financing, but increasing taxes 
at the local level is simply not always politically achievable. In order for municipalities to 
access long-term finance, the obvious course of action is to access innovative financial 
instruments to tap into domestic and international capital markets directly.188 As is the case 
in many developed countries, capital markets can play a critical role in mobilising 
resources for infrastructure finance in water and sanitation, in allocating resources among 
infrastructure finance programs and projects, and in mitigating the risks of any private 
participation (domestic private investment and/or international private investment). 
However, as noted above, most cities in the developing world context are not yet equipped 
to use debt instruments to finance their investment needs on their own. Although capital 
market tools could and need to be adapted to meet the financial demands of municipal 
investment, building an open, diversified, and competitive sub-national credit market in 
any developing country involves a variety of risks that, once again, depend on a country’s 
unique fiscal framework for decentralisation, and on legal and regulatory frameworks for 
municipal borrowing. The limitations to the public finance model outlined above are 
certainly not unique to Bolivia, but the case-study helps to demonstrate with more 
specificity how systemic financial barriers, external to water sector norms and regulations, 
affect the ability for municipalities to invest in upgrading their water and sanitation 
services. 
In addition to these financial, legal, and regulatory challenges to municipal 
borrowing, and to the lack of capital market options, the biggest challenge under the public 
finance model remains a political problem that is shared globally. There are 30 countries 
across the developing world, hosting 90 per cent of the 1.1 billion people who lack access 
                                                
 
188 Debt finance is often more attractive than equity finance, not only because the costs of raising the funds (for 
example arrangement fees with a bank or the issue costs of a bond) are lower, but because the annual return required to 
attract investors is less than is the case for equity. 
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to clean water. According to a WHO/UNICEF report released in 2000, only two out of 
these thirty countries prioritised and budgeted for water and sanitation within their poverty 
reduction strategy programs (PRSP). This is an indication of two correlating problems: (i) 
the lack of political will at the central government level to prioritise water and sanitation 
over other sectors, as the water and sanitation sector does not demonstrate immediate 
productivity gains for the economy; and (ii) that governments find it simply too expensive 
to make the substantial improvements necessary without borrowing significantly, and so 
they opt instead to focus on other sectors. This translates into developing countries 
spending (on average) less than 0.25 per cent of their income (in percentage of total 
income) on water supply and sanitation. There are three main financial flows available to 
the global water sector, but direct public sector funding accounts for between 70–75 per 
cent of total water provision investment (Annamraju et al 2001). Given the minimal 
prioritisation of the sector by governments, it should seem obvious that municipalities, and 
municipally-owned water companies, must look to other sources of finance to meet the 
growing demands the sector requires. 
7.3 Systemic Constraints ODA Investment Flows 
An often premature or simply unrealistic belief is that any business must be 
good business and that the private sector has unlimited funds189 
One of the most important ways in which MFIs [multilateral finance 
institutions] can increase funding for water is through the much greater use 
of their guarantee programmes to leverage other kinds of finance190 
There are three main categories of water financing flows: long-term flows, based on end 
payers (water users, tax payers) and capital market access (bonds); medium-term flows, 
based on transfers (ODA, donors); and short-term flows, from cash facilities (public 
banks/intermediaries, private banks, private investors, and also donors). The largest 
financial flow comes from the first category: long-term financial flows delivered via the 
utility, paid for by water consumers through tariffs, and via the government budget through 
                                                
 
189 J.F. Talbot, the chief executive of SAUR International (the fourth largest water company in the world), rejecting the 
assumption that privatisation would automatically tap into private funds or have the financial capacity to deliver the 
required investment (Talbot 2002). 
190 Camdessus (2003: 26). 
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direct budget allocations and subsidies, paid for by taxpayers. The second-largest financial 
flow to the water sector comes from the private sector, which accounts for 20–25 per cent 
of total investment (Berg and Holt 2002). 191 From 1990–2000, private foreign and local 
investment amounted to only USD 36 billion for the global water sector (World Bank 
2002), and most of this investment was not channelled to the lowest income countries. This 
is very low when compared to other sectors, such as telecommunication and electricity, in 
which USD 292 and USD 197 billion respectively were invested during the same period 
(Gray 2001). Given that the cost-benefit ratio of water and sanitation investments is high 
when all benefits are included, standing at around between USD 5 and USD 11 economic 
benefit per USD 1 invested (Schouten and Schwartz 2007), it is frustrating that willingness 
to invest in the sector is so low. Infrastructure investment levels today very roughly 
average at 40–50 per cent of what they were 10–15 years ago (Estache 2004), and we 
know that very little of this can be attributed to more efficient service delivery. Donor 
funding for the sector, which represented only 5–10 per cent of the investment flows to the 
sector, declined by more than half between 1995 and 2002. Partly to blame for the decline 
in donor finance was the great hope for large private-sector contributions in infrastructure. 
Figure 7-1: ODA Commitments 
 
(GLAAS 2010; WHO 2010) 
                                                
 
191 These estimates were first made by DFID (2002) and have since been confirmed by World Bank estimates (Briceno et 
al. 2004), but they are nonetheless rough estimates, as a significant amount of data was unavailable at the times these 
estimates were made. 
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Overseas Development Aid (ODA) started to decline in the 1990s, with 
infrastructure commitments from development banks falling from USD 18 billion in 1996 
to USD 13.5 billion in 1999. Historical data show that more than 8 per cent of total ODA 
was allocated to sanitation and drinking water at that time (Annamraju et al 2001), with 
other social infrastructure sectors receiving lower percentages; from 1997–2008, however, 
the proportion fell from 8 per cent to 5 per cent (see table below). Today the private sector 
is thought to provide more infrastructure financing than does ODA (Estache 2004), but 
there are no official statistics to demonstrate this decisively. According to the World 
Bank’s PPI database, private sector commitments to developing countries from 1990–2002 
totalled USD 805 billion, or USD 62 billion a year, but this average masks enormous 
fluctuations and is based on infrastructure investment in general rather than just for water. 
The most recent note produced for the OECD Horizontal Programme on Water, in June 
2010,192 contains the most recent statistics on ODA financing for water supply and 
sanitation, but it does not cover private funding. Given the extent of current fiscal 
consolidation and considering the trends in aid flows during previous recessions from 1977 
through to 2007, some researchers suggest that ODA could fall by as much as 20 to 25 per 
cent in the current economic crisis and a decade for flows to recover (Dang, Knack, and 
Rogers 2009). This probably represents a worst-case scenario. The same OECD note also 
calculates that the donor community committed an average of USD 7.2 billion for 2007–
2008. 
Unfortunately, estimates of the cost of achieving the 2015 Millennium 
Development Goal target of halving the proportion of people without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and sanitation continue to vary widely, in part due to data and 
methodological inconsistencies in calculating access, but particularly because data on 
water supply and sanitation are often reported together, hindering efforts to disaggregate 
them. Also, it is virtually impossible to estimate accurately the current financing gap at the 
global level given the lack of up-to-date data on actual combined spending by governments 
and households on water supply and sanitation in developing countries (WHO, 2011). 
Since 2000, many studies have nonetheless attempted to estimate the cost of attaining one 
                                                
 
192 See www.oecd.org/dac/stats/water. 
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or both of the components of the MDG target for water and sanitation at the global (Global 
Water Partnership 2000; Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council 2000) and 
regional (Mehta 2003; Asian Development Bank 2005; Danish Ministry of Environment 
2004) levels. Reviews of these studies give the global level range as between USD 9–30 
billion per year (Fonseca et al 2004; Toubkiss 2006). The wide range of discrepancies is 
largely explained by methodological differences in terms of assumptions around unit cost. 
Studies also often fail to incorporate the costs of maintaining existing coverage levels 
(operating, maintaining, monitoring, and replacing existing infrastructure and facilities). 
Toubkiss (2006) concludes that approximately USD 10 billion per year would be required 
to supply low-cost water and sanitation services to people who are not currently supplied, 
and a further USD 15 to USD 20 billion a year to provide them with a higher level of 
service and to maintain current levels of service to people who are already supplied. 
Another component in the variability of sanitation is technology choice: a low-cost 
household-improved latrine can provide both safety and privacy, yet waterborne sewerage 
must also include the cost of treatment to reduce health and environmental risks from the 
discharged wastewater. Toubkiss further concludes that in addition to the above costs, 
approximately USD 80 billion must be projected solely for collecting and treating 
household wastewater. A more recent study by Hutton and Bartram for the World Health 
Organisation (2008) estimates that the total spending, excluding programme costs, required 
to meet the water component of the MDG target is USD 42 billion, while for sanitation it is 
USD 142 billion. However, in terms of the estimated total spending on water and 
sanitation required, including maintaining and replacing existing infrastructure and 
facilities and extending coverage to existing and future increases in population, the figure 
is roughly USD 360 billion for each service annually from 2005 to 2014. This much larger 
figure rightly includes the hidden costs associated with the investment required to prevent 
the existing covered population from falling back into the unimproved coverage category, 
which has until now been left out of most other estimates. 
The lack of understanding as to what the financing demands of the sector truly are 
represents a significant systemic constraint to the global commitment to meet the MDG 
targets, but studies such as those conducted by Hutton and Bartram are at least highlighting 
costs that have previously been ignored. Still, as Hutton and Bartram (2008) explain, “cost 
results are only as good as the information feeding into the quantitative model and as the 
model’s assumptions.” In order to address the systemic constraint of assessing accurately 
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demand and the financing gap to meeting MDG targets (which will by no means solve the 
problem of access), we must address existing uncertainties, including: (i) the lack of 
representative unit costs of diverse water and sanitation improvements for different 
regions; (ii) the lack of distinction in unit costs between rural and urban areas; (iii) the lack 
of globally compiled data on water and sanitation improvement options chosen by 
governments and households; and (iv) the inconsistency in coverage rates revealed by 
different household surveys applied across the country (Hutton and Bartram 2008) . As 
ODA statistics improve, a more realistic and potentially even more daunting task will 
present itself to the donor community. 
Another consideration for ODA is the character of the aid being channelled to the 
water and sanitation sector. Although the bulk of ODA is extended in the form of grants, 
over half of ODA to water and sanitation in 2007–2008 took the form of loans. These loans 
are of course concessional and must contain a grant component; if at least 25 per cent if the 
loan satisfies the ODA criteria, the whole amount is recorded as ODA.193 What we have 
observed in the case of Bolivia, and in other countries that fall into the HIPC category, is 
an incapacity to fulfil some of these financial commitments, and this raises the question as 
to whether the character of ODA funding for the water and sanitation sector needs to be 
changed. According to Bulow and Rogoff (2005), institutional weaknesses provide the 
simplest explanation for why the poorest countries lack access to international financial 
markets, and they argue that this also explains why the loans of multilateral banks are non-
recoverable and why these countries should not have access to soft loans either. According 
to Radelet (2005) loans carry perverse incentives because they can create pressures on 
creditors to make new loans to allow countries to repay old debts, whereas grants can be 
devised to generate positive incentives. A further explanation, as described in the first 
section of this chapter, is that these countries lack access because their economies are too 
volatile. Financial markets, as we know, do not handle economic volatility well when it 
comes to sovereign creditors. The lack of efficient procedures for settling debts in the case 
                                                
 
193 The grant element is expressed as the percentage which the present value of the expected stream of repayments falls 
short of the repayments that would have been generated at a given reference rate of interest (in OECD 10 per cent). Thus 
the grant element is nil for a loan at less than 10 per cent, it is 100 per cent for a grant, and it lies between these two 
figures for a loan at less than 10 per cent interest. 
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of unexpected shocks makes it particularly difficult to cancel debt when needed. The HIPC 
debt reduction initiative was in many ways proof of the failure of the ODA soft loan 
strategy, and since 2000 the grants-versus-loans controversy has led to the cancellation of 
USD 56 billion in loans owed to the World Bank, the African Development Bank, and the 
IMF. However, it is one thing to agree on cancelling a debt, and another to consider that a 
loan instrument should be foregone. As to the question of whether grants are more efficient 
than loans in improving access to water and sanitation, there are so far no obvious answers. 
Some work has been carried out that correlates the effect of loans versus grants on 
economic growth (Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2010), but for the water and sanitation sector 
more research evaluating the benefits of both is needed. In theory, modern ODA has the 
capability to use a wide range of financial instruments, from direct subsidies to market 
loans, guarantees, and state contingent debt, in addition to traditional grant instruments. 
The traditional view of ODA is that it offers either direct grants or concessional loans but 
ODA has the capacity to mix taxpayers’ money with a number of financial instruments to 
create flexible and innovative financial solutions.  
The Camdessus report on financing water for the poor, presented at the Third 
World Water Forum at Kyoto in March 2003, was written partly as a response to fears of 
increasing reluctance by private sector stakeholders to engage in PPPs in developing 
countries, and partly to address the question of how to finance water infrastructure to meet 
the goals outlined in the MDGs for 2015.194 The devices proposed by the Camdessus report 
include the use of aid and IFI money to help provide guarantees against political risks, to 
finance private sector tendering costs, and to reduce currency risk. In other words, the 
Camdessus report makes a call to the international community to create innovative 
institutional arrangements at the global level to improve the enabling environment for 
investment in the water sector, in particular through risk-reducing arrangements such as 
guarantee instruments from the development banks: “One of the most important ways in 
which multilateral finance institutions can increase funding for water is through the much 
greater use of their guarantee programmes to leverage other kinds of finance [and this 
                                                
 
194 The report was written by James Winpenny as a contribution of the World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure, 
chaired by former Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Michel Camdessus. 
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could] be assisted through the use of aid money in the creation of a Revolving Fund or 
funds consisting of grant money to finance the preparation and structuring costs of 
complex projects, including private sector participation and other innovative structures” 
(Camdessus and Winpenny 2003). The report goes on to describe the way in which the 
fund could be used to cover legal, financial, and technical advisory costs in project 
preparation, tendering, and/or negotiation. Ultimately, the fund could help to reduce 
currency risk by using public sector funds to create a devaluation liquidity backstopping 
facility (Camdessus and Winpenny 2003). 
Drinking water revolving funds are nothing new. In the United States there are 
plenty of examples of state-funded revolving funds that provide significant financial 
incentives for municipal (and privately owned/managed) drinking water systems to finance 
needed drinking water infrastructure improvements, including treatment plants, 
distribution mains, and storage facilities, etc. These state-level bond banks were created to 
support borrowing by small municipalities, who otherwise would find it difficult to tap the 
capital markets directly. A bond bank is basically a state-sponsored intermediary that is 
allowed to borrow from the capital market, usually with some state or federal credit 
enhancement. It then lends on to participating local governments by purchasing their bonds 
or providing them with direct loans. By pooling debt in this manner significant savings can 
be realised through reductions in marketing costs and reduced spreads due to a higher 
credit rating, larger issue size, and wider investor coverage (USAID, 2003). Most of the 
US state-sponsored funds provide subsidised low-interest rate financing for the 
construction of certain water infrastructure projects. Each time financings are repaid, 
money is made available for new financing—essentially a revolving fund. Grants are 
distributed and interest rates are even reduced to zero per cent in instances where 
communities demonstrate financial hardship.  
As developing countries simply have less state funds available to adopt fully the US 
revolving fund model, it seems difficult to imagine that a country like Bolivia could 
sustainably support this model. However, designing a fund structured as a public-private 
revolving water fund is worthy of further research. Ideally, the fund could be supported by 
a mixture of (i) global institutional investors (including large pension funds and university 
endowment funds) and other private equity investors such as the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC), the European Bank 
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for Reconstruction, the Development (EBRD), and new private equity players to support 
the financing of utility capital investments, upgrading, expansion, research, and 
development; (ii) using targeted grant support from European and US utility industry CSR 
budgets; (iii) using targeted grants from donors for public outreach and hygiene education; 
and (iv) using targeted government subsidies such as out-put based aid (OBA) to assist 
utilities in expanding into less-profitable, low-income urban areas. Such a fund could offer 
more sustainable solutions to leveraging the amount of financial resources required to meet 
the water sector demands of the developing world, and to tackle some of the systemic 
constraints discussed further in the sections below and including (i) market 
concentration/lack of competition in the sector; (ii) the lack of technological innovation; 
and (iii) information dissemination. Ultimately, the fund would act as a bridge between 
utility companies and the capital market, which is what is currently lacking. If we return 
our attention to the case of the La Paz/ EL Alto concession, and to the problems faced by 
consumers in the serviced areas of the cities when they experienced the external shock of 
the currency devaluation, it would seem that new, more modern, mechanisms supported by 
ODA to deal with such vulnerability to shocks could be useful in future cases. Further 
discussion of the intricacies of the exact structure of these financial instruments is beyond 
the scope of this research, but more research on the use and effectiveness of ODA financial 
instruments, targeted towards the water and sanitation sector specifically, certainly 
deserves greater attention.  
7.4 Systemic Barriers to Competition: International Water Market Concentration 
Without stricter rules on market dominance and a phase out of the existing 
market distortions in favour of some big players, the European utilities 
market will be dominated by a handful of oligopolies. This is a threat to the 
functioning of the market and the democratic control of vital public 
services."195 
If only we had been able to bundle gas and water services in La Paz and 
ElAlto—we would have simultaneously dealt with demand-side constraints 
and most likely made it cheaper for everyone at the same time.196 
                                                
 
195 Claude Turmes, rapporteur of European Parliament for the directive on liberalisation of the electricity market. 
196 Interview with Claude Besse, Superintendent, SIRESE, 28 January 2004. 
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Another systemic constraint to sector reform, which we observe in the case of Bolivia, but 
which is also common across the developing world, is the limited scope for competition. 
This is tied in part to the monopoly characteristic of water network provision and in part to 
the fact that there is currently only a small selection of international providers available. 
According to the Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) database, the top 10 per cent 
of the largest firms—defined by the number of transactions that each company has 
undertaken—have been awarded about half of the total number of infrastructure PPP 
contracts. Even in the traditional public procurement context, the degree of competition is 
in general limited (Estache 2006). In the water industry, six multinational water enterprises 
are globally dominant (Foster 2005): Aguas Barcelona, Bechtel, Thames Water, SUEZ 
(whose water division used to be known as Ondeo or Lyonnaise des Eaux), Violia 
(previously part of Vivendi, and also known as Generale des Eaux), and Saur. The latter 
three French companies dominate the world private market: Veolia alone has been 
awarded 51 contracts, and SUEZ has won 50 transactions in the developing world. This 
gives them a share of 70 per cent globally and 56 per cent in lower and middle income 
countries; they control operations for four-fifths of the people served by international PPPs 
in low- and middle-income countries, and provide two-thirds of the total investment 
(Franceys 2003). 
Entry into the concentrated global water industry is difficult even for well-
established corporations already active in numerous infrastructure sectors. Some attribute 
this to the power of larger firms to distort markets and to the lack of enforcement of anti-
competitive laws (Lobina and Hall 2002), while others highlight the specialist nature of the 
industry (Nickson and Franceys 2003). Since 1990, a few large energy groups have 
attempted to break into the water market, but with little success: the US-based energy 
company Enron acquired the UK company Wessex Water, and then formed an 
international company, Azurix (Hall, 2007). This proved to be a failure, with Enron 
deciding to break up Azurix and sell its assets even before Enron's accounting brought 
about its own collapse. Azurix' failure was partly due to the poor results obtained when 
bidding against Veolia and SUEZ because it could not afford to accept initial lower-profit 
ratios in order to win a tender (Lobina and Hall 2003). One of the main reasons why 
companies such as Veolia and SUEZ are better able to bid aggressively when it comes to 
winning a tender is because they have diversified their portfolios both vertically and 
horizontally, bundling the services they provide. Many European multi-utilities now 
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provide energy, water, waste, and telecommunication services (see Table 7.2), and the 
trend towards market concentration is set to continue across Europe. The situation can be 
described as an oligopoly: the combined four leading firms control 60–100 per cent of the 
market, and barriers to entry persist. The literature197 points to seven adverse effects 
associated with oligopoly in utilities: 
1. Prices will not track costs. Instead, prices will tend to reflect corporate strategies 
and the bargaining power of individual players. 
2. Profit levels will be higher than those that would prevail under effective 
competition or capable regulation. 
3. Network technology and design will be driven by the demands of the largest users 
rather than the infrastructure requirements of the region or nation. 
4. There will be an inducement to disinvest in the network whenever alternative 
investment opportunities appear to offer a higher return. This will result in a 
denigration of both infrastructure and quality of service.  
5. Oligopoly pricing can lead to price rigidity for many services when costs fall, so 
that consumers of these services will not participate in attendant savings.  
6. The gains from network and coordination economies will not necessarily accrue to 
those classes of customers who serve to bring them about. Some customer classes 
will not enjoy network benefits in proportion to their contribution to the success of 
the network.  
7. Societal goals, such as universal service, conservation, and infrastructure 
enhancement, may not be consistent with the goals of tight oligopoly. As a 
consequence, society will have to bear an additional burden to achieve these 
objectives.  
Table 7-1: Service Provision of Multi-Utilities 
 Energy Water Waste Communications 
Suez X X X X 
Vivendi X X X X 
                                                
 
197 See: Trebing (1997 & 1999). 
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RWE X X X X 
Eon X X X X 
EdF X X   
Endesa X X   
ENEL X X X  
There is therefore no doubt that market concentration can have economic and social 
downsides, but while it is not the intention of this research to argue in favour of market 
concentration, findings from the La Paz/EL Alto case highlight other factors that need to 
be considered in the debate, particularly: (i) the significant efficiencies to be gained from 
bundling services, including savings and risk mitigation associated with pooled reserves; 
(ii) economies of scale and scope; and (iii) the ability to match diverse usage or demand 
patterns. Of course, any efficiency gains are assumed first by the firm, and possibly 
translate into greater profit margins, but they can also translate into gains for consumers. 
This was strongly argued by Claude Besse, the former superintendent of SIRESE, the 
GoB’s umbrella supervisory agency overseeing all sector-specific regulatory agencies. He 
explained that Bolivia would have had a great deal to gain from replicating the bundling 
practice of the major European utility companies.198 According to Besse, had the 
government awarded SUEZ with a PPP concession that bundled, for example, the 
provision of gas, electricity, water, and sanitation, this would have not only helped to 
increase the demand for water (because water could be heated and ultimately be more 
enjoyable to consume), but it would have allowed the firm to employ creative tactics to 
recoup costs in some sectors (such as gas/electricity) in order to make further investment in 
less lucrative sectors (such as water/sanitation expansion in El Alto). Besse pointed out 
that this would have helped, rather than hindered, the government to meet its universal 
service policy objectives. Equally significantly, administrative efficiency gains—in the 
form of the issuance of one bill for all services per month—would have potentially been 
passed on to consumers in the form of savings. Further, and beyond monetary savings, the 
                                                
 
198 Interview with Claude Besse, 28 January 2003. 
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overall ease of having one bill for all services would have made things easier on consumers 
psychologically. 
From Besse’s perspective, the overall welfare gains to consumers in El Alto would 
have far-outweighed the risk of market concentration. As for the regulatory hurdles to 
monitoring one firm’s control over multiple sectors, he believes that contracts should be 
designed well to ensure prices track costs regardless of whether services are bundled, and 
even if the firm has a diversified portfolio of sector investments. Such a contract would 
also be able to require a minimum level of investment in the water and sanitation sector 
(with specified targets and performance-based grant schemes) to combat any incentives to 
disinvest in the sector in favour of other sectors. Further, in relation to bargaining power 
asymmetries between corporate agents and government, Besse argued that the GoB (or any 
government) would be able to exert more power over a hypothetical oligopoly because a 
firm with vested interests in so many different areas of the country’s economy would 
simply have too much to lose by pulling out. However, it is clear from the case that 
contracts are immensely complex to write and enforce, because one has to specify in 
advance all the relevant contingencies and how performance should depend upon each 
contingency. In addition, and as previously explained in Chapter Six, having all the rules 
set out in detail can make it more difficult for informal renegotiation, and gives less 
flexibility if certain elements of the contract are identified as unsustainable ex post. This 
was the case with the discrepancy over the concession area to be covered by Aguas de 
Illimani, which originally under-estimated the areas of service in El Alto. Even so, Jose 
Barragán, the former Vice-Minister of Basic Services, Johnny Cuellar, former regulator of 
SISAB, and Claude Besse, former regulator of SIRESE, all agreed that a bundled services 
approach in Bolivia should have been given further consideration, as part of the wider 
sector reforms implemented in the late 1990s. 
Maria Sicilia, Senior Electricity Markets Expert at the OECD further explains the 
benefits of market concentration across other utility sectors: 
After a number of years’ experience with market reform, the energy sector, and 
electricity supply in particular, has recently attracted allegations of collusion or 
cartelisation, or claims that the liberalised retail electricity market operates in 
ways that do not work for the benefit of end-consumers. These concerns have been 
articulated by consumer organisations for some time. The main reason argued is 
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that, in highly concentrated markets, vertically integrated firms with significant 
market power are, in some way or another, ripping off consumers. Taking an 
economic-based approach, EU and Australian Competition authorities consider 
that there are no market thresholds for defining dominance—as even a low market 
share may be compatible with dominance in the energy sector. Furthermore, it is 
the abuse of, not the existence of, a dominant position that is prohibited by antitrust 
law. Current economic thinking tells us that all sorts of conduct by dominant firms 
can be anti-competitive but there can also be substantial benefits associated with 
precisely the same forms of behaviour, which in fact not only characterize normal 
competitive markets, but can be crucial to the effective functioning of normal 
competitive markets. It is therefore inappropriate to take measures against large 
vertically integrated firms simply based on their market shares.199 
More research is needed to explore further both the positive and the negative 
implications of water market concentration at each stage of the PPP process, because there 
may in fact be instances where market concentration can drive welfare-maximising 
principles and generate efficiencies. A study by Atushi Iimi (2008), for example, evaluates 
the trade-off between increasing competition during the PPP auction/bidding stage and 
potential economies of scale in service operation. In the Latin America region, the average 
number of bidders for a PPP is merely 2.2, while globally the number tends to range from 
three to six (World Bank, PPI database). This paper quantifies the optimal size of PPP 
contracts in the sector and considers the respective benefits of bundling water-related 
services (although not across sectors), or unbundling them into smaller-scale contracts to 
attract other market players and to increase competition. Interestingly, the findings 
conclude that competition should in some cases be sacrificed in order to achieve 
economies of scale. Iimi and Estache (2008), also study joint bidding during public 
procurement auctions, empirically addresses whether such bidding is pro-or anti-
competitive, and they find that there is no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are 
incompatible with competition policy, aside from in a few cases. In road procurements, 
coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive, 
                                                
 
199 Interview with Maria Sicilia, Senior Electricity Markets Expert at the OECD, 28 May 2010. 
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while in the water and sewage sector local joint bidding may be useful to draw out better 
offers from potential contractors. However, they found that joint bidding composed of only 
foreign companies is mostly considered anticompetitive. 
The question has been raised as to whether the purpose of regulatory supervision of 
natural monopolies, as specified in theory, should be to try to replicate the results that a 
competitive market would achieve by way of allocative and productive efficiency (Morin 
and Hilman 1994). This would mean that regulators would act as a substitute for the 
market, even taking on some of the functions of a competitor. However, can a regulatory 
body truly compel a regulated utility to behave much in the same way as it would behave if 
free from regulation but subject to market forces of competition? Such theoretical notions 
of how regulatory functions should manifest do not seem to take account of the role that 
regulators play on a day-to-day basis—as intermediaries and apolitical technical 
institutions, which fit within a complex mix of government ministries, municipalities, 
service providers, civil society, and development agencies—when they are not specifically 
reviewing a contract compliance. Regulatory agencies in practice seem to have much more 
than “contract compliance” as their remit, and Bolivia’s SISSAB certainly did not have 
either the mandate or the capacity to replicate the results of a competitive water market. To 
address the issue of market concentration, perhaps we should focus first on coming to 
accept regulatory institutions for what they are and how they function in reality, instead of 
creating make-believe institutional assumptions and building unrealistic expectations 
among consumers as to what regulatory agencies are able to achieve. Acquiescence and 
even enthusiasm for cooperation between business and government is achievable as PSP in 
the water sector evolves and as business leaders come to realise that regulatory supervision 
can act in their interest as well as in that of the public. Perhaps if we become more honest 
about the purpose of regulatory agents, pragmatism in business attitudes will begin to lean 
toward ideological change on their own, without the heavy hand of regulatory agents; 
perhaps utility companies will come to recognise that they are acting against their 
shareholder’s long-term interests by ignoring pollution, climate change, and social policy 
objectives (such as extending networks, at an initial financial loss to the firm, to low 
income consumers). Polarisation between corporate giants and government does not make 
sense, and managers, investors, and governments need to discover new ways to reconcile 
financial, political, and regulatory targets. If we recognise the usefulness of market 
concentration and cooperatively exploit this concentration for the ultimate benefit of the 
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consumer, we may be able to turn a systemic constraint into a resourceful tool to address 
seriously the existing demand for clean water.  
7.5 Systemic Barriers to the Development of New Technologies 
From a technological standpoint, a pipe is hard to beat. Pipes, pumps, and valves are all 
mature technologies, but they also represent the largest equipment supply segments in the 
water industry. The global technology focus in the water and sanitation sector is now on 
pipeline rehabilitation, which is probably the most pressing and costly water investment 
category across the developed and developing world. There are other small innovations in 
wastewater treatment, disinfection technologies, and technological improvements to 
desalination membranes, but these all have very restricted market potential. In the 
developing country context, it is difficult to find any discussion around new technologies 
being adopted by urban water utilities. Also, it was primarily the donor community that 
funded the research that formed the backbone of the lower-cost condominial technology, 
which was first adopted in Brazil and later in La Paz/El Alto. In places where modern new 
technologies have been introduced, they are sometimes met with opposition and a 
preference for more traditional/indigenous technologies or approaches to provision. 
Technological solutions to servicing the poor are evolving slowly and seemingly continue 
to revolve around condominial services and/or standpipes as the lower cost alternative for 
the poor. However, research relating to technological advancements in the construction or 
provision of water through either of these options, particularly standpipes, is virtually 
impossible to find. Although there is more innovation in the area of simplified, low-cost 
sanitation provision, there are still very few sanitation technology options available for 
urban utilities to adopt.200 Technological solutions to meet the needs of consumers would 
ideally come from engineers and other industry professionals working at the local level, 
designing local-level solutions with the support of a research and development (R&D) 
team within an existing utility, but it is doubtful whether Aguas de Illimani (or many other 
utilities operating in the developing country context) would have had the resources 
available to fund R&D or to address the complex socio-technological relationships that 
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exist between consumers and providers more generally. However, this systemic issue is not 
only prevalent in low-income countries. 
A report by the Council for Science and Technology (2009) highlights the growing 
concern that the skills base in the global water industry is in decline; it surveyed all the 
major water companies across Europe and found that each company reported difficulties in 
recruiting skilled people, both technicians and those at graduate levels. Such a decline in 
Europe and the USA does not bode well for developing countries, as utilities are often 
quiet reliant on technology and skills transfer from more developed economies. Using data 
from the UK water industry, the same report demonstrates that there has also been a fall in 
research and development (R&D) since privatisation. Although some innovation is 
occurring, most research concentrates on the supply chain; this is predominantly in the area 
of water treatment, where regulation has primarily focused on end-of-pipe quality 
standards. The evidence from ten of the UK’s major water and sewerage companies shows 
that there has been a downturn in R&D since privatisation, where investment is currently 
around the GBP 18 million mark compared to around GBP 45 million in the late 1990s. 
This translates into an R&D spend against turnover of less than 0.5 per cent for water 
companies. The report concludes that the reductions reflect a combination of factors: (i) 
pressures on operating costs to keep water charges as low as possible; (ii) changes in 
ownership and management styles that place greater emphasis on short-term profitability; 
and (iii) the end of the large research programmes of the 1990s, which were driven by the 
European Directives on Drinking Water and Urban Wastewater treatment. Water 
companies themselves have suggested that innovation has been stifled because the risk 
appetite is much lower today than it once was, as some of the most speculative endeavours 
funded historically (and in use today) in the water and other sectors would not be 
undertaken under the tough regulatory structure of the present day. The central question 
raised in the paper was whether the price cap regulatory formula places too little emphasis 
on delivering capital investment (including R&D) rather than on providing incentives for 
water companies to deliver efficiencies in operating expenditure. By its nature, the outputs 
of R&D are uncertain and the costs associated with both development and implementation 
even more so, even well into the later stages of the development. The result is that if the 
combined costs of introducing and operating new technology are not cost-beneficial, such 
technology is very unlikely to be introduced by a company. This is particularly the case 
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with revolutionary or step-change technologies, which by their nature require significant 
implementation costs and effort. 
Between 1998 and 2009, a total of USD 1.12 billion of venture capital was invested 
in developing new water technologies (Kwok et al 2009), but this was a tiny amount given 
the huge amount of interest the clean technology sector has attracted. , ERI and Zenon 
Environmental--the two most successful start-ups since 1980--took more than a decade to 
have an impact on the market. This indicates that good technologies are being held back in 
the water industry, in part by the lack of research and development, and in part by the 
challenge of reaching the market. Once again, companies like, Veolia, SUEZ, GE Water, 
and Siemens Water Technologies, which have wide international distribution networks, are 
better placed than venture capitalists to back new technologies which bring money and 
encouragement that are not necessarily supported by the market. Even though there is 
booming interest in the water technology sector, utilities are very reluctant to try new 
technologies due to conservative. And while other utility industries (i.e. energy and 
telecoms) deregulation has helped open the door for new technology development, the 
same cannot be said for the water and sewerage sector. From what was observed in the 
case of La Paz/ El Alto, new, lower-cost solutions may not even be welcomed by 
consumers if they suspect utility suppliers of providing them with lower-quality 
technologies. The point, however, remains that if utilities are unable to set (or are 
constrained from setting) tariffs at a level that would give sufficient commercial return on 
capital, they will simply not have funds available to put towards research, training, the 
development/testing of new technologies, or innovative approaches to delivery. This is 
clearly visible with regard to utilities in the developing-country context, but the same types 
of constraint can be seen to be a systemic constraint on the international water utility 
industry as a whole. In general, innovation within the water industry is too fragmented; the 
industry needs to do a better job in connecting to the R&D base in universities or other 
research organisations to access leading-edge technologies. They also need to be able to 
plug into information-sharing networks, which enable technologies to be shared. 
7.6 Consumer Advocacy Groups and Media Bias 
Corporate donations and lobbies often drown out the voices of workers, 
consumers, women, environmentalists and other interest and citizen 
groups…(and) the concerns of local people, intellectuals, environmentalists 
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and other groups are often ignored until they develop into protests and major 
confrontations. (UNDP Human Development Report 2002) 
Private interests do not take better care of natural resources than public 
interests. Consider the extractive industries, such as mining, that have 
destroyed the land in order to extract as much of a given commodity as is 
possible. Now think about public parks. If private interests owned these 
priceless treasures, many of them would likely be covered with housing 
developments and unavailable to the public. Consumers, especially poor 
ones, are not benefiting from this water monopoly. Corporate shareholders 
naturally get maximum profit; we should not expect them to be social service 
agencies. Privatised water will never deliver safe and affordable water for 
all. 201 
The water war showed us that it's possible to change our lives, collectively; 
that even if our enemy is very powerful, he's not invincible. We learned that, 
maybe capitalism can privatize everything, but what it can never privatize is 
our capacity to dream. And as long as we have the capacity to dream, we 
have the obligation to keep struggling for a better world. (Oscar Olivera, 
speaking about the Bolivian conflict)202 
Rarely do we hear about the power that advocacy groups can have in drowning out the 
voices of local people, workers, pensioners, minorities, women, and children. Generally, it 
is assumed that any consumer advocacy group acts on behalf of consumers, and that they 
are the true representative voice of the people, especially the poor and marginalised 
members of society. But this assumption is somewhat naïve. The first 20 hits in a simple 
Google search of the words “water” and “Bolivia” take curious searchers to sites managed 
by a range of consumer advocacy groups and anti-privatisation campaigners, or to personal 
websites managed primarily by non-Bolivians, including students, journalists, and anti-
globalisation and human rights activists.203 The first four hits in Google Books search 
begin with: Cochabamba: Water War in Bolivia by Oscar Olivera, followed by Out of the 
Mainstream: Water Rights Politics and Identity by Rutgerd Boelens, David Getches, 
Armando Guevara-Gil, and then Water Wars: Privatization, Pollution and Profit by 
                                                
 
201 Wenonah Hauter, Director Water for All Campaign, 15 July 2005. 
202 Interview with Jeff Conant, International Research and Communications Coordinator for Food and Water Watch, 14 
January 2009. 
203 This exercise was repeated on numerous occasions; the most recent Google search was conducted in July 2009. 
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Vandana Shiva, followed by Blue Gold: The Fight to Stop the Corporate Theft of the 
World's Water by Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke. The titles of the books clearly reflect 
which way the authors lean on the topic of PSP in the water sector, and the remainder of 
the list continues in much in the same way down the entire first visible Google results 
page. These, and many other books and papers with a similar slant against PSP, were 
reviewed as part of this research endeavour and they did provide insightful findings and 
analysis surrounding the conflict over water rights and PSP, even if at times there was 
clear evidence of bias against PSP. However, what the list of hits demonstrates is that the 
discourse dominating web-based information dissemination across the globe is somewhat 
one-sided and therefore misleading. Although there is a significant amount of information, 
including links to articles, books, and documentaries promoting alternative perspectives 
with a more positive slant on PSP, they are less easy to find—especially with regard to 
Bolivia’s specific experience with PSP. This not only presents a barrier for young 
researchers starting out on a quest to understand the complexities involved in water sector 
reform, but for anyone interested in the issue. Since early 2000, various international 
consumer advocacy and human rights groups as well as global social movements against 
privatisation have taken a particular interest in the plight of Bolivians. Many of these 
groups have either established local offices in Bolivia or partnered with local associations 
in order to combat the so-called monsters of our time: globalisation and privatisation. 
These groups, especially those with ties to major international consumer advocacy groups 
in Canada and the United Sates, consist of many members with just the right mix of 
naiveté about water sector issues and policy reform in the developing country context. 
What has made these local organisations powerful, though, was that they could rely on 
financial resources and strong social networks from abroad to enhance their community 
reach at the local as well as the international level. The power of these groups to distort 
information and misrepresent the voices of consumers is the fourth systemic constraint to 
water sector reform and PSP identified as part of this research. 
The Democracy Center, a San Francisco-based organisation, opened its offices in 
Cochabamba specifically to support the civil uprisings of 2000. The well-intentioned 
organisation works globally to advance human rights through a unique combination of 
investigation and reporting, training citizens in the art of public advocacy and organising 
international “citizen campaigns”. In the ten years since it began operations in Bolivia, the 
Democracy Center has raised the profile of Bolivian causes across the globe, documenting 
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and reporting on Bolivia's role as a test lab for conservative global economic policies. The 
Center is funded largely through grants from George Soros’ Open Society Institute, and in 
2000 it was the only on-going source of international reporting of the Water War in 
Cochabamba; it consequently became one of the strongest voices promoting international 
activism against PSP in Bolivia. It is important to note that none of the seven staff 
members at the centre have academic backgrounds or professional experience in the water 
and sanitation sector: they are, by and large, political activists who use the multimedia-
journalism platform as their medium of communication. There were various other 
international advocacy groups that also became interested in the plight of Bolivians during 
the Water War: the Canadian Union of Public Employees, for example, created a formal 
partnership with the Cochabamba Federation of Factory Workers in 2000, while other 
groups demonstrated their unity with Bolivians more creatively: in one solidarity action, 
the New Zealand Water Pressure Group hosed down their local Bolivian consulate office 
with a bright red fire truck, boldly displaying signs reading, “Bolivia, the world is 
watching you”. 
As part of this research, interviews were conducted with Jim Shultz, the director of 
the Democracy Centre in Cochabamba, and with Maj Fiil, the Campaign Coordinator of 
Water for All, an American consumer advocacy group turning over USD 10 million each 
year; Ms Fil established the African Water Network of anti-privatisation movements in 24 
African countries. Both these organisations provide significant resource contributions to 
rally against the commercialisation of water and against private sector investment, and they 
supported the mobilisation of groups opposed to PSP across Bolivia. During the 
interviews, specific questions were asked regarding the methods the organisations 
employed in order to help people in Bolivia to understand their rights and entitlements to 
water provision. For the most part, the representatives explained that they offered free 
advocacy materials, including newsletter inserts, hand-out materials for training, and 
curricula for university courses. They also offered (and continue to offer) workshops, 
training, and counselling across the full range of advocacy activities, including: strategy 
development, media advocacy, organising and coalition building, lobbying, and 
influencing public officials. In other words, it seemed that there was a significant amount 
of advocacy-for- the-sake-of-advocacy training taking place, with a particularly one-sided, 
often superficial understanding of the deeper issue. While incredibly passionate about the 
plight of Bolivia’s poor, it was surprising to discover just how little understanding 
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representatives of these organisations actually had about the differences between the 
Cochabamba case and the La Paz/El Alto case. Most had extremely simplistic ideas about 
PSP and most voiced the same—somewhat scripted—account of the plight of the 
Bolivians: that “multinational water corporations were making a profit off Bolivia’s poor 
and that the poor were paying the biggest cost of reforms.” Our discussions revolved 
primarily around the Cochabamba case, with the outcomes of the La Paz/El Alto case (and 
many others taken from across Latin America and even Africa) sewn into their 
argumentation as a matter of impassioned principle, rather than because they could 
substantiate claims with empirical evidence or clear understanding. Interestingly, not one 
of the advocacy organisations active in Bolivia used the resources at their disposal to 
conduct household consumer surveys in either of the cities (before, during, or after the 
water conflicts began), which might have provided them with a more honest interpretation 
of the needs and preferences of consumers, not to mention of the degree to which many 
consumers were actually pleased with reform outcomes in the La Pa/El Alto case. 
Over the last 10 years, Jim Shultz, has successfully grown his organisation’s global 
profile, and he continues to extend its mandate for social justice. The organisation’s most 
recent project was to launch a “Get Goni” campaign on behalf of “all Bolivians”, which is 
a plea to have the former president extradited to face charges of extra-judicial killings in 
the Black October Massacres (as they have since been termed). Shultz’s impassioned 
support of Bolivia began in the water sector, but today, on his website, he claims that it is 
his “personal mission to spread the word across the world and make sure the former 
president is brought back to Bolivia to face legal charges for his mishandling of the 
protests back in 2003.”204 He writes on his blog that “Among most Bolivians his [Goni] 
name has become synonymous with gross acts of corruption and the giveaway of all of the 
nation's major industries to foreign corporations. More important, for more than sixty 
Bolivian families, Mr. Sánchez de Lozada's name has become synonymous, along with 
that of Mr. Sánchez Berzaín, for the smug impunity that allowed them to order the killings 
of their families followed by happy and wealthy lives in Maryland and Miami under U.S. 
protection.”  
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Other independent media groups that played a role in the downfall of AISA 
included the Independent Media Center, better known as Indymedia. It describes itself as 
“the voice of those without a voice”, and it was created by various independent and 
alternative media organisations and international activists in 1999 for the purpose of 
providing grassroots coverage of the World Trade Organization (WTO) protests in Seattle; 
Indymedia became very involved in Bolivia between 2000 and 2005, acting as a 
clearinghouse of information for journalists and providing up-to-the-minute reports, 
photos, audio, and video footage through their website. Another media group, called One 
World Media, also posted a great deal of material relating to the Cochabamba water 
conflict, including a documentary entitled The Water Is Ours, Damn It!, which featured 
emotive interviews with a wide range of people who were involved in forcing the 
government of Bolivia to back down. It is very easy to post a publication on any of these 
media sites and the organisations assist in translating articles from any language into 
Spanish, Quetchua, and Aymara. Through this on-line journalistic medium, just about 
anyone with an opinion about water has a voice. 
Surprisingly, the scholarly literature about populism has paid very limited attention 
to the contribution of the media, and especially news media, to the surge of populism in 
Latin America. The proliferation of technological advancements and online knowledge 
transfer has fuelled the ambitions of newsrooms across the world to give more attention to 
socio-economic and political issues of the developing world. However, a problem arises 
when journalists prioritise advocacy through emotive, attention-grabbing story lines rather 
than accuracy. With full access and control of the news outlets that reach the masses, and 
answerable to no-one, media has become a powerful tool for fraud and manipulation. A 
full understanding of the populist phenomenon cannot be achieved without studying mass 
communication perspectives and media-related dynamics; while there exists extensive 
research on media influences on politics, campaigns, election outcomes, and political 
leaders, little has been written on how the media work as initiators or even as catalysts of 
populist sentiments (even less with regard to how this has affected PSP in the water sector 
directly). Some interesting recent research identified television media bias (domestic and 
international coverage) as directly helping to prop up neo-populist politicians in Latin 
America by orientating their coverage of campaigns toward the atomised poor (Boas 
2005), while a book by Gianpietro Mazzoleni et al. (2003) does a good job in reflecting 
media-related factors in the rise of populist ideas and movements and, in particular, how 
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existing neo-populist politicians attempt to gain access to the news media. The existing 
literature also recognises that in many political contexts, the media may stand as a “Fourth 
Estate”, pursuing goals that either converge with or diverge from the mainstream political 
climate, and that the mass media themselves act as players in the political game, 
intentionally and unintentionally endorsing or opposing populist stances and policies. 
What is clear from the findings of this La Paz/El Alto case study is that the main 
points of contact for the aforementioned advocacy groups and media organisations during 
the period of conflict in Bolivia (2000–2005) were with Bolivia’s Neighbourhood 
Association Leaders (NALs), and that the NALs played an excellent reciprocal game by 
tapping into the power of these advocacy groups. A year prior to the cancellation of the 
AISA contract, in 2004, the Director for the Clean Water Program for Catholic Relief 
Services in Bolivia—an NGO with a long history, spanning several decades, of actively 
working in Bolivia’s water sector with marginalised, low-income communities across the 
country—explained that these advocacy groups were destroying any possibilities for 
compromise and reconciliation around reforms. He then chuckled about the irony of how 
international advocacy groups complain of the monopolistic practices of large water 
multinationals, when they “do everything in their power to monopolise the channels of 
information to the public and the poor in developing countries like Bolivia.” He further 
went on to explain that “the amount of on-line reportage of the events that transpired in the 
water sector between 2000 and 2006 by these organisations would suggest that the 
uprisings in Cochabamba represented the will of the Bolivian poor against the will of 
money-hungry multinational corporate agents, when in fact those involved in the uprising 
in Cochabamba were predominantly of middle income background (including some fairly 
well-off land owners) rather than the poor. The unique circumstances of La Paz/EL Alto 
were never properly disaggregated from the wider socio-political conflict.”205 
Over the same period in which the anti-privatisation movement was gaining 
strength in Bolivia, so too was the anti- (water) privatisation movement in the United 
States, as labour unions and the watchdog group Public Citizen waged an 18-month-long 
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campaign to halt the trend toward privatisation across the country. The group lobbied 
heavily in the US Congress in 2001 and 2002 to remove language from a bill advocating 
public-private-partnerships, and Public Citizen said that the bill “jeopardizes public access 
to safe and affordable drinking water and adequate wastewater treatment by making 
federal assistance conditional on the recipient's consideration of privatisation."206 A 
coalition of municipal water companies and public interest groups formed an anti-
privatisation lobby that called on Congress to increase grants and loans to USD 57 billion 
over five years to improve public utilities' infrastructure; the campaigners eventually won 
their battle and a bill that might have helped to support the emergence of more PPPs was 
completely abandoned. This is an unfortunate example of the polarisation that occurred 
through the last decade; a polarisation that led to organisations originally focused on 
protecting the environment, improving affordable access to clean water, or on preventing 
climate change, becoming instead organisations primarily concerned with weakening 
capitalist ideology. 
The lack of quality control behind the anti-privatisation messages being propagated 
around the world is disconcerting. There is something very wrong about someone sitting in 
an Internet café across the Atlantic and with no understanding of the particularities of the 
Bolivian context having greater reach to the residents of La Paz/El Alto than elected 
government authorities and water and sanitation specialists. This is perhaps a lesson to 
governments that they need to update their communication methods to compete for 
community outreach and information dissemination. In particular, more financial and 
human resources are required for government to address this systemic constraint to PSP in 
the water sector, so that government policymakers can compete on a level playing field 
with these powerful (globally supported) voices. Although one might think that private 
utilities such as AISA would be equipped with sufficient financial resources to initiate 
powerful public relations campaigns around PSP, this is not always possible. Cledan 
Mandri-Perrott, the former utility manager of Trinidad and Tobago Water, explained in an 
interview that in 1999, while the utility was undertaking a PPP Management contract with 
the UK’s Severn Trent, the contract was abruptly terminated after civil discontent and 
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popular uprisings over contractual disputes. At the time that he and his company were 
being “attacked in the press and radio, Severn Trent had a policy against [his] speaking 
with the media and engaging in any public relations campaigns.” According to Mandri-
Perrott, this was “simply out of fear that the company’s predominantly British shareholders 
would be resistant against further participation in risky activities in developing 
countries.”207 
The role played by corporate shareholders of the large multinational utilities and 
the power they exert over the decisions made by utility managers in the field are worthy of 
additional research. The findings from the current research, however, do shed light on the 
complexity of public relations and corporate outreach to consumers during periods of 
turmoil, and on how these may also affect the ways in which contracts are renegotiated. 
For a company such as SUEZ, the amount of money invested in AISA was miniscule 
relative to their other investments. By looking at SUEZ’s publicly-listed finances during 
the 2004–2005 period, one can clearly see that less than 2 per cent of SUEZ’s consolidated 
turnover came from South America, while 81 per cent was generated from their activities 
in Europe.208 This must surely have implications for spending on everything, from 
investment in public outreach and information dissemination, to research and development 
of low-cost technologies, and to public relations campaigns and/or the tedious 
renegotiation of contracts during periods of political turmoil. Shareholders tend to dislike 
negative press associated with a firm they have a vested interest in, and although shorter-
term profit gains are currently more evident in SUEZ’s European and US operations, there 
is no reason why we should not be making a concerted effort to educate and empower 
shareholders to take a longer-term view in their support of PPPs in emerging markets. If 
there is a willingness on the part of shareholders in SUEZ or Severn Trent (or the other 
giant players in the water sector) to be more active in emerging markets, more strategic 
approaches to PSP can be designed in partnership with government agencies, regulators, 
and NGOs to secure more sustainable PPPs, and an appropriately significant weight can be 
placed on public relations and education campaigns. Of course, ensuring such willingness 
                                                
 
207 Interview with Cledan Mandri-Perrott, former Managing Director Trinidad and Tobago Water, 3 June 2005, 
Washington DC. 
208 SUEZ Environment: Fact and Figures Report for 2004–2005. 
263 
 
 
on the part of shareholders is a big uncertainty, but it is a systemic issue affecting the water 
and sewerage PSP paradigm that needs to be tackled. 
7.7  Addressing the Systemic Constraints to Water Sector Reform 
The concept of introducing a revolving fund specifically geared toward addressing the 
needs of the myriad players involved in water sector reform and PSP is an idea that 
deserves a great deal of academic attention, not only from financial and economic quarters 
but also from social policy quarters. Much of the discussion around the conceptualisation 
of such a fund has been geared primarily around the specific financial risk-mitigating tools 
that are needed, and less so in relation to the institutional structure of the fund and other, 
non-financial, risk mitigating arrangements that could be offered via the fund. Improving 
the enabling environment for water sector investment should be conceptualised in a way 
that simultaneously addresses domestic capital market development, competition, 
innovation, and, most critically, improved information dissemination with consumers and 
advocacy around the potential benefits of PSP. 
It is also imperative for the ODA community that we accurately assess demand and 
the financing gap to meet our MDG targets by (i) determining a representative unit costs of 
diverse water and sanitation improvements for different regions; (ii) creating a specified 
distinction in unit costs between rural and urban areas; (iii) compiling data on water and 
sanitation improvement options chosen by governments and households; and (iv) building 
consistency in coverage rates, as revealed by different household surveys applied across 
the country. Improving the statistical and knowledge base of the problem we are currently 
facing will help ODA to consider more innovative options for channelling resources, and 
consequently the character of aid to the water sector will invariably improve. 
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Chapter 8.  Public-Private-Partnerships at the Crossroads: Conclusions 
and Policy Considerations 
On 29 July 2010, The United Nations voted 124 to zero in favour of 
recognising a human right to water. 
8.1 The Public Sphere 
If you put the federal government in charge of the Sahara Desert, in five 
years there would be a shortage of sand.209 
The good news is that global awareness and concern over the precarious state of the water 
sector have increased significantly over the last decade. In every direction, there seems to 
be someone campaigning either on behalf of the precious resource or on behalf of those 
who lack access to it. Even the latest James Bond film, Quantum of Solace, tackled the 
issue of water privatisation—in fact, the storyline of the film revolves around a greedy 
multinational water company’s attempt to help overthrow none other than Bolivia’s left 
leaning government in order to exploit the country’s water resources and profiteer off the 
indigenous population. Although the film can be applauded for being topical and creating 
awareness about the value of water and the vulnerabilities of those without access, the film 
unfortunately sends the wrong message about PSP. This is the bad news. Over the last 
decade we have witnessed increasing public concern over PSP in almost every sector of 
the economy—transport, health, education, energy, telecoms, domestic security, and 
international military operations. The financial crisis of 2008–2009 further exacerbated this 
sentiment and marked a systemic transformation of the global capitalist system, which we 
are still experiencing in 2012.  
We are currently witnessing a backlash not only against the private sector and the 
so-called “fat-cat” culture bred through capitalism, but also against the very essence of our 
liberal economic ideals with regard to regulation, market-led growth, and even trade. 
Across Europe and the United States there is a resurgence in the debate over to what extent 
governments should interfere in the functioning of the market and how equipped the 
market is to take care of the casualties when markets fail. There is also a great deal of 
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speculation as to what the character of our new economic paradigm will be. What the 
global financial crisis ultimately revealed is that market forces on their own cannot always 
be trusted to create price signals consistent with broader social objectives. This may 
translate into a new paradigm in which governments play a greater role in setting prices, 
managing currencies, and creating environmental incentives, but it would be a mistake to 
chastise the private sector in the process for simply doing what it does best under a for-
profit model. 
The irony of the privatisation debate in the water sector is that, in most parts of the 
world, water utilities were never completely privatised. PSP has always meant private 
sector participation and PPP has always meant public-private-partnership. The rationale of 
the 1990s was relatively straightforward: the original intention of the PPP framework was 
to combine private sector incentive structures and, in tandem, strengthen public 
governance oversight by creating independent regulatory institutions where previously 
there had been none, as well as to develop new laws and myriad regulations aimed at 
protecting consumers and the environment. The failure of PSP in the case of Bolivia 
exemplifies the imperative need re-open the debate about the long-term outlook for PSP in 
the provision of water, and to draw new conceptual dividing-lines between government 
and private enterprise that are better understood by the people. In the first instance, this 
will require politicians across party lines to do their best as pragmatists to depoliticise the 
issue and address the needs of the sector. In the second instance, it will require all 
stakeholders active in the water sector to rid themselves of a priori ideologies and replace 
them with an openness and a willingness to consider creative solutions to improving access 
to the poor; some of these solutions may involve PSP and some may not.  
Why is there a disconnect between the positive perception that consumers have 
towards improvements made to their water and sanitation services under PSP 
arrangements and the negative perceptions that consumers have towards private sector 
participation in the provision of these services?  
This question--the primary question driving this research endeavour--can be applied 
to other sectors beyond water and sanitation. The health sector is prime example of a space 
where people demonstrate extreme ambivalence about private sector participation. Just like 
the debate over water, individuals are torn between their ideological beliefs that everyone 
should be entitled to free healthcare and their rational acknowledgement that efficiencies 
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might be possible through PSP in some areas of health service provision. Ultimately, much 
of this debate comes down to a question of language. The way in which we define and 
articulate the ideas around what “public”, “private” and “partnership” really mean. I 
believe we need to work very hard as a society to re-evaluate the lines we have demarcated 
between the "private/corporate" and the "public/government" as a first step in achieving 
the welfare demands of our global society. If we, as a global society, are meant to 
collectively assure the conditions in which people can be healthy--be it through improved 
access to clean water or improved access to health services as the case may be--than our 
collective self includes all of us: from the private individual, to the local community 
representatives, the local government, local private enterprises, service providers, 
practioners, central government, private banks, cooperative banks, utility operators, 
regulators, large private corporations, foundations, educational institutions--we are a 
diverse collective force each with a unique capacity to add value to programs and projects 
that are in the best interest of our fellow community members.  
Much like the debate around PSP in health care provision in the UK, the debate 
over the role of the private sector in water and sanitation service provision has created a 
false dichotomy that has led to a distorted conceptualisation of the truth. With health care, 
Americans make the assumption that despite the expense of their system, the privatised 
model will deliver greater innovation and greater satisfaction than the “socialised 
medicine” model of other countries. In a mirror image of the false dichotomy, the British 
take the polar opposite view, based on an assumption that American-style privatisation, 
which would potentially double their costs and reduce scope of their health care, is the 
only available alternative to the NHS. In clinging to these false dichotomies, the US and 
Britain have ignored the multitude of other countries, such as France, Switzerland, 
Germany, Canada, Austria, Sweden, and Japan, that have mixed public-private provision 
and deliver far better outcomes and greater consumer satisfaction that the British system, at 
far lower cost than is the case in the USA (Kaletsky 2010).  
In Chapter 5 we discussed the ways in which Bolivia's informal institutional 
environment--its historical traditions, cultural values and fear of multi-nationals posed 
some of the greatest challenges to the process of sector reform because this environment 
perpetuated the false dichotomy between the public and the private sector. The chapter 
deconstructed areas of tension and highlighted areas where compromise might have been 
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achieved if more effort had been made to (i) understand rural-urban demographics, social 
norms and community-oriented practices, (ii) spiritual sentiment towards the pachamama, 
(iii) lack of trust in multinational corporations--including development organisations, and 
the (iv) historical political relationship between the people and the land in El Alto. 
Equipped with this information, appropriate social policies could have been integrated 
within the policy reform process to create greater solidarity among the public around the 
idea of a PPP. Retrospectively, it seems quite evident that areas of existing conflict 
between the informal and formal rules of the water provision paradigm need to be fully 
considered and ultimately resolved before formal engagement with the private sector can 
take place. On a practical level, without public solidarity around reform measures, a 
government will simply be unable to nurture a partnership with the private sector, even 
under the best regulatory environment, because the relationship will always feel 
antagonistic. In other words, PPPs cannot be pushed on consumers; private sector solutions 
must be demanded by consumers and it is up to public leaders to make the case for PSP. 
While complete buy-in of reforms are nearly impossible to achieve in any democracy, at 
the very least, major campaigns and public debates must take place with a focus on 
reaching out to households most vulnerable to the impact of reforms. This should be a 
carefully considered process, where households come to understand exactly how reforms 
will translate for them on a day-to-day basis; it should also involve a long enough period 
for policy-makers to receive feedback from households, NGOs, and CBOs active in the 
sector on how to improve reforms or on how to introduce creative risk-mitigating solutions 
to protect low-income households. 
It is apparent from these research findings that infrastructure development projects, 
supported by the World Bank and other Regional development banks, need to re-evaluate 
the teams of professionals that are put together to support similar projects, particularly 
those involving water and other natural resources. Teams involved in PPP projects need to 
include a wider range of expertise, beyond the traditional financial economist, regulation 
specialist and water utility expert, to include more social development expertise. 
Unfortunately, there is a wide spread perception prevailing at the World Bank about non-
economic social scientists (professionals with post-graduate degrees in anthropology and 
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sociology for example) that they lack operational know-how and slow down otherwise 
economically efficient projects (Hall 2007).210 Rarely do we find these social scientists 
involved in assessing and integrating social policy measures in the design and 
implementation of operational infrastructure projects, where they are clearly needed. This, 
coupled by the bureaucratic organisational structure that fragments the social agenda of the 
Bank (Hall 2007), continues to pose a critical challenge for innovating with partnerships in 
the water and sanitation sector. 
The public-private debate ultimately begins in the public sphere and requires 
pragmatic leadership rather than polarising politicking games. The goal should be to 
acquire some degree of ideological compromise, or, at the very least, an enlightened 
awareness of the myriad options and partnership models that exist to support the water 
sector. All parties must make a commitment to look at the water and sanitation sector more 
objectively; creating a unifying strategy that crosses political party lines at the country-
level and institutional divisions between the myriad stakeholders involved. A unified social 
policy strategy at the national level would lessen the likelihood that consumers (low-
income as well as higher-income consumers) find themselves wedged in the middle of this 
false dichotomy, and this could potentially decrease the current ease with which special 
interest groups are able to pile every societal grievance into an unresolvable melting pot of 
protest soup.  
I went into this research endeavour expecting that the issue of price—an 
unaffordable tariff structure—would be at the heart of the conflict over PSP in Bolivia. 
And I did not expect low-income residents to say that services were better under AISA--
that the quality of the water was better, the reliability was better, and the responsiveness of 
the company was better. I expected consumers to say what the international media was 
reporting--that they were being ripped off in exchange for bad service. I certainly did not 
expect that consumers could speak with such praise about their current services under 
private provision on the one hand and in the same breath say that they would prefer to 
return to public provision. It was incongruous to me at first. How could a mother or father, 
                                                
 
210 Social safeguard policies are considered only in extreme cases where a project involves resettlement of indigenous 
peoples for example (See more on this topic in Hall 2007). 
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if given the choice, willingly accept returning to a service that in many instances made 
their children physically ill? My initial reaction was to believe that this was a 
demonstration of pure human irrationality but it wasn't. These were value-based 
judgements--choices that were motivated by preferences and influences other than price; 
choices that one could argue, were not necessarily in their self-interest, but rational choices 
nonetheless. Understanding the choices and preferences of individuals require 
anthropological and sociological insights.  
Other influences on consumer demands and preferences highlighted in Chapter 5, 
included the effect that international humanitarian laws had on consumers' sense of 
entitlement to clean water. The recent unanimous agreement by the UN to recognise the 
human right to water was an extraordinary demonstration of the growing global concern 
for improving access for billions of people and sends a message to the citizens of wealthier 
nations that it is not only our moral responsibility, but our legal responsibility to ensure 
that our global citizens have access to safe drinking water. However, recognising access to 
clean water as a human right can lead many to believe that they are entitled to consume 
unlimited amounts of water; it also can lead many to believe that clean water often bares a 
high price tag. The UN would have done the sector more justice, and offered more room 
for innovation through partnerships, had they recognised not only our human right to water 
but also water’s utility value; a value (based on a desire, need, and articulated demand) that 
carries a financial cost. Acknowledging a “right” to something is a philosophical construct 
based on our projection of an ideal. This is a good thing so long as the construct is viewed 
by the people for what it is—an ideal, not a policy strategy for improving access.  
Unfortunately, factions of our society who wish to polarise the debate, easily hijack 
declarations such as these. In response to the aforementioned UN declaration, for example, 
the Council of Canadians’ self-proclaimed Global Water Justice Movement, issues a press 
release stating: “After over a decade of hard work, the global water justice movement 
achieved a major victory today as the United Nations General Assembly voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of recognizing water and sanitation as human rights. This 
resolution has the overwhelming support of a strong majority of countries, despite a 
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handful of powerful opponents. It must now be followed-up with a renewed push for water 
justice.”211 Their statement begs the question, who are these powerful opponents? The 
answer is: no-one. Everyone is in favour of a human right to water. What is critical to our 
wider discussion around water and sanitation provision is that there are ways of expressing 
these rights with economically sustainable solutions. Some may do a better job than others, 
but this may have less to do with the economic model per se, and more do to with the 
socio-political institutional environment that supports the sector—in other words, the 
challenge of provision is as much (if not more) reliant on the strength and dynamism of the 
public sphere.  
In September 2010, UN Independent Expert Catarina de Albuquerque published her 
findings on the human rights obligations and their application to non-state service 
provision. She is unequivocal on the issue: “human rights are neutral as to economic 
models in general, and models of service provision more specifically”. She points out that 
where private operators do not serve poor neighbourhoods, it is not because they are 
private operators: “The geographic coverage of services provided by non-state actors is the 
result of a political decision and a contract proposed by the public authorities; non-state 
service providers will not extend services to un-served or underserved areas unless 
explicitly mandated to do so in their contracts”, she says, adding that contracts and 
regulation should also address issues of the price, quantity, and quality of supply. 
Essentially, Albuquerque is content with the professionalism of private water operators. In 
her report, she signals greater concern over small informal water vendors, which is very 
much in line with the perspective of governments across the developing world, that 
“operating unregulated, [informal water vendors] often provide poor quality services at 
exorbitant prices”. Overall, the report indicates that reaching low income groups is a long-
term aspiration rather than something that can be achieved simply by adopting the right to 
water: “States must develop a national plan, including legislation and other appropriate 
measures, to progressively achieve the full realization of the rights to water and sanitation, 
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including in currently un-served and underserved areas, independent of the modalities of 
the service provision chosen”, she concludes. 212 
Policy Implications: In order to rectify the false dichotomy endemic to the debate 
around PSP, governments have the power to: (i) Creation a unified long-term social policy 
agenda at the national level that crosses party lines outlining the primary objectives for 
reaching communities with clean water and sanitation; (ii) Build inter-governmental 
consensus around the various approaches to servicing the lowest income communities with 
services—specifying the range of available options suited to meeting user demand; (iii) 
Communicate a commitment to strengthening public institutions at the central, as well as 
the local level, so that consumers build their own understanding of the technological and 
economic barriers to service provision, which will strengthen their sense of consumer 
identity; (iv) Build creative programs that enhance community participation in the 
provision of water and sanitation—not only in terms of digging and building infrastructure, 
but also by involving residents in the initial design of participatory programs and listening 
to household suggestions as to how best to improve access; (iv) Modify the language they 
use in order to avoid polarisation of the debate around PSP—substituting the word 
privatisation with partnership is a good starting point; (v) Recognise that sweeping 
reforms require more time and more outreach--the most vulnerable members of society 
must be given a platform to voice their concerns and leaders should enter into debates at 
the most local level; (vi) Direct more funding to support campaigns around PSP and work 
collaboratively with NGOs and CBOs to nurture a proper feed-back loop between 
households and policy-makers.   
8.2  The Private Sphere 
In the philanthropic world, the problem is the product; in the business world, 
the product is the solution. NGOs are forced to 'sell suffering.' The needless 
focus on sappy narratives often overlooks sophisticated solutions that can't be 
easily marketed with a T-shirt-clad celebrity holding a small child. --Howard 
                                                
 
212 UNHCR Press announcement, Geneva, October 2010. The mandate of the Independent Expert on the issue of human 
rights obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation was established by the Human Rights Council in 
March 2008. 
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Buffet (Warren Buffet's Grandson and new executive director of the Buffet 
Foundation)  
Is it ethical for a utility operating in a poor slum to make a profit from servicing its 
customers? There are two answers to this question: The first answer is: Yes. The domain 
of private enterprise is the pursuit of efficiency and growth, the reward for which is profit 
and water remains a good industry for global investors.213 There is a profit to be made in 
the sector and this is ultimately a good thing--a very good thing--for everyone, especially 
the poor. Private sector innovation, particularly in stimulating technological advances, 
should serve to stimulate possibilities for improving access for the most vulnerable in our 
society. Also, one should keep in mind that while the poor often demonstrate cooperative 
behaviour when it comes to meeting communal water demands—such as sharing access 
points to water or organising a communal bill-collection savings scheme—there is no 
reason to suppose that they act in a less capitalistic fashion than any other service provider 
would act. In the case of El Alto, there were many examples of this, where some 
households charged other residents who were not connected, or who were having 
difficulties with their utility network services. It is not known exactly how much those with 
access points charged unconnected residents, but given what we generally know about 
informal water vending practices among the urban poor, there is no reason to believe that 
these households would fail to return a profit from selling their water. It is also important 
to keep in mind that penalties for those who violate informal communal bill-collection 
schemes can in some cases be much more severe than the penalties handed out by utility 
operators. In the peri-urban settlement of Nelson Mandela, outside of Cartagena, 
Colombia, physical punishment for failing to contribute to the monthly communal pool to 
pay a water bill was commonplace.214 The second answer to the question of whether 
utilities operating in a poor slum should make a profit is: They don't tend to. In the Bolivia 
case, AISA may have recovered their costs for servicing low-income households in El Alto 
(barely), but they were able to afford extending services to these areas by offsetting their 
                                                
 
213 S&P Water Index, September 2010.  
214 Interview with community representative in Nelson Mandela, Cartagena (See: Barbery 2005). Interviews were carried 
out around this topic for a joint Building Partnerships for Development (BPD)/World Bank case study on multi-sector 
water partnerships in Cartagena, Colombia. 
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cost of provision for low-income residents, with the provision of services to higher and 
middle-income residents, commercial, government, and industrial customers.  
We learned from this case study that there were not very many “takers” interested 
in bidding for the La Paz/El Alto concession, but that this may have been because the 
original offer that the government put on the table may have been unaffordable for most 
local investors (we do not know for sure because the offer letter was never made public). 
Based on the case-study findings, we are also aware that former President Goni made a 
discrete political plea to President Chirac to help direct the attention of the French utility 
players toward Bolivia. As we explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the push for a PPP 
concession with SUEZ in La Paz/El Alto was a clever attempt to direct as much capital 
investment as possible into the poorest areas of El Alto, but it was ultimately a quick fix 
solution for a sector not yet familiar with market-based solutions to their water woes. But 
in the rush to meet internationally imposed development targets for access to clean water 
and sanitation, it isn't all together surprising that governments across the developing world 
adopted policies that were not always in accordance with, or driven by, the will of the 
people. While a PSP approach to improving water and sanitation in Bolivia may have 
appeared perfectly logical on paper, we have learned from the case study that the treatment 
of water as a commodity is a complex process, particularly when it involves international 
investment—not only because of currency risk or increased tariffs, but because of how 
easy it is for consumers to get caught up in the false dichotomy of what PSP represents.  
It would be interesting to carry out further research exploring the current sentiment 
residents in La Paz/El Alto have towards their water and sanitation services. The utility 
servicing this area is publicly owned but is meant to operate as a commercial enterprise. It 
would be interesting to interview consumers to ask them whether they realise that the 
utility operates on a commercial basis. It would also be interesting to discover whether PSP 
would have been welcomed had Bolivian private sector stakeholders solely owned AISA. 
In other words, would the treatment of water as an economic good, and the pursuit of 
sector efficiency through the profit model have been acceptable if the PPP consortium was 
made up entirely of national private sector stakeholders? Was the eventual outcry against 
PSP in Bolivia (and other similar cases) exacerbated simply because the majority 
shareholders of AISA were French? This is an important consideration when exploring 
future water sector reform involving the melange of PSP alternatives. If consumers are 
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more comfortable with PSP, so long as it is supported by national private companies rather 
than development institutions, financial lending agencies and policy-makers should direct 
their attention toward improving the enabling environment for private-sector led growth 
more generally, and find more ways of encouraging private sector stakeholders to invest in 
local water and sanitation utilities. 
8.3  Public-Private-Partnerships 
Public-private-partnerships are built to coordinate, align, and add value to 
work already being done by multiple parties where is clear that no one party 
can work effectively alone. In the absence of strong public-private 
partnerships we miss an opportunity--the opportunity to rise above politics 
and do what's right.215  
Chapter 6 demonstrated how the delicate nature of the water sector provides evidence that 
our behaviour is motivated by a volatile set of preferences, which makes it particularly 
difficult for policy-makers to manage the reform process and accurately predict reform 
outcomes. In the Bolivian case, stakeholders severely underestimated the transaction and 
transition costs involved in the process of reform. In particular, major informational 
challenges made it particularly difficult for regulators to understand the preferences of 
low-income water users. These were predominantly adverse selection problems whereby 
the regulator’s ignorance of consumers’ private information led to the design of ineffective 
incentive structures for consumers and AISA. Under-estimating consumer demand due to a 
lack of information about consumer preferences and consumption habits led to a stress on 
tariff structures suitable for the needs of low-income user groups. Ignorance about the 
time-cost of adjustment to reforms resulted in a lack of trust in policy-makers and reform 
objectives. But at the time of reform during the 1990s, there were numerous networks and 
active organisations working closely at the local level with consumers; these organisations 
had an informational advantage, better access to low-income households for the purposes 
of outreach, hygiene and water usage education. Most critically, however, such 
organisations could have carried out much needed, large-scale demand studies detailing the 
preferences of low-income users, which would have demonstrated the government's 
compassion and commitment to residents. In other words, CBOs, NGOs and 
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Neighbourhood Associations should have been brought into the partnership paradigm at 
the onset of the reform process and officially recognised as partnership players in the 
design of the PPP concession. This might have helped to steer these organisations away 
from selling narratives of discontent when things started to turn sour for the La Paz/El Alto 
case, towards working with partners to ultimately sell solutions to the collective problem 
faced by residents, policy-makers, regulators and the private utility.  
Another challenge to water sector partnerships identified in Chapter 6 is in creating 
a shared philosophical belief system or reaching agreement on a set of new values to be 
upheld by governing institutions. The new institutional value-system created in Bolivia in 
1990s was to embrace a market-based approach to service delivery across a broad range of 
sectors and to establish regulatory bodies to oversee market players for the very first time. 
But creating a new value system such as this requires wide institutional consensus that cuts 
across all government agencies and even party lines; the government did not have such 
consensus at the time. It takes a many generations to build up institutions and establish 
trust in the capacity of these institutions to act responsibly and in the best interest of the 
public.  
There has been a great deal of discussion and research geared to assuring a strong 
and capable institutional environment for supporting PSP in the water sector, but perhaps 
too much weight has been given to securing sector-specific regulatory agencies and 
equipping regulatory agents with the skills to negotiate and supervise the performance of 
private water utilities. A World Bank (2006) publication recognised that after the creation 
of over 200 regulatory entities worldwide during the past 15 years, there is now ample 
evidence to show that regulatory systems have failed to achieve the expected sector 
outcomes. Research carried out by UNRISD argues that regulation often becomes an end 
in itself rather than a means of achieving social, economic, and environmental objectives 
for the well-being of the population, and that because of this, agencies encounter extreme 
difficulties across the developing world (Ugaz 2006). While sector-regulation may be an 
important feature of the institutional environment, the institutional environment itself 
embodies more than water regulation. 
Allowing more time to pass from one government administration to another may 
have generated much more long-term support and consumer buy-in of sector reform 
policies. Also, this would have allowed more time for consumers to embrace the 
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government’s legislation requiring all households to connect to the utility network or to 
challenge government legislation through less destructive (politically stifling) channels. 
Meanwhile, SAMAPA could have set in motion its mandate to operate on a commercial 
basis, updating its management style and restructuring its staff ratio and employee 
incentive schemes. At the very least, the utility might have been on a better financial 
footing at the time offer letters were sent out to potential bidders.  
To understand exactly what institutional barriers stood in the way of SAMAPA 
following a path to financial success without the involvement of SUEZ in the concession 
arrangement would be another research project altogether, but one that would surely be of 
interest today, with so many countries embracing a renewed sense of nationalism. It is 
impossible to know for sure, but it seems likely that a PPP owned partly by a consortium 
of local private investors and partly by government might have a better chance of initiating 
many of the same commercial practices that AISA instituted, simply because the utility 
would not suffer from being associated with a multinational company worth billions of 
dollars. Today, it is unclear whether any of Bolivia’s 14 water and sanitation utility 
operators are currently operating on a commercial basis, although they do continue to be 
referred to by the government as Empresas Prestadores de Servicios de Agua; “empresa”, 
meaning “business”, remains the defining feature of the terminology associated with 
provision despite its public-ownership model. It is also unclear whether the municipally-
owned utility now servicing La Paz/El Alto has retained any elements of its former identity 
as AISA with respect to its employee incentive structure, billing practices, fining 
procedures, or any other of AISA’s characteristics. It would be very interesting to build on 
research from the La Paz/El Alto case to learn what effect the continued process of 
institutional change from public to private (presented in this dissertation) and back to 
public government control have had (i) on the day-to-day management and operation of the 
existing water utility; (ii) on the relationship between the utility and its governing and 
regulatory institutions; and, particularly, (iii) on consumer perception of the current utility 
and the treatment of water as a commodity. 
Policy implications: What this case study has ultimately revealed is that consumer 
demand and preferences will determine the sustainability of water sector reforms, not top 
down, heavy-handed policy makers. Reforms that support PSP must involve social policy 
strategies that allow for diverse historical contextualisation, that question the proposed 
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rules for distributing water rights and consumer obligations, that consider extra-communal 
laws, institutions and markets, and allow for innovative multi-sector partnerships within 
the traditional PPP paradigm. Understanding anti-privatisation sentiment and the 
indigenous social movements that occurred across the Andean countries more generally, 
requires a nuanced analysis that goes beyond the simple public vs. private debate, or the 
conflict between common and private property, abundance vs. scarcity, economic 
growth/efficiency vs. subsistence/conservation, rationality vs. local knowhow and 
tradition.  
The failure of the La Paz/El Alto PPP was not caused by the poor being priced out 
of access to clean water, it was caused by the collective indigenous fear that water 
resources were being stolen from their land, from their Pachamama. Creating international 
humanitarian goals to get clean water to the world’s poor is ultimately a top down, supply-
driven development approach. Although we might not wish to accept this, in just about 
every area of our global economy, supply-driven development approaches have created 
unnatural distortions and pressures. We therefore must come to a better understanding of 
consumer demand in developing nations. We need to learn more about the preferences, 
vulnerabilities, customs and values of low-income consumers that drive the choices they 
are willing to make when it comes to water rights and consumption. Supply should be 
driven by the types of services low-income households are willing to accept, the solutions 
and compromises that they are willing to make, and, ultimately, what they are willing to 
pay for services. Otherwise, reform efforts will backfire. Governments across the 
developing world should learn from the case of Bolivia that consumer buy-in to reform is 
critical, or else reforms that seem to bring a population one step closer to meeting the UN 
development targets may actually result in moving two steps back, and they will find 
achieving these mutually shared global ambitions an even more distant prospect. 
Chapter 7 sheds light upon the systemic constraints facing water and sanitation 
utilities. In all the academic discussion around the role of PSP in water and sanitation 
provision, there is only a small amount of discourse relating to the role that the 
development community could play in helping local utility companies in emerging markets 
access financial markets. While there has been increasing work and academic attention on 
sub-sovereign finance and capital market development for municipalities and municipal 
companies over the last decade, there is not enough attention given to helping water and 
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sanitation utilities access alternative sources of finance. The negative experiences of the 
development lending community—in particular, the infrastructure development units 
within development agencies—should give rise to a concerted effort for more internal 
collaboration between development units at the World Bank and other development 
institutions. Not only should social policy professionals collaborate in the design of water 
and sanitation projects but also the private and financial sector units of the bank should be 
a part of infrastructure lending and technical assistance programmes. Private and financial 
sector development units within these organisations to provide (i) technical assistance to 
municipal companies to help them improve their commercial capacity; (ii) technical 
assistance to improve the legal and regulatory environment for municipal borrowing; (iii) 
help with structuring PPPs between municipalities and local private institutional investors, 
and for willing and able commercial utilities; and (iv) assistance in accessing both 
domestic sources of finance as well as the capital market. A concerted effort to build up 
properly the financial institutional environment for municipal finance in Bolivia might 
have been a suitable stepping-stone before establishing a PPP concession. After all, 
between 1996 and 1998 Bolivia’s progressive decentralisation initiatives had only just 
begun to take shape, independent regulatory agencies had just been created, and the 
legislation that would lay the groundwork for a modern securities exchange had only just 
been passed. Allowing a few years for these new institutions to build confidence internally 
and across government agencies, a few years for citizens to feel the positive gains to 
Bolivian democracy as a result of the progressive decentralisation and popular 
participation laws, before inviting bids for PPPs La Paz/El Alto, might have made all the 
difference.  
Ideally, the lessons we have learned from those mistakes made in PPP processes 
across the globe should help policy-makers and investors to adapt PPPs to better meet the 
demands of consumers and social policy objectives. One of the best qualities of liberal 
capitalism is the fact that it is an adaptable system. Throughout its modern history 
capitalism has evolved with each passing decade, marked by the degree to which it has 
succeeded in meeting societal social policy objectives, particularly the principle of fair and 
equitable distribution of services (from welfare to health care, housing, education, water, 
and sanitation). Social policies are meant to work in tandem with capitalist economic 
principles, each supporting and feeding on the other to improve the tools at their disposal 
to meet the greater good of society. Social policy should, therefore, be viewed as the 
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bridge that links the public sphere with the private sphere. Social policy is the critical 
essence of a successful PPP, and in its absence every PPP is doomed to fail.  
In the water sector we know that the most widespread forms of social policy are 
income support (for example, the establishment of flexible payment methods, connection 
subsidies, and vouchers) and tariff adjustment (for example, the establishment of 
increasing block tariffs, cross-subsidies, and special tariffs for low-income households). 
The case of La Paz/El Alto revealed additional areas where social policy interventions are 
needed. These can be explored by combining New Institutional Economic (NIE) analysis 
with contemporary social policy discourse and existing development approaches, 
particularly those within the Sustainable Livelihood (SL) strategy. This strategy 
categorises the needs of our society into sets of assets that consist of: (i) human capital 
(health nutrition, education, skills, capacity to work); (ii) natural capital (land, water 
resources, environmental services, wildlife, biodiversity); (iii) financial capital (savings, 
credit, pensions, wages); (iv) physical capital (infrastructure, tools, and technology); and 
(v) social capital (networks, relations of trust, common rules, collective representation, 
participation). This differentiation more astutely facilitates our understanding of the 
consequences of institutional arrangements at the micro/household level. 
The NIE analytical framework combined with a social policy development strategy 
that places particular emphasis on the contextual vulnerability of a population, supports 
social policy objectives in a number of ways. First, it emphasises that institutions (the 
institutional environment and arrangements, both formal and informal) are a very 
important part of social capital, together with a culture of trust between transacting or co-
operating parties. The institutional arrangements that people are able to engage in also 
depend upon and affect their relative power (individually or collectively) and determine 
their access to and gains from other assets. Second, NIE emphasises and gives insights into 
the importance of access to assets. The benefits that come from access and the incentives 
for their development depend upon institutional arrangements, and these in turn depend 
upon the institutional environment, information flows, asset characteristics, vulnerability 
and sense of power felt by the various stakeholders involved. The physical and economic 
characteristics of assets in the water and sanitation sector should not be examined without 
reference to the institutional arrangements, which constrain or promote their use.  
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A third insight from NIE concerns the importance of information as a resource. 
This has implications for the valuation of human and physical capital: we have learned 
from the case study that effective information flow is a critical pre-requisite for the 
development of the institutional environment, and this may require investment in building 
literacy (specifically with regard to understanding bills and tariffs), in communications 
infrastructure or in a culture of openness and information sharing. Finally, NIE analysis 
can make an important contribution to understanding the value of physical and natural 
assets. Market valuations, on their own, are inadequate, as they do not take account of 
transaction costs and risks, or of the transformation costs involved in asset use or 
production. Identifying different types of institutional arrangements may help reduce 
transaction costs and risks, and increase asset values for different users. Collective 
arrangements, both formal and informal partnerships between community groups and 
utility operators, may facilitate better information transfer with regard to stakeholder 
behaviour. 
The future of the water and sanitation sector is entirely dependent upon the social 
policy approach used to help utilities harness the added value that the private sector is 
capable of providing under the right social conditions. Hopefully, the backlash against PSP 
will begin to let up as more academics, development practitioners, investors, and policy-
makers stop taking such a hard-line approach to the subject. Milton Friedman fervently 
believed that people’s savings and spending behaviour were not a function of 
psychological or cultural factors, but based on rational estimations of wealth. Today, we 
are fortunate to have a more nuanced interpretation of this view as many economists and 
social scientist from across a wide spectrum of disciplines have found evidence to the 
contrary. The recent selection of Nobel laureates for 2010216 is a clear indication of the 
value today’s society places on understanding the choices people make from an 
institutional and behavioural perspective. Equally, society is placing greater pressure on 
social policy-makers to follow up on this deeper-level understanding and to address the 
complexities of poverty using creative inter-disciplinary ideas. It is the interdisciplinary 
nature of the field of social policy, which reaches out to encompass traditional economics, 
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institutional economics, behavioural economics, sociology, anthropology, and history, that 
supports the logic behind social policy’s participatory methods in research and 
development and its asset-based conceptualisation of what it takes to sustain a person’s 
livelihood. Social policy is a critical component to improving the water sector reform 
process, particularly (although not exclusively) where there is potential for partnership 
creation with the private sector. 
8.4 Final Thoughts 
[Institutions] are those “humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction.217 
In the case of Bolivia we observed a struggle by the indigenous poor to reclaim their 
indigenous heritage and to demand a new social ethic from its governance framework. The 
conflict over the treatment of water provision was the medium used to rally a largely 
heterogeneous group of people around a common cause, using private foreign agents an 
easy scapegoat for dissatisfaction. Irrespective of how Bolivian water utilities will fare in 
the future, the process of conflict promoted democratic discourse and provided the impetus 
to empower Bolivia’s social movements and to realign Bolivia’s largely unrepresentative 
democratic institutions. However, questions remain as to the impact that this will have on 
the future of service delivery. By defining the plight of the urban poor within the protective 
confines of their indigenous heritage, Bolivian leaders may now have backed themselves 
into a corner on the issue of PSP, and this will make it extremely difficult for leaders to 
come up with innovative solutions to meet the growing demands for clean water and 
sanitation. The false dichotomy between the public and the private must be eliminated if 
we are to see any significant change in the provision of water and sanitation to the world’s 
poor. 
In the case of Bolivia, we witnessed the extraordinary power that the public-private 
debate can have in destabilising the fine balance of a political economy. Today, every 
sector of the Bolivian economy is back in the hands of the government, and this is because 
the current government assumes that there is an inherent opposition between capitalist 
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market incentives and democratic demands for social justice. The consequences of the 
backlash against the liberal reforms of the 1990s have revealed themselves in a variety of 
ways far beyond water sector policy. President Evo Morales (now serving his second term 
after winning 63 per cent of the popular vote) has agreed to build an economic union to 
improve Bolivia’s bargaining power with the USA, Europe, and China. Rejecting the US 
plan for a free-trade agreement of the Americas, the governments of Venezuela, Bolivia, 
Nicaragua, and Cuba have created a “People’s Free Trade Agreement’’ to exchange goods 
and services. This new coalition of countries has embraced the president of Iran, Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad, who pledged aid and trade as part of a goodwill tour of Latin America in 
2008 and again in 2009.218 Ahmadinejad signed an agreement with Morales committing 
Iran to help the Andean country do research on exploiting lithium, the lightweight metal 
used in batteries for electric cars and other items (Bolivia possesses half the world's known 
lithium reserves). Morales and Ahmadinejad also signed a joint declaration supporting the 
right of all nations to the use and development of nuclear energy for peaceful means; Hugo 
Chavez, who also hopes to start a nuclear energy program, shares this stance. 
Only time will tell whether this extreme reaction against the liberal reforms of the 
1990s will be worthwhile, but it would be interesting to go back and conduct a similar 
survey of the same communities in El Alto to gain an understanding of their current levels 
of satisfaction and their retrospective views on PSP. Six years ago the government 
reclaimed ownership and operation of the water utility; when the initial phase of this 
research was carried out it had been five years since the utility had operated under the 
AISA concession. It is clear that Bolivia's water movements put in place a social and 
political process that has profoundly affected the course of the country socio-political and 
economic activity over the last 10 years, forcing policy-makers at the sub-national, 
national and international-level to explore new models for the distribution and 
management of water, taking on board more thoughtful consideration of the informal 
institutional environment. The establishment of a Ministry of Water in 2006 signified a 
formal institutional shift giving the provision of clean and affordable drinking water, 
sanitation services and water resources management greater political recognition. Three 
                                                
 
218 Chicago Tribune, 25 November 2009. 
283 
 
 
years later, on January 25, 2009, Article 373 of the new Political Constitution of the State 
was passed, clearly defining water as a “basic fundamental right for life” for all Bolivian 
citizens. The new constitution outlined the prominent role the State should play in the 
management of water: “the State has an obligation to manage, protect and plan the 
adequate and sustainable use of the water resources, with social participation, guaranteeing 
access to water to all its inhabitants” (Article 374). In addition, it states that, “the water 
resources [….] cannot be subject to private appropriations, the water as well as the 
services, according to the law” (Article 373). What is interesting about the new 
constitution is that while it makes clear that there is no possibility of Bolivia's water 
resources to be fully privatised under a full-divestiture model, there appears to be more 
openness to the private sector when it comes to water service provision. Article 309, which 
regulates the economic organisation of the State, stipulates that the state public enterprises, 
within their different objectives, will have to “administer the basic services of potable 
water and sewerage, directly or through public, community, cooperative or mixed 
enterprises” (Article 309). The Constitution has therefore left open a possibility for the 
“public-private partnerships” and other mixed enterprise modalities, such as social 
enterprises for water services and varied forms of cooperatives.  
 There are cities across the developing world that experimented with various forms 
of PPP arrangements to meet their water needs; many of these utilities have since returned 
to public ownership/management models. In light of this, it might be equally interesting as 
a second phase to conduct a broader cross-country comparative assessment of consumer 
perception of private sector and overall levels of satisfaction. It would also be particularly 
interesting to learn whether these public models have maintained any of the commercial 
features of their former identity. Acquiring transaction cost data in order to compare the 
cost of regulating PPP arrangements with the costs of regulating public utilities would be 
useful for addressing transaction cost issues more generally. While regulation of PPPs 
helped shine a spotlight on the significance of transaction costs in monitoring contractual 
compliance, this was partly due to the fact that privately operated firms were obliged to be 
more transparent. The degree to which public utilities continue to adhere to these 
regulatory requests would deepen our understanding of the transaction costs of regulating 
public utilities. 
284 
 
 
The systemic barriers to water sector reform continue to constrain the space for 
partnership innovation and flexibility in the provision of water and sanitation, debilitating 
the possibilities for future collaboration between civil society, government, and the private 
sector. In everyday practice, social policy-makers are well-positioned to (i) create peace 
within the informal institutional environment in the treatment of water as a commodity; (ii) 
help create mechanisms that reduce transaction costs by improving information flow, 
particularly information directly related to the mismatch between supply and demand; (iii) 
build-in more complex provisions in contracts (be they public/private) that better protect 
vulnerable households; (iv) design campaigns that raise awareness around hygiene, saving, 
billing, and maintenance; (v) support communication strategies that promote multi-
directional dialogue between stakeholders; (vi) devise tariff schemes that match not only 
the ability of users to pay for services, but also their willingness to pay (which should 
invariably adjust/increase in accordance with improvements in education around water and 
sanitation); (vii) determine the ways in which out-put based grants might be best targeted 
towards households with greatest need; and, last but not least (vii) make a concerted effort 
to break down the false dichotomy that exists between the public and the private sphere.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
 
Questionnaires 
Attitudes Toward Aguas De Illimani (AISA) 
Section I: Initial Questionnaire 
Q1 How satisfied are you with the value for money you are getting from Aguas de 
Illimani as compared with your previous water and sanitation service provider 
(SAMAPA or other) 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
Q2a How satisfied are you about the type of access you have?  
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
Q2b What type of access do you have?219 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
N/A 
Q3 How satisfied are you with the quality of your water? 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
Q4 How satisfied are you with the reliability of your water? 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
Q5 How much do you agree/disagree that AISA’s water and sewerage charges are 
affordable to you? 
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree/disagree 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
                                                
 
219 This question was dropped from the survey as initial set of household’s interviewed did not seem to know 
whether they have a conventional or unconventional connection to the network and it caused a great deal of 
social awkwardness—as if it were being insinuated that one type was superior to another.  
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Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Don’t know  
5 
99 
Q6 How satisfied are you with the clarity and accuracy of your billing statements? 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
Q7 Are you satisfied with the type of responsiveness from AISA (e.g. do they 
addresses your complaints, provide you with information/advice)? 
Very satisfied 
Fairly satisfied 
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
Fairly dissatisfied 
Very dissatisfied 
Don’t Know 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
Q8 Overall, would you agree/disagree that services are better today under AISA 
than they were under SAMAPA?  
Strongly agree 
Agree 
Neither agree/disagree 
Disagree 
Strongly disagree 
Don’t know 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
99 
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Section II: Open Ended Household Questionnaire 
Households (x 60) 
1. Do you have a water connection? 
a. If no, why? 
b. If yes… 
i. Is it a new connection? If yes,  
1. When did you first get it? 
2. Did you help to build the connection? 
3. Did you help to build the facilities? 
ii. If no, 
1. Were you aware of the fact that your service provider was 
going to change to Aguas de Illimani? 
a. Did you ever get a notice, hear about it on the radio, 
TV, or read about the change in the newspaper? 
b. Were there any community/neighbourhood meetings 
regarding the change? 
2. How did you feel when you first realised that there was 
going to be a new provider?  
3. Has your service quality changed in any way since the time 
when SAMAPA was your provider/has it changed in any 
way over the last five years? 
iii. Do you have water all the time or only at certain hours of the day? 
iv. Does your water ever get cut off? If yes, under what circumstances? 
v. Is the quality of the water good in your opinion? 
1. What colour is the water when it comes out of the tap? 
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2. What does it smell like? 
3. Does it look/smell different then it used to? 
vi. Do you drink the water directly from the tap? If no, why not? 
vii. Are you happy with your connection? Why/why not? 
viii. Are services better/worse now than before? 
ix. Have you ever been dissatisfied with your service? Why/why not? 
1. If yes, what did you do about it when you were unhappy? 
2. Were you able to complain to anyone?  
3. Who? 
4. What was the response? 
x. Approximately how much is your water bill each month?  
1. Do you find that expensive/inexpensive? 
2. Do you understand your billing statements? If no, what do 
you find confusing? 
3. Has your service ever been cut off because of non-payment? 
a. Have you ever been fined?  
b. How much was the fine? 
c. Did you know what to do about it? 
d. Were you able to pay the fine? 
e. What did you do while your water was cut off? 
4. Do you know where your water meter is? 
a. Are you able to read it? 
b. Does it always work? 
c. What do you do if it isn’t working? 
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d. Does anyone come to fix it? Who? 
i. Are they nice to you? 
ii. Do they explain what they are doing? 
xi. Do you have any contact with your neighbourhood association? 
1. If yes, what do they say about the water? 
2. Do you think that they can help you when you have a 
problem with your water? 
xii. Have you heard of the “Water War” in Cochabamba? 
1. If yes, what do you think about it? 
2. Do you think the situation in El Alto is different/similar to 
Cochabamba? 
xiii. Who do you think runs Aguas de Illimani? 
1. Are you satisfied with the way the company seems to be 
operatinng? 
xiv. Have you heard of X ? What have you heard about them? 
1. Abel Mamani? Miguel Quispe? 
2. Cordinadora de Agua? Oscar Oliviera? 
3. Jose Barragán?  
4. World Bank? 
xv. What do you believe the current politicians think of your water 
situation? 
xvi. What do you believe Evo Morales thinks of your water situation? 
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Questionnaire for Development Organisations/Donors/Advisors 
1. Under what circumstances did you first become involved in the La Paz/El Alto 
concession arrangement? 
2. Who were your main counterparts in the government? 
3. What were your main concerns when you first became involved?  
4. What were the main risks that you foresaw and what were your suggestions to 
mitigate these risks? 
5. Did your level of involvement change over the course of the PPP process (pre-
bidding, bidding, contract negotiation, legal & regulatory overhaul, implementation 
& supervision)? If so how and under what circumstances? 
6. In 1997, the year in which this project began, were there any other active projects, 
which complemented this initiative, either administered by your organization or 
another?  
7. Can you please explain your involvement in the La Paz/El Alto Condominial 
Project. Who solicited the project? Who were your main partners? How did you try 
to ensure project sustainability? Do you feel this project influenced the perception 
of users towards Aguas del Illimani?   
8. Which department/s from your organisation was involved in this project? Was there 
coordination or input from other departments/groups within your organisation (e.g. 
“The Participation & Civil Society Group, NGO) 
9. Were there any internal difficulties you faced within your organisation in terms of 
your involvement in the concession? If so, what kinds? And how did you deal with 
them? 
10. Were there any conflicts of interest with other development agencies as to the 
approach? If so, what kinds? And how did you deal with them? 
11. Were there any disagreements with the government at any of the stages of PPP 
process? If so, what kinds? And how did you deal with them? 
12. What was your relationship with Suez-Lyonnaise during the pre-bidding phase? 
Who were your main counterparts? Had you worked with them on previous 
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concession arrangements? Were there any pre-existing tensions with the company’s 
approach or was the relationship very amicable? 
13. What was your involvement, if any in the formation of the consortium? 
14. What was the process used to select the legal advisory services for the government 
on the design of the contract? Was this a standard process? Was there anything that 
happened differently in this case compared to others? 
15. What type of involvement, if any did you have with other representatives of 
stakeholder groups in Bolivia (e.g. with the municipal authorities, neighbourhood 
associations, the media, local NGOs etc.)?  
16. Are you aware of any activities by the government or civic engagements, if any are 
you aware of that  
17. What are the main sustainability issues you envisage for the successful 
implementation of this PPP initiative? 
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Questionnaire for Advocacy Groups/other NGOs active in water sector reform 
 
1.What are the main messages/values your hope to espouse in the water sector? 
2. What is your target group/audience?  
3. What are the methods you find most useful to reach out to the international and local 
community to raise awareness around water issues? 
4. How long have you been actively involved in the developing country context and over 
this period what changes (if any) have you observed regarding the way in which NGOs, 
private sector and government collaborate? 
5. What are the barriers you encounter in terms of programme implementation? 
6. Does your organisation take a position with regard to the introduction of private sector 
participation in the provision of water service delivery and can you please explain what 
this is and why?  
 
Focus Group Discussion Questions 
 
1. What do you consider to be the primary causes for lack of access to clean drinking water 
and sanitation services? 
2. What do you think the overall perceptions of private sector participation in the delivery 
of water services are in the city of La Paz/El Alto? 
3. What are the main issues involved with PSP in water and sanitation? 
4. What are the main drivers to water sector reform and the incorporation of PSP?  
 
5. Discussion points around drivers: 
- lack of public financing for water? 
- idological preferecnes for PSP? 
- perception of poor performance of public water providers? 
- inability to raise rates for services? 
- interest in profit? 
- international development goals? 
- donor agency conditionalities? 
- local community desire for self reliance? 
- policy environment in support of PSP generally? 
- filling need/demand/consumer preferences? 
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Appendix B 
Stakeholders Interviewed 
Stakeholder Group Stakeholders # interviewed 
 
Users/Consumers 
 
Low-income users 
(District 1) 
(District 2) 
(District 3) 
(District 4) 
(District 5)  
(District 6) 
 
11 
12 
12 
10 
8 
7 
Low-income users  1 Focus group  
w/ 12 participants  
Middle/high-income users 
 
1 Focus group 
w/8 participants 
Civil Society 
 
CBOs/NALs 
Water Coordinator 
Democracy Centre 
Public Citizen 
Plan International 
Catholic Relief Services 
Pro Mujer 
CARE 
Building Partners for Development (BPD) 
Former SAMAPA employees 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
Int’l Dev Agencies 
IBRD 
IFC 
IDB 
USAID 
UNDP 
SIDA 
 
4 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
 
Academic/Research Institutions 
Universidad para la Investigación Estratégica en Bolivia 
(UPIEB) 
Universidad Católica 
National Unity for Economic Policy Analysis (UDAPE) 
University of Loughborough, WEDC 
University of New Castle 
Public Services International Privatisation Research Unit 
(PSIRU) 
 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
Media 
- Journalists 
 
2 
Government Local authorities 
Municipality of El Alto 
Municipality of La Paz 
Federación de Asociaciones de Municipios (FAM) 
Line Ministries 
Viceministry of Basic Services 
Viceministry of Environment and Natural Resources 
Ministry of Sustainable Development  
Viceministry of Municipal Planning 
Ministry of Sustainable Development  
Ministry of Popular Participation  
 
4 
2 
1 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
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Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Finance 
Regulatory Agencies 
SIRESE 
SISSAB 
1 
2 
5 
Private Sector AISA 
Suez/Ondeo 
Severn Trent 
Connal S.R.L 
Caja Los Andes (mico-credit bank) 
EcoFuturo (micro-credit bank) 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
List of meetings 
Names of community respondents (and a few additional respondents) are not included as they requested 
anonymity. 
 
Private Sector 
Roberto Bianchi, Gerente General, Aguas de Illimani (AISA) 
Darco Suazo, Director AISA 
Isabelle Vincent, AISA 
Luis Curridor, AISA 
Alberto Chavez Vargas, AISA 
Cledan Mandri-Perrott, Former Managing Director Trinidad & Tobago Water, Svern Trent 
Pedro Arriola, Caja los Andes, La Paz 
Gonzalo Puente, Gerente General, Eco Futuro, Fondo Financiero Privado 
Government: 
Jose Barragan, Viceministro de Servicios Básicos  
Johnny Cuellar, Superintendente de Saneamiento Básico  
Valeria Adriazola Arze, Jefe de Atención al Consumidor, Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) 
Jorge Flores Ramallo, Consultor Técnico, Superintendencia de Saneamiento Básico (SISAB) 
Claude Besse, Superintendente, Superintendencia General 
Luis Fernando Salinas, Director Técnico Económico, Superintendencia General  
Arq Jorge A. Cardona Salame, Director Fortalecimiento Municipal, Prefectura del Departamento de La Paz  
Marcelo Vasquez Villamor, Presidente H. Consejo Municipal de El Alto 
Mery Quiton P, Coordinadora Regional Altiplano, Servicio Apoyo a la Sostenibilidad en Saneamiento 
Básico (SAS) 
Jaime Dunn de Avila, Director Departamental, Prefectura del Departamento de La Paz 
Marco Antonio Gutierrez, Responsable de Proyecto de Desarrollo de Aguas Subterráneas  
Bernardo Requena Blanco, Viceministerio de Finanzas Publicas 
Carlos Alberto Zamora Pineiro, Director General, Ministerio de Desarollo Sostenible y Planificacion y 
Viceministerio de Medio Ambiente y recursos Naturales 
Juan Carlos Reqena, Lead Coordinator of the Bolivian Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) 
Carlos Kempff Bruno, Former Minister of Ministry of Sustainable Development National/Directorate of 
Water & Sanitation 
Jaques Trigo, Former Superintendent of Banks 
Patricia Venegas, Director of Sustainable Business Development, Ministry of Basic Services 
Erico Navarro, Director de ProAguas, Ministerio de Servicios Basicos 
Ronald MacLean, Former Mayor of La Paz 
Sergio Reyes Villa Bacigalupi, Honorable Concejal de Cochabamba 
Mariano Molina Taborga, Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) 
Sergio Arenas, Fondo Nacional de Desarrollo Regional (FNDR) 
Diego Zavaleta, Technical Secretary of National Dialogue, Bolivia 
NGOs/CBOs/ Development Organisations & Academic Institutions 
Francisco Guachalla, Responsable de Planificación y Evaluación, Catholic Relief Services  
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Guachalla, Ronny Vega M., Gerente General, ANESAPA (Asociación Nacional de Empresas E Instituciones 
de Servicio de Agua y Alcantarillado 
Javier Aguilar Perales, Iniciativa Local y Ciudadanía--ILC 
Kristin Komives 
Victor Ortiz Gomez, National Statistics Institute 
Ozcar Olivera, Coordinating Committee for the Defence of Water and Life 
Carlos Melo, Representative of the Inter-American Development Bank, La Paz 
Claudia Gonzales-Doell: Water Center at University of San Simón  Cochabamba 
Peter McFarren, President of the Quispus Foundation 
Teresa Flores Bedregal, Coordinator for the Bolivian Civil Society Alliance for Sustainable Development 
Michael John Bennett, Presidente Federación de Asociaciones Municipales (FAM-BOLIVIA) 
Rocio Bustamante, Director, Commision for Integrated Water Management (CCIAB) 
M. Sohail, Professor University of Loughborough 
Yan Schollaert, Director CARE Bolivia 
Ken Caplan, Director, Building Partnerships for Development in Water and Sanitation 
Ile McAiley, Water for People and North Carolina Water for People Committee 
Maj Fiil, Director Public Citizen 
Maria Sicilia, Energy Specialist, OECD 
Jim Shultz, The Democracy Centre, Bolivia 
Jeff Conant, International Research and Communities Coordinator, Water Watch 
Julian Perez, Advisor to the FEJUVE 
Harry M. Trbing, Professor Institutue of Public Utilities 
Wenonah Hunter, Director, Water for All Campaign 
Lupe Cajias, Secretary General, Lucha Contra la Corrupcion 
Jenifer Brinkerhoff, Professor George Washington University  
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Appendix C 
Mapping Consumer Behaviour & Stakeholder Engagement 
1. Consumer Satisfaction Mapping 
In order to map the findings from the 60 in-depth interviews conducted with households in 
El Alto for analysis, a consumer satisfaction model was designed that visually personified 
the types of expectations, levels of satisfaction, attitudes and behaviour of these 
predominantly low-income consumers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Satisfaction / Dissatisfaction Private 
Action 
Public 
Action 
expectations attitude 
Complain 
to family 
and 
friends 
 
Borrow 
water from 
neighbour 
 
Make 
illegal 
network 
connection 
Seek 
redress 
from 
utility 
operator 
 
Complain 
to 
community 
leader 
Complain 
to 
governmen
t agency/ 
Take Legal 
Action 
 
Take to 
the street 
in protest 
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2. Mapping the Reform Process 
Phases Decision Points 
 
Development of 
strategy to improve 
the institutional 
framework 
supporting the 
provision of water 
and sanitation 
 
Design and implementation of new water sector regulations 
Integration of water sector reform within capitalisation framework 
Creation of independent regulatory authority for basic services 
Development of water sector policy targeted at low-income areas 
Creation of a special water and sanitation planning unit within the Vice-
Ministry of Basic Services 
Redefine tariff structure 
Development of 
strategy to involve 
the private sector 
Development of overall policy to attract PSP 
Defining the scale and scope of PS involvement 
Selection and appointment of advisors 
Investigation of PPP models and options 
Selection of preferred option 
Development of detailed PPP format 
Planning for regulation 
 
Selection of private 
sector provider 
 
Sourcing of relevant information 
Advisors prepare bid documents including a draft contract 
Procurement of PPP arrangements 
Pre-qualification of potential providers 
Bidding by the potential providers 
Evaluation of the bids by client and its advisors 
Negotiations with successful bidder 
Financial closure & award of contract 
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Operation and 
regulation 
 
Implementation of PPP arrangement 
Establishment and implementation of independent regulation 
Service delivery, operation and development of the system in 
accordance with agreed performance standards and contract outputs 
Further development of regulations and re-basing prices 
 
Renegotiation & 
Termination 
Renegotiation of contract 
Termination of contract 
Handover of assets 
Evaluation/Audit of PPP 
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3. Mapping Constraints to PPP  
DOMAINS ENABLING/DISABLING 
FACTORS 
INSTITUTIONAL/POLITICAL  
 
Degree of water policy formalisation 
Political staibility/accountability/ governance 
Regulatory institutions 
PPP agencies/institutions 
Development Funds 
Extent of PSP in other infrastructure sectors 
PRSP status 
Sector coordination mechanisms 
Civil Society engagement 
ECONOMIC 
 
HIPC (other borrowing constrains) 
GATS 
Fiscal framework for decentralisation 
Currency risk 
PRSP and water sector planning 
FINANCIAL 
 
Sub-national debt/credit market (foreign/domestic) 
Market transparency 
Access to int’l / local political risk insurance 
Transaction costs  
User willingness/ability to pay for service 
Revenue/operating/construction risk 
Donor dependence and borrowing capacity 
Finance available to consumers / micro-credit 
LEGAL/REGULATORY 
 
Water policy 
Strength of regulatory institutions  
Municipal autonomy 
Property rights  
Natural resources 
Tariffs/subsidy structures 
CULTURAL Values 
Social norms/beliefs 
Participation 
Racism  
Vulnerability  
Civil Society engagement 
CONTEXTUAL 
  
Demographic/geographic 
History of sector performance 
Access to water resources 
Access to house-hold data 
Capacity (human/technical) 
Information sharing/ communication 
Stakeholder incentives to participate 
Status in relation to MDG 
Civil Society engagement 
FORCE MAJEURE 
 
Environmental  
Financial crisis 
Riots/civil war 
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Appendix D 
Sample Billing Statement & Suspension of Service Warning 
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Appendix E 
Summary of AISA Audit on Expansion Targets, Investment and  
Estimated Penalties Due to the Firm220 
Pozo & Asociates, May 2006 
 
1. FIRST FIVE YEARS (AUGUST 1997–DECEMBER 2001)  
1.1. Pozo & Asociates considered that AISA did not comply with the Expansion 
Targets that were established for the first five years of the Concession Contract 
(CC), which included the attainment of 100% of potable water coverage in the 
Achachicalay Pampahasi systems and the installation of 71,752 new connections 
for The Alto System. The non-compliance would result in the enforcement of 
clause 26 (26.2.1, expiration) of the Concession Contract, in addition to the fines 
stipulated in Annex 9, number 2.3. 
1.2. This conclusion is based on the following: In the Alto System AISA did not attain 
the required installation of 71,752 new connections, reaching only 52,764 (73.54% 
of the contract). AISA argued that the non-compliance was due to the fact that the 
demographic projections for El Alto were overestimated when the proposal for the 
71,752 new connections was made, and now, by the end of 2001, AISA will 
achieve 100% coverage with fewer amounts of connections. 
1.3. On the basis of the information supplied by AISA and without any proven 
information that would support that AISA did in fact reach 100% of potable water 
coverage in the three systems of La Paz and The Alto, SISAB proceeded to define 
new Expansion Targets for the following five years.  
1.4. The CC stipulates in Annex 6, that to determine 100% of coverage, the Contractor 
must respond to a new connection request within 90 days. The Contract also 
                                                
 
220 Author’s own translation.	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stipulates that 100% of coverage must be reached during the first five year period 
that concluded at the end of 2001.  
1.5. The report that AISA prepared as requested by SISAB on “Execution Periods for 
the Connections of Water and Sewerage for 2002……….”, establishes that AISA 
incurred in only 8.5% of connections beyond the deadline established for the three 
Systems. In addition, it was important to point out that during 2002; there were 
50% more connections than the previous year, demonstrating that during 2001, 
notwithstanding the increase in cost per connection from US$155 to US$196, there 
existed unsatisfied demand for potable water connections.  
1.6. Notwithstanding these assertions, there seems not to be any justification, by AISA, 
for the delays in complying with the schedules of new connections for potable 
water that were stipulated in the CC. 
1.7. Upon verifying the AISA did not comply with their commitment to have 100% 
coverage in all the area of service by 31 December 2001, and since the reason of 
low demographic growth did not demonstrate that it was a factor in the non-
compliance, the sanctions stipulated in the CC could be legally imposed. For the 
non-compliance in The Alto Area, AISA should have been fined the equivalent of 
US$9,494,000 (18,988 connections x US$500) and the obligation of installing 
22,786 connections of potable water for the following year. 
1.8. There was also non-compliance with the targets set sewerage in the areas of 
Achachicala and Pampahasi in the city of La Paz, which resulted in the failure to 
connect 2,530 additional connections according to the terms stipulated in Annex 6 
of the CC. This non-compliance should have been sanctioned by a fine of the 
equivalent of US$1,265,000 (2,530 connections x US$500) and the obligation of 
the installation of 3,036 sewerage connections the following year. AISA also could 
not mitigate the non-compliance in the city of La Paz, by having carried out 
connections that were in excess of the Contract in the El Alto Area.   
1.9. AISA argues, that the infractions that were committed should prescribe because 
they happened over two years ago; however, our legal opinion is that the 
infractions do not prescribe according to Bolivian Civil Law, in particular article 
1453 and 1454, which stipulates that the Bolivian State has the right to demand 
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total compliance of all the commitments of a Concession Contract at any time. It is 
also important to point out that, were it not for the efforts of the “Works with 
Community Participation” (OPV’S) as well as the “Condominium Works”, both 
with financial support from the communities and third party donors, the non-
compliance of the annual targets would have increased up to 35.3% in potable 
water and 32.8% in sewerage. The possibility of not taking into account the works 
done by these community based associations is based on the interpretation of 
clause 13.10 of the CC which stipulates that “the Concessionaire will be 
responsible for the cost and construction of all the installations”.  
2. SECOND FIVE YEARS (JANUARY 2002–DECEMBER 2006) 
2.1. The objective is to verify if the expansion targets for the second five years, from 
January 2002 through December 2005, are being complied with. 
2.2. The program targeted in potable water was to maintain 100% of coverage (which 
was considered attained in all of three systems when the first five year program 
was concluded) until the end of 2006. In order to achieve this target, AISA must 
install 33,859 additional connections in the three systems (1,527 in Achachicala; 
9,004 in Pampahasi; and 26,328 in El Alto). In sewerage the target was also to 
maintain 100% of coverage, having to install 1,050 connections in Achachicala; 
4,607 connections in Pampahasi; and 4,607 connections in El Alto. 
2.3. During this period, through 31 December 2005, the date of the last report, AISA 
managed to attain 25,452 potable water connections, reaching 75.2% of the five 
year targets. With these figures AISA is 3% below the projected targets for the 
period. With respect to sewerage, AISA reported more connections then were 
targeted for this period; having installed 28,622 connections of the 19,478 that 
were programmed for this period. 
2.4. The execution period for the installation of the potable water connections for the 
years 2002 through 2004 had to be increased by 12.61% with relation to the 
execution periods established in the CC. In consequence, it was recommended to 
SISAB, that they impose the fines that were establishes in Annex 9 of the CC for 
those connections that were not installed in the agreed upon execution period. 
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2.5. It was also verified that AISA did not comply with the annual targets of potable 
water connections. SISAB, should apply the sanctions established in number 2 of 
Annex 9 for the non-compliance of the annual targets for the years 2002 and 2003. 
The consequences would be as follows: 
• For the year 2002, AISA should have been fined with the obligation of 
executing 559 additional connections the following year (20% more than was 
executed) 
• For the year 2003, AISA should have been fined with the obligation of 
executing 1,843 additional connections (20% more than was executed). 
Additionally, because 15% of the annual works, were not complied with, AISA 
should be fined US$768,000. 
2.6. With respect to the connections of potable water that were to be executed outside 
the service area, as of 2005, the Concessionaire, had executed 34.7% of what had 
been programmed for the five year period, having only one year to install an 
additional 9,795 connections. Taking into account that during the last four years 
(2002–2005), AISA only carried out 5,205 connections outside the service area, it 
was very improbable that they would be able to meet the targets by the end of 
2006. 
2.7. Regarding the sewerage component, according to the information reviewed, we 
can conclude that AISA has already complied with the number of connections 
stipulated in the contract for the entire five year period. In the different systems 
they have complied with the agreed upon expansion connections; however, with 
the connections for densification there was non-compliance in all the three 
systems. 
2.8. Also, as in the first five years, own financing and financing from third parties, at 
the end of 2005 the compliance with the targets would only reach 56,3% in potable 
water and 87% in sewerage. 
3. INVESTMENTS   
3.1. According to AISA, the fixed assets, as of 31 December 31 2005, were valued at 
US$65,958,617 and the net assets were valued at US$47,655,672, of this amount, 
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the greatest portion corresponds to the line item “permanent installations” which 
amounted to US$51,725,535 and the net amount to US$42,180,237. All of the 
investments that are a part of these accounts were reviewed. 
3.2. The results of our review of the “permanent instalations” accounts, have 
determined that the amount of fixed assets should be US$ 28,165,649 and the net 
amount should beUS$22,293,039. 
3.3. We have taken into account in addition to our review of the permanent 
installations categories, the following two clauses: according to clause 19.2.2 of 
the CC, upon the termination of said CC, the Concessionaire will transfer all fixed 
assets to SAMAPA; also in accordance with clause 3, numeral 3.1.10 of the 
“Regimen Contract” and clause 19.2.1 of the CC, all the assets and investments 
and inventories will be transferred by AISA to SAMAPA free of charge at the end 
of the Contract. 
3.4. As a result of our review, we have established that the investments in permanent 
installations reported by AISA differ substantially of those estimated by us on the 
basis of the Audit that was carried out. 
3.5. Amounts that should not be considered “investments” (Permanent 
Installations).  
3.5.1. According to the technical review of the works and other investments, the 
following items in the investment categories have been found to be invalid 
due to either insufficient or total absence of information to support said 
investment. 
3.5.2. Transfer of investments in infrastructure from SAMAPA 
3.5.2.1.AISA did not register the specific goods that were transferred from 
SAMAPA to AISA, making it difficult to estimate which investments 
were from AISA and which were from SAMAPA. 
3.5.2.2.There is not a conciliation of expenses for each of the infrastructures 
works that would validate the investments made by the Concessionaire, 
as well as no documentation of the payroll of each of the projects. 
3.5.3. The reports from the firms GITEC and CAEM omit costs. 
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3.5.3.1.In the Minutes making references to the transfer of assets and liabilities, 
relevant information about permanent installations is omitted. 
3.5.3.2.The confirmation of said transfer of investments by SAMAPA is also 
not incomplete and does not provide supporting information on the 
amounts that were transferred. 
3.5.4. Indirect Costs 
3.5.4.1.For the calculation of indirect costs, both financial as well as personnel, 
AISA implanted procedures that could not be verified during the review. 
Consequently, the amounts in these categories could not be considered as 
investments and were excluded from the total. 
3.5.4.2.A similar situation presented itself for the financial costs that were 
charged to the investment works; the information supporting these costs 
was insufficient and therefore these costs were excluded from the total. 
3.5.4.3.Binders with the information of the Investment Works presented by 
AISA. AISA did not provide us with 14 binders relating to the 
infrastructure works that were carried out and reported as investments. 
3.5.5. Investment Expenses without accounting support documents 
3.5.5.1.During the review of the spread sheets relating to costs and the 
corresponding support documents, we have not been able to verify or 
identify the support documentation for 395 infrastructure works, making 
it impossible for us to validate these works as “investments”. 
3.5.6. Expenses without supporting documentation 
3.5.6.1.During our review, we found accounting documents that did not have 
the supporting documentation for expenses such as: payroll expenses for 
some of the works, receipts, and storage costs. 
3.5.6.2.Capitalized costs for the payment of Consultancies. The following 
aspects have determined that the amount of US$1,288,464 (net of 
depreciation US$1,063,512) cannot be attributed to investments. 
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3.5.6.3.Lack of relevant information in the contracting process of the 
consultants, which impeded us from including these costs as part of the 
investments. 
3.5.6.4.Lack of information of the consultants contracts 
3.5.6.5.Lack of a Final Report prepared by the Consultant 
3.5.6.6.Lack of documentation supporting the approval of the work by the 
corresponding employee, for the work that was done by the consultants. 
3.5.7. Construction of the Condoriri Dam 
3.5.7.1.According to the financial observations, there exists a discrepancy 
between the amount reported by AISA and the amount certified in the 
payroll ledgers for US$167,121 
3.5.7.2.In addition to the above observation, the following technical 
observations are relevant: at the moment of execution, in the year 1998, 
the pipeline Rib Loc did not have the certification from IBNORCA; also 
IBNORCA did not have the authorization of the International Normative 
(DIN 16961); AISA installed the pipeline without the necessary 
certification, since the normative was not approved until 10 August 
1999. 
3.5.8. Assets without ledgers for costs or accounting notations 
3.5.8.1.We did not receive ledgers for costs or the corresponding accounting 
notations for 36 infrastructure works. 
3.5.9. Other Assets without supporting documentation 
3.5.9.1.We could not verify documentation for 4 assets that were included as 
investments between September and December 2005. The corresponding 
amount could not be identified from the works that were registered in the 
balance sheets. 
3.5.10. Other Concepts. 
3.5.10.1. There are various categories that should not be considered part of 
investments: repair of the deficiencies found when compacting; errors in 
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the calculation of monetary conversions; other costs that have no 
supporting documentation.  
4. Observations that affect the contents of the Concession Contract 
4.1. Contracting Policies 
4.1.1. There were modifications made that broadened the technical specifications 
of the contracts without the approval of SISAB, violating those established in 
the CC. This modification did not permit an open competition for the 
contracting of the infrastructure works because it impeded the contracting of 
firms that had more specialization and could propose economies of scale, 
reducing the costs of investment and guaranteeing good technical quality in 
the works. 
4.1.2. We reviewed the frequency of contracting the same firms, however the 
archives did not contain the necessary minimum legal information that was 
required, infringing on the contents of the CC (Annex 11). 
4.2. Absence of the necessary and pertinent evidence to support the investments that 
were made 
4.2.1. There were identified a series of deficiencies and inconsistencies in the 
documentation provided that either weakened or invalidated the necessary 
evidence to validate the investments that were made and violated article 14 
and numeral 2 of Annex 11 of the CC, as well as point CXCII of the manual 
for Monitoring and Control that says: “the Concessionaire should have 
registers, archives and other controls to register the necessary information, 
qualitatively and quantitatively, in order to facilitate the efficient management 
of the Concession and the control by the Superintendency”.  
4.2.2. This weakness is also evident when we try to review the support 
documentation in the utilization of materials in the projects and the detailed 
verification of the cost of each project. 
4.3. Differences found in the technical specifications 
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4.3.1. In the execution of 155 excavations, to verify the quality of the material 
used in the execution of the project, we found discrepancies in 10 projects 
with what was indicated in the Execution Plan of the Project. 
4.3.2. These discrepancies alter the terms of the project and could cause below par 
service to the beneficiaries, violating point 2.1 of Annex 2 of the CC.  
4.3.3. Differences in the percentages established in the CC that were used for 
depreciation. 
4.3.4. During the period 1997 to 2001, AISA used depreciation percentages that 
were different from those stipulated en RAR 17/97 and 79/99, reflecting an 
overestimation of the value of the investments of the first five years. 
4.3.5. A similar situation presents itself in the second five year period, even 
though the extension of the useful life of the investment was negotiated with 
the changes in the tariffs. The percentages of depreciation agreed upon in the 
negotiation were not based on technical criteria. 
4.4. Economic and Financial Aspects 
4.4.1. From a purely economic and financial analysis, we can conclude that the 
presence of the operator limits itself to the provision of services and to a very 
limited degree to the capital investment, which is the finality that is looked for 
in the Concession of the basic services operators so that it permits the State to 
convert into a State Regulator. From a financial point of view, this premise is 
done taking into account what is detailed in the following table: (Insert 
Table) 
4.4.2. The Capital contribution of AISA only comes to 9. 4% of the total 
investment resources. The remaining 90.6% of the resources is funded from 
the operational income (37.8%) and from loans of the financial markets 
(52.8%), whose payments were possible by the amount of the tariffs that were 
charged to the beneficiaries. 
4.4.3. During the second five years, the charges for connections, in accordance 
with the CC, were an integral part of the operative income of AISA and 
together with other incomes, financed the operations of the Concessionaire. 
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According to numeral 15.4 of the CC the contribution of the Operator should 
be to provide the technical assistance and know-how and to manage the 
Concession. The costs of Technical Assistance paid to the Operator 
(Lyonnaise des Eaux) for US$11,045,367 up to 31 December 2005, in essence 
are more of a dividend, than an operative cost. 
4.4.4. The financial return that we have calculated that the Concessionaire has 
obtained during the 8 ½ years that have been reviewed, is 15.1%; US$2.65 
million above the rate cut of 9% that was verified as the cost of financing 
during the analyzed period. Taking an average for the 30 years of the 
concession, the financial return for the Concessionaire would be 22.9%. 
4.4.5. The rates of financial return demonstrate that with the present prices and 
tariffs, the level of generation of income is important. If in fact these resources 
did not have to be given to the Operator as part of their profit, these resources 
could permit any enterprise acceptable levels of operative profits, the same 
that could be transferred and used for future investments that would assure the 
viability of the enterprise. 
4.5. Debt Service 
4.5.1. AISA did not comply with clause 9.5 of the CC that protects the continuity 
of the provision public services granted under the concession. Furthermore, 
the difficulty in being able to identify the projects and works executed with 
financing from international organizations and other sources, did not permit us 
to determine if the charges for financial costs, that these resources generated, 
were reasonable or not. The total debt from all the providers is as follows: IIC 
US$4,216,289; IADB US$4,216,289; CAF US$2,810,859; and Public Bonds 
US$5,078,189; Total as of 31 December 2005 US$16,321,626. 
4.6. Bonds 
4.6.1. Previsions have not been made for the redemption of the issued bonds, nor 
were we able to determine if the interest payable to the bondholders has been 
paid.   
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Appendix F 
El Alto Maps 
 
   Map provided by the office of the Mayor El Alto, Bolivia 
